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Executive summary  
The study explores how the policy of decentralisation emerged and how actors involved in 
the provision of pre- and primary education in Benin (West Africa) mediate this policy. This is 
an important topic reflected in the national education strategy in Benin and much debated amongst 
scholars and practitioners in the field of international education and development since the 
emergence of the global ‘good governance’ agenda in the 1990s. The contestation about the 
emergence and implementation of the policy of education decentralisation in Benin in the context 
of a highly centralised pre- and primary education system provides fertile ground for closely 
investigating this policy.  
The conceptual framework draws on literature about the concept of decentralisation 
(Rondinelli, 1980, 1990; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007) and policy analysis (Ball, 1993, 1997, 
2015; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). This framework provides a spatial and temporal dimension about 
the policy of education decentralisation ranging from the local to the global level over a period of 
nearly 30 years from 1990 onwards. The ideas of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough 
2013; Fairclough 2010) and actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1996, 2005; Fenwick and 
Edwards, 2010) inform the study of the policy tensions and mediation of the process of 
decentralising education in Benin. 
This is a qualitatively oriented, in-depth study about how policy is generated and mediated 
by different actors in Benin. It is guided by one main research question which is how the 
decentralisation policy in Benin is discursively and socially constructed, and how actors involved 
in the provision of pre- and primary education mediate this policy, and three specific sub-
questions: How is the policy of decentralisation discursively constituted, and how does it relate 
to the broader policy ensemble? How do the actors involved in the provision of pre- and primary 
education mediate the current decentralisation policy from a relational perspective? How did 
actors connect to bring about the agenda setting of education decentralisation in 1990 as a 
complex web of assemblages? 
The empirical research draws on qualitative data including semi-structured interviews 
carried out in 2017 with high and middle-ranking officials from the Ministry of Pre- and Primary 
Education, from the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Governance, and the State Ministry 
in charge of Planning and Development as well as their sub-units. It also includes focus groups 
with head teachers, teachers, parents and members of teacher unions in a Northern and a Southern 
field site in Benin. In total, the sample consisted of more than 80 research participants. 
~ 6 ~ 
 
The study of the policy of education decentralisation finds that it is underpinned by the 
discourses of development and modernisation and reflects Benin’s colonial and post-colonial 
legacies and development trajectory. Further, the study reports that the policy as enacted results 
in a multiplicity of social practices of actors at the national, regional and local levels in Benin. 
Further the findings suggest that the construction of the policy of education decentralisation in 
1990 was influenced by exogenous factors, including the global world events such as the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1990, as well as endogenous factors such as the experiences of policy-makers 
and citizens of local community forms of participation initiated under the Marxism-Leninist 
government that was in power in Benin between 1974 and 1989 as well as during the pre-colonial 
period prior to 1894.  
This research contributes to the understanding of education governance in the Global 
South, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, and provides insights into how the policy of education 
decentralisation in Benin is influenced by local, national and global factors. As such, this study 
offers a holistic understanding of the emergence and implementation of decentralisation reforms 
in Benin contributing to a deeper understanding of how local policy knowledge is discounted by 
policymakers. This study is of interest to the government of Benin, international organisations, 
scholars and practitioners working on large-scale education reforms.
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1 Introduction  
This research examined how the decentralisation policy in Benin was discursively and 
socially constructed, and how the actors involved in the provision of pre-school and primary 
education1 have mediated this policy. First, the dominant discourses in the National Policy of 
Devolution and De-concentration (Politique Nationale de Décentralisation et de 
Déconcentration, PONADEC) in 2010 are deconstructed to unpack the underlying values and 
ideologies. Second, the discursive and social practices used by the actors involved in the 
mediation of education decentralisation in 2017 are identified in the form of a multiplicity of 
networks which negotiate the power and responsibilities of individuals, groups and institutions. 
Third, this thesis traces how lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups 
and social formations linked together around 1990 to bring about the decentralisation reform. 
This chapter presents the rationale and context of this study as well as the research 
questions, delineates the material and data gathered for this research, describes the methods used 
and provides an overview of each of the chapters. The next section introduces the rationale.  
1.1 The rationale 
The topic of education governance is a highly discussed issue among both academics and 
development practitioners internationally. The ‘good governance’ agenda emerged in response to 
the insufficiencies of the Washington Consensus development model in the 1990s (Robertson et 
al. 2007). Decentralisation is part of the new global governance reforms calling for participatory 
governance through legal and policy frameworks. A whole set of new global governance reforms 
emerged out of the good governance agenda, such as market liberalisation, deregulation, 
privatisation and public-private-partnerships. These new governance reforms contribute to the 
dynamics and complexities that result from embracing increased economic development, political 
accountability, and public participation (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). 
Currently, decentralisation remains not only a core tool of International Organisations (IOs) 
for promoting democracy, good governance and economic development, but its advocates 
consider decentralisation a requirement for achieving the United Nation’s (UN) Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). While the SDG 4 - promoting 
inclusive and equitable quality education - does not explicitly mention participatory governance 
as a key target, this concern is reflected in the framework for action. For example, the Incheon 
                                                          
1 This term is a translation from the French expression enseignement maternel et primaire, covering three 
years of pre-school (from the age of 3) and five years of primary education. 
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Declaration of the World Education Forum 2015 (UNESCO, 2015, p. 9) points out the importance 
of ‘legal and policy frameworks that promote accountability and transparency as well as 
participatory governance’ (cf. also UNESCO, 2015, p. 60).  
In the context of globalisation, governments around the world have attempted to adjust to 
new perceptions of governance (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). Decentralisation has been on the 
national agenda of Benin for nearly 20 years. The current president, Talon, announced at the 
beginning of his mandate in 2016, his aim of strengthening the devolution and de-concentration 
reforms (Erlecke, 2016). In addition, this is a prominent theme in Beninese education reviews and 
its national education strategy2 (Ministeres en charge de l’Education, 2012). This study is relevant 
to the operations of the Beninese government as well as illuminating the dynamics of governance 
reforms globally. It throws into sharp relief how far education decentralisation, as a global 
governance reform, using the national context of Benin as an example, informs policy and 
practice. 
Finally, the study has also personal significance. My interest in education decentralisation 
emerged from my previous work experience in Benin. I worked on the education project of the 
German development agency (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) in Benin 
between 2011 and 2014. The project aimed at strengthening the capacities of the local school 
authorities through the Ministry of Pre-school and Primary Education (Ministère des 
Enseignements Maternel et Primaire, MEMP).3 My particular role consisted in advising how the 
local school authorities could improve their collaboration with those elected in their 
municipalities. Although I had firmly believed in the principle of subsidiarity, I observed 
hesitancy if not reluctance and contestation by local education officials regarding the 
decentralisation of pre-school and primary education. This raised my interest in exploring how 
actors understand and enact devolved and de-concentrated responsibilities for pre-school and 
primary education in a period of great resistance and controversy.  
                                                          
2 La nécessité de renforcer la déconcentration et la décentralisation est clairement ressortie à travers les 
diverses évaluations et diagnostic. Pour pallier les dysfonctionnements constatés, le gouvernement est 
dans un processus d’élaboration et de validation d’un plan de décentralisation/déconcentration de 
l’administration scolaire avec un système de communication (Ministeres En Charge De L’education, 
2012, p. 74). 
3 Henceforth, I will use the abbreviation MEMP and the term Education Ministry interchangeably to 
denominate the same institution.  
~ 18 ~ 
 
1.2 The problem statement 
The changing landscape brought about by globalisation requires a reassessment of 
decentralisation. Governments in the Global South continue to experience difficulties in 
implementing decentralisation reforms effectively (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007, p. 10), which 
raises questions about why and how this relates to their post-colonial legacies and their current 
context-specific particularities. Tikly (2019) points out, for example, that global discourses, such 
as good governance, often fail to address the relative newness of African states in light of their 
colonial experience.  
Although the Beninese government decided to decentralise parts of its education system in 
1990 (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994), it struggled with effectively transferring resources 
to the municipal level. Despite the commitment of the government and the technical and financial 
support of IOs, the results have been rather tentative, as the evaluation report of PONADEC shows 
(MDGLAAT, MEF and MERPMEDER, 2014). The various and controversial discursive and 
social practices contrast with the policy text of PONADEC, claiming decentralisation enhances 
participation, improves access to social services at the local level, and supports the socio-
economic development of the municipality (MDGLAAT, 2008). 
1.3 The context of this study 
Decentralisation, power, and participation are the key concepts of this study. 
Decentralisation is a global governance reform that aims to redistribute power within a 
governance institution, alias government (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). I understand 
decentralisation as the transfer of power to a lower level in the context of an education governance 
system (Lauglo, 1995). In the Beninese context, I suggest that PONADEC consists of multiple 
sub-types of decentralisation, whereby the sub-concepts of devolution and de-concentration as 
administrative forms of decentralisation are of particular importance (Rondinelli, 1980).  
Power is inherently contained within the concepts of policy and decentralisation. Power is 
not only built into policy, as in Bell and Stevenson’s (2006, p. 9) definition of policy as the ‘power 
to determine what is done', but also in the concept of decentralisation, when the latter is 
understood as a transfer of power to lower levels (Lauglo, 1995). As regards power, I 
predominantly adopt a Foucauldian (1978, 1988, 2003a, 2003b) informed understanding, which 
considers power as relational, productive and normative; power relations are dynamic, multi-
directional, fluid and open to change. Moreover, this study is informed by the concept of 
participation, which intersects with power in that different degrees of participation are associated 
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with different degrees of power. Participation can be considered as the corner-stone of democracy 
(Arnstein, 1969) and is also key to the concept of decentralisation if it is understood as the re-
distribution of power.  
Scholarly literature on education decentralisation shows that there is comparatively little 
research on education decentralisation in the francophone region of West Africa, and in Benin, in 
particular. For example, White’s (2011) review of scholarly papers, articles, and books of the U.S. 
government, the World Bank, national and international think tanks, and academic papers from 
1956 to 2011, found only three studies out of the 33 scholarly papers, articles, and books on 
education decentralisation refer to the African continent.4 Edwards and DeMatthews (2014) 
reviewed 127 studies on education decentralisation from four continents between 1945 and 2014 
and found a similar trend: 13 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been listed with at least 
one reference, compared to Southeast Asia and the Pacific with 16 and Latin America with 11. 
Benin is not referenced once, but Ghana and Tanzania are referenced four times, and Malawi and 
Nigeria are referenced five times each. This meta-analysis reveals the lack of research on 
education decentralisation in francophone SSA and the particular context of Benin.  
1.4 Research questions 
The research questions, inspired by Ball’s (1993, 2015) policy trajectory studies, consist of 
one main question and three sub-questions. The main research question goes as follows: How is 
the decentralisation policy in Benin discursively and socially constructed, and how do the actors 
involved in the provision of pre-school and primary education mediate this policy? Before 
introducing the sub-questions, I clarify how I understand the discursive and social practices. My 
understanding of discursive practices involves the process of (spoken or written) text production, 
distribution, and consumption (Fairclough, 2010) and ‘addresses the structures and rules that 
constitute discourse rather than the texts and utterances produced within it’ (2015, p. 311). I 
extend this understanding by drawing on Foucault (1990, p. 101) that everyday life in modern 
societies is composed of discourses: ‘discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, 
but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy’. Foucault’s theorisation of discourse is useful for unpacking decentralisation as an 
inherently structural concept to shed light on some of the complex and unstable dimensions of the 
                                                          
4 White (2011) examined more theoretical than empirical literature, which can partially explain the 
absence of empirical references to the African continent. 
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enactment of education decentralisation. In contrast, the social practices point to the varying 
interpretations of the policy by the actors involved in the enactment of the policy.  
Starting with the assumption that policies are co-constructed knowledge, offering a 
mediated account of multiple realities, this understanding prompts the following sub-questions: 
a) How was the policy of decentralisation discursively constituted, and how does it relate 
to the broader policy ensemble?  
b) How did the actors5 involved in the provision of pre-school and primary education 
mediate the current decentralisation policy from a relational perspective?  
c) How did the actors connect to bring about the agenda setting of education decentralisation 
in 1990 as a complex web of assemblages? 
Although Ball’s (1993, 2015) policy trajectory studies served as the first point of reference 
for developing the research questions, some modifications  occurred in the writing-up of the 
thesis. First, I structured the questions in accordance with the three moments of the policy cycle, 
namely the context of influence (agenda setting), the context of policy text production and the 
context of social practice(s). Second, I decided to privilege the local, implying a bottom-up 
understanding of policy, starting with the context of social practice(s) informed by ANT (Latour, 
2005; Fenwick and Edwards, 2010) and the spatial lens (Massey, 1994a). Third, I rearranged the 
questions and findings chapters in light of my use of these two distinct analytical approaches. As 
I indicate later, chapter 5 relates to Ball’s second dimension, the context of the policy formulation 
process, chapter 6 to the context of social practices and chapter 7 to the context of influence.  
This thesis is the first study that focuses on education decentralisation across all levels of 
the Beninese governance system by adopting a holistic account to explore the emergence, the 
formulation and the mediation of the PONADEC in the context of pre-school and primary 
education in Benin. The research design provides a multi-layered perspective on education 
decentralisation, contributing to a deepend understanding of education governance in 
francophone SSA through its discursive de-construction of the policy of decentralisation and the 
analysis of the contestations of local, national and international actors. The divergent and 
contested mediation of education decentralisation in Benin questions the relevance of 
decentralisation in historically centralised contexts, such as that of Benin, and the legitimacy of 
IOs in the Global South more broadly. It also points out that the governance systems and policies 
                                                          
5 I use assemblage and actor/actant interchangeably, whereby I understand assemblage as an analytical 
focus on ‘how disparate material and discursive practices come together to form dynamic associations' 
(Koyama and Varenne, 2012, p. 157). 
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in the African continent are often intertwined with their colonial legacies. As such, this study 
offers a full understanding of the dynamics of decentralisation reforms in a globalised space and 
contributes to policy knowledge as unaccounted for by policymakers. 
1.5 Method 
This study is a qualitatively oriented in-depth study of how policy is generated and 
mediated using policy trajectory studies (Ball, 1993, 2015). I decided to conduct this research to 
understand the temporal and spatial dimensions of the emergence, formulation and the mediation 
of policy in two local field sites in Benin for two reasons: first, I believe that policies have a 
significant impact on their targeted ‘beneficiaries’, and second, I benefit from having access and 
networks to education and decentralisation officials through my previous work. Drawing on Ball 
(1993, 2015), Rizvi and Lingard (2010) and Bell and Stevenson (2006), among others, I 
understand policy as implying questions of authority and power, text, discourse and values, hence 
the analysis sheds light on these dimensions.  
I use policy trajectory studies as the framework, incorporating three different contexts: the 
context of influence, the context of policy text production, and the context(s) of practices. These 
different contexts link the discursive origins of the policy, the responses to and the belongings of 
the policy (Ball, 1993, 2015). Moreover, I draw on Massey’s (1994b) theorisation of space, 
exploring the relations between space and place as social constructions. Spatial thinking is vital 
in policy analysis as the local and the global overlap as spatial relations in the education policy 
cycle (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). This work uses a temporal and spatial lens, beginning with 
research in two local field sites in 2017, then extending the analysis to the national and global 
influences on policy formulation and mediation around 1990. Finally, I position this study in a 
post-development framework which I understand as being critical of the very idea of 
‘development’ as Eurocentric and which serves  the global development industry and the West 
more broadly (Sachs, 2010; Escobar, 2012; Ziai, 2017).  
For the analysis of the data, I use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1995, 
2010, 2013) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Latour, 1996, 2005; Fenwick and Edwards, 
2010). I consider these as contributing to a more in-depth analysis: CDA helps to show how power 
is exercised through language, namely the discursive and social practices, while ANT weaves 
together the historical and lived events of individuals, groups and concepts to demonstrate how 
power is achieved or enacted. For the research paradigm, I distance myself from categorising this 
study within a single research philosophy. Instead, I look at the data from two different angles, 
~ 22 ~ 
 
informed by CDA and ANT, which are anchored in different theoretical paradigms. In doing so, 
I loosely draw on post-structural and critical paradigms. The critical paradigm foregrounds issues 
of power and how discourse is embedded in political purpose, whereas the post-(structural) 
paradigm considers discourse as inseparable from its subject and reality remains unknowable 
(Samuel, 2016).  
1.6 Delineation of the material 
As outlined, this study is a qualitatively oriented policy study on the emergence and 
mediation of education decentralisation in Benin. Due to the study design and the resulting data, 
it describes the diverse geographies of the Northern and Southern field site, rather than elaborating 
the urban/ rural divide in detail. The study privileges the perspectives of the officials involved in 
the conceptualisation and implementation of education decentralisation rather than those of IOs, 
although the latter played a significant role. I draw only loosely on interviews with IOs to 
complement or nuance the main body of data because I believe that IOs voices are already 
adequately represented. Moreover, the data may have advantaged the views of administrators, 
mostly senior and male, over those of school actors, particularly female teachers and parents, due 
to the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions in the education administration, 
schools and parents’ associations. Further research to explore those underrepresented groups may 
be beneficial as the further implications of the research suggests (cf. chapter 8). The last section 
of the introduction provides an overview of the chapters.  
1.7 Overview of the chapters 
Chapter II outlines the politico-administrative, socio-economic, and cultural context of 
Benin with a particular focus on the governance of pre-school and primary education. It describes 
the historical origins of education governance, dividing it into its pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial periods. The historical context is key to explaining why Benin adopted a democratic 
system, including the decentralisation of 1990, and how the socio-cultural profile of citizens has 
affected the enactment of the policy in particular ways. This chapter also provides a thick 
description of the Northern and Southern field sites. In this chapter, I show how N’Dali 
(Northeast) and Porto Novo (Southeast) have been shaped by different histories, ethnicities, and 
language characteristics and diverging access to educational provision. The particular 
geographies have implications on how to understand and theorise the data, particularly in light of 
the spatial turn (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010; St. Pierre, 2011). 
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Chapter III is the literature review of education decentralisation from three perspectives. 
First, I introduce and discuss the framework of policy trajectory studies, and how ideas of different 
theoretical lenses inform this work. It provides a fuller exploration of this theoretical challenge 
and its contribution to this research. Second, I provide an overview of the main concepts - 
decentralisation, power, and participation - all of which are vital for understanding the trajectory 
of education decentralisation in Benin. Third, I review the empirical literature on education 
decentralisation in general in order to situate this study within the wider context of education 
governance reforms. Finally, this chapter outlines the conceptual framework, mainly based on 
Ball's (1993, 2015) policy trajectory studies and informed by the reviewed concepts.  
Chapter IV introduces the research methodology of this study. After introducing the 
research paradigms, it provides a detailed outline of how I proceeded from the design to the 
collection and analysis of the data and then the writing-up of the thesis. In this chapter, I describe 
the sampling strategy, justify the field sites selected, and describe which research participants I 
selected to capture their perspectives, and which policy documents I used to complement their 
perspectives. This chapter is also about data production, including methods and processes as well 
as the analysis, to shed light on how the theoretical approaches inform the analysis. I explain how 
I addressed credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability and outline the ethical 
concerns, particularly questions of confidentiality and anonymity. Towards the end, I reflect on 
questions of power and positionality in getting access, producing data, and analysing it.  
Chapter V is a deconstruction of the discursive nature of the PONADEC, its philosophical 
underpinnings, and its internal and external co-authors. It explores how this policy is discursively 
constituted, and how it relates to pre-school and primary education. CDA informs this chapter 
through the analysis of the textual and discursive features of the decentralisation policy, whereby 
I understand discourse in a historicised sense and extending to the process of policy formulation. 
The first part analyses the devolution and education laws; the second part de-constructs 
PONADEC, and the third part discusses the implementation plans and strategies. For the legal 
framework, I suggest that the devolved responsibilities are limited, vague and are not translated 
into a regulatory or clear guidance framework. In the second part, I consider PONADEC as a 
bricolage of local and global formations because it is interwoven with international strategies, 
influenced by global actors, and re-inscribes the colonial legacy, to some extent. In the third part, 
I not only discuss the relative absence of devolution in the Ten Year Education Sector Strategy 
(Plan Décennal de Développement du Secteur de l’Education, PDDSE)6, but also the non-
                                                          
6 The Education Sector Strategy 2016-2025 was not available during the analysis stage of the thesis. 
Therefore, I decided to take into account the preceding version 2006 - 2015. 
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adoption of the Implementation Plan for Education Decentralisation (Plan de Décentralisation et 
de Déconcentration des Enseignements Maternel et Primaire, Plan2D) as a form of resistance.  
Chapter VI outlines an understanding of the enactment of the decentralisation policy in 
what is still a rather centralised context. It explores how the actors involved in providing pre-
school and primary education mediate the decentralisation policy at the provincial, municipal and 
school levels. This chapter draws on ideas from ANT, considering the school settings in the 
Southern and Northern field sites as small-scale networks (Law, 2009; Gorur, 2015) which serve 
as a starting point to develop the analysis of this chapter. First, I consider the mediation of the 
decentralisation policy as a social arena allowing for institutional and relational pluralism or, in 
Ball’s (1994a) terms, for a wild profusion of social practices. Second, I discuss the reconfiguration 
of relationships between government and non-government actors as well as central and municipal 
government entities. Following from this, I argue that the decentralisation policy reinforces the 
role of the central and municipal government actors, whereas parents and teachers report feelings 
of disempowerment, drawing attention to the unstable nature of discourses and practices.  
Chapter VII is about the agenda setting for education decentralisation in Benin exemplified 
in the National Conference of the Active Forces held in 1990. It explores how actors connected 
to bring about education decentralisation, tracing the origins of the PONADEC. Relying on ANT 
makes visible how lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, and 
social formations connected to understand how education decentralisation had become 
institutionalised in the 1990 constitution as an interplay between global and national forces. In 
this chapter, I first argue that the 1990 Conference has been discursively presented as the event 
marking a political transition leading to decentralisation. The second part unpacks the roles of 
different groups of actors, suggesting that policy elites and IOs played a significant role in the 
agenda setting. Third, the agenda setting of education decentralisation has to be considered within 
broader events, such as the global world shift and the democratisation discourse. Fourth, this 
chapter explores the endogenous precursors of decentralisation. More precisely, I suggest that the 
political representative democracy system, including decentralisation, has been built up 
incrementally on previous political regimes. 
Chapter VIII presents the conclusion of this thesis. I synthesise the main findings of this 
study, present the contribution to knowledge, and the political and practical implications as well 
as implications for further research. The following chapter outlines the historical and current 
context of Benin, notably education governance.
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2 Context 
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the context of Benin, where this 
research took place. The first part is the chronological evolution of the political and 
administrative, socio-economic, and education experiences from pre-colonial to the democratic 
renewal in 1990. The second part outlines the contemporary politico-administrative, socio-
economic and education situation in more detail with particular emphasis on the organisation of 
the governance of education. The chapter finishes by outlining the unique situation of both field 
sites: the capital, Porto Novo in the South, and the semi-urban municipality, N'Dali in the North, 
shaped by different histories, ethnic and language divisions, access to educational provision and 
outcomes, among other differences. The first part starts with the historical beginnings, the pre-
colonial rule.  
2.1 The historical beginnings from pre-colonial to contemporary times  
It is essential to understand internal and external factors which shaped Benin’s history to 
understand the current situation of education governance. Gifford & Weiskel (1971) categorise 
Benin’s past into three historical periods: the pre-colonial rule until 1890, the colonial rule until 
1960 and the post-war era of decolonisation from 1960 onwards. This part illuminates the relevant 
political periods, describing the dynamics of decentralising and centralising power that have 
influenced the form and content of the decentralisation policy today. It also sheds light on the 
education system of Benin within these different historical periods and how it influenced the 
current education system.  
2.1.1 Pre-colonial rule: the kingdoms (16th century – 1894) 
In the pre-colonial rule before 1890, local kingdoms organised how citizens co-existed. The 
current Beninese government denominates the local kingdoms as city-states (cités-États) and 
describes them as well-structured political entities with functional urban centres (Gouvernement 
de la République du Bénin, 2018). The organisation of the local kingdoms is relevant to the 
current decentralisation reform because I consider it as the first endogenous experience of power 
being distributed between the central state and these city-states.7 Particularly influential was the 
kingdom of Dahomey, a regional kingdom in the 17th century which lasted into the 19th century 
                                                          
7 The concept of city-state, which can imply sovereignty, may be understood in various ways. For example, 
it can refer to the city, its political status and its territorial limits and this raises questions about the state, 
its functions and the body politic that organises it (Glassner, 2004). 
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(One World - Nations Online, 2013). The city-states had local trade based from early 17th century 
on the slave trade, then on palm oil after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. These economic 
developments favoured the installation of commercial ports along the coast controlled by the 
British, the Danes, the Portuguese and some French, and led to the French protectorate of 1863, 
renewed in 1882 (Gouvernement de la République du Bénin, 2018).  
The creation of schools in Benin, like in other West African countries, goes back to the 
1860s when missionaries created schools along the coastline. In Benin, regular missionary schools 
were first established in the South, whereas the North of Benin had to wait 40 more years (Decalo, 
1987), which may contribute to the geographical disparities between the South and the North and 
between urban and rural areas today. School education aimed not only to transfer knowledge and 
skills but also to transmit a way of life, explicitly defined as Christian, implicitly implying 
European habitus (Bierschenk, 2006). Belgium and later, Spanish missionaries had to hand over 
the missionary schools to France in the 1890s when the kingdom of Dahomey came under colonial 
rule. France secularised these missionary schools in 1903, which is the beginning of the colonial 
era of education (Fichtner, 2012).  
2.1.2 Benin as a French colony (1894 to 1960) 
The colonial rule divided Dahomey into circles, which had subdivisions and then cantons, 
covering several villages. The local royal families ruled these cantons under French supervision 
(Decalo, 1987; Ki-Zerbo and Holenstein, 2003). After World War II, Benin was divided into 
départements, governed by a central prefect, sous-préfectures, governed by assistant governors 
or sous-préfets, and their related necessary administrative area, the arrondissement (Decalo, 
1987). The decentralisation reform in the Territorial Administration Act of 1993, mostly kept this 
administrative organisation, except for replacing the sous-préfectures with elected bodies, the 
municipalities (MISAT, 1993).  
As previously indicated, the principles of secularisation and nationalisation informed the 
reorganisation of the education system at the beginning of the colonial rule, which mirrored 
France’s conflict with the catholic church at that time (Gifford and Weiskel, 1971). In 1903, 
France replaced the integrative system, educating native and French children in the same schools, 
by separate schools. Moreover, schools were highly selective not only in terms of access, but also 
in terms of their functions. In 1938, only 3.3% of children, mostly boys, had access to schools, 
which had the purpose of serving the colonial administration (Bierschenk, 2006). Overall, current 
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disparities in terms of social status, sex and geographical location have their origins in colonial 
and pre-colonial rule.  
Bierschenk (2006, p. 265) and Fichtner (2012, p. 41), referring to Corby (1990), argue that 
the colonial education discourse served the purpose of ‘educating Africans for inferiority’. This 
statement refers to the point that delivering the staffing requirements of colonial administrations 
was the primary aim of schools for native children, notably the training of a limited number of 
subaltern African civil servants in the service of the general colonial administration, schools and 
public health (Bierschenk, 2006). Tikly (2019) explains that the French approach to education 
was assimilative, implying a stronger emphasis on the ‘adoption’ of African elites into French 
culture. It was only in 1946 that the constitution of the Fifth Republic guaranteed all the citizens 
of French colonies equal access to public services (Fichtner, 2012).  
Interestingly, Benin had the highest enrolment figure in all of French West Africa in 1938, 
with 3, 937 enrolled children in total (Bierschenk, 2006). This may have suggested to Decalo 
(1987) that Benin had a relatively more advanced educational system within Francophone Africa. 
Moreover, Benin gained recognition as the Latin Quarter of Africa (Quartier Latin de l’Afrique) 
through a large number of Dahomean intellectuals and professionals (Decalo, 1987) in the post-
World War years. Decalo suggests that the term Latin Quarter of Africa has two implications:  
The former referring to the large number of intellectuals, authors, and professionals 
produced by the small but upwardly mobile southern populations, and the latter a testimony to the 
extremely high turnover of French governors in Cotonou—partly a consequence of the rapid pace 
of events in Dahomey and the country’s social vibrancy and turbulence (Decalo, 1987, p. 4).  
The idea of the ‘quartier latin’ contrasts with the relatively low development and 
achievement in schooling today, as I will outline later. Beginning in the 1950s, there was a general 
trend in former French African colonies that expanded the demand for education. Notably, 
General Councils and Territorial Assemblies made education a priority, but the construction of 
the school system remained under the financial control of France (Bierschenk, 2006).  
Proclaimed a Republic on December 4, 1958, Benin acceded to international sovereignty 
on August 1, 1960, under the name of Dahomey. Although Dahomey aimed for a radical re-
definition of the education system, the first education reform launched in 1964 to ‘ruralise’ the 
school system and expand primary education (La ruralisation de l’école), in fact, re-produced the 
colonial system of ‘applied’ education (Fichtner, 2012). In spite of a short experience of 
democratisation in 1960, when Dahomey proceeded to general elections, it overall experienced a 
period of political instability: six coup d’états between 1963 and 1972, and two constitutions were 
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adopted (1960 and 1964) before Kérékou seized power in 1972 (Gouvernement de la République 
du Bénin, 2018), as explained in the next section. 
2.1.3 Benin under the Military-Marxist regime (1974 to 1989) 
In 1975, Major Mathieu Kérékou8 of the military government renamed Dahomey as the 
People's Republic of Benin (République Populaire du Bénin) and proclaimed a socialist economy 
of Marxist-Leninist orientation. Gisselquist (2008, p. 795) suggests that the Beninese 
‘government borrowed from Soviet models selectively as other ‘Afro-Marxist’ States did’ as 
Benin had to rely economically on neighbouring countries like Nigeria. During this political 
regime, several opponents were murdered, tortured and exiled (Decalo, 1987). Despite an assault 
by a French mercenary, Kérékou remained in power until 1990 (Houngnikpo and Decalo, 2013). 
Kérékou re-organised the colonial territorial division, similar to the administrative 
organisation that exists today, which resulted in ‘a change of the nomenclature of the various 
regional and local structures’ (Decalo, 1987, p. 19). The previous départements were named 
provinces, and the sous-départements were called districts at that time. Kérékou aimed at 
‘revitalising government and bringing it closer to the masses' (Decalo, 1987, p. 19), an aim 
currently associated with de-concentration (Jarroux, 2017). Decalo claimed that several new 
structures had either advisory or executive powers. He considered local government - at least - as 
partially decentralised. In particular, Kérékou introduced community participation mechanisms 
with the Municipal Revolutionary Commissions and the Provincial State Committee of 
Administration. These organs were elected, but elections took place within the political party in 
power (Decalo, 1987). Thus, this regime could be considered as a limited form of socialist 
democracy (Lauglo, 1995). 
In 1975, Kérékou undertook a fairly innovative educational reform. While the previous 
‘Ruralisation of the school’ reform of 1964 was a continuation of the colonial system, a further 
reform, termed ‘New School’ (Ecole Nouvelle) aimed to decolonise the education system and 
hence the Beninese citizen. This new programme, incorporating the international education 
discourse of the 1970s on the one hand and the Marxist-Leninist orientation on the other, adapted 
the education system to national needs (Fichtner, 2012). Notably, it changed the academic 
                                                          
8 Kérékou was President of Benin under a Marxist-Leninist regime from 1972 to 1991 and again under a 
democracy from 1996 to 2006 (Houngnikpo and Decalo, 2013). 
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calendar to the agricultural cycle and introduced industrial and technical education at the post-
secondary level.  
In the mid-80s, the military government of Kérékou experienced a significant economic 
recession ending in bankruptcy, and hence the loss of political power. Bierschenk and de Sardan 
(2003) claim responsible the financial crisis as well as the global 'de-ideologisation' and the 
relaxation of the Marxist underpinnings as rationales for the unfolding of the democratic renewal. 
Even though Kérékou’s academic reform had increased school attendance from 41.5% to 61.3% 
by 1983, it resulted in several negative consequences, such as the decline in academic standards 
and the exodus of qualified teachers (Decalo, 1987). The recruitment of the civil service was 
disrupted, and consequently, school and university diplomas were devalued. Since the State was 
unable to pay its civil servants, it began to lay off permanent post-holders, which led to an urban 
exodus (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2003). 
In December 1989, after 17 years of Marxist-Leninism, President Kérékou announced it 
was to be abandoned, and Benin was renamed the Republic of Benin three months later (One 
World - Nations Online, 2013). The next section outlines the current situation of Benin as a 
democracy.  
2.1.4 The democratic renewal (1990 –) 
After the socialist government, Benin transitioned into a multi-party western-style political 
system in 1990. This conference, a major event for political transition, gave rise to two main 
decisions: the first introduced economic and political liberalism, democracy and the rule of law; 
the second appointed a Prime Minister to assist General Mathieu Kérékou who retained the 
presidency, losing, however, most of his former prerogatives (Gouvernement de la République 
du Bénin, 2018). The National Conference of the Active Forces held in Cotonou in February 1990 
assembled more than 500 delegates across social groups (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994; 
Gisselquist, 2008; Bierschenk, 2009; Houngnikpo and Decalo, 2013). 
The 1990 conference and the relatively smooth transition of presidents9 through fair 
elections heralded Benin as a democratic model in francophone West Africa (Mathurin & Decalo, 
2013). The liberalisation and democratisation process in the 90s and the subsequent partial 
withdrawal of the state had several effects. It not only re-empowered some traditional chiefdoms 
but also created space for Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Bierschenk and Olivier de 
                                                          
9 Nicephore Soglo in 1991, Mathieu Kérékou in 1996, Boni Yayi in 2006 and Patrice Talon in 2016 
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Sardan, 2003). Gisselquist (2008) suggests that the political transition to democracy was able to 
succeed because of the support of external actors and a wide variety of domestic groups. She 
considers Benin’s democracy as a ‘deviant case' compared to other countries in West Africa, in 
particular francophone countries, because despite Benin's low level of development, the country 
transitioned to democracy before its neighbours. Bierschenk (2009) situates the reasons for this 
in internal rather than - as often argued - external factors, suggesting the neo-patrimonialism, 
personalisation, authoritarianism, regionalism and generationalism of the previous government as 
the constituent factors of the political dynamic (cf. also chapter 7). 
Since 1989, Benin has peacefully organised six presidential, seven legislative, and three 
municipal elections (Gouvernement de la République du Bénin, 2018). The regimes under 
Kérékou and Yayi Boni evidence significant decentralisation efforts with the development of the 
devolution laws in the 90s and the policy of devolution and de-concentration in 2010, as the 
documentary analysis indicates (cf. also chapter 5). In particular, the government under Yayi Boni 
(2006 to 2016) pushed education decentralisation even further. For example, the Education 
Ministry created the Department of Education Decentralisation in 2006. In 2007, it founded the 
technical committee to support education decentralisation (Comité Technique d’Appui à la 
Décentralisation dans l’Education) and extended the Plan for the De-concentration of the School 
Administration (Schéma de Déconcentration dans l’Administration Scolaire). In 2010, the 
Ministry organised a National Forum on Decentralising Education. Finally, in 2014, it extended 
the Implementation Plan of the decentralisation policy for the pre-school and primary education 
sector, and created services for education decentralisation at the provincial level. In 2016, 
however, the decentralisation department at national level, and the decentralisation services at 
provincial level, closed following a reform by incoming president, Talon, to ‘slim down’ the state 
bureaucracy. The peaks in education decentralisation in 2007, 2010 and 2013 correlate with the 
financial and technical support of IOs, notably Danish and later, German development aid.10  
The next part of this chapter outlines the contemporary politico-administrative and socio-
economic situation as well as the organisation of education governance.  
                                                          
10 This paragraph draws on documentary data from the Department of Decentralisation of the Education 
Ministry (Département de la Décentralisation dans l’Education, DDEC) (cf. chapter 4). 
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2.2 Contemporary politico-administrative, socio-economic and 
education conditions 
This part introduces Benin’s period as a democratic republic from 1990 onwards. It 
explains first, the administrative and political organisation of governance and second, the socio-
economic background that framed the education system. The last section outlines the steering 
structure of education at different levels, and provides data about access to and the quality of 
education.  
2.2.1 Politico-administrative conditions 
The contemporary political system is derived from the 1990 Constitution of Benin. Benin 
follows a Western model of a presidential, representative, democratic republic. It has a multi-
party system, with separation of the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary (cf. Law of the 
Fifth Republic on 11 December 1990). The government exercises executive power, whereas the 
national assembly has legislative power. The judiciary is independent of both the executive and 
the legislature (République du Bénin, 1990a).  
Benin has 12 major political parties and approximately 20 additional minor parties. The 
legal system consists of a civil law system modelled largely on the French design and some 
customary law with a unicameral National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale). The population 
reacted angrily to the last legislative election in April 2019 because the president passed a law 
which ruled out all opposition parties (BBC, 2019). With regard to the executive branch, President 
Patrice Talon has been both head of state and head of the government since 6 April 2016; the 
prime ministerial position has been abolished (CIA, 2018). Currently, there are 22 ministries 
(Gouvernement de la République du Bénin, 2018). In the judicial branch, Benin’s highest courts 
are the Supreme Court (Cour Suprême), the Constitutional Court (Cour Constitutionnelle) and 
the High Court of Justice (CIA, 2018). More than 50 IOs are present in the country, and currently 
supporting the decentralisation reform are the World Bank, the European Commission (EC), and 
bilateral agencies from Switzerland and Germany.  
In terms of constitutional law, Benin is a unitary state, as opposed to a federal state. This 
means the state is the ultimate and supreme power and that any administrative divisions exercise 
only those powers that the central government chooses to delegate, devolve or privatise that is, 
the laws defining the responsibilities of the devolved and de-concentrated units (as well as any 
shared and delegated responsibilities). All other responsibilities fall within the sphere of control 
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of the central state (Dafflon and Madiès, 2008; MDGLAAT, 2010). Today, Benin has one de-
concentrated level, the province, notably the prefecture and the sectoral authorities, and one 
devolved level, which is the municipality. Overall, Benin has 12 provinces (de-concentrated) and 
77 municipalities (devolved), which are subdivided into 569 districts and 3,743 villages. Three 
municipalities have a special status11 - Cotonou, Porto Novo and Parakou (MDGLAAT, 2010).  
In terms of de-concentration, the Council of Ministers appoints a governor to run the 
prefecture. The governor is the only representative of the government (and all its ministers) at 
provincial level. Governors coordinate the de-concentrated services, ensure the preservation of 
order and the guardianship of the municipalities. The de-concentration of the ministries means 
power is transferred to the sectoral authorities at provincial level (MDGLAAT, 2008). In terms 
of devolution, the people elect the town council, which chooses a mayor to govern a municipality. 
The function of the municipality is based on: 
(i) a deliberative body - the municipal or municipal council - which has three permanent 
committees, (ii) an executive body with the mayor and his deputies, (iii) an administration and 
(iv) local advisory councils: borough councils and village or town councils (MDGLAAT, 2008). 
Article 2 of devolution law 97-029 states the mayor is a legal entity with financial autonomy. 
Devolution law 97-029: The municipality is a territorial collective endowed with a legal 
personality and financial autonomy (article 1) [...] It constitutes the institutional framework for the 
exercise of democracy at grassroots level (article 2).12 
In contrast, article 14 of devolution law 97-028 articulates the role of the governor as the 
‘supervisor' of the town council.  
Devolution law 97-028: Under the conditions fixed by law, the governor supervises the 
territorial collectives and the control of the legality of their acts (article 14).13 
As the fifth and sixth chapters will show (cf. chapter 5 and 6), these two paragraphs create 
many battles centred around the themes of autonomy versus control. The following table (cf. 
Table 1) summarises the key features of both de-concentration and devolution in the Beninese 
context. 
                                                          
11 Three of 77 municipalities have special status (MDGLAAT, 2008, p. 19). Municipalities with special 
status have the responsibility to construct, equip and repair secondary schools, as well (article 99).  
12 La commune est une collectivité territorial dotée de la personnalité juridique et de l’autonomie 
financière (art. 1) […] Elle constitue le cadre institutionnel pour l’exercice de la démocratie à la base.  
13 Dans les conditions fixées par la loi, le préfet exerce la tutelle des collectivités territoriales et le 
contrôle de la légalité de leurs actes. 
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Administrative Forms of 
Decentralisation 
De-concentration (Sectoral 
authority) 
Devolution (Municipality) 
Individual Appointed Elected  
Responsibility/ power  Delegated Transferred or shared 
Financial resources De-concentrated/ assigned 
funds (crédits délégués)  
Devolved/ transferred funds 
(crédits transférés) 
Accountability Accountable upwards to the 
hierarchy 
Legal and financial autonomy  
Table 1 Subtypes of decentralisation in the context of Benin (author’s compilation based on PONADEC, 2008) 
Benin demonstrates a rather low governance score but stands out in the categories of 
Participation & Human Rights, and Safety & Rule of Law, according to the Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance (IIAG). The 2016 IIAG, which measures the state of governance across the 
continent, ranks Benin 16th with an overall governance score of 57.5% out of 100 African 
countries (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). I suggest the high Participation & Human Rights score 
of 68.6% could be due to the decentralisation reform, which started in 1990. Olsen (2007) points 
out state reforms’ potential to foster participation and the rule of law for the peaceful management 
of the state. 
Having outlined the politico-administrative context, I now move on to the socio-economic 
background informing the education system.  
2.2.2 Socio-economic conditions 
Benin has a population of approximately 10.9 million (2016), 46.7% of which was under 
the age of 15 in 2013. There are at least 52 ethnic groups with their respective languages (UNDP, 
2020). The forecasts of the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis (Institut 
National de la Statistique et de l'Analyse Economique, INSAE) suggest lower population growth 
in the coming years than in the past (INSAE, 2018). However, the population could reach about 
15.8 million by 2030 (MEMP, 2018).  
Although below the average for African countries, the human development of Benin has 
improved by 4.5 points (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) data shows that Benin’s Human Development Index (HDI) was about 0.515 
in 2017 (ranked 163) compared to the worldwide average, which shows an increase since 1990, 
at 0.348. The trends in Benin’s HDI components show significant increases in life expectancy 
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and education, and moderate increases in Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and the HDI. 
Benin scores less well when taking account the criteria for inequality in the HDI. In this context, 
the HDI falls to 0.326, a drop of 36.6% from 0.515 in 2017.  
In 2017, the Gender Development Index (GDI)14 had a value of 0.479 for women in contrast 
to 0.547 for men, giving an overall value of 0.875. In contrast, the Gender Inequality Index (GII)15 
at 0.611 ranked Benin at 146 out of 160 countries in 2017 worldwide. Even though female-headed 
households experience lower levels of poverty, women lack economic opportunities and are 
under-represented in high-level decision-making positions (The World Bank Group, 2020). For 
example, only 7.2% of women hold parliamentary seats, and only 18.2% of adult females have 
reached at least secondary education compared to 32.7% of adult males (UNDP, 2019). In 
addition, the administration of education in Benin is male-dominated: in 2016, only 18% of 
women were in leading positions16 in the MEMP, 0% at the provincial level, 3% at the municipal 
level, and 2% of mayors were female (informal data from MEMP, 2012 and GIZ, 2016).  
In 2015, 49.6% of the population lived on under US$ 1.90 per day (with higher rates in 
rural areas and some provinces). World Bank data shows that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and the GNI have slightly increased in the last 25 years. The current GDP averages to 8.573 
Billion US$ with a GNI of 820 US$ (2016) compared to the 1989 GDP of 1.502 Billion US$ and 
a GNI of 340 US$. The agricultural sector, especially cotton production as well as an increase in 
public, particularly infrastructure investment, can help explain the moderate rise in Benin's 
economy level (The World Bank Group, 2019). According to the IIAG (2016), Benin shows 
minimal progress in Sustainable Economic Opportunity (+0.1), mainly based on Infrastructure 
(+5.6), and remains overall a relatively low ranking country in this sub-category (37th) (Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). The economy remains mainly informal (>90%), whereas the formal 
sector is divided into primary services (41.5%), secondary (19.2%) and tertiary (39.3%) (MEMP, 
2018).  
In 2016, the Trading Economics (2020) reported a total of 3.9947% of GDP public 
spending on education. More specifically, national public spending on education represented, on 
                                                          
14 The GDI is based on the sex-disaggregated HDI, defined as a ratio of the female to the male HDI. 
15 The GII reflects gender-based inequalities in three dimensions –reproductive health, empowerment, and 
economic activity. 
16 Leading position is defined as  
- Ministry: director of a department; advisor of the minister: cabinet director; secretary of the 
minister 
- Regional school authority: director; head of the section 
- Local School Authority: head 
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average, 28% of total public expenditure by the state between 2010 and 2015. This amount is well 
above the 20% recommended by the international community as the point to aim for by countries 
lagging behind in education (MEMP, 2018). The government invested a total of 226 billion francs 
CFA in 2015, equivalent to US$392,833,000. 46% went into pre-school and primary education, 
where the teacher salaries are the most expensive item (MEMP, 2018).  
Having outlined the politico-administrative and the socio-economic conditions, I now 
outline how education is organised, notably its administrative structure, education as a shared 
responsibility, and issues of access and quality in the context of pre-school and primary education.  
2.2.3 Education 
2.2.3.1 Administrative structure 
The steering structure of the education system at national level, as shown in Figure 1, 
below, has three elements: the steering committee, the coordination committee and the Permanent 
Technical Office (Secrétariat Technique Permanent, STP). The steering committee, constituted 
of the ministers, the head of the National Education Board, and leading IOs, is in charge of 
providing political and strategic orientations. The coordination committee is at the centre, 
consisting of key people from each ministry, e.g. the cabinet director and the head of the 
department for planning and development. The STP ensures that decision are put into practice at 
the operational level, and is in charge of implementing the Ten Year Education Sector.17  
 
                                                          
17 The study took into account the views of people from the strategic and political level as well as the 
operational level. 
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Figure 1 Steering structure at the national level (author’s compilation based on MEMP, 2018) 
In 2017, three different ministries were in charge of education: Pre-school and Primary 
Education came under the MEMP; Secondary Education, Technical and Vocational Training - 
including Literacy - came under the MESTFP; and Higher Education and Scientific Research 
came under the MESRS (MEMP, 2018), but this study only focuses on the MEMP among the 
Education Ministries. Although the devolution laws stipulate that Benin has only one de-
concentrated level, this ministry has sectoral authority at the provincial level (Direction 
Départementale des Enseignements Maternel et Primaire, DDEMP) and at the municipal level 
(Circonscription Scolaire, CS).18 In fact, education has historically been de-concentrated since 
the 1970s, which is 20 years before Benin decided to introduce decentralisation within its 
governance system. This temporal divergence may explain the discrepancies within the 
governance structure. 
Figure 2 represents the organisation of the Beninese administration of the institutions 
involved in pre-school and primary education. The governance of education is as follows:  
 The Association of Students’ Parents (Association des Parents d’Elèves, APE) exists 
from the national to the school level. Their duty is to promote equal education for all 
without any exclusion (Conseil d’Administration de la FENAPEB, 2011).  
                                                          
18 Mawhood (1983) explains that de-concentration systems, especially on the Africa continent, differ 
considerably from conventional British concepts of de-concentration.  
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 The MEMP has 12 authorities at provincial level and approximately 45 local school 
authorities responsible for the provision of pre-school and primary education (MEMP, 
2016c).19  
 The Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Governance (Ministère de la 
Décentralisation et de la Gouvernance Locale, MDGL)20 is in charge of issues relating to 
decentralisation and spatial planning; it oversees the 12 prefectures and 77 municipalities 
(MDGL, 2016).  
 The State Ministry in charge of Planning and Development (Ministère d’Etat chargé du 
Plan et du Développement, MPD)21 has 12 sectoral authorities at provincial level to 
ensure the coherence of the development and planning processes at national and sub-
national levels (MPD, 2016).  
 Finally, the National Association of Mayors in Benin (Association Nationale des Maires 
du Bénin, ANCB) unites all the mayors of the country (MDGLAAT, 2008). 
This section has discussed the administrative structure of education. Vital to the concept of 
education decentralisation here is the fact that education is considered a shared responsibility 
between the central and municipal government entities. The next section outlines which 
institution is responsible for which domain concerning pre-school and primary education.
                                                          
19 In 2017, the MEMP introduced several reforms to re-organise its local school authorities. These 
reforms replaced the previous 85 local school authorities by approximately 45 ‘pedagogical regions’ 
(régions pédagogiques). They now combine three to four local school authorities, geographically situated 
in between the municipalities and the provinces. The reason to reduce the number was the lack of 
teachers, and consequently, pedagogical advisors and school inspectors. Neither the General States of 
Territorial Administration from 1993 nor the PONADEC from 2008 defines these pedagogical regions, 
however. They are only legitimised through a decree from the Ministry itself. Before 2017, every 
municipality had at least one Local School Authority, whereby every Local School Authority oversaw 
around 50 public and private pre-schools and primary schools in their catchment area. Up to four local 
school authorities could be found in municipalities with large populations (e.g. Cotonou). 
20 Henceforth, I will use the abbreviation MDGL and the term Decentralisation Ministry interchangeably 
to denominate the same institution. 
21 Henceforth, I will use the abbreviation MPD and the term Planning and Development Ministry 
interchangeably to denominate the same institution.  
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Figure 2 Organisational chart of the Beninese administration (author’s compilation) 
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2.2.3.2 Education as a shared responsibility  
The MEMP is one of five pilot ministries involved in sectoral decentralisation in Benin 
(MDGLAAT, 2008). PONADEC states that education remains a shared responsibility22 between 
the government and the municipality: the municipality is mainly in charge of providing pre-school 
and primary education infrastructure and the central level as well as its de-concentrated sub-units 
manage education otherwise, as outlined in the appendix 9.1.  
The municipality is responsible for school infrastructure and youth activities in the domain 
of education, as defined in articles 97 and 98 of the devolution acts. Article 97 in the devolution 
act refers to all municipalities, whether ordinary or with special status, concerning pre-school and 
primary education.  
The municipality is responsible for the construction, equipment and repair of public 
institutions of pre-school and primary education. It also ensures the maintenance of these 
institutions. To this end, the State transfers the necessary resources (MDGLAAT, 2010, p. 29, 
own translation, italics added).23 
Article 97 is explicit about the mandatory transfer of funds from the State to the 
municipalities. Moreover, the municipality may delegate, be assisted, grant, lease, sub-contract 
or contract out any necessary repair, support or construction work, as defined by the devolution 
act 1999-029, article 108 (MDGLAAT, 2010).  
The devolution laws and education law cohere in that the education law (2003, revised in 
2005) also refers to school buildings and equipment needs.  
To effectively fulfil its mission, the school must have the infrastructure that meets the 
standards of school architecture and be equipped with the appropriate furniture and equipment 
(Assemblée Nationale, 2003, article 13, own translation).24  
The DDEMP and CS are de-concentrated actors and depend largely on the MEMP, above 
them. School authorities at the provincial and local level are mainly in charge of ongoing 
education (formation continue) and of pedagogical activities. The order 289 defines the role and 
responsibilities of DDEMPs as follows:  
                                                          
22 The devolved responsibilities of the municipality can be categorised as ‘own responsibilities’, ‘shared 
responsibilities’, and ‘delegated responsibilities’. More precisely, the shared responsibility requires the 
intervention of the central government and of the municipalities (Republic du Benin, 2010). 
23 La commune a la charge de la construction, de l’équipement et des réparations des établissements 
publics d’enseignements primaire et maternel. Elle assure en outre l’entretien de ces établissements. A 
cet effet, l’Etat lui transfère les ressources nécessaires.  
24 Pour remplir efficacement sa mission, l’école doit avoir pour cadre des infrastructures répondant aux 
normes de l’architecture scolaire et être dotée du mobilier et du matériel adéquat. 
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The DDEMPs are responsible for the implementation of pre-school and primary education 
policy at provincial level. In addition, they are responsible in their area of expertise for technical 
assistance and advisory support to municipalities following the laws and regulations in force 
(MEMP, 2016b, article 1, own translation).25  
Vital in this excerpt is the statement that DDEMPs offer technical assistance and advisory 
support to the municipalities under the laws and regulations in force. This article is an expression 
of the mixed form of de-concentration (DDEMP and CS) and devolution (municipality), notably 
how education is conceptualised as a shared responsibility.  
In accordance with the devolution laws, it also states that  
in the province, the head of the provincial authority is placed under the authority of the 
governor of the province and takes part in the administrative conferences for the coherence of the 
interventions of the State in the province (MEMP, 2016b, article 3, own translation).26 
The emphasis of the ‘subordinate’ position of the sectoral head to that of the governor is 
recent, compared to a previous decree from 2012. In other words, the head of the provincial 
authority is no longer accountable to the General Secretary of the Ministry, but to the prefect, who 
is accountable to the MDGL. This article is a vital step towards the idea of education as a shared 
responsibility, but discursively and socially, not mirrored yet, as the analytical chapters will show.  
Some areas, such as the support and control of pedagogical activities are further de-
concentrated to the local school authorities. The same order also defines their role and 
responsibilities as follows:  
Each school district (CS) in its territory is responsible for the implementation of the pre-
school and primary education policy defined by the state. It is specifically responsible for the 
support and pedagogical control […] as well as the further training of teachers (MEMP, 2016b, 
article 22, own translation).27  
                                                          
25 Les Directions Départementale des Enseignement Maternel et Primaire (DDEMP) sont responsable de 
la mise en œuvre au niveau des départements, de la politique des enseignements maternel et primaire. En 
outre, ils sont chargé dans leur domaine de compétence de l'assistance technique et de l'appui conseil aux 
communes conformément aux lois et règlements en vigueur. 
26 Dans le département, le directeur départemental est placé sous l'autorité du préfet du département et 
participe à la conférence administrative pour la mise en cohérence des interventions de l'Etat dans le 
département. 
27 Chaque Circonscription Scolaire (CS) est, dans son ressort territorial, chargée de la mise en œuvre, au 
niveau des enseignements maternel et primaire, de la politique définie par l’Etat. Elle est spécialement 
chargée de l’animation et du contrôle pédagogiques, des établissements maternels, primaires, publics et 
privés, ainsi que de la formation continue des enseignants. Elle rend compte régulièrement à son 
Directeur Départemental des Enseignements Maternel et Primaire de l’exécution de sa tâche.  
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Hence, the CS is primarily in charge of aligning with and implementing the national 
education policy and its head is accountable to the head of the regional authority and to the 
delegated educational inspector (from the central level).  
This section explained how education is organised as a shared responsibility. The last 
section briefly discusses issues of access to and quality of education based on some statistics of 
the MEMP.  
2.2.3.3 Access to and quality of education 
Most children in Benin can access primary schooling, but they do not all complete the 
primary education cycle. The Gross Enrolment Rates (GER) for primary school in 2014/15 stood 
at 124.82% (126.6% boys and 123.37 girls).28 In comparison, the completion rate for primary 
schooling was 79.22% (82.03% boys and 76.18% girls) (MEMP, 2016a). Even if Benin meets its 
aim of universal primary education, issues of quality and equity remain questionable (The World 
Bank Group, 2020). For example, Garnier (2012, p. 35) stated that only one-third of students in 
the first class of primary school achieved the minimum level in French and Mathematics. 
The figures below, based on the statistical yearbook 2014/15 (MEMP, 2016a), provide an 
overview of equity in relation to gender and inequity in terms of the economic, urban/ rural divide 
and regional disparities. Figure 3 shows that there is little variance between boys and girls 
regarding access and completion of primary schooling. However, inequality can be observed in 
family backgrounds (Figure 4) as well as between urban and rural areas (Figure 5). Furthermore, 
the education situation in Benin depends on the financial situation of the municipality as well as 
its geographical location (Figure 6). For example, the Southern field site in Ouèmè is at the top 
level, whereas the Northern field site in Borgou ranks in the centre.  This observation leads to the 
last part of this chapter, which is a detailed description of both field sites.  
                                                          
28 Definition GER: Total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a 
percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a 
given school year (UNESCO, 2009a, p. 9). In this case, the GER exceeds 100%, as some younger 
children attend school, while others retake a school year.  
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Figure 3 Relative gender equity  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Income inequity 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Urban/rural inequity 
 
Figure 6 Regional inequity 
2.3 The Northern and Southern field sites  
The last part of this chapter describes the contrasting aspects of the Northern and the 
Southern research field sites: their different histories, ethnicity and language, their different access 
to educational provision and outcomes, among others. It starts first with introducing the Northern 
field site and moves on to the Southern field site, before summarising the main points of the 
chapter.  
2.3.1 Northern field site  
2.3.1.1 Administrative Organisation 
N’Dali is situated in the province Borgou, 500 kilometres (km) away from Porto Novo, the 
capital. Its administrative centre (N'Dali-centre) is located about 56 km from Parakou, which is 
the administrative centre of the province of Borgou, where the provincial authorities (planning 
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and education), as well as the prefecture, are located. N’Dali covers an area of 3748 km2 
representing 14.50% of the area of the province and 3.27% of the total area of Benin. The 
municipality N’Dali covers five districts (arrondissements) and 24 villages or city districts 
(quartiers de ville) (Houngnihin, 2006).  
2.3.1.2 Socio-economic situation 
The population of N'Dali is estimated at 67, 379 inhabitants (Atlas Monographique des 
Communes du Benin, 2010). 70% of the population is under 45 years old (Houngnihin, 2006). 
The dominant ethnic group in N’Dali is the Bariba, followed by Pheul, which is a nomadic group. 
The principal religion in the municipality is Islam (49.5%), followed by traditional religion 
(14.6%). 13.7% claim to be Catholic and 3%, Protestant (Houngnihin, 2006).  
The primary source of revenue is agriculture, followed by fishing, commercial activities, 
transforming raw material and tourism (Houngnihin, 2006). N’Dali has a relatively high poverty 
level. According to the INSAE (2018), the multidimensional poverty rate of 55% (i.e. health, 
education and living conditions), and the poverty impact on households at 50.4% (calculated from 
the household living condition variables) is particularly high (INSAE, 2018). The socio-economic 
situation of N’Dali has particular implications for education, as shown in the next section.  
2.3.1.3 Education situation 
N’Dali is one of the larger municipalities, with rural and semi-urban schools, which are a 
long way from each other. The GER in N’Dali is 124%, disaggregated to 116% for boys and 
124% for girls, and corresponds to the country average; of interest here is the higher rate of girls 
compared to boys. However, the completion rate of 75%, disaggregated to 74% for boys and 77% 
for girls, is 4 points lower than the country average (MEMP, 2016a). In summary, it can be said 
that the Northern field site is semi-urban with significant socio-economic disparities and 
educational outcomes are slightly below the national average. The next section introduces the 
Southern field site. 
2.3.2 Southern field site  
Porto Novo, the capital of Benin since 1894, is located in the Southeast of the country at 
the centre of the axis between Nigeria and Togo. Although the presidency and most ministries 
transferred to Cotonou in the 60s and 70s, the democratic renewal in 1990 confirmed the status 
of Porto Novo as capital. The city of Porto Novo, consists of five districts and covers an area of 
52 km² or 0.05% of the national territory (Gandonou and Guidibi, 2006). 
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2.3.2.1 Administrative organisation 
Porto Novo is a site with a colonial history. From the 18th century, Portuguese, Dutch, 
British and French explorers organised intercontinental trade, which led to colonisation and the 
slave trade. The colonial rule goes back to the first treaty making the country a French protectorate 
in 1863. The second protectorate was established on April 14, 1882, marking the installation of 
the French colonial administration. They created the colony of Dahomey, and Porto Novo was 
decreed the capital on June 22, 1894 (Gandonou and Guidibi, 2006).  
2.3.2.2 Socio-economic situation 
The municipality of Porto -Novo has 264,320 inhabitants (RGPH3, 2002) and the current 
population density is estimated at 1,985/ km². The population is young, 40% aged under 14 years 
old (INSAE, 2018). Different ethnic group live together, mostly Goun and Fon (66%), followed 
by Yoruba (25%), and Adja, Mina and Toffin (4%). In the Southeast, the Christian religion is pre-
dominant (45,70%), followed by traditional beliefs (29,20%) and Islam (25,10%) (Gandonou and 
Guidibi, 2006).  
Porto Novo's economy is mostly informal, favoured by the permeability with the Nigerian 
border. According to Gandonou and Guidibi (2006), the citizens of Porto Novo have not 
specialised in any particular area, but Porto-Novo remains a metropolis for large traders with a 
relatively large turnover. According to the INSAE, the town has relatively moderate poverty 
figures. The Human Poverty Index (HPI), that is, the percentage of the population without access 
to drinking water, the illiteracy rate of the population and the infant and child mortality rate, is 
low (21,4%) (INSAE, 2018). 
2.3.2.3 Education situation  
Porto Novo has a high density of both private pre-school and primary schools (>200) 
compared to ~160 public pre-school and primary schools (CS Porto Novo, 2017). The trend 
towards private schooling may have its roots in the relative wealth of families in the capital. The 
GER in Porto Novo of 125%, disaggregated to 127% for boys and 122% for girls, is the same as 
the country average, while the completion rate of 92%, disaggregated to 91% for boys and 92% 
for girls, is 12 points higher than the country average (MEMP, 2016a).  
2.3.2.4 Summing-up 
Historically, Porto Novo used to be where the colonial negotiations took place, whereas 
N’Dali does not have a particular colonial history and, hence, there is less stratification among 
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the population. As the table below shows (cf. Table 2), the Southern field sites are urban with a 
relatively high socio-economic status, whereas the Northern field sites are semi-urban and urban 
with medium socio-economic status. Consequently, the educational outcomes in the Southern 
field site are better than in the Northern field site.  
Southern field site  
(urban; centre and periphery) 
Northern field site  
(semi-urban and urban) 
• Urban (capital; central and provincial 
education administration)  
• Relatively high socio-economic status  
• Relatively high educational outcomes, not 
significant gender gap at the end of 
primary school 
• Historically the place where colonial 
negotiations took place  
• Mainly Catholics and Muslims, numerous 
private schools  
 Semi-urban (cross-road city)  
 Medium socio-economic status  
 Relatively low educational outcomes, 
slight gender gap at the end of primary 
school 
 No particular colonial history, less 
stratification 
 A majority of Muslims, Koranic schools  
 
Table 2 Comparison of the Northern and the Southern field sites (author’s compilation) 
The last section of this chapter summarises the main characteristics of Benin, notably from 
its historical genesis, the current governance situation regarding education and the particularities 
of the field sites in the Northeast and the Southeast of the country. 
2.4 Summary 
The context chapter explored the origins of the political, economic, social and education 
background from pre-colonial to contemporary times, suggesting that the precursors of 
decentralisation pre-existed the decentralisation reform, installed by the 1990 constitution. The 
second part explained the political and administrative system and contemporary socio-economic 
conditions. Most importantly, it emphasised that education remains a shared responsibility 
between the recently created municipalities and the central state government. It also discussed 
concerns of access and quality based on education statistics at the national level, demonstrating 
that access and completion rates are relatively equitable between boys and girls, but not between 
students from different family backgrounds and in different geographical areas. The chapter ended 
by outlining the unique situation of both field sites, the capital Porto Novo in the South, and the 
semi-urban municipality N'Dali in the North, shaped by different histories, ethnic and language 
differences, and access to educational provision and outcomes.
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a broader picture of education decentralisation within the global 
world setting relating to the overall aim of the research study. It aims to explore the discursive 
and social practices of actors involved in the delivery of pre-school and primary education in the 
context of the 2010 decentralisation policy in Benin. First, this chapter introduces the conceptual 
approach to policy analysis informed by ANT and CDA. The second part reviews the three main 
concepts of this study: decentralisation, power and participation. Education decentralisation is the 
focus of this study and power and participation are the related concepts. For each of these 
concepts, I provide a definition and conceptual discussion, informed by the empirical literature. 
The third part is a discussion of the empirical literature about the conditions for and effects of 
education decentralisation. More specifically, I discuss the necessary conditions for 
decentralisation reforms and the effects of these reforms referring to case studies from Africa, 
Latin America and Asia. Finally, this chapter outlines the conceptual framework of the research 
drawn from the literature review. The first part of this chapter outlines the theoretical and 
conceptual approach to policy analysis, policy trajectory studies informed by different theoretical 
perspectives. 
3.2 Policy trajectory studies  
3.2.1 Policy 
From a historical perspective, policy studies emerged, mostly in liberal democratic 
countries, in the 1950s. It is an established research field today linked to the processes involved 
in bringing about change. At its early stages, a so-called rationalist approach, grounded in political 
science, was developed. It mainly addressed the needs of the state (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). For 
instance, the idea of a liberal-democratic state is sustained through its welfare agenda that finds 
expression in policy. While there may be promise of ‘change‘, the institution of the state and its 
dominance is maintained through policy. Researchers were interested in examining ‘how they 
[the state actors] negotiated various political interests, and more generally, managed policy 
processes’(Rizvi and Lingard, 2010, p. 2). During the 1980s, the rationalist approach lost 
popularity and critical policy analysis became more dominant. A shift took place from social 
democratic to neoliberal orientations.  
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After this brief introduction into the historical development of policy studies, I take a step 
back to reflect on how I understand policy. How one understands policy determines how one 
studies policy, Ball (1994a) suggests. 
3.2.1.1 What is policy? 
Bell and Stevenson (2006) state that  
Policy is political: it is about the power to determine what is done. It shapes who benefits, 
for what purpose and who pays (Bell and Stevenson, 2006, p. 9). […] Policy is about the power to 
determine what gets done, or not done (Bell and Stevenson, 2006, p. 23).  
This definition highlights the political nature of policy and the power involved in decision-
making. Rizvi and Lingard (2010) explain that policy ensembles - a collection of interrelated 
policies - exercise power in the form of discourse through the production of ’truth’ and 
’knowledge‘. They allude with this insight to a Foucauldian (2003a) understanding of knowledge 
production in that power and knowledge are related insofar as knowledge exists within power 
relations and power relations influence the production of knowledge. 
Besides questions of power and knowledge, I embed my understanding of policy within 
the debate about policy as text and discourse following several writings of Ball (1993, 2006, 
2015). For example, decentralisation can be informed by a discourse of austerity in the case of a 
financially driven rationale or by a socio-democratic discourse, which emphasises the 
participation of the local population. Ball (2006) expands the previous definition of policy as 
power, to policy as discourse, whereby discourse is understood as follows: 
Discourses are about what can be said, and thought, but also about who can speak, when, 
where, and with what authority (Ball, 2006, p. 48).  
In his response to his article, What is policy? from 1993, Ball (2015) examined the 
continuing tensions between domination and agency, discourse and text in policy research and 
the misapplication of the concept of discourse. In particular, he criticises how many studies, 
claiming to use a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis, misuse the term discourse. He 
suggests that Foucault meant by discourse ‘to address the structures and rules that constitute a 
discourse rather than the texts and utterances produced within it' (Ball, 2015, p. 311), while most 
studies analyse the textual rather than the discursive level of the social practices, power relations 
and so on hence reducing power to domination, and detaching knowledge from power. While Ball 
understands policy text as ‘policies [that] are ‘contested', mediated and differentially represented 
by different actors in different contexts' (Ball, 2015, p. 311), he considers policy as discourse 
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‘produced and formed by taken-for-granted and implicit knowledges and assumptions about the 
world and ourselves' (Ball, 2015, p. 311). 
Rizvi and Lingard (2010), inspired by Easton (1953), expand the understanding of policy 
as text and discourse to questions of values. They define policy as the ‘authoritative allocation of 
values’ and explain more precisely: 
how education policies represent a particular configuration of values whose authority is 
allocated at the intersection of global, national and local processes (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010, p. 2). 
The crucial question for this study is how particular values, such as control, are interpreted 
and negotiated in light of other values, such as autonomy. What Rizvi and Lingard (2010) call the 
‘trade-off of values' is political as some values are privileged over others through political 
processes. In the context of globalisation, they suggest a convergence of values towards efficiency 
and accountability makes it necessary to re-articulate some values and subordinate others, such 
as democracy and equality. That is how policies ‘re-orchestrate’ and enact an assembly of shifting 
values (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). 
Drawing together different ideas of policy, I understand policy as concerning questions of 
authority and power, text and discourse and to be a matter of values. This understanding helps to 
deconstruct the policy of education decentralisation for this study. In the next section, I explore 
different approaches to policy analysis. 
3.2.1.2 Approaches to policy analysis 
To start this section, I clarify the difference between analysis of policy and analysis for 
policy. This study is an analysis of the policy of decentralisation in Benin where I seek to 
understand ‘why a particular policy was developed at a particular time, what its analytical 
assumption are and what effects it might have’(Rizvi and Lingard, 2010, p. 45). In contrast, 
analysis for policy implies the study of an issue for developing a particular policy, which is often 
commissioned by a government, hence theoretically and methodological speaking constrained 
because of tighter time frames, among other restraints.  
Ball's (1993) framework for analysing policy requires looking at policy trajectories within 
three different contexts: the context of influence, the context of policy text production and the 
context(s) of practices. The context of influence examines how the agenda was set for a particular 
policy, such as education decentralisation, whereas the context of policy text production analyses 
the process of formulating the policy. Finally, the context(s) of practices focus on the mediation 
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and the enactment of policy. In this way, these contexts provide ‘a mechanism for linking and 
tracing the discursive origins and possibilities of policy’ (Ball, 1993, p. 16), the responses to and 
the effects of the policy. The policy cycle is messy, often contested and displays non-linear 
relationships (Ball, 1994a; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010).  
Taylor (1997) developed another framework to analyse policy, which is grounded in 
discourse theory.29 Her framework for policy analysis involves three aspects: context, text and 
consequences. In the first instance, and similarly to Ball's framework, the economic, social and 
political factors, as well as pressure groups and social movements, are examined (context). In the 
second instance, the content of the policy itself is analysed in order to state what the policy aims 
to accomplish and what the underpinning values of the policy (text) are. In this regard, Bell and 
Stevenson (2006, p. 12) highlight the importance of ‘silences': ‘what is clearly said and what is 
not said'. In the third instance, the consequences of the policy, which are the effects of the policy, 
are explored (Taylor, 1997). Bell and Stevenson (2006) emphasise the process of moving from 
the policy formulation to the policy in practice or as Taylor et al. (1997, pp. 24–25) write: ‘policy 
is both process and product'. In this respect, the term policy covers the text itself, the production 
process and ongoing modifications to its implementation. Rizvi and Lingard (2010) add a further 
dimension to Taylor's (1997) three-dimensional framework; implementation. 
Grimaldi (2012) takes up the conceptualisation of policy as discourse from a Foucauldian 
perspective. He suggests that such a conceptualisation helps to explore critically ‘the 
embeddedness of policy within wider discursive frameworks and knowledge/ power regimes’. 
His proposed framework consists of a Foucauldian archaeology and structuration theory and 
critically explores the ‘power/ knowledge regimes shaping policy enactment itself and the 
transformative capacities inherent in the agency of the actors involved’ (Grimaldi, 2012, p. 462).  
Taylor (1997), Ball (1993, 2006, 2015), Rizvi and Lingard (2010) as well as Grimaldi 
(2012) share a common understanding of policy and policy analysis in that they are all interested 
in how the policy idea came about as well as the formulation of the policy whose process can be 
understood in discursive terms. They all subscribe to a tighter or a looser understanding of a 
Foucauldian influenced conceptualisation of discourse. For example, Ball (2006, p. 48) suggests 
understanding how ‘policy ensembles […] exercise power through the production of “truth” and 
                                                          
29 Taylor’s approach to discourse theory in relation to education policy analysis is informed by her work 
in feminist cultural studies and in feminist policy studies. She adopts a ‘broad—and pragmatic—approach 
to the interrelated developments in social theory, and reject[s] any tight categorisation of theoretical 
positions’ (Taylor, 1997, p. 25). 
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“knowledge”, as discourse’. Rizvi and Lingard, as well as Taylor, focus on the effects and 
outcomes of policy, and Rizvi and Lingard, as well as Ball, are also interested in policy enactment.  
From a post-modernist perspective, it could be suggested that they all implicitly assume 
linearity of time without allocating enough importance to questions of place and space. Time is 
not linear nor is space flat, but '[s]pace-time is dynamic, fractured, porous, paradoxical, and non-
individual with sets of space-time relations existing simultaneously, rhizomatically and 
overlapping, interfering with each other’ (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 619). In line with Massey (1994b), 
who argues that space and time are integral to one another, I provide a historical exploration of 
education governance in two different regions in Benin. If spatial is conceptualised in terms of 
space-time, a place can be considered as 'a particular articulation of those relations, a particular 
moment in those networks of social relations and understandings' (Massey, 1994b, p. 5). This 
work draws on a temporal and spatial lens, beginning with research in two local field sites in 
2017, extending to the analysis of national and global influences on policy formulation and 
mediation from 1990 onwards.  
3.2.1.3 An excursus into policy borrowing and lending 
Discourses of globalisation and globalised discourses shape the context of policy text 
production (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). In anticipation of the coming discussion on decentralisation 
in the context of globalisation (cf. section 3.3.1.3), I briefly relate how policy ideas and reforms 
travel across time and space. Sayed (2010), for example, wonders about  
the extent to which national policies across different contexts show a remarkable 
similarity around a narrow range of global policy prescriptions and the extent to which they 
constrain the autonomy of nation-states (Sayed, 2010, p. 62).  
Rizvi and Lingard (2010) point out the need to analyse education policy not only from a 
historical perspective but also from a global one and how these two perspectives are entwined. 
The continued interest in this area of research is an outcome of the discussion of how global 
governance affects national education systems, beliefs, and practices, and vice-versa.  
Steiner-Khamsi (2012), a significant scholar of theorising policy borrowing and lending, 
proposes an interpretive framework for exploring the process, impact, and timing of policy 
transfer from a political and economic perspective. The unit of analysis, she claims, is the local 
policy context, but she does not address issues of agency and mediation as much as the previously 
referenced approaches to policy analysis. Steiner-Khamsi (2012) explains the powerful force of 
globalisation as a social imaginary that impacts on the ‘evening' of education systems around the 
globe as does globalisation itself. However, she also points out that globalisation cannot be used 
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as an external mechanism to explain policy borrowing. Rather, it is the interplay between national 
governments and global actors that make education policies travel, revealing the remarkable 
similarity, Sayed (2010) mentioned above.  
As the conceptual framework at the end of this chapter shows (cf. section 3.5), I mainly 
draw on Ball's approach to clarify the context of influence, the context of the policy text 
production and the context of social practices. However, my understanding of the context of the 
policy text production is closer to the textual analysis suggested by Taylor (1997). She explored 
what a policy aims to accomplish and what the underpinning values of the policy are. In a similar 
vein, Rizvi and Lingard (2010) understand the analysis of policy and textual issues as the 
discursive formation of policy and policy concerns, textual considerations, the interests involved 
and that underpin the policy, policy structural processes and resource issues. As suggested by 
them, I take into account the history (e.g. colonialism), the political aspirations (e.g. post-
colonialism) and the state's geopolitical location in policy studies (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). The 
next section explains how the theoretical lenses inform the conceptual approach to policy 
trajectory studies.  
3.2.2 Theoretical lenses: complementarities or contradictions? 
This study is informed by ideas of different theoretical lenses, notably ANT and CDA, but 
without following them rigidly. I draw on the ideas of both approaches as they respond to different 
aspects of the three dimensions of Ball’s policy framework. This section introduces both 
approaches, ANT and CDA, independently, and discusses the rationale for combining them. It 
finishes by explaining how they inform the policy framework adopted. The next section starts by 
outlining the main features of CDA. 
3.2.2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis  
In this section, I introduce the aim and the different dimensions of CDA and explain how 
CDA informed this research. CDA is an analytical framework ‘to develop ways of analysing 
language which address its involvement in the workings of contemporary capitalist society’ 
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 1). Blommaert (2005, p. 22) states that ‘CDA was founded on the premise 
that linguistic analysis could provide a valuable additional perspective for existing approaches to 
social critique’. CDA examines how societal power relations are established and reinforced 
through language use (Blommaert, 2005). Although French poststructuralist theory has influenced 
CDA, this approach is most committed to Critical Realism (CR) (Fairclough, 1995, 2010).  
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Following from the objective above, CDA has the following characteristics:  
[…] it is part of some form of interdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse 
and other elements of the social processes; […] it includes some form of systematic analysis of 
texts. […] it addresses social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or 
mitigating them (Fairclough, 2010, pp. 10–11).  
In that regard, CDA offers an approach to analysing text from its interplay with broader 
social processes, while taking a normative and explanatory stance. CDA is normative because it 
evaluates existing realities and their underlying values. It is explanatory because it not only 
evaluates these existing realities and underlying values, but it also explains them as the effects of 
structures or mechanisms of forces, for example (Fairclough, 2010).  
Critical theory of language, in which CDA is grounded, considers the ‘use of language as 
a form of social practice’ (Janks, 1997, p. 329). Woodside-Jiron (2011) recalls Fairclough’s 
definition of social practices, discourse practices and discourse as text. While ‘social practices 
represent discourse as ideology and power’, discourse practices, he suggests, ‘involve the process 
of text production, distribution, and consumption’(Woodside-Jiron, 2011, p. 154). Fairclough 
(1995) conceptualises power in terms of the asymmetrical relations between the production, 
distribution and consumption of texts. Text, based on Halliday’s understanding, refers to words 
in spoken and written form, as well as silences and absences (Woodside-Jiron, 2011).  
In his book ‘Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language’, Fairclough 
(1995, 2010) developed a three-dimensional framework combining discourse analysis with the 
social analysis of sociocultural change. As the table below shows (Table 3), the third dimension, 
social analysis, aims to examine hegemonic processes such as democratisation (Blommaert, 
2005). The processing analysis scrutinises how and by whom the policy is produced and 
interpreted. For the text analysis, Janks (1997) recalls Fairclough's critical criteria based on 
Halliday’s systemic-functional linguistics which are:  
lexicalization, patterns of transitivity, the use of active and passive voice, the use of 
nominalization, choices of mood, choices of modality or polarity, the thematic structure of the text, 
the information focus [and] cohesion devices (Janks, 1997, p. 325). 
Types of analysis Dimensions 
Text analysis/ Discourse as a text 
(description)  
 
The analysis of the linguistic features and 
organisation of concrete instances of 
discourse, e.g. analysis of vocabulary, 
grammar, cohesion, and text structure 
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Processing analysis/ Discourse-as-discursive-
practice (interpretation)  
The process by which the object is produced 
and received by human subjects, e.g. speech 
acts, coherence, and intertextuality 
Social analysis/ Discourse-as-social-practice 
(explanation) 
The analysis of discursive events as instances 
of sociocultural practice, e.g., i.e. the 
ideological effects and hegemonic processes 
in which discourse operates 
Table 3 Dimensions of Critical Discourse Analysis (author’s compilation based on Fairclough, 1995 and 
Blommaert 2005) 
Even though this study draws on the three-dimensional model above, my overall 
understanding of discourse subscribes to a Foucauldian rather than a semantic approach to the 
text. This is in line with other scholars using a Foucauldian approach to CDA. For example, 
Bazzul (2014) deploys Foucauldian notions of discourse and subjectivity in his CDA of science 
education texts. As this research suggests, Bazzul argues that it is not necessary to use CDA 
through research paradigms already legitimated in the literature. Instead, the varied use of more 
structural/poststructural, politicised approaches offers transformative, critical research in science 
education. Using a Foucauldian approach to CDA is also in line with the previous discussion 
inspired by Ball (2015), who argues that discourse is concerned with the structures and rules that 
constitute a text. In other words,  analysis of the discursive levels helps to de-construct the 'taken-
for-granted and implicit knowledge and assumptions about the world and ourselves' (Ball, 2015, 
p. 311) (cf. section 3.2.1.1).  
I moved away from an initial analysis of the policy of decentralisation privileging a 
semiotic analysis of the policy text - analysing the patterns of transitivity and different temporal 
use or passive voice - because I considered this interpretation was limited to the policy text itself. 
Overall, I foreground the processing analysis (second) dimension of the framework shedding light 
on how and by whom the policy was produced and interpreted as well as  the discourses at work, 
and the social analysis (third dimension) to discuss the effect the postcolonial context had on the 
formulation of the decentralisation policy (cf. section 5.2). Taking this approach, CDA is used in 
the Foucauldian sense - to understand the policy discourse and issues of power. The next section 
discusses Actor-Network-Theory. 
3.2.2.2 Actor-network theory  
As in the previous section, I briefly introduce the aim of ANT and explain how it was used 
for the analysis of the data in this research. According to Latour (1996, p. 369), ANT ‘aims at 
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describing the very nature of societies’ and ‘extends the word actor- or actant- to non-human, 
non-individual entities'. It ‘rebuild[s] social theory out of networks' and is, therefore, ‘as much an 
ontology or a metaphysics as a sociology’.  
In order to understand ANT, I clarify its components - actors and networks. Networks in 
the context of ANT are different from and not reducible to technical or social networks. In contrast 
to a technical network, the actor-network is an entity ‘that does the tracing and the inscribing’ 
(Latour, 1996, p. 372). The network is understood as a global entity that remains local. For 
instance, Latour (1996) rejects the conceptualisation of space in terms of geography, which 
implies undoing many notions associated with far / close, small-scale / large-scale, inside / 
outside. As an alternative, he suggests ‘associations' to refer to how actors connect and ‘make 
others do things’ - which could also be referred to as acts of transformation or translation (Latour, 
1996, 2005).  
An actor can be any element in the network that acts, is given activity or activated by others, 
as the following quote explains. 
An “actor” in ANT is a semiotic definition- an actant-, that is something that acts or to 
which activity is granted by others [implying] no special motivation of individual human actors 
(Latour, 1996, p. 373).  
ANT does not contrast structure and agency but explores how a given element becomes 
strategic or how it becomes less important. The potential interest of ANT here lies in the inclusion 
of non-human actors, which it borrows from New Materialism. In contrast, in traditional 
sociological perspectives, things and objects are subordinate to humans and thus obscured. For 
ANT, the human subject is neither agentic nor intentional, but an effect of networked associations 
(Fenwick and Edwards, 2010). 
Even though Latour (1996) distinguishes between actants and actors in his earlier work and 
between a mediator and an intermediary in his later work30, he  also suggests less rigidity  in the 
definition ‘of what sort of agencies populate the world’ (Latour, 2005, p. 55).  This proposal is 
also taken up by Fenwick and Edwards (2010) in suggesting that the distinction between human 
and  non-human can be considered an effect rather than a basic assumption. Koyama and Varenne 
(2012) use assemblage interchangeably with actor and actants. This term usefully extends the 
notion of assemblage to the dynamics of actual activities tracing how an actor-network is 
                                                          
30 The actor is a working entity with agency, whereas the actant enables an activity;  and a mediator can 
change or distort the meaning of the elements, whereas an intermediary only transports meaning without 
changing or acting upon it. 
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translated into discourse and practices. For this study, the distinction between actor/ actants is 
unhelpful, and I use actor and assemblage interchangeably following Koyama and Varenne 
(2012) to avoid the ‘naturalness’ of categories. 
As previously pointed out, while this thesis does not strictly subscribe to ANT, it draws on 
some of the ideas of this analytical approach. Some ANT authors strongly emphasise the role of 
non-human actors,  with the example of an educational reform as  a non-human actor in  Fenwick‘s 
(2011) chapter ‘Reading Educational Reform with Actor Network Theory: Fluid spaces, 
otherings, and ambivalences’, while others predominantly focus on human actors. They still 
follow other main ideas of ANT, such how elements/ actors translate one another (cf. Assembling 
and Dissembling: Policy as Productive Play of Koyama and Varenne, 2012). This work considers 
non-human actors in the analysis to the extent that they are part of the broader network (cf. 
sections 6.1.1, 7.1, 7.3 and 7.4), but tends to privilege the voices and actions of human actors in 
sections 6.1.2, 6.1.3 and 7.2. Overall, ANT is less about creating categories for the human and 
non-human, but more about the ‘intimate associations between objects and all human attributes, 
capacities and activities’ (Fenwick and Edwards, 2010, p. 4).  
This study is in line with Fenwick and Edwards (2010, p. 6) suggestion that educational 
policy processes are ‘shaped by the material things […] as much as by the human ideas, desires, 
meanings and actions’. This study examines education decentralisation as a popular governance 
reform, particularly in Global South countries. Chapter 6 focuses on small-scale actor networks 
at the local level in the Southern and Northern field sites in mediating the decentralisation policy. 
Non-human actors include, among others, networks (education and development fora), school 
buildings and quality norms, documents (development plans, devolution and education laws) (cf. 
also section 4.4.1.3 for a discussion on how the methodological choice of actor-maps cohere with 
the underlying principles of ANT). In contrast, chapter 7 takes the 1990 conference as a starting 
point to trace the connections between the lived events, historical processes, concepts, individuals, 
groups and social formations that contributed to the emergence of the decentralisation policy in 
Benin. 
Applying ANT to policy studies may not only help to reveal the connection within and 
across assemblages to guide the analysis of the policy’s emergence, formulation and enactment 
but also the process for the production of new policies by understanding actor-networks provide 
explanations through their connections (Koyama and Varenne, 2012). Explanations in this context 
are understood as the ‘attachment of a set of practices that control or interfere in one another’ 
(Latour, 1996, p. 375). Each network offers its explanations implicitly, blurring the line between 
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description and explanation. For example, ANT starts from unconnected localities to provisional 
connections instead of taking globalisation as an explanation for the borrowing of educational 
reform policies.  
Moreover, ANT helps to trace how power is achieved as opposed to power as an 
explanation (Gorur, 2015). Fenwick and Edwards (2010) suggest that potentially powerful actors 
become dominant because they are the assemblages of broader assemblage networks. Gorur 
(2015) understands power, with reference to Foucault, as a ‘taken-for-grantedness and 
naturalisation’. He considers power as a process of translation of the relations between actors and 
argues that ‘actors may become powerful in their capacity to translate other actors’ (Gorur, 2015, 
p. 90). Foucault (1978, 1988) calls it the immanence of power, starting from ‘”local centers” of 
power-knowledge, all-pervading and operating within and through its subjects.  
The added value of applying ANT to this policy research is the ‘linked distribution of 
activities in networked ad hoc and emergent assemblages that produce different experiential 
objects in each of the linkages' (Koyama and Varenne, 2012, p. 158). In other words, starting 
from unconnected localities and then considering the various ways they can connect, at least 
temporarily, has the potential to reveal various perspectives on a given topic. In the final section, 
I explain the rationale for combining both approaches and how they inform this study. 
3.2.3 How have the analytical lenses informed this study? 
I consider neither ANT nor CDA as distinct to policy analysis but search how they can 
inform the analysis of policy. Rizvi and Lingard (2010) suggest that for the analysis of policy 
texts, CDA in particular, is a common approach. Fairclough’s (1995, 2010) approach combines 
the analysis of the linguistic features of a policy text with a Foucauldian inspired account of text 
in context. Consequently, CDA is useful for examining ‘how political ideologies are authorized 
through policies by locating them in the dominant popular imaginaries’(Rizvi and Lingard, 2010, 
p. 63). In addition, CDA coheres with the earlier discussion of policy as text and policy as 
discourse insofar as policy as text relates to text analysis (description) and policy as discourse, to 
the analysis of processes (interpretation) and social practices (explanation). 
CDA informs the fifth chapter through the analysis of the textual and discursive features of 
the PONADEC. This analytical approach seems to be relevant to the analysis of both policy 
documents and interview data because it covers the analysis of text, processes and social practices. 
This chapter focuses on the first two dimensions, discourse-as-text and discourse-as-discursive-
practice. Discourse as text allows the analysis of the linguistic features and organisation of 
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concrete instances of discourse, whereas discourse-as-discursive-practice is about the processes 
of text production, distribution and consumption (Fairclough, 1995). Chapter 5 deconstructs the 
discursive nature of the decentralisation policy, its philosophical underpinning and its internal and 
external co-authors, shedding light on its production, distribution and consumption.  
Drawing on ANT, I consider the different contexts of Ball's policy cycle, particularly the 
context of influence and the context of social practices- as ‘as actor-networks in which 
participants and participation are ordered in time and space' (Fenwick and Edwards, 2010, p. 131). 
In this research, ANT concepts inform the sixth and seventh chapters. Multiple forms of ANT 
exist, but in this instance, I used ANT as a methodological tool. Kanger (2017) describes ANT as 
a method to learn from actors without imposing on them any a priori definition of their world‐
building capacities. This means that I watched how actors (human and non-human) interacted 
with one another, formed networks and brought about certain, temporarily stable, social practices 
that were more dominant than others were. I used two local field sites in 2017 to reveal the social 
practices around the 2010 policy of education decentralisation from a relational perspective in 
chapter 6. For chapter 7, I take the 1990 conference in Benin as the starting point to unfold the 
contextual and historical formations, which led to the decision of the Beninese government to 
decentralise parts of its government machinery. 
 The sixth chapter is a study of small-scale actor-networks at the local level in both the 
Southern and Northern field sites to explore how the actors involved in the provision of pre-school 
and primary education mediated the current decentralisation policy. I analysed their discursive 
and social practices from a relational perspective. Focusing on ‘the strategic, relational, and 
productive character of particular, small-scale, heterogonous actor-networks’ (Law, 2009, p. 145) 
is in line with the actor-network as a methodological approach. The seventh chapter explores how 
and implicitly why education decentralisation came onto the agenda in 1990 through following 
actors and their networks in space (from the local to the global) and time (from 1990 back to the 
early 20th century).  
Ball (2015), adopting a post-structural position in his 2015 article, implicitly alludes to 
assemblage theory and ANT, I propose. For example, he understands policies ‘as discursive 
strategies [made up of] sets of texts, events, artefacts and practices' (Ball, 2015, p. 308), 
transcending the centrality of human actors and even the dichotomy of human and non-human 
actors. Later, he addresses the ‘complex web of interpretations, translations, ‘active readership' 
and ‘writerly' work around the policy' (Ball, 2015, p. 309) whereby I approach web in the context 
of actor-networks. In drawing on poststructuralism and implicitly alluding to New Materialism, 
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Ball’s (2015) ideas of policy analysis cohere with ideas from ANT and assemblage theory in that 
he takes into account notions of webs and actors covering texts, events, artefacts and practices, 
among other aspects.  
Before the completion of the literature review, I expand my understanding of policy 
analysis in the context of the post-development framework of this study. 
3.2.4 A policy study in the context of a post-development framework 
Overall, I position this study in a post-development framework which I understand as being 
critical of the very idea of ‘development’ as being Eurocentric. Escobar (2012), for example, 
explores the production of the idea of the Third World and its construction within development 
in the post-cold-war period. Development is presented as a social imaginary that has become 
stabilised, underpinned by the economic growth of nation states and informed by human capital 
theory. In his book ‘Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World’, 
Escobar offers examples of how development discourse shapes reality, which he aims to 
deconstruct, locating development within historically produced discourse. 
More broadly, post-development suggests alternative ways of thinking, e.g. radical forms 
of democracy, an economy based on reciprocity and solidarity, acknowledging the value of 
traditional knowledge (Sachs, 2010). However, this study intends neither to romanticise local 
communities and cultural traditions, such as the traditional kingdoms in Benin, nor to engage in 
dichotomies, such as traditional versus modern. Moreover, I acknowledge the challenge of re-
producing categories of the development discourse, such as in using the concept of participation 
in this study (cf. Rahnehma (2010) for a further discussion in section 3.3.3.3).  
Overall, it is crucial to position this study in a post-development framework reviewing the 
Eurocentric character of development discourse and the hierarchical understandings and 
behaviours between developers and those 'to be developed'. Despite the criticisms mentioned 
above, post-development offers a framework for a more nuanced critique of 'development' 
discourse, and ways of thinking about alternatives (Ziai, 2017) as well as the implications of this 
for official governance and decentralisation structures and policies and the way people engage 
with these.  This framework and its impact on education governance also lead on nicely to the 
two conflicting yet somehow linked notions of power that I bring to the discussion in section 
3.3.2. While the concept of policy trajectory studies provides the framework for this study in the 
context of a post-development setting, I now turn to the key concept of decentralisation and 
related ideas. 
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3.3 Conceptual approach: decentralisation, power and participation 
The second part of the literature review discusses the main concepts of this study, which 
are decentralisation, power and participation. Power and participation are important to the 
understanding of education decentralisation because they are inherently part of decentralisation 
as a governance reform, potentially redistributing power and the possibilities of participation. As 
such, this part starts with reviewing the conceptual literature on education decentralisation. 
3.3.1 Decentralisation 
This section is a critical engagement with the literature on decentralisation. There are three 
sub-sections: first, I define decentralisation and its sub-concepts - delegation, de-concentration, 
devolution and privatisation. Second, I situate these definitions in the context of Benin and third, 
I discuss decentralisation at the intersection of governance and globalisation.  
The decentralisation of government in developing countries became a topic of debate at the 
same time as discussions on development began in the 1950s (Conyers, 1984). These discussions 
emerged in a period when many developing countries, particularly in the African continent, 
prepared themselves for independence. In the second wave, independent governments initiated 
decentralisation reforms in response to centralisation trends immediately after independence in a 
second period, from the early 1970s to the early 1980s (Conyers, 1984). During this period, the 
emphasis was on ‘deconcentrating hierarchical government structures and bureaucracies’ 
(Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007, pp. 2–3). The second wave of decentralisation extended the 
understanding of decentralisation to ideas of ‘political power sharing, democratization, and 
market liberalization’ (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007, pp. 2–3), which opened up the door for 
privatisation. During the third wave in the 1990s, decentralisation was seen as a way of opening 
governance to wider public participation through civil society organisations. Edwards and 
DeMatthews (2014, p. 29) observed that decentralisation in the third wave was ‘reconceptualized 
[…] to embody […] further market mechanisms in the provision of education’.  
The decentralisation periods alternated with centralisation periods, commonly known as 
the decentralisation-centralisation pendulum. In 1984, Conyers (1984) asked 
whether this [growing criticism of the second decentralisation period] will result in increased 
decentralization (for example, by a renewed emphasis on devolution rather than deconcentration), 
or in a ‘backward’ swing of the pendulum resulting in increased centralization (Conyers, 1984, p. 
190). 
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However, I attempt to avoid the dichotomy of the decentralisation- re-centralisation debate 
in this study by drawing on a Foucauldian understanding of power ‘as manifesting only in 
relations offers a framework’ (Berkhout, 2005, p. 318). This considers the ‘interactive force of 
networks and other structures and actors in a world of pluralistic policy-making’ (Berkhout, 2005, 
p. 318) offering a multi-layered analysis beyond the policy-practice gap and decentralisation-re-
centralisation rhetoric. In other words, such a theorisation takes a step back from a functional 
analysis and the focus on binary distinctions between decentralisation/ centralisation and policy/ 
practice. It aims to consider issues of education governance through capillary power, in which 
questions of governance, decentralisation and re-centralisation remain blurred and fluid.  
3.3.1.1 Definitions and forms of decentralisation  
This section draws on major theorists, such as McGinn and Welsh (1999) as well Cheema 
and Rondinelli (2007), providing a defined understanding of decentralisation and the multiple 
sub-forms it embraces. In light of the changing nature of governance influenced by global trends, 
Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) understand decentralisation as follows:  
Decentralization now encompasses not only the transfer of power, authority, and 
responsibility within government but also the sharing of authority and resources for shaping public 
policy within society (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007, p. 6). 
This definition highlights that government entities, the private sector and civil associations 
negotiate the sharing of power. New public management systems, implying deregulation and 
privatisation for efficiency and effectiveness, have been the major drivers of devolution. 
Decentralisation is often presented as a means to empower participants in decision-making 
and contribute to socio-economic growth. Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) explain that the 
underlying rationale of democratic governance is two-fold: it not only offers an institutional 
framework for the participation of citizens in economic and political processes but also favours 
human rights and values as ends in themselves. However, administrative decentralisation,  in the 
case of de-concentration, not only promotes greater political participation but also implies the risk 
of extending ‘state control to territorial units’ (Rondinelli, 1990, p. 494). This is of particular 
importance in this research as the Beninese government tends to privilege de-concentration over 
devolution.  
Rizvi and Lingard (2010) distinguish democratic devolution from functional and fiscal 
devolution: democratic devolution points to democratic participation, local control and 
community decision-making, whereas functional decentralisation is often linked to accountability 
and transparency. In contrast, Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) distinguish four forms of 
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decentralisation: administrative, political, fiscal, and economic. Administrative decentralisation 
points to the sub-concepts of de-concentration, delegation and decentralised cooperation, whereas 
political decentralisation can be understood as the ‘devolution of powers and authority to local 
units of government’ to increase citizen participation (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007, p. 7). 
Although of less importance for this study, fiscal decentralisation can imply fiscal cooperation, 
fiscal delegation or fiscal autonomy, whereas economic decentralisation points to market 
liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and public-private-partnerships. As the concepts have 
become more complex, so have their goals of embracing increased economic development, 
political accountability, and public participation (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). 
Figure 7 represents different forms of decentralisation as administrative reforms based on 
Rondinelli (1980). The least extensive form of decentralisation is de-concentration. This involves 
shifting the workload from the central ministry headquarters to government staff located in offices 
outside the national capital. It is a form of spatial relocation and reorganisation of power. 
Delegation is another form of decentralisation, whereby decision-making and the management 
authority for specific functions are delegated to bodies, which are only under the indirect control 
of central government ministries, such as specialist agencies. Devolution is a more pronounced 
form of decentralisation and points to the strengthening or the creation of local governments, 
although it can be extended to the school level, while privatisation refers to a transfer of ownership 
and responsibilities from the government to the private sector. For this study, de-concentration 
and devolution are the relevant forms of decentralisation.  
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Figure 7 Four forms of administrative decentralisation (author’s compilation based on Rondinelli, 1980) 
Although decentralisation is often linked to neo-liberalism, decentralisation reforms can be 
embedded in different political traditions. Sayed (1999) suggests, for example, that either the 
political left or right can initiate the conception and implementation of decentralisation reforms. 
Decentralisation is not only differently motivated, but also different political traditions shape the 
decentralisation reform in different ways. For example, McGinn and Welsh (1999) identify 
different decentralisation types according to questions of political legitimacy, professional 
expertise and market efficiency, which are political decentralisation, expert decentralisation and 
decentralisation driven by market reforms.  
Political legitimacy reforms imply a shift from professional to political control and are 
feasible in ‘strong states’ with a high level of social equity, whereby decision-makers at lower 
levels in the system have to be ‘experts’ who know the ‘best practices’ (McGinn and Welsh, 
1999). If the objective is to maximise community participation in decision-making, this is a form 
of political decentralisation. In contrast, expert decentralisation occurs if the objective is to 
minimise variations in school quality and to maximise overall school effectiveness, under the 
assumption that a small set of ‘best practices’ will likely result in higher levels of performance. 
Decision-makers at the lower level have to be experts or persons trained to a sufficient level of 
expertise (McGinn and Welsh, 1999). Market efficiency, also known as finance-driven or 
competitiveness-driven reforms, is closer to the privatisation of education. The concept identifies 
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public and private choice: Public choice offers choices to communities, whereas private choice 
enables the increased freedom of individual parents (McGinn and Welsh, 1999).  
Following this general discussion of decentralisation and its sub-concepts, a contextualised 
understanding of decentralisation is provided in the next section. Berkhout (2005, p. 316) points 
out that ‘individual terms that appear similar,  often have different referential implications and 
are embedded in different constructions of meaning’. Similarly, Grauwe et al. (2005) point out 
that particular kinds of understanding of decentralisation are differently translated in the reality 
of West-Africa. 
3.3.1.2 Decentralisation in the context of this study 
In the Beninese context, the PONADEC implies several subtypes of decentralisation, 
whereby the sub-concepts of devolution and de-concentration are central. Interestingly, the 
decentralisation policy does not explicitly clarify these concepts, but its implementation Plan2D 
did five years later. It states in the appendix:  
Decentralisation is a political reform aimed at empowering people in the management of 
local affairs through elected bodies and citizen participation mechanisms for local development. 
It is based on the following institutional changes: 
- The transfer of powers, responsibilities and patrimonies following the laws and 
regulations governing the municipalities and the PONADEC […].  
- The transfer of budgetary resources following the code of local communities 
[municipalities] and the budget law of each budget year […] (MEMP and 
MDGLAAT, 2015, p. 113).31  
Keywords in this definition are the elected body, which indicates that this definition can be 
understood as devolution (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). The definition gives equal weight to 
the municipalities as elected bodies and civil society. Decentralisation is presented as a means to 
promote local development.  
De-concentration, in contrast, is defined as follows:  
De-concentration is a public reform involving (i) the separation of strategic missions from 
implementation missions and (ii) the delegation of powers and funds to the dismantled structures of 
                                                          
31 La décentralisation est une réforme politique visant à responsabiliser les populations dans la gestion 
des affaires locales à travers des instances élues et des mécanismes de participation citoyenne au 
développement local. Elle repose sur les mutations institutionnelles suivantes: le transfert des 
compétences, pouvoirs et patrimoines conformément aux textes législatifs et réglementaires régissant les 
communes et la PONADEC. […] ; le transfert de ressources budgétaires conformément au code des 
collectivités locales et à la Loi de finances de chaque exercice budgétaire […]. 
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an institution. It comprises two dimensions: administrative de-concentration and budgetary de-
concentration […] (MEMP and MDGLAAT, 2015, p. 113).32 
From this definition, the aim of de-concentration is to bring the administration closer to the 
administered. The French term for décentralisation refers to devolution, while déconcentration 
indicates a hybrid form of de-concentration and delegation (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). For 
consistency, I use devolution for the French term décentralisation and de-concentration for the 
French term déconcentration.  
As concepts of decentralisation and governance have changed rapidly and constantly in the 
context of globalisation, I discuss their interlinkages and changing nature in the next section. 
3.3.1.3 Decentralisation as a global governance reform  
Decentralisation is part of the new global governance reform calling for participatory 
governance through legal and policy frameworks (UNESCO, 2015), as stated in the introduction 
(chapter 0). In this section, I first discuss the concepts of governance and globalisation separately 
and then how they relate to each other. I put forward that policy-making is no longer the 
responsibility of the nation-state but influenced by multiple stakeholders. In that regard, it links 
back to a previous discussion on policy borrowing and lending, in which I argued that it is the 
interplay between national governments and global actors that makes education policies travel 
and show a remarkable similarity (cf. section 3.2.1.3).  
The Global Education Monitoring Report (GEMR) (2009) defines governance as the 
operationalisation of ‘the responsibilities of national and subnational governments’ and ‘decision-
making from the national finance or education ministry down to the classroom and community’ 
(UNESCO, 2009b, p. 6), whereas decentralisation implies a transfer of responsibilities and 
resources from the national to a subordinate level, as the previous definitional discussion of 
decentralisation has shown (cf. section 3.3.1.1). Furthermore, governance systems define ‘who 
decides on policies, how resources are distributed across society and how governments are held 
accountable’ (UNESCO, 2009b, p. 129), which links back to the discussion on policy (cf. section 
3.2.1). 
Although globalisation does not explain changes in governance and decentralisation 
reforms, the processes of globalisation interact with reform processes. Cheema and Rondinelli 
                                                          
32 La déconcentration est une réforme publique portant sur (i) la séparation des missions d’ordre 
stratégique des missions de mise en œuvre et (ii) la délégation de pouvoirs et de crédits aux structures 
démembrées d’une institution. Elle comprend deux dimensions : la déconcentration administrative et la 
déconcentration budgétaire. […] 
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(2007) understand globalisation as the de-concentration of economic activity to subnational levels 
to increase the participation of individuals and enterprises. Steiner-Khamsi (2012) argues that 
imagined globalisation has affected the agenda setting of education policies in such a way that 
systems in the same ‘educational space’ align to global agendas. Linking governance and 
globalisation, Verger et al. (2012, p. 10) define the global governance of education as the 
'redefinition of the relationship between education and the State'. In other words, governance 
implies changes in government because of the effects of globalisation (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). 
Steiner-Khamsi (2012) goes further and insists that global governance is more than the sum of 
national governance systems; it is about the tension between state autonomy and the dynamic of 
global networks which challenges policy formulation and implementation. 
[G]lobalisation is not an external force, but rather a domestically induced rhetoric 
mobilised at particular moments of protracted policy conflict, to generate reform pressure and 
build policy advocacy coalitions (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012, p. 49).  
Similarly, Moutsios (2009) argues that policy-making takes place trans-nationally, 
implying that 'national borders are eliminated and mixed up and power flows from the global 
sphere into nation-states’ arenas of power' (Moutsios, 2009, p. 471). This view of the link between 
globalisation and global governance resonates with Rizvi and Lingard’s (2010) view about the 
post-Westphalian conception of the state. Policy formulation and implementation are no longer 
within the authority of the nation-state, but multiple stakeholders negotiate which kind of 
educational policies underpinned by particular values are on the agenda of national governments. 
Previously, the government could be considered as the embodiment of the state, but more recently, 
Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) proposed considering the government as a governance institution. 
Likewise, Rizvi and Lingard (2010) argue that the nation-state no longer has authority over the 
policy process but that ‘the interests of a whole range of policy actors’ negotiate the form and 
content of policies. This observation raises the question of who the dominant stakeholders are, 
for instance IOs. 
IOs, which I broadly understand as bi- and multilateral agencies, can be conceptualised as 
‘relatively autonomous sources of power’. Their power is anchored in the ‘legitimacy of the 
rational-legal authority’ through their representation and the control over information (Verger, 
Novelli and Altinyelken, 2012, pp. 16–17). Barnett and Finnemore (2004) explain that 
transnational organisations exercise power through three mechanisms: firstly, they classify the 
world e.g. through international standardised examinations such as the Programme of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for International Student 
Assessment (PISA); secondly, by fixing meanings in the social world (e.g. defining educational 
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development through indicators and benchmarks); thirdly, by articulating and disseminating new 
norms, principles and beliefs (e.g. through disseminating ‘best’ practices).  
Finally, globalisation needs to be considered in relation to post-colonialism. The new 
transnational networks emerging from globalisation ‘imply the need to re-think narratives of 
colonisation and anti-colonisation’ because they cannot be disassociated from their roots in 
European imperialism (Rizvi, Lingard and Lavia, 2006, pp. 254–255). Even though both concepts 
have different roots and foci - postcolonial theory in cultural studies focuses on place, identity, 
difference, the nation and modes of resistance and contrasts with globalisation in social studies, 
which focuses on issues of governance, among others. One of the major contributions of 
postcolonial theory is to consider ‘the discursive and cultural practices […] as essential to the 
production and maintenance of colonial relations’ (Rizvi, Lingard and Lavia, 2006, p. 256).  
Therefore, this research also addresses of how this study speaks to the postcolonial 
condition. Tikly (2019) defines the postcolonial condition in discursive and material terms, 
i.e. in terms of the constitutive effects of different discourses of development on the way 
that social reality and postcolonial identities are constructed but also materially, as an aspect of the 
cultural political economy of globalisation (Tikly, 2019, p. 223).  
Following this quote, I understand the post-colonial condition from a postcolonial and 
global perspective, as well as in terms of discourse and practice. Globalisation from a 
contemporary perspective, and postcolonialism from a historical perspective, share the same 
conceptual territory in that both concepts refer to reciprocal relationships between actor groups, 
complicated networks of complicities and internal power imbalances (Rizvi, Lingard and Lavia, 
2006).  
Summing-up this section, I argue that the global and national are co-produced. From a 
Foucauldian (2003b, 2003a) perspective, it is about the dominance of particular discourses or the 
capillary ways in which global discourses, such as the global governance agenda, permeate 
national and local contexts, such as in the Beninese case. Inherently involved within these 
structures, and thus decentralisation, are questions of power and power relations in society, which 
are reviewed in the next section. 
3.3.2 Power 
Acknowledging that traditional understandings of state power, sovereignty and 
decentralisation are anchored in a structural understanding of power, as are parts of the analysis 
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of this study, I lean towards a Foucauldian influenced understanding of power, while both 
contrasting this with and borrowing from a Critical Realist conception where appropriate. This 
understanding and positioning are in line with the overall methodology of this thesis, subscribing 
to critical and post-paradigms in using different analytical approaches in this study, as discussed 
in section 3.2.2, and taken up again in section 4.2. More specifically, the above is also coherent 
with using a Foucauldian conception of discourse rather than a semiotic understanding for the 
CDA of the policy of decentralisation, as proposed in section 3.2.2.1 and exemplified in chapter 
5. Finally, it subscribes to the implications of a post-development framework (cf. section 3.3): 
either power as acting externally upon people, viewing people as subjects, as 
recipients/receptacles/objects of these policies without voice and expression, or 
resisting/remaking/signifying these. 
Informed by Foucault, I understand power as a  
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere […]; as the process which […] 
transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one 
another; and lastly, as the strategies  in which they take effect (Foucault, 1978, pp. 92–93). 
Perhaps one of the most important characteristics is that power is exercised ‘in the interplay 
of nonegalitarian and mobile relations’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 94) rather than acquired, as the 
following quote clarifies. 
Nobody holds power, but the lines of power become unfolded in the sense of ourselves. 
[…] Power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised’ (Foucault, 2003a, 
p. 351).  
According to Dore (2010), power is normative, productive and omnipresent. He proposes 
that power has a normative force ‘in proportion to its ability to persuade, incite, influence, direct, 
repress or control the conduct of the other’(Dore, 2010, p. 738). He explains that ‘force’ has a 
coercive meaning which can, but does not have to be, a physical threat. Second, power is 
productive. ‘The productive aspect of power […] produces truth and reality’ (Dore, 2010, p. 739). 
Dore adds that not only are truth and reality identified, but also individuals and the knowledge 
behind them. Third, power is omnipresent. To this end, Foucault suggests that 
[p]ower is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). 
This understanding implies that power is produced in moments and relations contingent  to 
each other. 
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Relations of power are immanent in other types of relationships, e.g.  political,  economic 
or social. They can be considered as ‘the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and the 
disequilibriums’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 94); and they are productive.  
Of interest to this study is the idea that power can come from below to undo the binary 
notion of ruler/ ruled, the traditional notion of state authority- as a unitary state in the Beninese 
case- and its sovereign character. Even though the policy of decentralisation aims to devolve 
responsibilities from the central to sub-ordinate levels, this conception of power implies that 
power can be exercised at various levels and among various actors, reviewing the hierarchical 
understanding of institutions and individuals within a government and their capacities to exercise 
power. This idea is illustrated in chapter 6, where I discuss the analysis of power relationships 
from a structural and a post-structural understanding, i.e. the idea that decentralisation reform 
strengthens the central and municipal government entities to the detriment of parents and teachers, 
and contrast this with decentralisation manifesting itself in dynamic and potentially changeable 
actor-networks. Foucault calls this the rules of continual variations. Instead of thinking of who 
has power, e.g. the governor over the mayor, Foucault invites us to look at ‘patterns of 
modification’ as ‘relations of power-knowledge are “matrices of transformations”’ (Foucault, 
1978, p. 99). 
Also of interest for this study is the idea of resistance implied by power. Foucault (1978, p. 
95) talks about a ‘multiplicity of points of resistance’, which are ‘present everywhere in the power 
network’. The ‘plurality of resistances […] can only exist in the strategic field of power relations’. 
This is comparable to power relations forming a dense web, so does ‘resistance traverse social 
stratifications and individual unities’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 96).  The analytical chapters deal in 
different ways with forms of resistance to the enactment of the decentralisation policy. For 
example, chapter 5 argues that the non-adoption of the implementation plan by the Beninese 
government can be considered as a form of resistance, whereas chapter 6 discusses the varied and 
multiple forms of resistance of local actors in the mediation of the policy.  
Foucault’s theorisation of power is particularly useful for unpacking decentralisation as an 
inherently structural concept to shed light on some of the complex and unstable dimensions of the 
enactment of education decentralisation. In particular, Foucault (1978, p. 93) reminds us that 
power ‘is the moving substrate of force relations which by virtue of their inequality constantly 
engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable’. As such, it is neither an 
institution nor a structure but rather ‘a complex strategical situation in a particular society’. 
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However, this conceptualisation also raises questions about how Foucault’s conception of power 
speaks to structures and hierarchies, as discussed in the next sub-section.  
3.3.2.1 Bringing a structural and a post-structural understanding of power into conversation  
[R]elations of power are understood as established and maintained through discourse and 
through positions taken up and made possible within particular discourses (Davies & Harré, 2000; 
Davies, 2008b). Power is seen as complex and unstable. […] These concepts are treated differently 
within critical, postmodern, and post-structural theories: indeed, their different takes on power, 
freedom, and agency act as distinguishing features between them (Gannon and Davies, 2014, p. 
67) 
As the above quotation explains, this section brings different takes on power relations, from 
a structural and a post-structural understanding of power, into the discussion. The Foucauldian 
concept of power contrasts with the Marxist idea of power, whether power can be possessed or 
simply exercised. From my viewpoint, Sayer (2012) usefully explores a critical realist view of 
power in comparison to Foucault’s. Firstly, Sayer asserts that ‘concepts of dispersed power [are] 
a potential possessed by all objects' (Sayer, 2012, p. 180). While the Foucauldian approach 
implies that power is exercised rather than possessed, Sayer suggests that power needs to be pre-
possessed to be exercised. Secondly, while Foucault (1978, 1988) refuses to classify power as 
good or bad beyond its productive/ destructive character, Sayer pleads for the ‘evaluation of 
power in terms of whether it causes flourishing or suffering […] for adequate description and 
explanation' (Sayer, 2012, p. 180). 
The underlying approach to bringing into conversation a structural and a post-structural 
understanding of power could be loosely framed as refraction as used in Webb’s thesis (2014). 
While I try to refract the paradigms in one concept in this section, the use of different analytical 
approaches/ paradigms could be framed as diffraction (Youngblood and Mazzei, 2012; Bozalek 
and Zembylas, 2017), that is, making explicit the different effects of the use of ANT and CDA 
respectively. By refraction, I mean bringing together different paradigms into one concept. In 
other words, I enrich this understanding by bringing in a critical realist perspective, even though 
I primarily draw on a Foucauldian informed understanding of power.  
Applying the idea of refraction to this study means that the whole study is written up in an 
arena of tension between a critical realist/ structuralist and a post-modernist/ post-structural 
understanding. This tension is expressed in the theorisation of power, on the one hand, and the 
analytical approaches rooted in different paradigms, on the other, but with a preference for a post-
modernist understanding of concepts. Returning to the structural/ post-structural conversation of 
power, Foucault’s (1984, 1988, 2003b, 2003a) work helps the understanding of how ‘the social 
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operates through techniques of discipline and regulation’ (Joseph, 2004, p. 144). In contrast, 
Critical Realism proposes a causality and a hierarchy of power relations. This conception of the 
power of the ‘structured and stratified world' is necessary for a traditionally conceived Marxist 
notion of ‘state power and its underlying structures’ (Joseph, 2004, p. 144). As such, 
decentralisation, as a governance reform, implies both acknowledging structure, such as the 
state’s structure, and a functional understanding of decentralisation, and in addition, the fluid and 
changeable process of governance in a global setting.  
The inherent tension between a structural versus a post-structural understanding of power 
is illustrated in the discussion of the empirical literature, in the next section.  
3.3.2.2 Power and decentralisation 
Power is part of most definitions of decentralisation and implicitly alludes to control, 
authority, supremacy, power or influence (Dictionary.com and Oxford University Press, 2020). 
Cheema and Rondinelli (2007, p. 6) define decentralisation as ‘the transfer of power, authority, 
and responsibility’ and similarly, Lauglo and McLean (1985) provide an education-specific 
definition for decentralisation using the notion of control for the concept of power:  
decentralisation is a transfer of the control of education from national to local bodies within 
a public governmental system (Lauglo and McLean, 1985, p. 3).  
Decentralisation shifts responsibilities and resources from one level to another, although 
the degree of power shift varies according to the sub-concepts of decentralisation. 
Sayed (1997) discusses the concepts of power and participation in the policy of education 
decentralisation in South Africa. By analysing three documents, which he considers as the keys 
to change in the discourses of education, he refers to an inherent tension between state control 
and individual freedom of consumer choice. He furthermore nuances participation, understood as 
the electoral process and the formulation of policy documents, as differently conceived in these 
key policy texts. For example, statutory consultative bodies are reduced to the role of 
‘consultation’. Monitoring bodies present an alternative option for citizen participation. Sayed 
contends that even though the particular goals and values instilled in the policy documents, such 
as parental participation, freedom and democracy, favour the idea of an individual with 
‘decentralised original power’, at least three limitations can be identified. Firstly, a particular 
version of democracy (mainly representative democracy) is implied. Secondly, the constitutional 
existence of one right may interfere with other rights; and thirdly, a ‘legalistic’ approach to rights 
can lead to complex legal procedures that marginalise minority groups.  
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In their comparative case study of four West African countries, Grauwe et al. (2005) point 
out that one of the central assumptions of decentralisation is the aims to widen the involvement 
of actors who do not belong to the community of education professionals. The authors state that 
the rather low involvement of local authorities in education varied, which can often be related to 
scarce resources (human, financial and material). Therefore, they argue that a ‘lack of 
involvement should therefore not be interpreted as an inherent characteristic of decentralization 
but more as the result of implementing decentralization in a context of scarcity’ (Grauwe et al., 
2005, p. 6). The relationship between the elected authorities and local education offices is as much 
one of conflict as of collaboration: ‘education officials refer to their professional legitimacy, while 
local authorities emphasize their political legitimacy’ (Grauwe et al., 2005, p. 6). The relationship 
between actors at the institutional level is much closer but not without tensions either. The close 
relationship between the head teacher and the president of the parents’ teacher association risks 
transforming the parents’ teacher association into an instrument of the head teacher that reinforces 
their authority over the school and the teachers. 
From a post-structural perspective, Berkhout (2005) challenges the conventional analysis 
of education decentralisation in her comparative study in Belgium and South Africa. Instead of 
proceeding to an ‘analysis of the functional (re-) distribution of power along the centre-periphery 
continuum in the public arena’, she uses a Foucauldian understanding of power which enables her 
to go beyond a merely functional analysis of the structural concept, decentralisation. A 
functionalist analysis, when power is conceived as ‘authority for decision-making’, revealed that 
‘decentralisation seldom constituted a clear shift or restructuring of power from the centre to the 
periphery, but was often an amalgamation of decentralisation and concealed centralisation 
measures’, according to Berkhout (2005, p. 316). In contrast, a Foucauldian influenced 
understanding of power ‘as manifesting only in relations offers a framework’, Berkhout (2005, p. 
15) suggests, for ‘rethinking the distribution of power and the decentralisation-centralisation 
dynamic’.  
As discussed in this section, questions of where power lies are inherent in concepts of 
decentralisation. Sayed (1997) discusses the concepts of power and involvement in the policy of 
education decentralisation in South Africa. He contends that even though there are particular goals 
and values instilled in the policy documents, such as parental participation, freedom and 
democracy, which favour the idea of an individual with 'decentralised original power', these 
documents are limited by questions of power. Grauwe et al. (2005) argue that the relationship 
between elected authorities and local education offices is as much one of conflict as of 
collaboration. While the relationship between actors at the institutional level is much closer, it is 
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not without tensions either. Berkhout’s (2005) conceptualisation of power, influenced by 
Foucault, goes beyond the practice of policy gap and a binary understanding of decentralisation/ 
re-centralisation by suggesting that power manifests itself in relationships and networks.  
From a structural perspective, power intersects with participation in that different degrees 
of participation are associated with different degrees of power or, as Arnstein (1969, p. 2016) 
states, ‘citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power‘. The next section sheds light 
on the concept of participation, which is conceptually related to decentralisation when 
decentralisation aims to increase citizen participation. 
3.3.3 Participation 
This section defines the concept of participation at its intersection with democracy, which 
provided a framework for analysing participation in this research, and finishes with a critical 
review of the concept. Arnstein (1969) understands  
citizen participation [as] a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power 
that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to 
be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining 
how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are 
operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it is the means by 
which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the 
affluent society (Arnstein, 1969, p. 216). 
Arnstein’s (1969) definition can be understood in the context of popular participation where 
participation aims at achieving a particular kind of power- people power- meaning that those who 
were previously oppressed achieve some degree of power through participation.  
Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) explored the different meanings of community 
participation to support and improve the quality of education provision through a case study in 
Ghana. They state that much of the theoretical and policy expectations on representation and 
participation in education by community members were only evident in form, but not in practice, 
despite the more comprehensive social and democratic governance reforms of 1987. They point 
out the need for a change in the professional culture to encourage teachers to incorporate a sense 
of serving the community into their roles and the importance of giving school management 
committees greater responsibility for teacher recruitment to achieve this end. Consequently, they 
conclude that:  
achieving a positive relationship with teachers is a first and most important step in the 
framework of a ‘social contract' between schools and community representatives (Essuman and 
Akyeampong, 2011, pp. 524–525).  
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Sayed’s (2010) review is based on a comparative case study of four regions (East Asia, 
East Africa, South Africa, and North Africa) to consider how far education governance and 
decentralisation have contributed to promoting equity, increased participation and improved 
education quality. Based on the analysis of these four case studies, Sayed (2010, p. 62) asks 'who 
benefits from policies of education decentralisation, what gets transferred and crucially [what is] 
the nature of democracy'. He furthermore points out the importance of knowing 'how services are 
delivered to where they are needed most, the extent to which education is responsive to local 
needs, and how institutions become spaces for active and empowering citizen action and 
participation' (Sayed, 2010, p. 62). Sayed argues that political and technical questions arise in the 
governance of education and recommends integrating a pedagogic model of devolved governance 
prioritising teaching and learning since simply granting schools greater autonomy does not 
necessarily improve the quality of education, the degree of participation or equity.  
All three authors in this section discuss the question of participation in education 
decentralisation. Sayed (2010) points out the need for a pedagogical model of devolved 
governance with a focus on teaching and learning, while Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) call 
for a change in the professional culture to encourage teachers to incorporate a sense of service to 
the community. Both studies show that decentralisation is not only a political or administrative 
matter of structure (institutions and their relationships) but that teachers 'as agents of change' are 
crucial for the implementation of decentralised reforms.  
Moreover, participation can be considered as the cornerstone of democracy (Arnstein, 
1969), particularly when it intersects with participatory forms of democracy. In the next section 
is a short discussion of how participation relates to an understanding of democracy and its 
particular forms. This discussion is important for this study because decentralisation is often 
linked to democracy. For example, the Literature and best practice review on educational 
decentralization (2004, pp. 4–11) writes that decentralisation can be viewed as ‘an integral part 
of democratization’. The empirical evidence is mixed, however, as to what extent democratisation 
and decentralisation are positively correlated.  
3.3.3.1 Participation and democracy 
This section gives definitions of democracy and outlines the intersection with 
decentralisation. Democracy can be understood in different ways. Some scholars suggest it means 
‘giving citizens equal political rights while defending large areas of society and the economy from 
‘political inference’’, while others suggest that ‘democracy has only been achieved when the 
aspirations of the masses are no longer thwarted by the powerful’ (Pinkney, 1993, p. 2). Bobbio 
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(1987) defines a minimal form of democracy, influenced by Rousseau, as a system where all adult 
citizens regardless of their situation can possess political rights and can vote on common issues, 
and where each vote has equal weight. Citizens can furthermore form their opinion freely in a 
context of free competition between rival political parties. Their choice is free in the sense that 
they have alternatives to choose from and they are bound by the majority decision, keeping in 
mind the principle that at least in theory the majority cannot bind the rights of the minority. 
As decentralisation intersects with democracy through participation, I discuss participatory 
forms of democracy in more detail. Participatory democracy assumes that participants within an 
institution are equally entitled to take part in decisions, which affect their work in their 
institutional settings. It furthermore stresses that the institution has relative autonomy, free from 
excessive external control. Lauglo (1995) suggests that participatory democracy consists of a mix 
of syndicalist and anarchist forms of socialism, emerging from the student movements in the late 
1960s and 1970s, which gave rise to neo-Marxist ideas. In participatory forms of democracy, 
voluntarism is vital with the aim of keeping norms, rules and regulations to a minimum, e.g. it 
could point to more scope for voluntarism in styles of learning. Also, it promotes ’empowering 
the powerless in developing countries' (Lauglo, 1995, p. 15). Institutions, such as schools and 
universities, are at the base of participatory democracies alongside some ‘communalist’ social 
forms outside these institutions. Participatory forms of democracy also gave rise to participatory 
forms of school governance, such as school committees, whereby the rationale is to distribute 
authority in an egalitarian way.  
As outlined in chapter 2, Benin’s history was marked by a socialist government with 
participatory elements in the 70s and 80s (Gisselquist, 2008), before transitioning into a liberal 
form of democracy in 1990 (Ngwane, 2006). Socialist democracies aim for equality and social 
justice, but they are not necessarily representative of the population through electoral competition 
as social democracies. Liberal forms of democracy, replaced many socialist governments after 
the end of the cold war, taking account of the rights and duties of the individual rather than society 
as a whole. They are criticised for privileging the voices of those who are already privileged, 
which is problematic in contexts of high inequality, particularly in the Global South (Pinkney, 
1993; Lauglo, 1995).  
To round off this section, I review some empirical literature that examines the question of 
how decentralisation and democracy relate to each other. Even though decentralisation and 
democracy seem to be inherently related in that decentralisation should widen democracy through 
citizenry participation in decision-making, Lauglo (1997) contends that at least three major 
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reasons show that decentralisation does not necessarily increase democratic behaviour. Firstly, by 
transferring some responsibilities to sub-national units, educational outcomes favouring the whole 
of society are limited. In particular, he argues that the decentralisation of certain aspects of the 
curriculum could lead to social disorganisation and a weakening of democracy. Second, 
democracy requires motivated and capable individuals and organisations to exercise their rights 
and duties. Often, however, communities lack the resources and skills to participate in a 
democratic society. Thirdly, democracy implies shared goals on the one hand and tolerance for 
diversity and disagreement on the other hand. Democracies suffer, however, when societies 
promote the ‘achievement of excellence’ because they favour certain groups over others.  
Putting decentralisation into context with democracy, participation and empowerment in 
the Global South, Kulipossa (2004) argues that  
the contribution of decentralisation to the fostering of democracy, participation, and 
empowerment is contingent on the coincidence of many factors and/or conditions at local and 
national levels (Kulipossa, 2004, p. 774).  
This statement suggests that decentralisation can be pursued in the absence of democracy, 
participation, and empowerment. The contingency of other factors and conditions at different 
levels of a governance system is an important argument to understand the (dis-) connection 
between decentralisation and democracy.  
Many scholars have found a causal relationship between decentralisation, democracy, and 
participation (e.g. Olowu, 1997; Brian Smith, 1985 in Kulipossa, 2004), yet just as many are 
critical about causal relationship between decentralisation, democracy, and participation (e.g. 
Crook and Manor (1998) and Wolman (1990) in Kulipossa, 2004). Following on from this generic 
discussion of participation and democracy, I introduce a framework for the analysis of 
participation in the next section. In particular, I draw on Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation 
for the empirical part of this study, notably chapter 6. His framework is helpful for this study 
because it focuses on the role of the citizen in the context of political decision-making.  
3.3.3.2 Arnstein’s typology of participation 
Arnstein (1969) distinguishes eight degrees of citizen participation on a ladder from the 
least involvement to the most extensive form. The two least extensive forms of participation are 
manipulation and therapy, whereby I understand manipulation as when 'participants' think they 
are involved, but their participation is only symbolic and may even be to their detriment. Therapy 
is similar to manipulation, but in a context where the participants become 'pathologised', in the 
sense that rather than taking account of the structures contributing the pathology of the citizen, 
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the focus is on curing the illness. Participants are forced into participation, in the same way into 
clinical group therapies. Arnstein (1969) considers these two types as forms of non-participation 
because they serve to either ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the citizen.  
He defines the next two rungs, ‘information and consultation’, as the first legitimate steps 
towards citizen’s participation. However, information can imply informing without participating, 
in other words, 'participants' are informed, but have little or no channels to offer feedback. 
Consultation, which is a dominant form of the agenda-setting and the formulation of education 
decentralisation in the context of this study, serves as a forum for bringing people with different 
degrees of power together, but in Arnstein’s (1969, p. 217) words, the ‘have-nots’ ‘lack the power 
to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful’. Placation, the fifth rung, enables 
citizens to have some influence, but it depends on their capacities, their quantitative representation 
to the more powerful, and to what extent their voices are heard. Citizens have only an advisory 
role in that regard. These three levels of participation can be considered as degrees of tokenism 
because they pretend to be participation without effectively enabling individuals to partake 
(Arnstein, 1969).  
The following rungs, which are partnership, delegation and citizen control, can be 
considered degrees of citizen participation and interrelate with the sub-concepts of 
decentralisation. Partnership can be understood as a redistribution of power between citizens and 
power-holders to share planning and decision-making responsibilities through particular 
structures. Partnership participation requires, however, certain pre-conditions to be met, such as 
a well-organised community and sufficient financial resources. Based on his case studies, 
Arnstein states that the city is not the power-holder, but the citizens themselves negotiate power.  
Since those who have power normally want to hang onto it, historically it has had to be 
wrested by the powerless rather than proffered by the powerful (Arnstein, 1969, p. 22). 
In the case of delegation, power is delegated to the citizen for a particular purpose in which 
they have authority over decision-making, whereas in the case of citizen control, citizens can run 
programmes (e.g. a community school), or govern an institution (e.g. town council or be 
responsible for policy and managerial issues). Arnstein (1969, p. 216) considers these two forms 
as achieved when ‘have-not citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full 
managerial power’.  
Arnstein (1969) considers the two first types of participation (manipulation and therapy) as 
forms of non-participation, as they only serve to either ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the citizen. He 
conceptualises the next three levels of participation as degrees of tokenism because they pretend 
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to share power without effectively enabling participation. The following rungs, which are 
partnership, delegation, and citizen control, can be considered as degrees of citizen participation 
and relate to the sub-concepts of decentralisation. In particular, Arnstein (1969) considers 
delegation and citizen control as achieved forms of participation. All degrees of participation that 
imply the empowerment of some and disempowerment of others have their risks, however. The 
power-holders may have racist, paternalist attitudes and resist power redistribution, whereas the 
less powerful may have difficulty ‘organizing a representative and accountable citizens’ group’ 
and may face ‘inadequacies of the poor community’s political socioeconomic infrastructure and 
knowledge-base’ (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217).  
I consider Arnstein's (1969) typology as useful insofar as it relates to and coheres with 
Rondinelli's (1980) typology of decentralisation in terms of how degrees of citizen participation 
cohere with ways of redistributing responsibility and power. Furthermore, participation has 
emerged as an important theme for active groups and levels in this research, and I share with 
Arnstein’s (1969, p. 217) concept that there are ‘150 rungs with less sharp and “pure” 
distinctions’. The eight categories present an over-simplification of a complex phenomenon. I 
also appreciate that he acknowledges that ‘neither the have-nots nor the power-holders are 
homogeneous blocs’ (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217). I reject, however, the view that power, and hence 
participation, are possessed and fixed within people or groups of people, but rather see them as 
fluid, relational and non-hierarchical.  
While Arnstein (1969) differentiates between eight forms of participation, I use a looser 
understanding of participation to view these forms as constitutive and not mutually exclusive. In 
the analysis of the data, I often considered more than one ‘category’ as relevant, e.g. in the case 
of parents, as I assume that their voice and engagement constantly adapt within their interaction 
with other actors, such as teachers or NGOs. Thus, participation and power are constantly re-
negotiated and depend on all the actors involved and the particular space in which the (re-) 
negotiation takes place. As such, categorising the degree of participation and power often felt 
uncomfortable, and I consider Arnstein’s (1969) typology as a set of useful capturing snapshots, 
but which can undergo alteration at any moment in time.  
The critique of the typology of participation leads to a further critique of the concept of 
participation itself, as discussed in the following section. Even though I decided to use this 
concept for this study, as the analysis of decentralisation brings up questions of participation 
through the (re-)distribution of power, I remain critical of its usefulness in light of its historical 
genesis in development. Sachs (2010) points to the connotation of the modernity surrounding 
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discourses of decentralisation, such as development, planning, participation and State, which all 
serve the development machinery, as he argues. 
3.3.3.3 Critiquing the concept of participation  
Rahnema (2010) provides a critique of the concept of participation centring on its 
instrumental use for achieving greater effectiveness, its potential to allow greater involvement of 
the private sector. Although history has shown that participation, particularly in its forced forms, 
has led to many negative consequences, such as the holocaust under Nazi Germany, he argues 
that it is no longer perceived as a threat, but has become politically and economically attractive. 
However, he distances himself from the instrumental use of the concept, particularly in the 
contexts of development interventions, as the following quote shows.  
This is how the pioneering participatory mendicants of the early development years were 
also robbed of their participatory ideal, as the latter was transmogrified into the present-day 
manipulative construct of participatory development (Rahnema, 2010, p. 141). 
In this quote, Rahnema (2010) alludes to the point that development interventions aiming 
for macro-change are often rejected by the many micro-changes questioning the dominant 
knowledge/ power centres.  
Similarly, Edwards and Klees (2015) argue that participation is instrumentalised through 
liberal governance systems in the sense that participation is used to legitimise policy 
interventions.  
In other words, liberal approaches tend to enable and sustain participation only as a front-end 
process that does not carry over to program management or policy implementation (Edwards and 
Klees, 2015, p. 491).  
They argue that governmental and nongovernmental representatives use participation, 
claiming that it results in better data analysis and problem identification besides increased 
ownership. Nevertheless, it is often conceived as top-down participation and limited to 
consultation according to Arnstein’s ladder of participation. ‘As such, they tend to reify, rather 
than redirect, those processes and structures into which they are fed’, which implies that ‘liberal 
participation maintains rather than challenges the status quo’ (Edwards and Klees, 2015, p. 491). 
Albeit brief, the critiques of Edwards and Klees (2015) as well as Rahnema (2010), 
highlight the instrumental use of participation in liberal democracies and the development sphere 
more broadly. As an alternative, Rahnema (2010) suggests other forms of participation anchored 
in endogenous movements and knowledge. This view is important in light of chapter 7, in which 
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I argue that education decentralisation is influenced by both endogenous and exogenous 
formations. I propose, thus, that greater importance should be given to endogenous knowledge 
and experience in designing social policies regarding the implications of this study (cf. chapter 
8).  
The second part of the literature review has reviewed the main concepts of this study, which 
are decentralisation, power and participation. I will come back to these concepts in the conceptual 
framework about how they relate to each other and how they are used in this study. The third part 
of this chapter reviews the empirical literature on education decentralisation. 
3.4 Conditions and effects of education decentralisation 
A discussion of the conditions for and effects of education decentralisation reforms follows 
in this section. I review the empirical literature concerning education decentralisation, particularly 
but not exclusively in SSA. It focuses on the transfer of resources and accountability in terms of 
conditions, and issues of inequity and marginalisation as well as quality in terms of the effects of 
decentralisation.  
3.4.1 Conditions  
3.4.1.1 Transfer of resources 
In the context of Benin, Odushina et al. (2008) examined the impact of decentralisation on 
the management of local school actors. Their research, based on three cases studies of local school 
authorities, and six schools in urban, semi-urban and rural parts of Benin, draws several important 
conclusions regarding the transfer of skills and resources. Despite the vital role of local school 
authorities in managing education, they do not have sufficient resources to support their schools 
pedagogically, the authors argue. At school level, the transfer of skills shows a willingness to give 
more responsibility and autonomy to local actors, e.g. via local subsidies for schools. Although 
school-based management has resources at their disposal and strengthened responsibilities as part 
of the legal framework, they lack support and funding. Indeed, despite the presumed autonomy 
of local actors in school management, they remain dependent on their external partners, such as 
parents’ associations and NGOs (Odushina et al., 2008).  
In the West African context, Grauwe et al. (2005) extended the understanding of resources 
as not restricted to funding but to the credibility and the social networks of the actors involved. 
In their comparative study of education decentralisation in four West African countries (Benin, 
Mali, Guinea and Senegal), they suggest furthermore that ‘resources, competencies and assets are 
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not immobile; they change continuously, and governments have opportunities and the obligation 
to impact upon them’ (Grauwe et al., 2005, p. 13). Nevertheless, it is not only a question of lacking 
financial resources but also how these are managed: firstly, the central level makes resources 
available within tight budget lines, which restricts the autonomy of municipal and local actors. 
Secondly, the transferred funds do not take into account the characteristics and needs of each 
district and its schools. Thirdly, the use of resources lacks transparency. Grauwe et al. (2007) 
point to the risk that ‘the lack of transparency reinforces the monopoly of power exercised by 
certain individuals within many offices and localities, which in itself is the cause of that lack of 
transparency’.  
Odushina et al.’s (2008) study, as well as Grauwe et al.'s (2005) study, have shown how 
the lack of transfer (skills, finances etc.) limits the autonomy of local actors and how the absence 
of transparency creates centres of powers. Odushina et al. explicitly point to the limited autonomy 
of local actors through constrained transfer of resources, while Grauwe et al. only mention it 
implicitly, pointing rather to the exercise of power by individuals in lack of transparency 
situations. Autonomy, when restricted by limited resources, is often discussed together with issues 
of control and accountability, as the next section illustrates.  
3.4.1.2 Accountability  
Gershberg, González and Meade (2012) examined the implementation of education 
decentralisation reforms that attempted to improve incentives and accountability through a 
combination of voice, exit, and institutional and management arrangements. They use the 
accountability framework of the World Bank (2003) aimed at ‘providing better services to the 
poor’ (Gershberg, González and Meade, 2012, p. 1025) which they developed further based on 
three case studies in Latin America (Chile, Nicaragua, and Colombia). This framework outlines 
the actors and relationships that are important for understanding the accountability functions in 
education service provision. The underlying assumption of the accountability framework is that 
‘holding service providers accountable for delivering expected results is key to successful 
education outcomes’ (Gershberg, González and Meade, 2012, p. 1025). The authors questioned 
the added value of stressing the impact of long-term, system-wide accountability reform processes 
depended on student results, and the transferability of the results of the evaluation to support 
reform strategies in other contexts. In their conclusions, they plead for a balance between ‘clear 
and efficient top-down monitoring and enforcement’ (Gershberg, González and Meade, 2012, p. 
1024) combined with other accountability measures, such as robust local quality support systems.  
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Autonomy is often discussed in the context of control or accountability, as do Gershberg, 
González and Meade (2012). Rwiza (2014) examined how head teachers in Tanzania harmonise 
different roles to achieve autonomy, external accountability and be competitive. Her study, which 
is informed by political discourse analysis and decolonising theories, found that the adoption of 
new roles in the context of education decentralisation creates conflict and imbalance. She suggests 
that educational policies should not only be separated from market influences but also 
decolonised. Qi (2017) explores the decentralisation of basic education in Shanghai, notably the 
devolution of the decision-making authority to local education departments and the introduction 
of policies for private schools granting them more autonomy. She considers this form of 
decentralisation as county-based school decentralisation since it allocates some of the decision-
making authority over a number of areas in the public school sector to the three county bureaux 
of education. She offers some recommendations about first, how to promote school 
decentralisation, and second, how to balance it with accountability. 
Gershberg, González and Meade (2012) plead for top-down monitoring mechanisms in 
combination with local quality support systems to improve the quality of local services.  Rwiza 
(2014) examined how head teachers in Tanzania positively combine the needs of autonomy, 
external accountability and competition in light of the dialectic between accountability and 
autonomy. Qi (2017) explored the decentralisation of basic education in Shanghai, discussing 
how to promote school decentralisation on the one hand, and accountability on the other. What 
they have in common is the inherent tension in decentralisation of allocating greater autonomy to 
sub-national levels while ensuring some form of accountability. The next section examines 
questions of inequity and marginalisation as well as quality as some common effects of 
decentralisation reforms. 
3.4.2 Effects 
3.4.2.1 Inequity and marginalisation 
Sayed and Soudien (2005) examined how the framework of decentralisation and factors of 
inclusion and exclusion in the South African context related to each other and how the focus on 
inclusion can exacerbate the problem of exclusion. Concentrating on governance, access and 
curriculum, they argue that  
decentralisation reforms that have been adopted in post-apartheid South Africa, as 
administrative and legislative mechanisms to deal with the divisive effects of apartheid, have 
themselves produced new forms of exclusion (Sayed and Soudien, 2005, p. 116). 
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Administrative and legal decentralisation led to a state divided between the centre and the 
decentralised provinces with parallel responsibilities. The reasons for exclusion lie in the 
distribution of responsibilities and resources as well as in the process of juridification 
(codification of the legislation). Firstly, decentralisation means that funds from national level 
funds are distributed to the counties and other sites but is not involved in the management and 
control of schools within these sites. Secondly, the process of juridification constrains rather than 
controls because the interpretation of the law is often contested. As a consequence, the ‘process 
of juridification of the political process […] (re)sites conflict between the centre and provinces, 
from the political arena, to the judiciary’ (Sayed and Soudien, 2005, p. 118). The authors argue 
that the re-articulation and representation of the legislation emerged from the policy tension 
between choice and democracy.  
Rasmussen (2011, 2013) analysed public service delivery and democratic decentralisation 
reform within the primary education sector in Benin. She argues that heterogeneity will always 
exist in conditions of access to public services, but variations are extreme in a context, like Benin, 
with a highly fragmented system of public authority. Consequently, decentralisation leaves room 
for the marginalisation of some groups at the local level and the abuse of public authority, e.g. in 
the unequal distribution of school materials. In the education sector, there seems to be a return to 
the centralised functioning of the state, whereby the role of the municipality is only minor in law 
and even more limited in practice. Despite the constitutional objective of free primary education 
for all children, varying costs remain for educational materials, teaching infrastructure and 
teachers. Increased state intervention in the sector of primary education can reduce parents' 
charges, but access to a high, or even reasonable, quality of education remains an unsolved 
problem (Rasmussen, 2011, 2013), as studies in other contexts have also demonstrated (Grauwe 
et al., 2005; Gershberg, González and Meade, 2012).  
Relevant to this study is how the legislation affects the enactment of education 
decentralisation, as shown by Sayed and Soudien (2005). In their case, they demonstrated how 
the focus on inclusion in the context of the decentralisation reform in post-apartheid South Africa 
had produced new forms of exclusion. Rasmussen explains that heterogeneity will continue to 
exist in service delivery, but it is more pronounced in fragmented settings like Benin. Even though 
more state interventions could respond to the problem of inequity, in terms of user fees, for 
example, it will not resolve the issue of quality. Besides questions of equity, the study of education 
decentralisation often questions whether the reform has improved or degraded the quality of 
education, as discussed subsequently. 
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3.4.2.2 Quality  
Grauwe et al. (2005) also examined whether decentralisation can lead to school 
improvement. They particularly focused on the collaboration between actors at the institutional 
and the municipal level and the quality of education through monitoring the management of 
teachers and funds. They state that a key mission of local education offices is to monitor the 
quality of the teaching in its schools, but inspection was of poor quality in all four cases. One 
cause, among others, was the challenge to cover a large number of schools in a context of scarce 
resources. Municipal actors furthermore face the challenge of exercising control, on the one hand, 
and offering support, on the other. Further discrepancies are the inadequate profiles of district 
officials, the rather traditional format of school visits and the lack of strategic planning.  
Channa (2016) studied the empirical evidence concerning the relationship between 
decentralisation and educational quality in Indonesia and Kenya. The case studies demonstrated 
that different approaches to decentralisation can result in significantly different outcomes in terms 
of educational quality. The author argues that that the design and implementation of education 
decentralisation influences quality outcomes, and the characteristics of design and 
implementation are shaped by economic conditions in development economies. Venkataraman 
and Keno (2015) analysed Ethiopia's post 1991 decentralisation reform. They evaluated the level 
of service delivery in two field sites in the education sector and discovered that there are quality 
constraints even though significant improvements has been made in extending educational service 
delivery. The concern for quality relates to existing challenges, e.g. the lack of adequate financial 
support, trained labour, increasing rates of teacher attrition, absence of adequate participation by 
the community and planning, among others. They conclude that the grass root level needs to be 
involved to tackle these challenges. 
Grauwe et al. (2005) highlighted the challenge of delivering good quality education in the 
context of the education decentralisation reforms in West Africa because of the lack of resources 
for school inspections, but due to the conflation of support and control in the Beninese case. On 
the other hand, they highlighted good practice, such as networks between the local school 
authorities and schools to support issues of quality. Channa (2016) discussed how decentralisation 
reforms in the education sector have had different effects on the quality of education, shaped by 
the design and implementation of such reforms as well as the economic conditions, in which they 
take place. Similarly, Venkataraman and Keno (2015) demonstrated how educational outcomes 
depend on economic factors, such as the lack of adequate financial support. 
~ 84 ~ 
 
This part of the literature review has discussed a selection of literature on education 
decentralisation with a particular focus on Benin and SSA, but has also referred to experiences in 
Latin and South America as well as Asia. The last section elaborates the conceptual framework 
for this study, bringing together the framework for policy trajectory studies, the main concepts of 
this study, and the analytical lenses.   
3.5 A post-development conceptual framework 
This research explores how the decentralisation policy in the context of Benin can be 
conceptualised as discursive and social practices and how actors mediate this policy in the context 
of the pre-school and primary education system in Benin. It uses the policy trajectory studies, 
incorporating three different contexts, as its main conceptual framework. This framework 
includes the context of influence, the context of policy text production and the context(s) of 
practices (Ball, 1993, 2015). Moreover, I draw on Massey’s (1994b) theorisation of space, 
conceptualising the spatial as space-time, implying a particular articulation between the networks 
of social relations. As such, this work adopts a temporal and spatial lens, beginning with research 
in two local field sites in 2017 and extending it to the analysis of national and global influences 
on policy formulation and mediation from 1990 onwards. Finally, I position this study in a post-
development framework which I understand as being critical of the very idea of ‘development’ 
as Eurocentric and which serves the global development industry and the West more broadly 
(Sachs, 2010; Escobar, 2012; Ziai, 2017). Post-development offers a framework for a more 
nuanced critique of 'development' discourse, and ways of thinking about alternatives (Ziai, 2017) 
as well as the implications of this for official governance and decentralisation structures and 
policies and the way people engage with these. 
All three sub-questions of this study relate to one dimension of the policy framework. The 
first sub-question addresses the context of policy text production. I understand this dimension in 
a narrow sense, as this research question explores how the decentralisation policy is discursively 
constructed, and how it relates to pre-school and primary education (cf. chapter 5). The second 
sub-question sheds light on the context(s) of practices: how the actors involved in providing pre-
school and primary education mediated the decentralisation policy from a relational perspective 
(cf. chapter 6). How actors connected to bring about the agenda setting of education 
decentralisation in 1990 related to the context of influence (cf. chapter 7). Tracing the genesis of 
education decentralisation in the Beninese context contributes to understanding why and how the 
policy of decentralisation has been enacted in particular ways, i.e. understanding resistance, and 
critically engaging with the colonial legacy, as revealed in the policy text, discourse and practices.  
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This is a qualitatively oriented policy study informed by ANT (Latour, 1996, 2005; 
Fenwick and Edwards, 2010) on the one hand, and CDA (Fairclough, 1995, 2010, 2013) on the 
other. In chapter 5, CDA helps to conceptualise policy as text, as discourse and as social practice, 
unpacking the dominant ideologies and powerful discourses and practices, to offer a vision of 
change. In chapters 6 and 7, I draw on ANT to conceptualise this research as shifting networks of 
human and non-human actors bringing about particular discourses and social practices which are 
temporarily stabilised but remain open to alteration. The tracing of their relations is useful for 
developing an understanding of the 'how', and implicitly, the 'why' of the emergence, the 
formulation and the mediation of the decentralisation policy. 
Decentralisation, power and participation are the main concepts of this study. 
Decentralisation is a global governance reform that redistributes power within a governance 
institution, alias government (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). In the context of globalisation, 
international, national and local forms of governance co-exist and interrelate with each other 
(Steiner-Khamsi, 2012). Decentralisation shares with participatory forms of democracy the view 
that power should be distributed and citizens are entitled to participate in the governance of their 
locality (Lauglo, 1995). In this study, devolution and de-concentration as administrative forms of 
decentralisation are of particular importance, since devolution overlaps with political 
decentralisation in that it transfers authority to elected bodies (Rondinelli, 1980).  
Power is inherently involved in the concept of policy and decentralisation. Power is 
implicated in policy as Bell and Stevenson (2006, p. 9) show, policy is about the ‘power to 
determine what is done' as well as within the concept of decentralisation when the latter is 
understood as a transfer of power to lower levels (Lauglo, 1995). Moreover, this study is also 
informed by the concept of participation. Participation intersects with power in that different 
degrees of participation are associated with different degrees of power from a structural 
perspective, and is linked to democratisation as decentralisation aims to increase citizen 
participation (Arnstein, 1969).  
The whole study is written up in the arena of tension between a critical realist/ structuralist 
and a post-modernist/ post-structural understanding, expressed in the theorisation of power, on 
the one hand, and the analytical approaches of ANT and CDA rooted in different paradigms, on 
the other. From a Foucauldian perspective, I understand power as relational, productive and 
normative, and power relations as dynamic and multi-directional, fluid and potentially 
changeable. Foucault’s (1978, 1988, 2003b, 2003a) work helps the understanding of how ‘the 
social operates through techniques of discipline and regulation’ (Joseph, 2004, p. 144). In 
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contrast, CR proposes causality and a hierarchy of power relations. This conception of the power 
of the ‘structured and stratified world' is necessary for a traditionally conceived Marxist notion of 
‘state power and its underlying structures’ (Joseph, 2004, p. 144). As such, decentralisation, as a 
governance reform, implies both acknowledging structure, such as the state’s structure, and a 
functional understanding of decentralisation, and in addition, the fluid and changeable process of 
governance in a global setting.  
To sum up the conceptual framework (cf. Figure 8) akin to post-development, it consists 
of policy trajectory studies, including the context of influences, the context of policy text 
production and the context(s) of practices (Ball, 1993, 2015). Decentralisation, power and 
participation, intersecting the local, national and global, present further conceptual instances 
through which I conceptualise the empirical data, while I draw on ideas of ANT (Latour, 1996, 
2005; Fenwick and Edwards, 2010) and CDA (Fairclough, 1995, 2010, 2013) to analyse the data. 
The next chapter introduces the research methodology. 
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4 Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
The methodology chapter first introduces the research paradigm as a reflection. The 
research design covers the sampling of institutions, research participants and policy documents 
and the processes of data production and analysis, including the methods used in the conduct of 
the interviews and for collecting policy documents. This chapter then outlines how the credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability of the research were established and 
subsequently addresses the ethical concerns about confidentiality and anonymity. The last part of 
this chapter describes my positioning and my reflections.  
Before discussing the research philosophies adopted, I first explain my understanding of 
the research paradigm. I understand by paradigm, ‘a shared world view that represents the beliefs 
and values in a discipline and that guides how problems are solved’ (Schwandt, 2001, pp. 183–
184). Chilisa and Kawulich (2012) explain that philosophical assumptions about the nature of 
social reality (as the ontology), ways of knowing (the epistemology), and ethics and value systems 
(the axiology) inform our worldview. The methodology is a process where the ontology, 
epistemology and axiology intersect and inform each other (Chilisa and Kawulich, 2012).  
4.2 Research philosophy as a reflection 
[N]othing is innocent; everything is dangerous; but dangerous can be useful (Lather, 
2006, p. 47) 
This section outlines the research philosophy as a reflection, which may be unusual but 
follows a trend of newer paradigms. In this thesis, I am drawing on ANT (Latour, 1996, 2005; 
Fenwick and Edwards, 2010) on the one hand and CDA (Fairclough, 1995, 2010, 2013) on the 
other. In that regard, this study may represent a methodologically uncomfortable zone for some 
researchers as I draw on different analytical approaches, arguably rooted in different theoretical 
paradigms. Lincoln, Lynham and Guba (2011, p. 100) plead, however, for the 'great potential for 
interweaving of viewpoints, for the incorporation of multiple perspectives, and for borrowing, or 
bricolage' in combining different paradigms. They argue that we are researching in a period where 
we need to accept that 'there will be no single "conventional" paradigm’(Lincoln, Lynham and 
Guba, 2011, p. 100). Instead, we need to make space for 'multivocality, contested meanings, 
paradigmatic controversies, and new textual forms’ (Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011, p. 125).  
The literature review discussed at length how both analytical projects complement each 
other, and how they inform this study. In this section, I want to add a more personal perspective 
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about my motivation for engaging with these different analytical approaches and paradigms. 
During the first part of the doctoral studies, an initial analysis of the policy of decentralisation 
was informed by CDA. Later, 'in the middle of the task at hand [my PhD]' (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 
620), I became interested, and temporarily more inclined towards ANT. I decided to use CDA for 
one of the earlier chapters, the discussion around the de-construction of the policy of 
decentralisation, while ANT informs the later chapters in the discussion of the agenda setting of 
education decentralisation and the mediation of this policy. The doctoral research mirrors my 
intellectual passage from one paradigm to another. 
The use of CDA and ANT in one piece of work can present concerns because they are 
rooted in different theoretical paradigms, although the boundaries are not clear-cut. Some scholars 
consider ANT as an empirical translation of poststructuralism, notably assemblage theory, a 
bottom up framework for the analysis of social complexity focusing on fluidity and multi-
functionality (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980), while others emphasise its roots in New Materialism 
(Fenwick and Edwards, 2010), a 1990s reaction to the dualism influencing much of cultural 
theory. CDA, arguably, may be anchored in a critical realist tradition, where language is 
understood as constructing our social realities (Riley, Sims Schouten and Willig, 2007), although 
it has roots in French poststructuralism (Fairclough, 1995, 2010). I briefly outline below my 
understanding of Critical Realism and Post-modernism, the underlying paradigms of the 
analytical approach used in this study.  
Critical Realism, predominantly developed by Roy Bhaskar (1989) and Andrew Sayer 
(2000), represents a shift from positivism (empiricism) to post-positivism (CR). The underlying 
ontology of Critical Realism considers reality as "real", 'but only imperfectly and probabilistically 
apprehensible'. Knowledge is constructed dualistically and objectively, whereby 'findings [are] 
probably true' (Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011, p. 98). In this way, Critical Realism provided 
a coherent frame for critical policy analysis (Woodside-Jiron, 2011) and for using CDA to analyse 
data (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010).  
In contrast, postmodern theories blur the distinction between epistemology and ontology. 
Although postmodernism and poststructuralism are often used interchangeably, they deserve 
further description. Lather (1983), for example, suggests that postmodernism 'raises issues of 
chronology, economics (e.g., post-Fordism) and aesthetics whereas poststructural[ism] is used 
more often in relation to academic theorizing 'after structuralism". 
Postmodernism argues against the values, practices, and goals of Enlightenment humanism 
as they play out in Modernism (Lather 1993, p. 688 in St. Pierre, 2011, p. 616).  
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Besides the previously mentioned discomfort zone, the use of both CDA and ANT is 
complex because they do not sit comfortably in a 'category' theoretical framework nor 
'methodology' and even less as 'methods'. CDA constitutes neither a theoretical framework nor a 
method; it is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse. Fairclough (1995, pp. 1–2) 
considers CDA as an 'analytical framework- a theory and a method for studying language in its 
relation to power and ideology'. Similarly, different scholars and theoretical conceptualisations 
inform ANT, which led Kanger (2017) to the comparative, critical and reflexive analysis named 
'the ANT multiple'. He distinguishes seven different readings of ANT, considering the first three 
as ontological frameworks; the fourth as a controversy about its applicability; and, the fifth as a 
set of methodological guidelines; the sixth as an ontological and a methodological approach and 
the seventh as indefinable.  
Being aware of the triangle between the substantive issues (concepts), theoretical 
frameworks and methodology (Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005), I argue against the convention of 
conceptualising the theoretical framework before defining the methodology and methods 
respectively. Instead, I suggest that it is a process of going back and forth, growing more 
organically and dialogically between all three dimensions. Although St. Pierre (2011) claims that 
neither she nor the other posts (postmodernism, poststructuralism, among others) offer an 
alternative methodology, she suggests that  
Putting posts to work, notably deconstruction33 and entanglement34, implies the creation of 
a different articulation, remix, mash-up, assemblage, a becoming of enquiry that is not a priori, 
inevitable, necessary, stable, or repeatable, but rather, created spontaneously in the middle of the 
task at hand...' (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 620). 
This quote emphasises a different form of inquiry which is always developing, 
unpredictable and allows for looking at the phenomena from different angles.  
Ending the section on the research philosophy, I emphasise that I looked at the data from 
two different angles, informed by CDA and ANT, without adopting a particular worldview, such 
as considering my actions as those of a critical realist or a poststructuralist. Instead, I used two 
different analytical approaches to analyse the data, which are derived from and anchored in 
different theoretical paradigms. I adhere to the concept of 'fluid exploration', which suggests that 
                                                          
33 '[D]econstruction is not just attention to language but to the very material structures we create through 
language and social practice, including that very material structure we call the human being' (St. Pierre, 
2011, p. 618).  
34 Entanglement in quantum theory implies 'to lack an independent, self-contained existence; [...] 
individuals emerge through and as part of their entangled intra-relating [...]' (Barad, 2007 in St. Pierre, 
2011, p. 619). 
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the construct of a paradigm can be too rigid, and 'paradigm proliferation', pointing to many 
different smaller paradigms (Samuel, 2016) may be preferable. In drawing on ANT and CDA, I 
loosely draw on post- and critical paradigms, foregrounding issues of power and how discourse 
is embedded in political purposes from the critical paradigm on the one hand, and that discourse 
as inseparable from its subject, where reality remains unknowable, from the post-(structuralist) 
paradigm on the other hand (Samuel, 2016). 
Taking up the position above implies that I assume my understanding of reality is jointly 
co-constructed with others in the social world and that my occupation of a spatial social 
construction enables me to negotiate a paradigmatic ’liminal’ trajectory that helpfully draws on 
both theoretical paradigms. I assert that occupying an ‘uncomfortable’ position that bridges two 
paradigmatic spaces allows me to question what both may offer to the sense making of my 
research topic in ways that produce new knowledge.  Having reflected upon my theoretical 
journey to understand 'how is it that we become available to a transformation of who we are, a 
contestation which compels us to rethink ourselves, a reconfiguration of our' place' and our 
ground' (Butler, 1995, p. 132 in St. Pierre, 2011), I now move on to the research design of this 
study, starting with the sampling strategy. 
4.3 Sampling  
This section discusses the sampling strategy, notably the type of policy documents, the 
selection of field sites and the groups of research participants. I understand by sample a subset of 
the total Beninese population (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011) and I used two different 
sampling strategies; purposive sampling and snowballing sampling. Purposive sampling means 
to ‘hand-pick’ the cases to be included in the sample based on evaluating their typicality. It does 
not represent the wider population and offers depth rather than breadth of information. Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison (2011) suggest that purposive sampling is often used for accessing 
‘knowledgeable people’ who have in-depth knowledge about particular issues because of their 
role, power, and access to networks, expertise or experience.  
Besides the purposive sampling, I had recourse to snowball sampling when I used my 
professional networks and those of research participants. Snowball sampling is used to identify a 
small group of individuals who have characteristics relevant to the research. These individuals 
then identify further informants, who in turn, may recommend further informants. It is useful for 
hard-to-reach groups, such as the very powerful or social elites. Noy (2008, p. 329 in Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison, 2011, p. 159) suggests that snowballing implies the ‘equalization of power 
relations’ because it reduces asymmetrical power relations between the researcher and the 
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participants due to its inherent nature of relying on social interaction. However, this sampling 
strategy may produce biases because the researcher’s initial contact may heavily influence the 
sampling strategy. In this sense, bias can include or exclude members of a population (Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison, 2011). Acknowledging the possible bias of snowball sampling, I mainly 
used purposive sampling and snowball sampling as an auxiliary method of gaining access to 
professional and social networks of interviewees previously identified by purposive sampling.  
Altogether, my sample consisted of policy documents concerning education 
decentralisation from 1990 to 2017 and research participants from the different ministries in 
charge of education, decentralisation and development as well as from municipalities and schools. 
I focused the documentary review on three normative documents (constitution and laws), one 
policy document (PONADEC), and two strategic and implementation plans (cf. section 4.3.1). 
The oral data came from the 64 interviews and four focus groups I carried out, with more than 80 
research participants (cf. section 4.3.3). Appendix 9.2 provides a chronological overview of 
research participants.35  
Overall, I collected more than twice as much data as planned. The main reason for the 
‘over-production’ of data was due to the snowball sampling strategy I adopted. The sample now 
covered not only the officials formally in charge of education decentralisation, but also retired 
officials or officials who had changed their institutional affiliation. As the initial focus of this 
study was on how officials in charge of education decentralisation understand and interpret the 
decentralisation policy, I prioritised the data of officials in the system rather than give voice to 
knowledgeable people often outside the system. 
4.3.1 Policy documents  
This documentary review includes normative documents, policies and implementation 
documents, produced by the government and often financially and technically supported by IOs. 
Normative documents include the constitution (1990), the education law (2003, revised in 2005) 
and the devolution laws (1999). The Oxford Dictionary defines a constitution as  
The rules and practices that determine the composition and functions of the organs of 
central and local government in a state and regulate the relationship between the individual and 
the state. Most states have a written constitution, one of the fundamental provisions of which is 
that it can itself be amended only in accordance with a special procedure (McLean and McMillan, 
2009, p. n.p.) 
                                                          
35 In order to protect their anonymity, I excluded their precise job description. 
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The PONADEC is a core policy document for this study. It is not specific to education but 
includes pre-school, primary and secondary education besides other sectors. The UNESCO 
handbook on education policy analysis and programming defines education policy as a document, 
which  
establishes the main goals and priorities pursued by the government in matters of education 
– at the sector and sub-sector levels – with regard to specific aspects such as access, quality and 
teachers, or to a given issue or need (Yano, 2013, p. 6). 
In contrast, the PDDSE, including a policy letter, is a strategy which specifies how the 
policy goals are to be achieved. This study analysed the 2006 to 2015 version because the 
Beninese government had not finalised the more recent 2015-2025 version by the time of the data 
analysis.  
Procedural or implementation plans cover: Plan2D at the national level, the Intra-sectoral 
Development Plans (PDDI) at the provincial level, the municipal development plans for two 
municipalities (North and South) and the sectoral pan for education in one municipality (North) 
respectively. The UNESCO handbook defines a plan as identifying ‘the targets, activities to be 
implemented and the timeline, responsibilities and resources needed to realize the policy and 
strategy’ (Yano, 2013, p. 6). In the course of the data analysis, I decided to include only the 
PDDSE and the Plan2D in this thesis, as insights from the analysis of the plans at lower levels 
did not add much to the overall information. In addition, I examined the proceedings of the 
national conference in 1990. I also had access to the documentation of the Decentralisation 
Department within the MEMP, which existed from 2006 to 2016. The documents included official 
correspondence, working plans with budgets, decrees, reports, magazines and studies, among 
others. Table 4 summarises the policy documents which have been used for this study in the 
aforementioned categories.  
 Education Devolution 
Normative framework Constitution 1990 
 Education law 2003 (05), 
decrees 
Devolution laws 1999, decrees 
Public policies and strategies  Education strategy 2006 - 15 Devolution and De-
concentration policy 2010 
Implementing documents Implementation Plan for 
Education Decentralisation 
(Plan2D) at the national level 
Provincial intra-sectoral plans 
(PDDI) 
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Sectoral development plans 
(PSE) at the municipal level 
Municipal development plans 
(PDC) 
Table 4 Overview of foundational and policy documents (author’s compilation) 
In addition, I examined the proceedings of the national conference in 1990 and had access 
to the documentation of the Decentralisation Department of the MEMP, which existed from 2006 
to 2016. This documentation included official correspondences, working plans including budgets, 
decrees, reports, magazines and studies among others.  
4.3.2 A note on elites  
As this research focuses on interviewing elites, among others, I briefly discuss my 
understanding of the problematic concept of elites. In contrast to school actors, I considered all 
other research participants, notably national officials, appointed officials at sub-national levels, 
and elected officials at municipal level as elites because they potentially had high levels of 
knowledge of the subject and general intellectual and expressive abilities’ (Herod, 1999). 
However, I first need to nuance my understanding of elites further before I discuss potential 
methodological implications of interviewing elites. I suggest that there is no single accepted 
definition of elites as it depends on the theoretical perspective of the researcher (Odendahl and 
Shaw, 2002; Burnham et al., 2008).  
Hence, scholars are divided about whether the construct of elites exists, if the boundaries 
between elites and non-elites are blurred or if there is no such thing as elite. Several proponents 
have developed distinct categories to classify elites, for example, according to the sector or 
geographical area they belong to. Odendahl and Shaw (2002) argue that elites might be perceived 
in terms of the power and privilege associated with certain individuals or groups. Herod (1999) 
considers the concept of elites as more open, related to level of experience and work, able to 
provide structured and well-documented information as members of particular organisations who 
often have an academic background and overseas experience. In contrast, postmodernist and 
feminist scholars plead that there are more commonalities between the elite and non-elite 
interview than might be assumed (Smith, 2006). This confluence is due to the conventional 
perception of power relations between the researcher and the researched, which Smith (2006) 
questions. From a poststructural perspective, not only is the definition of elite problematic but so 
is the transfer of professional power into the interview space. Even though I do not consider 
myself a poststructuralist, I borrow certain ideas, such as the Foucauldian concept of power, 
implying distance from the notion of elites.  
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The discussion of elites, in terms of the sampling strategy used, refer to the sample from 
the relevant institution and professional role/ area of expertise. It was not possible to include 
further criteria, such as gender or age, at higher levels because senior male officials mainly 
dominated the administration. At municipal and school level, however, I included gender to 
ensure female and male administrators and teachers’ perspectives. 
4.3.3 Research context and participants  
The data production in the field consisted of semi-structured interviews with three 
Ministries at different levels: the MEMP, the MDGL and the MPD, their de-concentrated sub-
units at provincial, and, in the case of pre-school and primary education, at the municipal level. 
The municipalities - the only devolved level - schools and IOs are further key institutions where 
I conducted interviews with key informants.  
The research participants included high- and middle-ranking education, decentralisation 
and planning officials, teachers, and the parents of students and members of teachers’ unions. I 
categorised them broadly into state (appointed) and municipal (elected) officials, and interviewed 
state officials at the national, the provincial and the municipal level from three different sectors. 
The main focus was on how officials from the MEMP understand and put into practice the 
decentralisation policy, but I also included officials from the MDGL and the MPD to clarify their 
perceptions regarding the emergence, formulation and how that policy was mediated. At the 
institutional level, I talked to parents, teachers, headteachers and members of teaching unions.  
- Government officials at central level: This category included high-ranking officials 
from the MEMP, the MDGL and the MPD. I mainly interviewed the heads of 
relevant departments as well as other high-ranking officials in key positions in 
charge of education decentralisation. Overall, I interviewed 17 central government 
officials. 
- Appointed officials at provincial and municipal level: Appointed officials included 
high and middle-ranking officials of the prefecture, the provincial planning 
authority, the provincial school authority and the local school authority. I 
interviewed the head of each institution, such as the governor as well as the heads 
of sectoral authorities and further officials in charge of particular aspects related to 
education decentralisation. Overall, I consulted nine appointed officials at the 
provincial and municipal level. 
- Elected officials at municipal level: Elected and employed officials by the 
municipality present a further participatory group. I interviewed heads and civil 
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servants from the relevant institutions and services, particularly the deputy mayor 
in charge of education, the general secretary and the technical official in charge of 
municipal development. Altogether, the discussions were with six elected and 
employed officials from two municipalities.  
- School actors: At the institutional level, I conducted four Focus Group Discussions 
(FGD) with three to four teachers in an urban and rural setting. For each focus 
group, I invited one female and one male teacher from the pre-school and one 
female and one male teacher from the primary school to participate. In some cases, 
fewer teachers were available, or more men/women were present due to the gender 
balance of teachers in each school. Moreover, I held individual interviews with the 
head teachers and representatives of the parents’ association and a representative 
member of a teaching union for each school. Summing-up, I spoke to four head 
teachers (all female), 13 teachers (six female and seven male), three representatives 
of parents’ associations (all male) and two representatives of teachers’ unions (all 
male).  
International Organisations as ‘secondary’ data 
I interviewed IOs, including bi- and multilateral agencies as well as international NGOs, 
because they were influential actors in the development and the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy. I used IO data as secondary data for two reasons. First, it was important 
to me to prioritise the voice of national and local government officials, teachers and parents rather 
than IOs. Secondly, the historical knowledge potential of IOs often seems to fade because of the 
rotation of staff working for IOs. For this study, I included the Swiss and the German development 
(bilateral), and the European Commission and the World Bank (multilateral) in the sampling 
because they currently support the decentralisation reform. It would have been valuable to include 
the French bilateral agency because they were involved in developing the devolution laws 
together with German bilateral agency in the 1990s, but I was not able to access informants.  
4.3.4 Location  
The study took place at two major sites, which I broadly categorise as South (Cotonou and 
Porto Novo) and North (Parakou and N’Dali), which is relevant for the lower levels of data 
production (from provincial to school level). At the national level, the data production took place 
in Cotonou, where two of three ministries relevant to this study, and the STP are situated, as well 
as Porto Novo, where the MEMP is located. Both cities are positioned in the South of Benin. 
Porto Novo, which is the political capital, is also the provincial capital of Ouèmè-Plateau 
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province. Cotonou, the largest city in Benin and often called the ‘economic capital’, is in the 
provinces Atlantique-Littoral. At provincial level, the North has four provinces: Borgou- Alibori 
and Atacora-Donga. I decided to choose a province in the Northeast of Benin for two reasons: 
first, Borgou- Alibori has the poorest results for access to education and achievement. Second, 
the Swiss development agency supported specific education plans at the municipal level in eight 
municipalities in these regions. I selected this province because I was interested in how the 
education-specific and the municipal development plans interrelated with each other and how 
they were enacted in practice.  
At the municipal level, I chose Porto Novo in the South for pragmatic reasons: it is the 
headquarters of the MEMP, and the other two ministries are situated at a distance of 35km. As 
two out of the three research questions targeted ministerial officials, it was important to me to live 
near these ministerial institutions. To minimise the logistical challenges, I decided to conduct 
interviews with provincial and municipal officials and teachers, as well as parents in the same 
field site. In the North, I choose the municipality of N’Dali concerning the availability of 
education-specific development plans at the municipal level, the existence of an education forum, 
and the security situation. Most municipalities in these provinces have a municipal education plan; 
however, are situated in areas the French Embassy recommended avoiding because of security 
issues (e.g. the kidnapping of foreigners). N’Dali was located in a secure region and had a 
municipal education plan and a municipal education forum during the period of the data 
collection. Table 5 below provides an overview of all municipalities in the Northeast of Benin 
and the criteria I used to decide the sampling strategy.  
Province  Existence of 
municipal 
education plan 
Existence of an 
education forum 
 Headquarters of the 
local school 
authority  
Risky for 
foreigners 
 
 
 
Borgou 
Kalalé Yes Yes No Yes 
Nikki Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pèrèrè Yes Yes No Yes 
N’Dali Yes Yes No No 
Tchaourou Yes Yes No No 
Sinendé Yes Yes No No 
Bembèrèkè Yes Yes Yes No 
Alibori Malanville Yes Yes Yes - 
Table 5 Selection of municipalities in Borgou-Alibori with particular characteristics regarding education 
and the security situation 
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As the chapter 2 has shown, the socio-economic and the education situation in Benin 
significantly differ according to the nature of the municipality as well as its geographical location 
in the North or South. Consequently, I suggest that the selection of the Northern and the Southern 
field site offers a maximum variation case, which can help to cover the various circumstances of 
the study process and outcome (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
In each municipality, I choose two schools, one pre-school – and one primary school for 
each. In the North, I sampled one semi-urban pre-school and primary school in N’Dali and one 
rural pre-school and primary school in the district of Gbégourou, which was the closest rural 
district to the N’Dali municipality. In the South, it was not possible to sample urban and rural 
schools, as all the schools were within the city of Porto Novo. Instead, I sampled one school in 
the centre of Porto Novo and one school in the periphery. I also took into account the infrastructure 
situation of the schools within the municipality based on the MEMP statistical yearbook (MEMP, 
2016a). In light of the legal framework for transferring the responsibility for school infrastructure 
to municipalities, I was interested in how the municipality, the local school authority and the 
school interacted to provide classrooms and equipment. I chose schools whose data indicated that 
they do not have sufficient classrooms or were missing equipment (e.g. tables and chairs). The 
third criteria concerned gender and I privileged female-headed schools over male-headed schools 
as women are underrepresented in this study.  
This section has outlined the sampling strategy in terms of the research context and 
participants, the policy documents and the location. The next part outlines the data collection 
methods and processes. 
4.4 Data production 
The research draws on qualitative data and is divided into two steps: firstly, I collected, 
reviewed and examined the texts of the decentralisation policy and related documents; secondly, 
I conducted semi-structured interviews and focus groups at different levels of the pre-school and 
primary education system to generate the data, which the respondents produced. These two data 
sets inform the research in response to the research questions: chapter 5 is mainly informed by 
the documentary evidence, whereas chapter 6 is mainly informed by the data from the interviews 
and focus groups. Chapter 7 discusses both documentary and interview data. I consciously use 
the term ‘data production ’ to refer to the interview data rather than ‘data collection’, borrowing 
from Mannay (2016, p. 22) the idea that ‘data is produced ‘with’ participants’ instead of ‘about’ 
them in interviews.  
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4.4.1 Methods 
Franklin (2012, p. 51) describes methods as ‘addressing particular method techniques’ in 
larger research designs. For this study, I used policy documents, semi-structured interviews and 
FGD as well as visual and participatory methods to collect data. I conducted all the interviews 
and focus groups in French language.36 The different interview schedules of the groups with the 
details of the interviews can be found in the appendix 9.5. When research participants authorised 
the recording of the interviews and focus groups, the discussions were audiotaped. In this section, 
I review the literature on documentary reviews, interviews, notably elite interviews, FGD and 
participatory visual methods.  
4.4.1.1 Documentary review 
The documentary review preceded the conduct of interviews and focus groups. As 
indicated in section 4.3.1, I analysed normative, policy and implementation documents. Before 
the analysis of documents, the authenticity and credibility of the document need to be verified as 
the first step as Scott (1990, p. 7 in Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011, p. 253) puts it: ‘How 
representative, typical and generalizable the surviving document may be.’ Some scholars 
criticised documentary analysis, however, for privileging a top-down view. The documentary 
analysis may also focus too much on factual knowledge.  
Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2011) suggest taking into account the text and its broader 
context in order to work out the meaning of a document. Several scholars have focused on 
language and form and especially language and discourse to explore the meaning of a document. 
Besides this focus, the document needs to be considered in the broader educational, social, 
political, economic and other relationships of the particular time of the document. Cohen et al.’s 
approach to documentary analysis reflects Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework for 
examining policy texts, the discursive and the social practices, as discussed in section 3.2.2.1 and 
illustrated in chapter 5 in terms of deconstructing the discursive nature of the policy of 
decentralisation, including the incremental and implementation plans. 
While an interpretive perspective on documentary research considers the document as a 
phenomenon, which has been socially constructed, a critical approach focuses on social conflict, 
power, control and ideology (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011). CDA subscribes to a critical 
                                                          
36 The process of translation from the empirical data in French to the written-up thesis in English can be 
found in section 4.7.2. 
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research paradigm. Therefore, I foreground the issues of conflict, power, control and ideology in 
this chapter manifested in the discourse.  The next section explains my approach to interviews.   
4.4.1.2 Semi-structured interviews 
For this study, I used semi-structured interviews as a flexible and powerful tool for research 
and particularly suitable to interviewing elites. Semi-structured interviews leave room for 
discussion to allow interviewees to give their opinions. Burnham et al. (2008) propose that semi-
structured interviews are more appropriate than, for example, structured interviews, although elite 
interviewing is not about a particular interview technique. As for the definition of elites, scholars 
are divided as to whether interviewing elites needs different strategies from interviewing non-
elites. Some argue that elites may have more professional and personal power than non-elites, and 
that power impacts positively on the conduct of the interview. They argue that interviewing 
powerful research participants leads to better data because the power difference between the 
interviewer and the interviewee is usually less compared to the relationship between interviewer 
and less powerful research participants. As elites hold a certain amount of power, the interview 
might have, what Kvale (2006) calls, an ‘agonistic character’ compared to, for example, a more 
empathetic interview with less powerful research participants. By virtue of the ‘approximate 
egalitarian power distribution’ and the acknowledgement of power differences and conflicts’ in 
these kinds of interviews, Kvale (2006, p. 486) argues, that a different kind of knowledge, 
possibly of better quality, can be produced. Similarly, Herod (1999) argues that elites might also 
provide ‘better data’ because of their educational background and former institutional affiliations. 
On the other hand, some scholars consider there are challenges in interviewing powerful 
research participants. Ball (1994b, p. 113 original quotation marks) considers the interview with 
powerful policy-makers as ‘an extension of the “play of power”’ and therefore as more 
challenging, but also richer to interpret’. Wang and Yan (2016) suggest, for example, that elites 
might be less easy to manage within the interview space because they might question the interview 
process or try to exert counter control strategies. From a similar perspective, McHugh (1994) 
argues that powerful research participants have more power to circumvent questions or, according 
to Kvale (2006, p. 485), to use counter strategies; for example, ‘not answering or deflecting 
questions, talking about something other what the interviewer asks, or merely telling what they 
believe the interviewer wants to hear’. Consequently, interviewing the powerful might intimidate 
the interviewer, which might limit the conduct of the interview, Walford (1994) argues. Elites 
might also embed the topic within pre-existing discourses dominant in their institutions or 
discourses influenced by IOs agendas, for example.  
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It is important to stress that the theoretical perspective of the researcher determines if and 
to what extent interviewing elites and non-elites is different concerning the methodology and 
ethical considerations. From a post-modernist viewpoint, there is not much difference between 
interviewing elites and non-elites as not only are the definition of elite and the positivist notion 
of the interviewee as the knower problematic, but so is the transfer of professional power into the 
interview space. Smith (2006) argues that there are more commonalities between interviewing 
elites and non-elites than might be assumed. These commonalities are not the same in different 
cultural contexts, I argue, although I generally agree with Smith that professional power can only 
partially be taken into the interview space and is dependent on other factors, such as time, space 
and the personality of the interviewee, among others. Similarly, Gubrium (2002, p. 28) states that 
the ‘postmodern trend in interviewing […] blurs the line between the interviewer and respondent, 
moving beyond symmetry to a considerable overlap of roles’. 
Odendahl and Shaw (2002) advise combining elite interviews with non-elite interviews to 
study how power is exercised between different social groups. Therefore, this study also covers 
focus groups with head teachers, teachers, students’ parents, and members of the teachers’ unions, 
which I discuss in the next section. 
4.4.1.3 Focus groups including visual and participatory methods 
In chapter 6, I used focus group data combined with visual data production methods to 
explore the perception of practices about devolved responsibilities, particularly school 
infrastructure. I used focus groups at the institutional level for two reasons: firstly, they are 
economical in terms of time when it is not feasible to interview all the relevant actors at 
institutional level on a one-to-one basis. Secondly, they make it possible to discuss a topic in a 
focused way. Generally, focus groups are carefully selected research participants who discuss a 
topic together, from which data primarily emerges from the interaction between members of the 
focus group and not with the interviewer (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011). 
I consider the visual and participatory tools to be methodological instruments by which 
to explore the perceptions of how teachers understand and mediate education decentralisation at 
the local level. The objective in producing the visual and participatory methods was not to achieve 
a picture reflecting the reality of the process itself, but rather to visualise the multiplicity of 
perceptions of the research participants. Mannay (2016) understands the objective of using 
participatory visual methods as eliminating the conceptual and practical filters of the researcher. 
This objective points to the underlying assumption of inclusive practice associated with 
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participatory methods in giving voice to participants, and hence, allowing for the production of 
more authentic data. 
I borrowed the actor-maps from the cooperation management book of GIZ (2014) but 
adapted it to the practicalities of this research. In using the concrete example of school 
infrastructure as the main devolved responsibility to municipalities, I explored the understanding 
of the actors involved in the delivery of pre-school and primary education at the local level. 
Mannay (2016) distinguishes between three types of creative approaches: found images and 
narratives, researcher-initiated productions and participatory productions. I locate the adapted 
actor-map in between researcher-initiated and participatory productions. Although I consciously 
neither contributed to nor intervened in the group process, I had to facilitate the exercise and 
provided elements, such as the guiding questions.  
The participatory visual instrument formed the first  part of the focus group, with a 
follow-up discussion between the participants, prompted by open-ended questions, forming the 
second part. Mannay (2016, p. 20) as do other scholars, insists that ‘the visual needs to be 
embedded and understood in and within narrative forms’. That is why I followed-up the ‘actor-
map’ exercise with open-ended questions about how school actors understand and enact education 
decentralisation.  
After introducing the study objectives and the formalities, I used three steps;  inviting the 
research participants to extend  the actor-maps, visualise the actors involved and the process of 
building pre-school and primary schools. First, I asked the research participants to identify all the 
actors involved in the process of school construction and write them on post-its. Second, I asked 
them to locate these actors’ physical location in relation to the centre, which was labelled 
‘decision-making’, close to the centre when they considered them influential in terms of providing 
school infrastructure, and further away when they considered them as less powerful. Third, I asked 
the research participants to outline the process of how a school is built, but also to visualise the 
relationship between the actors, e.g. if the relationship between actors in this process was 
unilateral or reciprocal, cooperative or not, and where major tensions existed.  
In line with ANT, the actor-maps were also particularly suitable  to make the material 
dimension of associations or the role of non-human processes clear. Even though the first step 
consisted of identifying (human) actors in the process of school building, the research participants 
did not limit themselves to these, but integrated corporate bodies, i.e. the Beninese government, 
a loose aggregate of institutions, i.e. NGOs, or individuals, i.e. benefactors (cf. also Latour, 2005). 
The various and messy ways of building and extending existing school buildings can be 
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considered as processes and how the various actors and processes act upon each other. Their 
resistance or convergence can be considered as further assemblages, which are part of the broader 
actor-network (cf. section 3.2.2.2). The next section outlines the process of conducting the 
interviews and FGD. 
4.4.2 The process of conducting interviews 
In this section, I discuss some of the methodological and ethical challenges involved in 
accessing the research participants, conducting the interviews and mediating the power relations 
in the context of interviews and focus groups. 
4.4.2.1 Negotiating access 
Generally, access and entry to the study site are important and sensitive issues, particularly 
in the context of elite interviews. Acknowledging the importance of getting approval and consent 
of hierarchies, I first presented this study’s purpose to all three ministries and asked for research 
authorisation. I received the research authorisation, generally signed by the cabinet director, 
within some delay. Getting the approval and consent of hierarchies, in the first instance, the 
concerned Ministries, is not only a bureaucratic requirement but also a cultural necessity in the 
context of a strongly hierarchical society such as Benin. As Festinger and Katz (1966 in Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison, 2011, pp. 82–83) argue, ‘there is a real economy in going to the very top 
of the organization or system in question to obtain assent and cooperation’.  
The network from my previous work with GIZ and the generosity of some ministerial 
officials in sharing their contacts and networks helped me to access the research participants. 
Generally, access at central level was fast and easy. I could organise an interview within a few 
days through a phone call, but the procedure slowed down at the lower levels, as I sent a letter to 
introduce the research project, including the research authorisation, information sheet and consent 
form. While the research authorisation did not seem to be of particular importance at the national 
level, it became more important when accessing research participants at lower levels, because it 
not only confirmed the validity of the research but also the consent of the top of the hierarchy.  
To access schools, I asked the head of the relevant CS to introduce me to the head teacher 
of the previously identified school. Then, the head teacher helped me to organise the FGD with 
teachers.  
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4.4.2.2 The conduct of the interview and focus groups 
In the context of interviews and focus groups, I took an approach reflecting my knowledge 
of their culture and ways of engaging in meaningful dialogues. This empathetic approach is in 
line with Dunne, Pryor and Yates (2003, p. 32) arguing that ‘sensitivity and empathy of the 
researcher are highly significant to the outcomes’. Moreover, I kept the semi-structured interviews 
flexible by adjusting to the preference of each research participant: in some cases, I only 
introduced the research topic, completed the consent form and the interviewees immediately 
started to reflect on education decentralisation. I focused the conversation by asking questions 
where appropriate. In other cases, I used an interview outline to structure the discussion 
chronologically. This procedure is in line with Moyser and Wagstaffe’s (in 1987, p. 18 Odendahl 
and Shaw, 2002, p. 310) recommendation that the ‘degree of structure or directiveness’ of the 
interview depends on ‘which data-generation strategy best fits the particular research design and 
theoretical problems’.  
Time and place proved to be important factors in the conduct of interviews and focus 
groups. Instead of conducting interviews in the office during work hours, I occasionally asked 
interviewees to meet me outside their office space and work hours, e.g. for lunch in a restaurant 
nearby. Some scholars argue that conducting the interview outside the office brings richer data in 
the sense of ‘sensitive or subtle ideas’ (Odendahl and Shaw, 2002, p. 304). Additionally, power 
dynamics might be more manageable outside the interviewees' offices as research participants 
may be more relaxed and less likely to play power games (Ball, 1994b). Although these interviews 
tend to have fewer interruptions and the interview can be more conversational, my experience 
showed that this was not always the case. I conducted interviews in formal office spaces and 
during work hours which went equally well. Overall, I concluded, however, that non-formal 
spaces outside work hours contributed to the smooth conduct of the interview facilitating open 
and in-depth discussions and insights.  
For the FGD, I presumed that the use of actor-maps would partially allow me to transcend 
the official discourse and provide a more diverse picture of social practices atthe local level. The 
finished maps presented an excellent starting point for the subsequent discussion to examine how 
research participants framed actors, their relationships and the process of school construction. 
However, I was not always able to clarify the tensions and contradictions that emerged from the 
two data sets, neither in the process of conducting the FGD nor in the analytical process.  
The actor-maps as visual participatory methods did help to balance the power relations 
between the research participants and myself to enable a lively discussion between the research 
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participants. As noted by Mannay (2016), participatory visual methods can reduce but not 
transcend relations of power. Indeed, power dynamics took place within the group; for example, 
a senior male teacher seized more time to speak than his younger or female colleagues did. In 
addition, even though I stepped back from my central role as interviewer, my presence still 
influenced the dynamics of the group, which highlights the importance of mediating power 
relations in interviews.  
4.4.2.3 Mediating power relations in the interview space 
Overall, I talked to a wide variety of research participants in terms of their power and had 
to adapt to different participants and contexts. Hence, ‘tensions of identity and positionality vis-
à-vis the different participant groups’ emerged (Srivastava, 2006, p. 211). While I tried to present 
a more ‘professional persona/profile’ to high-ranking senior officials, I identified differently with 
teachers, telling them about my past as a primary teacher, for example. Srivastava (2006, p. 214) 
suggests that the ‘[f]ield identities [of the researcher] have to change, adapt and be mediated’ in 
relation to the research participants. Similarly, McDowell (1998) recommends being very 
sensitive in the interview process concerning the changing positions of the interviewer and the 
interviewee. In that regard, I remained aware that this procedure could equally reinforce the power 
differences between research participants and myself.  
A point I want to emphasise is that power was not fixed in any interview situation. From a 
structuralist perspective, potentially powerful people did not necessarily play power games, but 
potentially less powerful people sometimes did. More specifically, I observed that officials in 
higher positions tended to play down their power more than middle-ranking officials in less 
influential positions or they used power differently, e.g. in questioning the interview questions. I 
assume that the potentially more powerful participants were confident of their position and power; 
also, they might be used to being involved in research. From my experience, I suggest that power 
is fluid, which requires flexibility in the interview space because of changing positions. I adopted 
Gubrium's and Holstein's (2002) position who advocates an alternative approach to power in the 
interview space. According to them, if the interviewer and the interviewee are both considered as 
interview participants, power can be redistributed. In this case, both sides can raise questions, and 
answers are not considered as conclusive.  
Following the process of data production, I now discuss the process of analysing the 
different data sets.  
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4.5 The data analysis process of interviews and focus groups  
For data analysis, I followed Nowell et al.’s (2017) proposal of the six phases for analysing 
qualitative data thematically: first, I familiarised myself with the data, second, I generated initial 
codes, third, I searched for themes, fourth, I reviewed the themes, fifth, defined and named the 
themes and sixth wrote-up the thesis. I was also inspired by the three levels of analysis of Samuel 
(2016), which are the descriptive, the evaluative and the theoretical. First, the descriptive level 
asks what the field revealed. Second, the evaluative level interrogates what sense I make of the 
data and the findings respectively. Third, the theoretical level invites the question: ‘how does 
what I found link to the existing literature and the theoretical framework’ (Samuel, 2016, p. 26)?  
The data analysed consisted of 28 transcribed interviews and FGDs, summaries of all 70 
interviews, and the main policy documents, the PONADEC, PDDSE and Plan2D.37 The principal 
analysis of the ‘oral and visual data’ after fieldwork was carried out with the help of the qualitative 
software tool, NVIVO, which built upon the previous analysis of field documents, which I 
undertook using hardcopies of the policy documents, post-its, pens and highlighters. To have the 
full body of data in one place, however, I also included the policy documents in NVIVO 
afterwards.   
The interviews were conducted in French, and hence, the transcriptions are in French 
language, too (cf. appendices 9.6.1 and 9.6.2 for two examples), but I provide the original quote 
in footnotes for every in-text quote in English. Most of the interview transcriptions were 
outsourced to save time and concentrate on the analysis. However, I did transcribe two significant 
group interviews at the beginning and the end of the data production process myself, and checked 
the accuracy of all interview transcripts from listening to the audiotapes. I also wrote-up 
summaries of each interview and FGD in a research journal (in English), which contributed to the 
familiarisation process with the data. 
4.5.1.1 Familiarising myself with the data  
During the field works, I built up a ‘close’ relationship with the data as I conducted and 
documented all my interviews and FGDs myself. Firstly, the documentary analysis informed the 
interview process. For each level and sector, I analysed the policy documents first before 
                                                          
37 Please refer to sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1.1 for the analysis of the policy documents as the documentary 
review preceded the conduct and analysis of the interviews and focus groups. 
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conducting the interviews, e.g. the PDDSE before interviewing national education officials or the 
municipal development plans before interviewing elected officials.  
4.5.1.2 Generating initial codes  
My research journal also contained short reflections on the data close to when it had been 
collected. When I re-read the summaries and initial reflections in the research journal as well as 
listened to the audiotapes, I highlighted and noted emerging ideas, such as control by the central 
state. These codes I allocated to these ideas remained open, initial and substantive (Samuel, 2016). 
During fieldwork, I developed a table (cf. table 6) where I documented initial ideas in response 
to the three research questions, some of which became themes later. The original research map 
was divided into institutions and levels to figure out if particular groups, for example education 
officials at central level, had a viewpoint other than central decentralisation, or planning officials 
about the question of control and autonomy.  
Actors  Education Decentralisation Planning  IOs Observations 
Research question 1 
The emergence of 
the policy 
- e.g. tension between the internal vision versus 
external influence 
 
Research question 2 
Formulation of the 
policy 
- e.g. discursive ownership of the policy 
- the divergent understandings of de-concentration 
and devolution  
- how sectoral and intra-sectoral local development 
plans interrelate with each other 
 
Research question 3 
Mediation of the 
policy 
- e.g. centralisation trends by the current government  
- cultural issues as a hindering factor  
- the role of donor-aid and the NGOisation of 
education 
 
Table 6 Initial table of codes (March – June 2017) 
4.5.1.3 Searching for themes 
Back from the field, I first analysed the data without software through the commentary 
function of Microsoft Office word, annotating each interview transcript. Second, I used the data 
management software NVIVO to manage the large amount of data more efficiently. I built up the 
project of this research and imported all the data defining sources, nodes and classifications. For 
developing themes, I used the conceptual framework and the research questions, such as the 
political factors or understandings of decentralisation. Themes also emerged while listening to 
the audio records and reading the interview transcripts. Subsequently, I was able to add relevant 
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queries to the case nodes, and ask, for example, if teachers in the Northern field site had a different 
understanding of decentralisation to that of teachers in the Southern field site. These procedures 
helped to identify and refine the themes of this study. Figure 9 represents a mind map with all the 
themes of the research project. I used the research questions as the basic structure, and added 
further themes, which had become dominant in the data, such as cultural conditions or questions 
of power, spatial and temporal issues.  
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Figure 9 Themes from the NVIVO project 
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4.5.1.4 Reviewing themes 
Reviewing themes checked whether the coded nodes/ themes were accurate and valid. As 
the next section shows, I used theoretical, methodological and spatial triangulation to ensure the 
validity of the data. I furthermore conducted a variety of queries in NVIVO to compare the themes 
generated from actor groups (education-decentralisation-planning; national-provincial-
municipal-institutional), locations (North-South, urban-rural) and sources (interviews and 
documents). Figure 10 shows a diagram of the municipality in the North compared with another 
in the Southern municipality identifying some of the differences that emerged in the different field 
sites. I also used free writing and other creative approaches to support my analytical process 
(Elbow, 1998). For example, I took particular themes, such as autonomy and control, and wrote 
freely for five to 10 minutes on the issue. This type of exercise helped to reflect more freely about 
the data, before linking it back more closely to the empirical data. 
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Figure 10 Comparison of nodes in the Northern and Southern field sites 
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4.5.1.5 Theorising the data 
Nowell et al. (2017) propose the fifth step is defining and naming themes. However, I 
suggest calling this step the theorisation of the data, informed by the theoretical framework of the 
thesis. This procedure is more aligned with Samuel's (2016) approach to data analysis, which 
distinguishes the descriptive, the evaluative and the theoretical levels of the analysis. For 
theorising the data, I used CDA and ANT respectively to analyse the data (cf. chapter 3). In 
chapter 5, I predominantly used CDA to analyse the PONADEC and related documents. I used 
Fairclough’s (1995, 2010) three-dimensional model of CDA to show how the policy is constituted 
discursively. At the textual level, I examined the patterns of transitivity, the use of active and 
passive voice, the thematic structure of the text, the information focus and the cohesive devices 
based on the textual analysis of Halliday's (1994) Introduction to Functional Grammar. At the 
discursive level, I examined the production process of the policy, e.g. actors who were in charge 
of developing the policy. The social analysis covered the wider political and socio-economic 
climate, within which the policy production process took place.  
Chapter 7 is informed by ANT (Latour, 1996, 2005; Fenwick and Edwards, 2010). I used 
the National Conference of the Active Forces in 1990 as the starting point to unfold the actor-
networks. This event can be considered a local event for understanding education decentralisation 
as a global phenomenon (first move). Starting from the actor chosen, I then explored this actor 
and the human and non-human actors that related to it, which coheres with the second move: 
redistributing the local (second move). The interviews and the analysis of the documents provided 
ways to identify these human and non-human actors. In this research, I identified lived events, 
such as the fall of the Berlin wall; historical determinations, such as colonialism; concepts, such 
as devolution and de-concentration; and individuals and groups, such as elites, the local 
population and IOs as human and non-human actors. In the next move to connect data sites, I 
clarified the connections, e.g. how the 1990 conference and the elites in exile relate to each other, 
and how did incremental documents, such as the constitution (1990) or the General States of 
Territorial Administration (1993) emerge from that interplay?  
4.5.1.6 Producing the thesis 
The sixth stage consists of producing the thesis. It points out the insights regarding the 
research problem and the research questions in relation to the wider literature and the theoretical 
framework (Samuel, 2016). I discuss the findings of education decentralisation in Benin in the 
context of Ball’s (1993, 2015) policy frameworks, informed by CDA and ANT respectively, in 
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the findings chapter, and provide a synthesis and an answer to the ‘so what question’ in the 
conclusions.  
This section explained how I analysed the data. In the next section, I discuss the credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability as alternative notions to validity and reliability.  
4.6 Credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability  
Denzin and Lincoln (2011) propose that the key criteria of validity in qualitative research 
are credibility (instead of internal validity), transferability (instead of external validity), 
dependability (instead of reliability) and confirmability (instead of objectivity). These four key 
criteria inform the trustworthiness of the results and conclusions of a project, which means 
evaluating its worth. I ensured the credibility of my findings through prolonged engagement in 
the field and triangulation of different production methods and consequently, of results. By 
credibility (internal validity), I understand confidence in the 'truth' of the findings by experts in 
the area of education decentralisation and the particular research context (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2011). I spent seven months in the field to collect the data in 2017, but I had previously worked 
and lived in Benin for almost four years. Therefore, I believe that I was familiar with the particular 
research context, even before starting the data collection.  
The research aims to describe and explain, as fully as possible, the ‘richness and 
complexity’ of education decentralisation as a social phenomenon by studying it from more than 
one perspective. Denzin (1970 in Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011, p. 196) distinguishes 
different types of triangulation, such as time, space, theoretical and methodological triangulation. 
As the methods section 4.4.1 shows, I used pre-dominantly methodological triangulation through 
using different methods - a documentary review, bi- and multilateral interviews and FGDs 
including participatory visual methods of the same object of study. Cohen, Manion and Morrison 
(2011, p. 195) define methodological triangulation as ‘the use of two or more methods of data 
production in the study of human behaviour’. In addition, I triangulated the data theoretically by 
using two different approaches to analyse the data, ANT and CDA. I also used spatial 
triangulation in that that I sampled two municipalities with very different characteristics in the 
South and the North of Benin (cf. chapter 2).  
Transferability (external validity) signifies the applicability of the findings in other 
contexts under expressed specificities (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Qualitative research privileges 
internal validity over external validity (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011), which quantitative 
research does not. In that regard, I have not focused on the transferability of my qualitative 
114 
 
 
research findings, though I used thick descriptions, first introduced by Geertz (1973), to support 
the findings. Denzin & Lincoln (2011) explain thick descriptions as when a researcher describes 
a phenomenon in as much detail as possible so that conclusions can be transferred to other times, 
settings, situations, and people. Some of my findings might be transferable (i.e. be relevant to) to 
other contexts of education or governance issues respectively, particularly in francophone West 
African countries. For example, the data collection at school level through FGD and visual 
participatory methods allowed for detailed descriptions of the substantive of education 
decentralisation, but also for the particular contexts and dynamics in which I conducted these 
discussions. Overall, I emphasise, however, that the locus of this research is the national context 
of Benin and the insights remain context-dependent.  
As qualitative research allows multiple interpretations of and meanings given to situations 
and events, the concept of dependability is important. Dependability (instead of reliability) 
implies that the findings are contingent and tentative in particular contexts and with particular 
participants (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Dependability is most often associated with inquiry audit 
or audit trails. Audit trails can refer to documenting and recording the methodological conduct of 
a study (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011). I used a reflexive journal during the fieldwork, 
which not only summarised the main aspects of each interview and FGD but also included 
methodological adjustments, such as the revision of the sampling strategy at the local level. In 
addition to the raw data in the NVIVO project, including the audio records, transcriptions and 
summaries of the interviews and FGD, the notes on the process of analysing the data can serve as 
a tool to help other researchers to (re-)construct the findings of this study. Following from this, I 
assume that another observer with the same theoretical framework and observing the same 
phenomena would come up with similar interpretations (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011).  
I addressed the confirmability of this study through triangulation on the one hand (cf. 
above), and reflexivity on the other. Confirmability (instead of objectivity) sees the role of the 
researcher as an instrument of the study shaping the analysis. It points to the researcher’s critical 
engagement with their own positionality and power (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). As a reflexive 
researcher, I acknowledge that I am part of the social world that I research, and that this social 
world has already been interpreted. I remain aware of my selectivity, perception, background and 
the inductive processes and paradigms potentially shaping the research (Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, 2011).  
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4.7 Ethical concerns 
This section addresses the ethical concerns. More specifically, it explains how I ensured 
the confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents and how I used and stored the data. Finally, 
I discuss the methodological implications emerging from conducting the data collection in French 
but analysing and writing-up the thesis in English. 
4.7.1 Confidentiality and anonymity  
Informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity are key issues in the context of research 
ethics. I followed Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2011, p. 76) who argue that ‘informed consent 
requires full information about possible consequences and dangers’. This requirement is based on 
respect for the research participants’ dignity and their rights to freedom and self-determination. 
The authors also draw attention to the fact that ‘informed consent implies informed refusal’ 
(Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011, p. 78) which means that the interviewees can refuse before 
or withdraw their participation without explanation up to the point when the thesis is submitted. 
Appendices 9.3 and 9.4 are the information sheet and a consent form used before 
conducting the interviews and FGDs. The information sheet explains the study in detail, why the 
research participants were selected to participate in the study, the procedure adopted for the 
interview and FGD, but also the implications of participating in the research (benefits and risks). 
The consent form, signed by the research participants, indicate their willingness to be interviewed 
by the researcher, that the interview can be audiotaped and transcribed and a copy made available 
to him/ herself. It also asks participants to be available for a further interview should that be 
required. It highlights the key ethical issues of confidentiality and anonymity, as well as the 
agreement to adhere to the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998).  
I assured the participants of the confidentiality of the information they provided on the 
information sheet as well as on the consent form. Guaranteeing the confidentiality of the data 
implies not disclosing ‘information from a participant in any way that might identify that 
individual or that might enable the individual to be traced’ (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011, 
p. 92). In line with Odendahl and Shaw (2002), I created identifiers through numbering the 
interviews chronologically (1, 2, 3 etc.), stating the sector and the level, e.g. national/ education, 
and added the date when the interview took place. This procedure makes it difficult for third 
parties to link the research data to the research participants. 
Questions of anonymity are especially sensitive when interviewing elites as they are more 
likely to be identifiable (Odendahl and Shaw, 2002), and therefore the information they provide 
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might be traceable. I consider this study as sensitive concerning the identity of the research 
participants. For example, I included particularly high-ranking officials in specific departments 
of the MEMP, for example, the head of department x. This interviewee, even without his/ her 
name being disclosed, could be easily identified due to his/ her unique position. As explained, I 
used composites, e.g. numbered interviews, level/ sector, date and generalised the function of 
research participants in the chronological overview of the interviews and FGD (cf. appendix 9.2), 
e.g. senior or junior official to preserve anonymity.  
Finally, the research records are held according to data protection guidelines of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 (Parliament, 1998). I stored the participant's names and addresses securely 
and separately from the research data. While the research data is stored on an external disc, the 
list with the interviewees' contact details is stored on a password-protected computer. I coded all 
the place names and institutions which could lead to the identification of individuals or 
organisations.  
This section has shed light on different dimensions of the research ethics (external, 
consequential, deontological and individual), questions of confidentiality and anonymity and the 
use and storage of the data. The subsequent section deals with the potentials and challenges of 
doing research in a different linguistic context.  
4.7.2 An excursus to translations 
This study took place in a multilingual context. While the PhD has been completed at a UK 
university, the data production took place in Benin. Benin has source-depending up to 52 local 
languages, but the official language and language of instruction in school is French. As I 
interviewed high- and middle ranking officials as well as teachers, I conducted all my interviews 
in French language. I acknowledge that the translation process for this study is embedded in a 
particular socio-cultural context. Although I am a native German speaker, due to my extensive 
period of study and work experience in Francophone contexts, I consider myself linguistically 
competent in the French language. In addition, I have some socio-cultural knowledge of the 
Beninese context, although I acknowledge that this is limited.  
In this section, I follow Temple’s and Young’s (2004, p. 164) suggestion that translation is 
‘part of the process of knowledge production’ in the interpretive paradigm. Regmi, Naidoo and 
Pilkington (2010, p. 17) define translation as ‘the process of changing something that is written 
or spoken into another language’. They point to several challenges that arise in conducting 
qualitative research in bi- or multilingual contexts, such as maintaining accuracy when translating, 
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but also the time-consuming and resource-intensive aspect of translations. However, I believe that 
the translation processes can also benefit the researcher as Regmi, Naidoo and Pilkington (2010) 
put it:  
the process of translation and transliteration can widen the academic audience for a piece 
of research without jeopardizing its validity (Regmi, Naidoo and Pilkington, 2010, p. 22). 
In that regard, I aim to make my thesis or parts of my thesis available in both languages, 
French and English, targeting not only scholars but also practitioners in the field of education and 
development. 
Regmi, Naidoo and Pilkington (2010) distinguish between literal translation, which implies 
word-by-word transcriptions and consequently translations, and piecemeal or free, elegant 
translations where ‘only the key themes or issues that emerge in the process of translation are 
transcribed’ (Birbili, 2000 in Regmi, Naidoo and Pilkington, 2010, p. 21). I decided to adopt the 
conceptual equivalence approach borrowing from Flaherty et al. (1998) for pragmatic reasons 
(saving time and resources), which implies that terms have ‘the same meaning and relevance in 
two different cultures’ (Regmi, Naidoo and Pilkington, 2010, p. 20). For example, I translated 
particular concepts, such as compétence in French into responsibility in English instead of using 
the term with the same linguistic origin competence. The concept responsibility seemed to fit 
better in the context of education decentralisation, as this is the dominant term used in the 
scholarly literature.  
I first did ‘forward translations’ of the research instruments, such as the information sheet, 
consent form and interview guides, which were then edited and proofread by a francophone 
researcher. Second, I conducted and transcribed all interviews in French, whereas the research 
journal, including the summaries of each interview, were written-up in English. This bilingual 
procedure was a first step to compare the accuracy of my understanding of key terms and themes. 
I analysed all the data in the original language but developed codes in English. When writing-up 
my analytical chapters, I only translated the quotes I used in the written text. As this procedure 
indicates, I moved progressively from French to English language.  
I acknowledge the risk of losing or changing meaning through the process of free 
translation. For accuracy, I asked other bilingual researchers to double-check the translation to 
reduce errors. Their feedback and our discussions were valuable for critically reflecting on various 
meanings and connotations in the translation process. However, I acknowledge that translations 
add a further layer of interpretation. For transparency, I kept the original quotes in the footnotes 
that readers could reconstruct the translation process.  
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The last section of this chapter discusses how I position myself to the study and how I 
understand and practised reflexivity. 
4.8 Positionality and reflexivity 
In this section, I provide a thick description of myself, my values, ideological biases, 
relationship to the participants and closeness to the research topic. It captures some of my 
reflections about power and positionality in the active research space. The nature of the social 
world and power relations is implicit in every research project as research is the result of the social 
interaction between the researcher and the researched (Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005). I raised 
questions such as did I consider myself an outsider or rather an insider, and did I navigate between 
these potential identities.  
My positionality is formed by different identities: as a German doctoral student in a UK 
university; my previous work experience as an advisor in different positions for GIZ in Benin; 
my belonging to a Beninese family, since my husband is from Benin. As a student, I was a non-
threatening interviewer, which may have facilitated access to the research participants. Odendahl 
and Shaw (2002) suggest that researchers perceived as ‘relatively harmless’ might more easily 
gain access to the research participants, which possibly enabled my respondents to be clear about 
their decision to participate in the research. Being acquainted with some research participants was 
most helpful in the sense that I already had their trust. Yet, some research participants considered 
me in still in my GIZ advisor role rather than as a doctoral student, and so tended to reproduce 
the official discourses. When I felt being addressed as a GIZ advisor rather than as a Sussex 
student, I diplomatically reiterated my new role and recalled that I could not address certain 
concerns in my new role.  
I also observed that most of the research participants gave more importance to my 
belonging to a Beninese family than to my previous professional work background. Many of them 
considered me ‘one of theirs’, and consequently spoke to me openly. For example, one 
interviewee reasoned: ‘I would like to support you in your research. A Gbaguidi, one cannot 
refuse a service. My wife is from Savè.’38 Besides, the last name of my husband, which I used to 
gain access, is common in Benin, associated with intellectuals in the past. Being married and 
having a child enhanced my status in the cultural context of Benin. Although Benin is often 
                                                          
38 Je veux bien vous appuyer dans votre recherché. Un Gbaguidi, on ne peut pas refuser un service. Ma 
femme est de Savè.  
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described as a patriarchal society, where older people have a higher standing than younger people 
have, I enjoyed a certain recognition because of my dual social and Westerner status. 
Informed by Kerstetter’s (2012) argument below, I consider myself both an insider and 
outsider, simultaneously noting that the two complement each other. She suggests that research 
should ‘move beyond a strict outsider/insider dichotomy’ to underpin the relative nature of 
researchers’ identities, depending on the specific research context’ (Kerstetter, 2012, p. 100). On 
the one hand, I was particularly aware of my involvement with the Beninese educational system 
in my previous professional work in the country and also the benefits of my family connections. 
This experience allowed me to develop insider familiarity with the social and cultural contexts 
necessary to carry out this research. However, I also benefitted from temporal distance due to my 
professional affiliation and role, which together with my new identity as a research student at the 
University of Sussex and my Western background, placed me in an outsider position. According 
to Ganga and Scott (2006, p. 1), this ‘increases awareness amongst both researcher and participant 
of the social divisions that exist between them’ while ‘paradoxically […being] an insider […] 
affords the researcher a degree of social proximity’. This proximity, nonetheless, is affected by 
‘the researcher’s position, ideas and experiences’ as an interpretive paradigm would suggest.  
4.9 Summary  
The methodology chapter first introduced a discussion of research paradigms. Instead of 
restricting myself to a particular paradigm, I chose 'fluid explorations' and 'paradigm proliferation' 
pointing to many different, smaller paradigms. I loosely draw on post- and critical paradigms, 
foregrounding issues of power and how discourse is interrelated with political purpose, from the 
critical paradigm on the one hand, and discourse as inseparable from the subject from the post-
(structuralist) paradigm on the other (Samuel, 2016). 
 The research design covered the sampling; I discussed how I sampled the research 
participants and policy documents. I also explained the sampling criteria for the two field sites of 
the study, in the Southeast and the Northeast of Benin, both with very distinct characteristics. In 
particular, I introduced the controversial notion of elites throughout this chapter. 
The research design consists mainly of semi-structured interviews (individual and group 
interviews), FGDs, including participatory as well as visual methods and documentary analysis. 
Discussing the process of data production, I reflected on negotiating access and the conduct of 
interviews and focus groups, and also how I dealt with the power relations. Following from that, 
I (re-) introduced two approaches to analysing the data: first CDA, for the formulation of the 
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decentralisation policy, and ANT informing the sixth and seventh chapters. Overall, I explained 
the six stages of data analysis, from familiarising myself with the data to writing up the thesis. 
I proposed credibility (instead of internal validity), transferability (instead of external 
validity), dependability (instead of reliability) and confirmability (instead of objectivity) 
borrowing from Denzin and Lincoln (2011) instead of the quality criteria of validity and 
reliability. The chapter then reflected on the ethical obligations and concerns, particularly for 
guaranteeing anonymity in the context of interviewing high-ranking officials. I furthermore 
discussed the limitations and advantages when translation is involved in the study since I collected 
and analysed the data in French, but I have written-up my thesis in English.  
In the last part of this chapter, I reflected on my positionality, notably my different identities 
as a doctoral researcher from a UK university, my previous work background in development and 
my belonging to a Beninese family. Shedding light on these different identities, implying different 
positionalities, I consider myself both an insider and outsider, simultaneously noting that the two 
complement and support each other.  
The next chapter de-constructs the policy of decentralisation and its wider policy ensemble, 
starting with normative documents, followed by the policy, and subsequently implementation 
plans.
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5 A discursive analysis of education decentralisation 
This chapter is a discursive de-construction of the PONADEC and other documents 
related to the second dimension of Ball’s (1993, 2015) policy framework, the policy production 
process. The first research question explored how the decentralisation policy is discursively 
constituted, and how it related to the broader policy ensemble, with the focus on the three stages 
of the policy cycle: first, the incremental documents, such as the constitution, the decentralisation 
and the education laws; second, the PONADEC, which is the unit of analysis of this chapter; and 
third, the Education Sector Strategy as well as the Implementation Plan for Education 
Decentralisation. This chapter also addresses how the analysis of the policy text speaks to the 
post-colonial condition, which I understand in discursive and material terms, as explained in the 
literature review (cf. chapter 3). 
In this chapter, I predominantly focus on policy as discourse. Discursive practices involve 
the process of text production, distribution, and consumption (Fairclough, 1995, 2010). By 
incremental, I refer to the common occurrence whereby ‘policies are usually built on or developed 
out of previous policies' (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010, p. 9). Rizvi and Lingard (2010) suggest that 
policy-making always has incremental links to previous (policy) documents, as state structures 
and policy history are continuous elements. Moreover, Taylor et al. (1997, p. 97) propose that 
there ‘is always a prior history of significant events, a particular ideological climate, social and 
economic context.' 
This chapter follows a chronological order to make explicit how education 
decentralisation was built up incrementally. Firstly, it analyses the legal framework of education 
decentralisation; secondly, it focuses on the de-construction of the policy of decentralisation; and 
thirdly, it discusses how education decentralisation was translated into forming the PDDSE and 
Plan2D. The next section starts with the analysis of the incremental documents, notably the 
constitution and the laws (education and decentralisation). 
5.1 De-constructing the legal framework for decentralising education  
The policy formulation process of PONADEC goes back to the legal framework for 
education and decentralisation as well as the constitution. More precisely, the devolution and de-
concentration policy has incremental links to the constitution of 1990, the General States of 
Territorial Administration (Etats Généraux de l’Administration Territorial) of 1993, the 
Devolution Laws (Lois de décentralisation) of 1999 and the Education law (Loi d’orientation de 
l’éducation) of 2005 (revised). I analysed these documents to examine when and how the concept 
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of decentralisation had been introduced into policy documents and how the idea of 
decentralisation is mirrored in the education law of 2005. This analysis mainly utilises the second 
dimension of Fairclough’s three-dimensional model (cf. chapter 3), which focuses on aspects of 
intertextuality and coherence within and between documents. In addition, I analysed the particular 
vocabulary used in these documents and examine the structure of the texts, which is part of the 
first dimension.  
5.1.1 The Constitution of 1990 enshrined education and decentralisation 
The Republic of Benin adopted its current constitution, considered as ‘Supreme Law of 
the State’, by referendum on 11 December 1990 (République du Bénin, 1990b). The former 
president of the Republic (Mathieu Kérékou), the Prime Minister and incoming president 
(Nicéphore Soglo) and, the Minister for Justice and Legislation (Yves Yehouessi) signed the 
constitution as documented in the conference proceedings (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994). 
Despite the formal signature of Beninese high-ranking politicians and officials, the constitution 
can be considered as a joint product of the Beninese government and IOs. A redaction commission 
under the leadership of Professor Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, a legal advisor of the United Nations 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), designed and wrote the constitution 
(Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994).  
The constitution is permeated by Western concepts, with emphasis on liberty, democracy 
and human rights, which may point to the influence of global actors. For instance, the constitution 
mentions Benin’s commitments to democracy in article 5; to human rights in articles 7, 19, 40, 
53, 114, 117, 120 and 121; and opens the possibility for privatising education in article 1439, which 
can be understood as a form of decentralisation (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). According to 
Fairclough (2010, p. 272), values are linked to style (the way of being). They serve to constitute 
an ‘authorial identity’, although most often they are implicitly expressed through value 
assumptions and ideologies, and have, therefore, a pervasive nature.  
The 1990 constitution marks a shift from the socialist regime to a liberal democracy. I 
suggest that the adoption of the constitution in 1990 represents a ‘cruces tension points’, what 
Fairclough (1995) refers to as moments of crisis because the constitutional transition comes after 
a ‘turbulent constitutional and political evolution since its accession to independence' (République 
du Bénin, 1990a, p. 3). The transition from ‘People's Republic of Benin’ instituted in November 
                                                          
39 Religious institutions and communities shall be able to cooperate equally in the education of the youth. 
Private schools, secular or parochial, may be opened with the authorisation and control of the State. The 
private schools may benefit from state subsidies under conditions determined by law (République du 
Bénin, 1990a article 4). 
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30, 1975 to the Republic of Benin on March 1, 1990, is built upon the following premises: ‘to 
find again the place and role as pioneer of democracy and defender of human rights; […] to create 
a State of law and plural democracy; […] [to] [r]eaffirm our attachment to the principles of 
democracy and human rights’ (République du Bénin, 1990a, p. 3).  
Although precursors of decentralisation pre-existed the democratisation process in 1990, 
this constitution is the first document to enshrine the idea of decentralisation in its current form. 
The constitution introduced the legal existence and role of the municipalities which have legal 
and financial autonomy, as a senior decentralisation official explained:  
The constitution of 11 December [19]90 had already instituted the creation of territorial 
authorities [municipalities] through its articles 150, 151 to 153. Elected bodies administer these 
territorial entities freely, and the State works to contribute to the harmonious development of the 
territories by putting all the necessary means [at their disposal] to allow an inter-regional balance 
(article 153 of the constitution). This constitutional mechanism remains the bedrock for the 
creation of the territorial authorities (I11, national/ decentralisation, 26 01 2017).40 
The constitution as a policy text introduces the municipality41 as a new actor or, as the 
interviewee puts it, the municipality is the ‘bedrock’ for the creation of territorial authorities. 
Elected bodies administer these territorial authorities, which have both financial and legal 
autonomy. This form of decentralisation coheres well with political decentralisation because it 
implies municipal elections and provides the elected bodies a degree of autonomy (McGinn and 
Welsh, 1999; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007).  
Article 98 of the constitution states that the rules concerning: […] the electoral system of 
the President of the Republic, the members of the National Assembly and the Local Assemblies; 
the territorial organisation, the creation and the modification of administrative districts, as well as 
the appointment of electoral districts […], are the domain of the law. The law determines the 
fundamental principles which are […] the free administration of territorial authorities, of their 
responsibilities and their resources (République du Bénin, 1990a).42 Hence, decentralisation is 
anchored in the constitution through the institutional creation of municipalities, and is an essential 
starting point in the formulation process of PONADEC.  
                                                          
40 La constitution de 11 décembre 90 a déjà à travers les articles 150, 151 à 153 revu la création des 
collectivités locales. Que ça soit des entités territoriales qui s’administrent librement par des organes 
élus et prévu que l’Etat travaille à concourir au développement harmonieux des territoires en y mettent 
tous les moyens qu’il faut pour permettre l’équilibre interrégional (article 153 de la constitution). Ce 
dispositif constitutionnel reste un sous-bassement de la création des collectivités locales. 
41 I use the terms municipalities, territorial collective and territorial authorities interchangeably.  
42 Article 98 Sont du domaine de la loi, les règles concernant: […]de la libre administration des 
collectivités territoriales, de leurs compétences et de leurs ressources. 
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The constitution only introduces the idea of municipalities gradually. The table below (cf. 
table 7), which is an excerpt from the constitution, shows that article 98 mentions ‘territorial 
authorities’ for the first time, while only articles 150 to 153 at the end of the constitution detail 
the role of future municipalities. The municipalities administer themselves freely (art. 151) and 
have financial autonomy (art. 152) (République du Bénin, 1990a). The idea of territorial 
administration and the principle of ‘free administration' are new and have yet to be naturalised in 
a Faircloughian sense. For example, Woodside-Jiron (2011) shows in her policy analysis how 
familiar elements relate to new features to naturalise the latter. Introducing a new concept this 
way helps to naturalise it (Halliday, 1994; Fairclough, 1995). 
ARTICLE 
150 
Territorial units of the Republic shall be created by law. 
ARTICLE 
151 
These units shall administer themselves freely by elected councils and 
under conditions provided by the law. 
ARTICLE 
152 
No expenditure for the sovereignty of the State is charged to their 
budget. 
ARTICLE 
153 
 
The State shall watch over the harmonious development of all the 
territorial units based on national solidarity, regional potentialities, and inter-
regional equilibrium. 
Table 7, Extract from the constitution (République du Bénin, 1990a, pp. 31–32) 
The constitution raises a tension between the role of the State to ensure the ‘harmonious 
development of all municipalities' (Article 153) and the principle of the ‘free administration' of 
these (Article 151) (République du Bénin, 1990a). A retired representative from a bilateral 
agency, who was involved in supporting the elaboration of the devolution laws, pointed out that 
free administration is not to be confused with autonomy. He suggests that the municipality is a 
legal body, but not autonomous ‘as often claimed' (I60b, IO, 04 06 2017). In his working paper 
about the History and Principles of Devolution and De-concentration in France and Germany, 
within reference to Benin, states 
The term municipal autonomy sometimes evoked a centrifugal tendency toward the 
independence of the municipalities or towards the formation of "republiquettes"43 which 
threatened to balkanise the national territory and endanger the principle of republican unity 
(Schneiderfritz, 2004, p. 4, own translation).44 
                                                          
43 The term "republiquettes"can be understood as many smaller units of a Republic.  
44 Le terme d'autonomie communale évoquait parfois une tendance centrifuge vers l'independanciation 
des Communes ou en direction de la formation "républiquettes" risquant de balkaniser le territoire 
national et de mettre en danger le principe de l'unité républicaine. 
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In contrast, Nanako (2016, p. 353) suggests that the ‘principle of the free administration 
of local authorities has not been fortuitously constitutionalised' in the Beninese context. He does 
understand 'free administration' as implying autonomy and suggests that the free administration 
in francophone SSA could not resist the claim of unity and indivisibility, implying a strong central 
state on the one hand, and a limited transfer of responsibilities to lower levels, on the other.  
Moreover, the 1990 constitution recognised the importance of education as a human right. 
In particular, articles 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the constitution refer to education issues. The 
constitution states that ‘the State guarantees its citizens equal access to education’ (article 8), 
‘ensures progressively free education’ (article 13) and that ‘education is a shared responsibility 
between the State and the municipalities’ (article 12) (République du Bénin, 1990a). In terms that 
are more precise it points out that:  
[T]he State and territorial authorities guarantee the education of children and to create 
favourable conditions for this purpose (République du Bénin, 1990a, p. 5, own translation).45 
Although the constitution laid the foundations for decentralisation through elected bodies 
at the municipal level, it remains silent about how education and decentralisation relate to each 
other. Only in 1999 did the devolution laws specify how education was to be shared between the 
central and municipal government entities, as shown in the next section, which presents an 
analysis of the devolution laws. 
5.1.2 The legal framework: education as a shared responsibility 
This section examines the relevant articles in the education and devolution laws after a 
short overview of the genesis of the legal framework. The formulation of the devolution laws took 
place between 1993 and 1998, when the National Assembly adopted them (MDGL, no date). The 
legal framework for the new territorial administration consists of five laws46, more than 25 decrees 
(décrets) and around ten orders (arrêtés). They define the organisation of the municipalities, the 
advisory role of the prefectures in support of the municipalities, the funding of the municipalities 
and the actors at the central level (MDGLAAT, 2008). The education law was adopted in 2003 
and revised in 2005.  
                                                          
45 L’Etat et les collectivités locales garantissent l’éducation des enfants et créent les conditions 
favorables à cette fin.  
46 loi n°97-028 portant organisation de l’administration territoriale de la République du Bénin 
loi n°97-029 portant organisation des Communes en République du Bénin 
loi n° 98-005 portant organisation des Communes à statut particulier 
loi n° 98-006 portant régime électoral communal et municipal en République du Bénin 
loi n° 98-007 portant régime financier des Communes en République du Bénin. 
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5.1.2.1 Devolved responsibilities for pre-school and primary education remain limited - the 
case of school infrastructure  
The devolution laws transfer two areas to the municipality: the construction, equipment 
and repair of public pre-school and primary education institutions (article 97) and, the promotion 
of education for young people (article 98). Article 97 of the law (97-029) states that the 
municipality is responsible for the construction, equipment and repair of public institutions for 
pre-school and primary education and their maintenance (MDGLAAT, 2010). It clarifies the role 
of the state, which is to transfer the necessary resources to the municipalities, which as chapter 6 
shows, is highly contested. As indicated in chapter 2, the education and devolution laws fit 
together for school construction in that the education law states the requirement of quality school 
infrastructure, and the devolution laws transfer this responsibility to the municipalities. However, 
the education law does not mention devolution explicitly (Assemblée Nationale, 2003).  
What emerges from the data is that school construction used to be managed locally but 
informally by parents. In the ‘absence’ of the State, a student’s parent provided either the 
resources or the labour to build schools in their village and to employ community teachers. In a 
focus group that touched on the role of parents in the construction of schools before the 
decentralisation reform, some teachers made this point:  
I said earlier that parents of students did that [built schools]. At the beginning of the school 
year, […] when we collect contributions, the parents give something. Afterwards, the director calls 
the parents' association. Well, we found so much, the school needs so much. So they take sand, 
cement. We call the bricklayer (I43, institutional, 20 04 2019).47 
Parents not only helped to build schools by supplying materials, such as sand and cement, 
as well as their labour, they also employed community teachers. The president of the municipal 
parents’ association explains that parents paid community teachers when the state was unable to 
provide government teachers:  
It was before Yayi [the former president between 2006 and 2016], even the first two, three 
years of Yayi. We paid all the gaps in terms of teachers, the hourly mass of individual contractors; 
it is the example [where] the parents of students paid (I40, institutional, 12 04 2017).48 
                                                          
47 Je disais tantôt que ce sont les parents d’élèves qui ont fait ça. A la rentrée, souvent à la rentrée quand 
on fait souscription là, les parents donnent quelque chose. Après, avec l’association des parents d’élèves, 
la directrice les appelle, le bureau APE. Bon on a trouvé tant, l’école a besoin de tant. Donc ils prennent 
sable, ciment. On appelle maçon. 
48 C’était avant Yayi. Et même les deux, trois premières années de Yayi. C’est nous qui payions. Tous les 
gaps en matière d’enseignants, les masses horaires des vacataires, c’est l’exemple, c’est les parents 
d’élèves qui payaient. 
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While teacher recruitment has been fully centralised recently, through the integration of 
community teachers into the formal recruitment system, school construction has become the 
responsibility of the municipality. The responsibility for school construction used to be 
decentralised, even though it shifted from the village to the municipal level and from civil society 
actors (parents) to elected officials (town council). This observation raises the question of the 
purpose of developing the devolution laws in light of the previous organisation of school 
construction. However, it can be argued that the decentralisation policy is an attempt to counter-
balance certain neo-liberal trends since the democratic renewal in the 90s, such as the privatisation 
of education, when the state shifted the responsibility from the state to non-state actors.  
The devolution laws are not only restricted to what used to be locally managed in the past, 
but also mainly limited to school infrastructure. This gradual transfer of responsibilities is 
consistent with the literature on education decentralisation, which advocates decentralising 
certain areas before others, e.g. school construction before teacher recruitment and management 
(McGinn and Welsh, 1999). A national representative of the mayors argued that the devolution 
laws only devolved a small set of responsibilities to the municipal level, as the following quote 
shows.  
This reform also involved the delegation of certain skills to the municipalities. Upon 
further observation, the skills delegated to the municipalities are not fundamental, that is pre-
school and primary education. We handle pre-school and primary education, the municipalities 
build, equip and repair schools. Moreover, the State, the [central] government decides on the 
curriculum. The [central] government recruits and assigns the teachers. That, I think, is what is 
meant by fundamental: building classrooms, it is true that it is important. However, I do not think 
that it is the most important aspect (I61, municipal/ decentralisation, 06 06 2017).49 
In other words, the transferred responsibilities, notably school construction and the 
education of the young, are limited compared to what is centrally managed, such as teacher 
recruitment and management or curriculum development. Gomez (2010) confirms that the 
responsibilities of the municipalities in Benin are not only limited to pre-school and primary 
education but exclusively limited to school construction, equipment and repair. Nonetheless, 
devolving school infrastructure, which requires the municipality to fund and build schools, raises 
                                                          
49 Cette réforme passait par aussi la délégation de certaines compétences aux communes. Et quand on 
regarde bien, les compétences déléguées aux communes ne sont pas les compétences fondamentales, 
enseignement maternel et primaire. Nous sommes dans l’enseignement maternel et primaire, les 
communes construisent, équipent et réparent. Et les programmes d’enseignement, c’est l’Etat, c’est le 
gouvernement qui décide. Les enseignants à recruter, à déployer, c’est le gouvernement. Ça, je pense que 
c’est ce qui est fondamental : construire les salles de classe, c’est vrai c’est important. Mais je ne pense 
pas que ça soit le plus important. 
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questions of equity, as the economic and financial capacities of municipalities varies significantly, 
as he points out.  
In the next section, I point out that other devolved responsibilities remain vague, which 
results in a multiplicity of practices, as discussed in the subsequent chapter (cf. chapter 6).  
5.1.2.2 Devolved responsibilities remain vague - the case of the education of the young  
The second article of the devolution laws (029-98), which deals with the education of the 
young, remains vague and is understood and implemented differently in the field. As the excerpt 
below shows, the second article gives the municipality the responsibility to initiate all measures 
to stimulate and promote the education of the young but without specifying what kind of activities 
are referred to. 
The municipality initiates all measures likely to favour and promote the education of the 
youth (MDGLAAT, 2010, law 97-029, article 98, own translation).50 
The lack of specification opens the door to multiple interpretations. For instance, a junior 
official of the municipality in the North (I30, municipal/ decentralisation, 22 03 2017) understood 
this article to mean ‘developing activities for economic growth’, while officials from the 
municipality in the South (I47, municipal/ decentralisation, 05 05 2017) thought it referred to 
‘supporting leisure time activities for young people’. These diverging interpretations could lead 
to different foci or emphasis for implementation.  
Gomez (2010) suggests that the reason for a multiplicity of interpretations and social 
practices could be because the relevant articles, 97 and 98, have never been translated into 
regulations, which complicates their application. In contrast to his perspective, I suggest that 
article 98 could be interpreted as a symbolic transfer of responsibility to the municipality because 
the education of the young is seen as beneficial to the municipality, but not as crucial as, for 
example, having school buildings or school teachers. Transferring less important tasks to the 
municipality may be convenient for central government officials, who want to hold on to power 
when it relates to financial power.  
The last sub-section of the analysis of incremental documents discusses how the limited 
and vague legislation in relation to a rather weak limits the application of the devolution laws.  
                                                          
50 La commune initie toutes les mesures de nature à favoriser et promouvoir l’éducation de la jeunesse.  
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5.1.2.3 Vague legislation in relation to a weak 
The legislation remains not only vague, but municipal actors do not access the judicial 
branch of the government. Although mayors can take the government to court in cases where the 
government fails to respect the devolution laws, they are able to avoid doing this as the national 
representative of the municipalities of Benin explains.  
The elected, that is to say, the mayor is given the possibility of bringing before the courts 
questions about issues he is unclear about and that the governor favours merit to. These courts can 
be, for example, the administrative chamber of the Supreme Court [...]. However, no mayor has 
ever assigned a governor to the court for the peaceful resolution of various situations. [...] Mayors 
are not inclined to do so; they will not spontaneously appeal for justice. It is bad. [...] They do not 
[assign a prefect] because they fear that the governor will find [an inregularity] during controls, 
since such is the power of the prefect. The governor has the power to control the legality of acts 
that the mayors take and put into effect. Therefore, the mayors fear that the prefect, in this function, 
will uncover something illegal. As a result, they avoid calling attention to themselves (I61, 
municipal/ decentralisation, 06 06 2017).51 
The mayors fear the consequences of their action as the prefect, who represents the 
government at the provincial level, can exercise power through the legal responsibility to control 
the legality of acts undertaken by the municipality (cf. chapter 6).  
The controversial role of the judiciary has to be considered in relation to the previous 
discussion about the principle of free administration, as instituted in the constitution (cf. section 
5.1.1). Nanako (2016) suggests the problem is that the municipalities in Benin do not administer 
freely, but are anchored to the weak judiciary responsible for ensuring the application of the 
devolution laws. The constitutional judge does not help to guarantee the effectiveness of the free 
administration of local authorities despite the clarity of the constitution, he argues.  
5.1.3 Summing up 
The five devolution laws (97-028, 97-029, 98-007, 98-005, 98-006), adopted in 1999, can 
be traced to the General States of Territorial Administration in 1993 and the Constitution in 1990. 
The constitution (1990) instituted the creation of local authorities and the General States (1993) 
detailed the administrative division of Benin into 12 provinces and 77 municipalities. The analysis 
                                                          
51 Et la possibilité est même donnée à l’élu c'est-à-dire au maire de porter devant les juridictions, les 
questions qui lui paraissent flouent sur lesquelles le préfet fait du zèle par exemple devant la chambre 
administrative de la cour suprême. […] Mais bon, dans les faits, et pour une gestion apaisée des 
différentes situations, aucun maire n’a jamais assigné un préfet en justice. […] les maires ne, sont pas 
enclins, ils ne vont pas spontanément saisir la justice. C’est mauvais […] Ils le font aussi parce qu’ils 
craignent qu’on ne leur découvre tout de suite lors des contrôles puisque c’est ça le pouvoir du préfet. Le 
préfet a un pouvoir de contrôle de légalité par rapport aux actes que posent et prennent les maires. Donc 
les maires, ils craignent que le préfet dans son contrôle n’aille lui découvrir des casseroles. Donc en 
conséquence, ils sont, ils s’aplatissent un peu. 
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of the education and devolution laws has revealed that devolved responsibilities for pre-school 
and primary education remain firstly, limited to what used to be managed locally, namely school 
construction; secondly, they remain vague and are not translated into regulations; and thirdly, a 
rather weak judiciary poses a challenge to municipal actors putting into practice the 
decentralisation policy.  
Summing-up, the first section has de-constructed the legal framework of education 
decentralisation. The next part of this chapter analyses and discusses the policy of education 
decentralisation, which is the focus of this chapter. 
5.2 A de-construction of the National Policy of Devolution and De-
concentration 
This part outlines some of the backgrounds to the production and interpretation of the 
national devolution and de-concentration policy, including a textual analysis of the policy, based 
on the two dimensions of Fairclough’s (1995, 2010) three-dimensional model: discourse-as-text 
and discourse-as-discursive practice. More broadly, it sheds light on how and by whom the policy 
is produced and interpreted as well as on the discourses at work, including the discourses of 
globalisation, and their underlying values. Firstly, I address a shift in the conceptual 
understanding of decentralisation from devolution to de-concentration. Secondly, I analyse 
underlying ideologies and values, and thirdly, I contextualise PONADEC within the global 
setting.  
5.2.1 The concept shifted away from the initial idea of devolution 
The most significant change in the policy text of PONADEC compared to the emergence 
of the idea in 1990 is the prominent focus on de-concentration in the National Policy of 
Devolution and De-concentration (Politique Nationale de Décentralisation et de 
Déconcentration). Devolution (décentralisation) and de-concentration (déconcentration) appear 
nearly equal in the policy text. In this study, the partial shift of the workload from the central 
ministries to their sub-units at the provincial and municipal levels, which are accountable to the 
hierarchy, is de-concentration. On the other hand, devolution refers to the transfer of 
responsibilities and resources to the municipalities (Rondinelli, 1980; Cheema and Rondinelli, 
2007). The analysis shows that the policy gives equal weight to de-concentration and devolution, 
although each concept has different implications: devolution is about giving-up some power, 
whereas de-concentration implies that the central level is still in a controlling position.  
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The focus on de-concentration was also mirrored in interview discussions at the national 
level. While the interviewees mainly addressed décentralisation (implicitly understood as 
devolution) when referring to the agenda setting of 1990, nearly all of them emphasised the 
importance of de-concentration as mediating the decentralisation policy. Most officials at the 
central and provincial levels conceived de-concentration as a bridge to devolution. 
For de-concentration, the central power continues always to exercise its prerogatives. De-
concentration allows a good devolution (I20, national/ education, 02 03 2017).52 
De-concentration is a corollary of devolution ... When the national level keeps the 
resources, how can devolution be a reality? First, we need a true de-concentration policy (I36, 
provincial/ decentralisation, South, 04 04 2017).53 
The underlying rationale for de-concentration is to ‘bring the central administration closer 
to the local population' (e.g. I6, national/ education, 18 01 2017). On the other hand, de-
concentration may imply the consolidation of central state control at the lower levels. This second 
understanding is exemplified in the quote from the following MEMP interviewee who claims the 
‘right to inspection' (droit de regard) concerning devolved responsibilities.  
This [the mixture of de-concentration and devolution] is another way of saying that the 
State is keeping an eye on what is being done through its de-concentrated structures in the context 
of transferred responsibilities to the municipalities (I20, national/ education, 02 03 2017).54 
In other words, the central state can exercise its control over devolved responsibilities 
through its de-concentrated sub-units. In effect, de-concentration allows the central state to 
indirectly monitor what it has transferred to the municipalities. The strong emphasis on de-
concentration by government officials is understandable in this respect, as most officials at the 
central level do wish to exercise direct control and power, even though they have to delegate some 
aspects of power and control. It appears that central state officials feel threatened by devolution 
because it may reduce their power, whereas de-concentration allows them to be a counter-balance 
and control devolution.  
                                                          
52 Pour la déconcentration, c’est toujours le pouvoir central qui continu d’exercer ses prérogatives. Une 
déconcentration pour permettre une bonne décentralisation […]. 
53 La déconcentration est corollaire de la décentralisation… Lorsque les ressources sont gardées an 
niveau national, comment la décentralisation peut être une réalité ? Il faut une véritable politique de 
déconcentration [d’abord]. 
54 […] est une autre manière de dire que, l’Etat, en transférant des compétences aux collectivités, a ses 
yeux sur ce qui se fait à travers ses structures déconcentrées. 
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Not only did government officials argue that de-concentration has to be functional to 
make devolution effective; this same argument is also mirrored in some accounts of IO 
representatives, as the following quote illustrates.  
Devolution has taken precedence over de-concentration in Benin. However, for a truly 
successful devolution, good de-concentration is needed. What we are saying [...] even if the texts 
were in the current state, if we had an actual de-concentration, we would not have this problem of 
monitoring the teachers and quality with the local authority (I18, IO, 21 02 2017).55 
As a government official, this IO representative considers de-concentration as the first 
step to devolution. De-concentration, in his words, allows the state to monitor the quality of 
education at the local level. This view contrasts with his previous comment where he suggests 
that devolution has become more critical than de-concentration. 
The next section unpacks the vision, the objective and the strategic orientations of the 
PONADEC, extending my analysis to the third dimension of Fairclough’s (1995, 2010) three-
dimensional model - the social analysis. More specifically, it discusses how ideas of development, 
modernisation and (neo-) liberalism have informed the policy text.  
5.2.2 The underlying ideologies of decentralisation 
The underlying ideologies behind decentralisation refer to a discourse of development 
and modernisation. Moreover, the reform subscribes to a hybrid mix of social, liberal and neo-
liberal values.  
5.2.2.1 The development discourse behind decentralisation  
The policy text is underpinned by a particular understanding of development. For 
instance, the PONADEC vision emphasises the role of the municipalities in delivering 
democracy, governance and development. The policy text says:  
Giving [the] territorial authorities space for grassroots democracy, good governance and 
sustainable local development in the context of a devolved unitary state that ensures the 
harmonious development of the national territory, on the basis of national solidarity, access to 
basic services for all, developing regional potential and inter-regional balance (MDGLAAT, 2008, 
pp. 11; 32, own translation, italics added).56 
                                                          
55 C’est la décentralisation qui a pris le pas sur la déconcentration au Benin. Or, pour une 
décentralisation vraiment réussie, il faut une bonne déconcentration. Ce que nous sommes en train de 
dire la […] même si les textes étaient en état actuel, si on avait une déconcentration, on n’aura pas ce 
problème avec de suivi des enseignants et de la qualité avec l’autorité locale. 
56 Faire des Collectivités Territoriales des espaces de démocratie à la base, de bonne gouvernance et de 
développement local durable dans le cadre d’un Etat unitaire décentralisé qui assure le développement 
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This vision points to the constitutional form of a unitary state ensuring a ‘harmonious 
development of the national territory'. The role of the unitary state was also highlighted in the 
interview data and may be understood both in the context of Benin's previous political instability 
and its ethnic diversity (cf. chapter 2).  
There were frequent coups d'états. This [instability] justified the fact that the then 
governors preferred to have a unitary state, strong and centralised, in the aftermath of 
independence until the coup of 75 (I11, national/ decentralisation, 26 11 2017).57 
Dafflon & Madiès (2008) propose that many decentralisation experiences in previously 
French-ruled Africa were in response to a desire to preserve national unity by taking into account 
tribal and local particularities. The vision is translated into an overall objective by: 
Creating the institutional and organisational conditions for a sustainable and balanced 
territorial development based on concerted local governance and by enhancing the potential of 
territorial authorities to boost development at grassroots level’ (MDGLAAT, 2008, p. 11, own 
translation).58  
Development appears to be the overall aim, and socio-economic development at the 
municipal level is explicitly identified as the overarching goal of this particular policy. Similar to 
the vision, the objective links local governance with development and highlights the importance 
of ‘balanced territorial development’ and ‘concerted local governance’, which may suggest issues 
of equity and participation. I understand the ‘balanced territorial development’ as concerns of 
equity because of the socio-economic disparities between urban and rural Benin as well between 
the South and North, but also in terms of its ethnic diversity. ‘Concerted local governance’ may 
refer to the coordination of (local) actors and/or it may refer to the middle range of forms of 
participation following Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation, which can be considered as 
degrees of tokenism.  
The discursive link between decentralisation and development is also reflected in the 
interview data. Nearly all the research participants link their understanding of decentralisation to 
local development, suggesting that decentralisation enables development. A senior education 
official from MEMP explained that:  
                                                          
harmonieux du territoire national, sur la base de la solidarité nationale, de l’accès de tous aux services 
de base, des potentiels régionaux et de l’équilibre inter-régional. 
57 Il y avait une fréquence de coup d’Etat. Cela a justifié le fait que les gouvernants d’alors ont préféré 
avoir un Etat unitaire, fort et centralisé au lendemain des indépendances jusqu’au coup d’Etat de 75. 
58 Créer les conditions institutionnelles et organisationnelles d'un développement territorial durable et 
équilibré reposant sur une gouvernance locale concertée et sur la valorisation des potentialités des 
collectivités territoriales afin de dynamiser le développement à la base.  
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It is this policy that allows the central state to transfer a certain number of responsibilities 
to the local authorities and to sub-units that can help the development at the grassroots level (I20, 
national/ education, 02 03 2017).59 
In other words, transferring a limited amount of responsibilities to local authorities will 
empower people at the local level to manage their own development needs or agendas. Another 
education official from the provincial level shared a similar understanding and argued that:  
If the state has to concentrate on all responsibilities, development is not possible through 
the elected [officials]. We have understood that we must [...] go down to provide the means to the 
population at the local level so that they can manage and identify their real needs as well as invest 
in them at this level. [...] The concern is to see the population participating in the governance of 
their locality for its development (I46, provincial/ education, South, 28 04 2017).60 
Interestingly, the idea that decentralisation will lead to (economic) development (at the 
local level) has been inscribed into the policy text and is echoed in the discourses of education 
officials. It seems, from the views expressed, that the idea of discursively linking decentralisation 
to local development is anchored in an influential speech by then French president, Francois 
Mitterand, at La Baule in June 1990 (cf. chapter 7), in which he linked development and 
democracy to French aid (Gisselquist, 2008). In addition, development agencies have been 
presenting (liberal) democracies as a necessary pre-condition for development in the Global South 
(Hippler, 1994; Escobar, 2012). 
5.2.2.2 Decentralisation has been driven by ideas of modernisation 
PONADEC explicitly refers to decentralisation as a modernising project, as the following 
excerpt shows.  
Decentralisation and de-concentration, therefore, will be the driving forces of State 
modernisation, one of the goals of which remains economic growth and the reduction of poverty ...’ 
(MDGLAAT, 2008, p. 9, own translation, italics added).61 
                                                          
59 C’est cette politique qui permet à l'Etat central de transférer un nombre [spécifique] de compétences 
aux collectivités locale et à des structures qui peuvent aider le développement à la base.  
60 Si l’Etat doit concentrer toutes les compétences, le développement n’est pas possible à travers les élus. 
On a compris qu’il faut […] descendre à la base, donner les moyens à la population pour qu’elle se gère 
et puisse identifier leurs besoins réels et investisse à ce niveau. […] C’est dans le souci de voir la 
population participer à la gouvernance de leur localité pour son développement. 
61 La décentralisation et la déconcentration vont donc devenir les éléments moteurs de la modernisation 
de l’Etat dont l’une des finalités restent la croissance économique et la réduction de la pauvreté ; cf. also 
‘Assurer la mise en œuvre des principes de bonne gouvernance territoriale par une administration 
modernisée et efficace (p. 11) ; la décentralisation et la déconcentration sont les moteurs de la 
modernisation de l’Etat (p. 12) ; L’efficience de l’administration au niveau déconcentré passe aussi par 
une rationalisation de l’organisation des services de l’Etat au niveau départemental (pp. 10, 47)’ 
(MDGLAAT, 2008). 
135 
 
 
The underlying idea of modernisation is to transform traditional societies into modern 
ones by adopting the dominant values of the West (Scott and Marshall, 2015). Models of 
economic growth, embedded in liberalism, are linked to the theory of modernisation, used to 
explain the process of modernisation within societies. A modernist view of progress underlies the 
concept of development, which again is the subtext suggesting underdeveloped regions and 
populations need to evolve into developed ones. According to Tikly (2019), the beginning of 
modernisation theory framed good quality education within a Western view of modernity. 
The emphasis on equating modernity with decentralisation and liberal democracies is also 
mirrored in the documents of the German Development Agency, GIZ, and the Delegation of the 
European Commission as shown in the analysis of appendix 9.7. Decentralisation is a component 
of the EC’s programme of ‘Support for good governance for development'. Its overall aim, as 
documented in the National Indicative Program (EC, 2014), is the institutional modernisation of 
the country and the strengthening of the rule of law and participatory democracy.  
Similarly, GIZ’s aims are similar in its declaration paper for the modernisation of the 
country’s system of governance. 
We support platforms for the promotion of international exchange of experiences and for 
the development of approaches to modernize decentralized political and administrative systems 
(Lampe, 2017, p. 2). 
GIZ considers modernisation as a challenge and offers support through advising countries 
on how to politically and administratively decentralise their systems of governance. Hence, I 
argue that both EC and GIZ consider modernisation as a challenge and offer their support to 
countries to modernise through decentralising their political and administrative systems.  
The last section will examine the underlying approaches to the governance reforms, 
pointing to a hybrid mix of social, liberal and neo-liberal orientations.  
5.2.2.3 Decentralisation: a hybrid mix of social, liberal and neo-liberal approaches 
Social, liberal and neo-liberal arguments for de-concentration and devolution can be 
observed in the decentralisation policy, particularly regarding its strategic orientations. The policy 
text builds upon two arguments: strengthening the population’s access to local services and 
improving economic development at the local level. ‘Access of the population to local services‘ 
(MDGLAAT, 2008, pp. 7, 28) can be considered a neoliberal or a social argument: neoliberal 
because it views the citizen as a consumer or social because it strengthens the rights and needs of 
the grassroots population. The idea of ‘economic growth' (MDGLAAT, 2008, pp. 10, 11; 31, 33, 
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34) can be seen as both liberal and neoliberal because it frames development in economic terms 
(cf. Edwards and Klees, 2015).  
The following excerpt from the policy text, concerning the efficient use of public funds, 
illustrates this link.   
Recalling the premises of decentralisation [...], decision-making in the field favours a 
better allocation of resources [...] and greater efficiency of public funding (MDGLAAT, 2008, p. 
26, own translation).62  
Apart from the emphasis on efficiency, this excerpt may furthermore suggest a financially 
motivated decentralisation reform. The content analysis of the document revealed that the term 
‘resources' appears 122 times in the policy text. This is indicative of the focus being on a liberally 
and economically driven decentralisation reform. 
Furthermore, the values explicitly underpinning the policy, such as transparency, 
accountability, performance, results-based, ethics, professionalism, respect for rules and norms, 
monitoring and evaluation and the strict application of the law by all actors (MDGLAAT, 2008, 
p. 35), point to a hybrid mix of liberal and neo-liberal rationales. While transparency, 
accountability, performance and results-based management represent typical values of 
development discourse, referring to a neoliberal agenda, ‘respect for rules and norms' and ‘the 
strict application of the law by all actors' subscribe to a liberal agenda with a strong emphasis on 
the existing institutions (MDGLAAT, 2008, p. 35). As Edwards & Klees (2015) point out, a 
liberal government often co-exists with market-based approaches. These values suggest that 
decentralisation is about achieving economically driven development while strengthening the 
control mechanisms of the State.  
5.2.2.4 Transition 
In this section, I revisited the analysis of the discourses of development surrounding the 
decentralisation policy. The analysis so far has shown that PONADEC is interwoven with a 
particular understanding of development, underpinned by ideas of modernisation, on the one 
hand, and leading to (economic) development (at the local level) on the other. The underlying 
rationale for development policies is rooted in human capital and functionalist paradigms, leaving 
out national and local contexts, history and culture, as pointed out by Colclough (2012).  
                                                          
62 Rappel du postulat de la décentralisation […]la prise de décision du terrain favorisera une meilleure 
allocation des ressources […] et une plus grande efficacité des fonds public. 
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Moreover, decentralisation as a reform implies the notion of something lacking and 
reiterates the very notion of development by Escobar (2012). He considers development as a 
singular historical experience, the creation of a domain of thought and action. This discursive 
understanding of development implies certainty in the social imaginary of a shaped reality. I 
suggest that framing decentralisation as a modernising enterprise on the one hand, and as boosting 
development on the other, serves the development machinery and repeats the colonial rules. 
Overall, this section has discussed how PONADEC has been framed by development 
discourses, such as discursively linking decentralisation and development, underpinned by ideas 
of modernisation. This section also refers to the discursive dimension of the post-colonial 
condition understood from a postcolonial and global perspective, as well as in terms of discourse 
and practice (cf. chapter 3).This examination calls for a further investigation of the policy in terms 
of local and global formations, which leads to the third section.  
5.2.3 PONADEC: policy as a bricolage of local and global formations 
In this section, I consider PONADEC as being part of a broader policy ensemble, leading 
to a textual analysis of global actors, and finally, consider the decentralisation reform in light of 
its (post-) colonial legacy. In this context, I understand bricolage as 
[n]ational policy making [which] is inevitably a process of bricolage: a matter of 
borrowing and copying bits and pieces of ideas from elsewhere, drawing upon and amending 
locally tried and tested approaches, cannibalising theories, research, trends and fashions and not 
infrequently ¯ailing around for anything at all that looks as though it might work (Ball, 1998, p. 
126).  
5.2.3.1 PONADEC is part of a broader policy ensemble 
The Policy of Devolution and De-concentration is informed by a broader policy 
ensemble, predominantly of global policies which have been translated to the national context. 
More precisely, I conceive PONADEC as part of a policy ensemble, e.g., the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) (MDGLAAT, 2008, pp. 20, 22, 30, 39, 67), and international 
strategies, implying that ‘policies are located in a collection of interrelated policies’ (Rizvi and 
Lingard, 2010, p. 8). For instance, PONADEC (MDGLAAT, 2008, p. 30) states in its third sub-
objective that ‘Benin's territorial development is based on [...] people's access to basic services 
and the reduction of poverty defined by the MDGs'. Elsewhere, it refers to the MDGs in the 
context of financial transfers to the municipality (MDGLAAT, 2008, pp. 19–20, 22, 39), which 
should amount to between 4% and 16% compared to the less than 2% in 2010. Moreover, the 
Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction (Stratégie de Croissance pour la Réduction de Pauvreté, 
SCRP) and the Strategic Development Orientations (Orientations Stratégiques de 
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Développement, OSD) are the key documents for PONADEC, with 17 and 14 references, 
respectively. For instance, PONADEC (MDGLAAT, 2008, p. 9) states that ‘the fight against 
poverty is an integral part of the decentralisation policy’ with reference to the SCRP'. This 
observation may be understood as PONADEC attempting to increase its legitimacy through 
reference to international strategies while also incorporating a (neo-) liberal understanding of 
democracy emphasising the economic fight against poverty. 
The network of international strategies translated into national strategies such as the 
SCRP and OSD, spawns a further analysis of additional global actors that fed into the 
decentralisation policy in Benin, as the next section will discuss.  
5.2.3.2 A textual analysis of global actors involved in the policy formulation  
A social and textual analysis revealed that global actors, such as development agencies 
and consulting firms, played a considerable role in the formulation of the policy of 
decentralisation. The Beninese-French-German tripartite agreement for the development of the 
devolution laws and the subsequent role of the French consulting firm Institutions & 
Développement (I&D) leading the formulation process of PONADEC, were important actors in 
shaping the decentralisation reform in Benin.  
In the mid-90s, the ‘Tripartite agreement’ of cooperation between the Beninese, French 
and German governments, represented by the French Development Agency (Agence Française 
de Développement, AFD)63 and the German Development Agency GIZ, formed a powerful 
network for developing the devolution laws. As appendix 9.7 demonstrates, the website of the 
French Development Agency, supported by secondary literature, suggests that AFD tends to 
consider the role of the state as pre-dominantly one of redistributing resources and prioritising 
support to local authorities today. They refer to their expertise and experience of decentralisation 
on their website, while Dafflon & Madiès (2008) classify France as constitutionally unified with 
a centralised budgeting system.  
In contrast, the analysis of the position of the German Development Agency points to a 
federal form of decentralisation (Lauglo, 1995; Dafflon and Madiès, 2008), referring to its 
governance system as ‘Bundesländer’ and ‘Landkreise’. GIZ's approach can be categorised as 
liberal based on Edwards & Klees framework (2015) because they emphasise the role of the 
                                                          
63 No official position paper on decentralisation is publically available for the French development 
agency. Instead, the elements in this section come from AFD commissioned reports (Dafflon and Madiès, 
2008, 2011). AFD states that the report does not necessarily reflect their official position. 
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central and local government in participation (cf. appendix 9.7). The textual analysis of these 
agencies suggests that there are divergent perspectives on how to advise Benin to develop its 
devolution laws. A previous IO representative, involved in the formulation process of the 
devolution laws, suggests a highly negotiated process of bringing in elements from the French, 
German and Beninese experiences but where the French experiences remained dominant (I60b, 
IO, 04 06 2017). Tikly (2019) reminds us of how different underlying conceptions of modernity 
and development underlie the self-conception of IOs, which complicates and confuses the reform 
of national government systems.  
In the 2000s, a French consulting firm played a considerable role in the formulation of 
the decentralisation policy. The Decentralisation Ministry, supported by IOs, commissioned the 
French consultants Institutions & Développement (I&D) to conceptualise and write the 
PONADEC. The website content of I&D consultation on the support to decentralisation alludes 
strongly to the French system as it emphasises de-concentration as much as devolution 
(Institutions & Développement (I&D), no date), mirrored in the text of the PONADEC itself. As 
shown in the first column in the table below (cf. Table 8), I&D recommends a National Policy of 
Devolution and De-concentration (Politique Nationale de Décentralisation et de 
Déconcentration) with the objective of creating competent territorial authorities to ensure the 
following functions: ‘the development of local services for the population [and] to become the 
engine of local development, [as well as] a space of local democracy (Institutions & 
Développement (I&D), no date, own translation)’.64 It states furthermore that 
[t]he territorial authorities, especially the municipalities, aim to provide the essential 
services to the population (public service mission) and to be the driving force for development in 
their territory (Institutions & Développement (I&D), no date, own translation).65 
As the second column of the table below demonstrates (cf. Table 88), the PONADEC 
incorporates similar key words, concepts and underlying values that the I&D consultants offer. 
Both the objective and the vision of the PONADEC refer to the development of local services for 
the population. The objective relates to ‘boosting grassroots development’ (dynamiser le 
développement à la base), and the vision refers to ‘sustainable local development' (développement 
local durable) and ‘access to local services’ (l’accès de tous aux services de base). Regarding 
democracy, the PONADEC envisions to ‘make the territorial authorities the democratic spaces at 
the local level’ (Faire des Collectivités Territoriales des espaces de démocratie à la base) 
                                                          
64 Des Collectivités Territoriales (CT) compétentes, assurant leurs fonctions en matière de : 
développement des services de base à la population, moteur du développement local, espace de 
démocratie locale. 
65 Les Collectivités Territoriales, notamment les communes, ont pour objet d'apporter des services de 
base aux populations (missions de service public) et d'être le moteur du développement sur leur territoire. 
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(MDGLAAT, 2008, pp. 11, 32). These excerpts demonstrate the similarities between the concepts 
of the consulting firm and the text of the policy. It raises the question of the extent to which the 
consultancy firm ‘copied and pasted’ the policy of decentralisation into the Beninese context 
without sufficiently paying attention to the contextual differences. 
 I&D Consulting 
(Institutions & Développement 
(I&D), no date) 
PONADEC  
(MDGLAAT, 2008) 
Title  - The national 
policy of devolution and de-
concentration (Politique nationale 
de décentralisation et de 
déconcentration) 
-  The national 
policy for devolution and de-
concentration (Politique nationale de 
décentralisation et de 
déconcentration) 
Objective  - to form competent 
territorial authorities which ensure 
the following functions:  
- ‘the development 
of local services for the population 
[and] to become the engine of local 
development, [as well as] a space for 
local democracy’. 
- Make [of the] the 
territorial authorities spaces for 
grassroots democracy, good 
governance and sustainable local 
development […] (pp. 11, 32, italics 
added). 
Strategic 
orientations 
 -  ‘access of the 
population to local services‘(pp. 7, 
28)  
- ‘economic growth’ 
(pp. 10, 11; 31, 33, 34) 
Table 8 Comparative table of the use of language in the PONADEC and the website of I&D Consulting, 
(author’s compilation, own translation)  
Moreover, the language used in the PONADEC and the mission statements of some IOs 
are unsurprisingly similar. The EC delegation describes the aim of its governance project on the 
website as follows: ‘a territorial development, sustainable and balanced, based on concerted local 
governance’ (Délégation de l’Union européenne au Bénin, 2016), which is the exact statement of 
the PONADEC (MDGLAAT, 2008, p. 11): ‘sustainable and balanced territorial development 
based on concerted local governance’. This similarity raises the question of the extent to which 
the EC Delegation influenced the formulation of the policy, or how far the EC itself is influenced 
by global policy formulation processes. In light of the linguistic similarities between the policy 
text in the PONADEC and that of IOs and consultancy firms, I argue that the Beninese case can 
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be classified as the ‘translation' of a decentralisation policy, i.e. that the reform has selectively 
borrowed from elsewhere, adapted it to the local context, and implemented accordingly (cf. 
Steiner-Khamsi, 2012).  
5.2.3.3 The (post-) colonial legacy in the policy of decentralisation 
The Beninese policy, notably the current administrative organisation of the territorial 
authorities, cannot only be considered as a continuation of the administrative organisation under 
colonial rule and the subsequent Marxist-Leninist regime, but also draws on the experiences of 
political and administrative decentralisation in France. The Territorial Administration reform 
document of 1993, one of the incremental documents leading to the PONADEC, replaced the 
sous-préfectures through elected bodies, that is, the municipalities. The PONADEC (2008) refers 
to the institutional framework as:  
Learning from the experiences of devolution and de-concentration in the world, [and] 
starting from the territorial specificities of Benin, the legislator conceived a simple institutional 
framework composed of a single level of devolution with 77 municipalities [...] and a single level 
of deconcentration composed of 12 departments. The territorial boundaries of the municipalities 
were defined in relation to those of the former sub-prefectures which were abolished with the 
advent of the municipalities (MDGLAAT, 2008, pp. 24–15, own translation).66  
The policy remains silent, however, about the origins of the former sub-prefectures 
created in colonial times and maintained in the subsequent Marxist-Leninist regime, as explained 
in chapter 2.  In this context, I argue that the ‘territorial specificities of Benin', as the policy text 
states, have been shaped by its colonial history rather than by its endogenous experiences.  
Besides the historical influence of France, Benin’s current decentralisation reform 
displays similarities with the contemporary French concept of decentralisation. A representative 
of the ANCB claims that the decentralisation system of Benin has its foundation in the French 
one. 
From there, the draft laws were elaborated. What were the sources of inspiration for the 
editors? That, frankly, I do not know. However, I noticed that our decentralisation is close to the 
French system, so I imagine that French laws inspired the fathers of decentralisation. We wanted 
to reform many things, including schooling (I61, municipal/ decentralisation, 06 06 2017).67 
                                                          
66 Tirant les enseignements des expériences de décentralisation et de déconcentration dans le monde, 
partant des spécificités territoriales du Bénin, le législateur a conçu un cadre institutionnel simple 
composé d’un seul niveau de décentralisation avec 77 communes [...] et d’un seul niveau de 
déconcentration composé de 12 départements. […] Les limites territoriales des communes ont été définies 
en lien avec celles des anciennes sous-préfectures qui ont été abolies avec l’avènement des communes. 
67 A partir de là les projets de lois ont été élaborés. Quelles étaient les sources d'inspiration des 
rédacteurs? Ça, franchement je ne pourrai le dire. Mais j'observe que notre décentralisation est proche 
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This perspective was added to in a group interview at the national level discussing the 
decentralisation reform more broadly.  
Yes, we are in the French system. [...] We have only (ever) copied the French system, 
only the French system. [...] French excellence has influenced all other suggestions. [...] The 
reform is pegged on the French system (I67, national/ education/ decentralisation, 22 06 2017).68 
Both quotes suggest that the French form of decentralisation may have shaped the 
elaboration of the Beninese reform of education decentralisation.  
This section harks back to the material dimension of post-coloniality, notably the political 
element, understood as referring to the ‘institutions that comprise the postcolonial state in Africa 
[extending to] civil society’ (Tikly, 2019, p. 232). Even though the systems in France and Benin 
diverge to some extent in their political and administrative organisation, the PONADEC was 
shaped by the historical and contemporary influences of France. The historical and the current 
similarity between the administrative decentralisation of Benin and that of France raises the 
question as to whether Benin’s education decentralisation can be considered as a neo-colonial 
imaginary rather than a post-colonial one.  
5.2.4 Summing-up 
The National Policy of Devolution and De-concentration represents a complex network 
of actors, objectives, concepts, rationales and values. I first argued that the policy presents a shift 
from the idea of devolution alone to a mixed system of devolution and de-concentration, whereby 
de-concentration is discursively privileged within the text and discourses, in line with 
Fairclough’s first dimension. Discursively privileging de-concentration over devolution may be 
interpreted as a way of maintaining the central state’s control of the lower levels. In accordance 
with the social analysis (Fairclough’s third dimension), the main features of the policy text are 
presented in the development discourse and ideas of modernisation in the context of a hybrid mix 
of socialism, liberalism and neo-liberalism. In line with the processing analysis (Fairclough’s 
second dimension), the PONADEC can be considered as a policy bricolage in light of the role of 
the French and German Development Agencies in the development of the devolution laws and 
the role of the I&D consultancy in the formulation of the policy. The remaining colonial residues 
in the decentralisation policy, such as the development discourse, ideas of modernisation and the 
                                                          
du système français. Donc j'imagine que les pères de la décentralisation se sont inspirés des lois 
françaises. On a voulu réformer certain nombre de chose dont l'école.  
68 Oui, nous sommes dans le système français. [...] Nous n’avons copié que le système français, que le 
système français. [...] L’excellence française a influencé les autres propos. [...] La réforme est arrime sur 
le système français. 
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replication of territorial structures from colonial times, ignore the social and cultural capital, as 
discussed by Rizvi, Lingard and Lavia (2006).  
The last part of this chapter provides an analysis of the Ten Year Education Sector 
Strategy (Ministeres en charge de l’Education, 2012) and the Implementation Plan for Education 
Decentralisation (MEMP and MDGLAAT, 2015) to show how the PONADEC has been 
translated and partially resisted by education actors. 
5.3 The operationalisation of PONADEC: absence and resistance  
I first discuss the extent to which the education strategy addresses questions of 
decentralisation before analysing the Implementation Plan for Education Decentralisation, which 
brings together the operationalised PONADEC and the Education Sector Strategy. As in the 
analysis of the incremental documents in the first part of this chapter, I focus the analysis on 
aspects of coherence and intertextuality (Fairclough’s second dimension) and the analysis of text 
structure and vocabulary (Fairclough’s first dimension).  
5.3.1 Absence of devolution in the Ten Year Education Sector Strategy 
The analysis of the Ten Year Education Sector Strategy (Ministeres en charge de 
l’Education, 2012) reveals primarily the relative insignificance of decentralisation. More 
specifically, this strategy consists of 104 pages, but only one page addresses the need for de-
concentration, in the first place, and devolution, in the second place. The evaluation report of the 
PDDSE (2012) also points out the virtual absence of decentralisation in the education strategy, as 
the following quote demonstrates: 
First, it must be noted that the issues of devolution and 
de-concentration are virtually absent from the PDDSE (Bogino and Sack, 2012, p. 159, own 
translation).69 
The PONADEC was developed after the PDDSE; however, the decision to decentralise 
parts of pre-school and primary education had already been instituted in the devolution laws of 
1999 and the constitution of 1990 respectively. Therefore, the absence of decentralisation, and 
more specifically of devolution in the PDDSE, cannot be related to the temporal distance between 
the PONADEC and PDDSE. 
                                                          
69 Force est d’abord de constater que les questions relatives à la décentralisation et la déconcentration 
sont pratiquement absentes du PDDSE 
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Moreover, most activities relating to devolution concern the transfer of funds from the 
MEMP to the municipalities. More specifically, three out of five measures address the transfer of 
funds to the municipalities, mainly how to control these funds. Interestingly, the authors of 
PDDSE suggest that a provincial mechanism decreed within the devolution laws is necessary in 
light of the absence of any control mechanism at the level of the ministries, as the following 
excerpt states.  
In the absence of any control mechanism by the ministries over the municipalities 
recognised by the laws on decentralisation, the deconcentrated device of the prefecture, [which is] 
the Provincial Administrative Conference, can be used (Ministeres en charge de l’Education, 2012, 
p. 76, own translation).70 
Partly due to pressure from donors, the MEMP transfers proportionately more funds to 
the municipalities than other sectoral ministries, according to a representative of the National 
Commission of Local Finances (Commission Nationale des Finances Locales, CONAFIL) (I38, 
national/ decentralisation, 05/04/2017) (cf. chapter 6). In emphasising the need for control of the 
transferred funds, I suggest, the MEMP reclaims the power it was forced to give up in the 
decentralisation reform. 
The rationale for de-concentration, as given in the PDDSE, is to strengthen the efficiency 
of the education system through closer management of service delivery to the user, the promotion 
and development of local initiatives and a better distribution of roles and responsibilities between 
the different levels of the system. Like the PONADEC, the PDDSE points to a mixture of neo-
liberal (efficiency and service delivery to the user) and liberal rationales (distribution of roles 
between government entities) (cf. Edwards and Klees, 2015). As regards devolution, the authors 
of the education strategy aim for ‘closer and more effective management of the educational 
service’ by ‘accentuating the responsibilities and the attributes of the municipalities’ (Ministeres 
en charge de l’Education, 2012).71  
A closer analysis of the measures to achieve the above-stated objectives shows a sharp 
tension between autonomy and control. 
[G]reater responsibility for de-concentrated services, for primary and general secondary, 
technical and vocational is through assigning to each level the objectives to be achieved with 
                                                          
70 En l’absence d’un pouvoir de contrôle reconnu par les lois sur la décentralisation des ministères sur 
les communes, utiliser le dispositif déconcentré de la préfecture, la Conférence Administrative 
Départementale (CAD).  
71 En accentuant les responsabilités et les attributions des communes elle permet une gestion rapprochée 
et plus efficace du service éducatif. 
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indicators that allow for monitoring and regular control (Ministeres en charge de l’Education, 
2012, p. 76, own translation).72 
The quote starts with the importance of allocating more responsibility to the de-
concentrated services, which I understand as giving them more autonomy in the context of de-
concentration. The quote, however, links responsibility to the ‘objectives to be achieved’ in order 
to ‘monitor’ and ‘control’ these. This excerpt from the education strategy implies the 
empowerment of the local school authorities is connected to a regulated system of accountability 
and control given to the central level.  
The silence concerning decentralisation in the PDDSE also emerged in the interview data, 
as education officials seemed scarcely aware of the PONADEC. For instance, an education 
official complained that the education ministries were not involved in the decentralisation forum. 
Nonetheless, he acknowledged that the decentralisation policy and Plan2D were not taken into 
account in the development of the post-education strategy 2015 – 2025 (I6, national/ education, 
18 01 2017). This statement suggests parallel and separate planning processes at the national level, 
which may also explain the vast array of operationalisation documents at the lower levels.  
Moreover, why the education strategy only timidly mirrors devolution and de-
concentration raises issues of political will, ownership and power relations, as further exemplified 
in the analysis of the Implementation Plan for Education Decentralisation in the next section.  
5.3.2 Non-participation through the non-adoption of Plan2D 
The PONADEC’s objective is for every ministry in the five priority sectors to develop 
and implement a programme of devolution and de-concentration (MDGLAAT, 2008; MEMP and 
MDGLAAT, 2015). Plan2D is the National Devolution and De-concentration Policy translated to 
the education sector and the only document coherently linking the devolution texts to the 
education texts. The MEMP was the first ministry to elaborate this plan in 2014, supported by the 
German Development agency. In 2017, the Council of Ministers was not able to adopt this plan 
because the MEMP did not agree with the MDGL on the latest version. I interpret the non-
collaboration of the MEMP as a form of resistance due to the institutional changes that this plan 
would imply.  
                                                          
72 Une plus grande responsabilisation des services déconcentrés, pour le primaire comme pour le 
secondaire général, technique et professionnel, en assignant à chaque niveau des objectifs à atteindre 
assortis d’indicateurs qui permettront un suivi et un contrôle régulier.  
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One motive within the PONADEC is the rationalisation of resources, which was 
substantiated in Plan2D. An interviewee from the MEMP said informally that ‘nobody [within 
this Ministry] wanted this policy' and explained the resistance of ministry officials to the 
rationalisation of resources. 
Plan2D was written by consultants from the perspective of rationalising resources. People 
[from the MEMP] were against it (Informal discussion, national/ education, 04 01 2017).73 
The following excerpt from Plan2D illustrates the changes to the organisational structure 
of the Ministry regarding the principles of subsidiarity between the central and municipal 
government entities. 
At the national level, the structures are reorganised and streamlined; their 
attributions/responsibilities to be focused on the role of reflection, orientation and management. 
Concerning the de-concentrated structures, in particular, the six DDEMPs, the transfer of many 
tasks is planned under the subsidiarity principle, which requires the redeployment of staff from the 
national level as well as recruiting new staff, in order to carry out these tasks. Consequently, a 
prerequisite is the re-profiling of positions (MEMP and MDGLAAT, 2015 conclusions, own 
translation).74 
This excerpt describes a shift of responsibilities and staff allocation: the MEMP ‘reflects, 
orients and manages’, whereas its sub-units implement the national education policy. The 
redefinition of roles at the national and sub-national levels also implies the reallocation of staff at 
the provincial level and perhaps the municipal level, which could entail education officials having 
to move to geographically distant cities from the capital.  
An official of the MPD addressed the relations of power and personal interests involved 
in the adoption and implementation of Plan2D.  
Since there are power struggles and conflicts of interest within the institutions themselves 
[...], so if you are with these players, be smart about it and see how each player reacts. You will 
see who the influential players are, and which players are influenced. At that point, you will better 
understand their game (I56, national/ planning, 24 05 2018).75 
                                                          
73 Le Plan2D a été écrit par des consultants dans une perspective de rationalisation des ressources. Les 
gens [du MEMP] étaient contre. 
 
74 Au niveau central, les structures sont allégées réorganisées, leurs attributions étant concentrées sur le 
rôle de réflexion, d’orientation et de pilotage. Au niveau des structures déconcentrées, notamment les six 
DDEMP, il est prévu le transfert de nombreuses tâches au titre de la subsidiarité, ce qui nécessite le 
redéploiement du personnel depuis le niveau central ainsi que le recrutement, afin de pouvoir réaliser ces 
tâches. En conséquence, un préalable est le reprofilage des postes. 
75 Puisqu'il y a des rapports de force et des conflits d'intérêts à l'intérieur même des institutions. [...] 
Donc si vous êtes avec ces acteurs-là, astucieusement allez sur ce pan et voyez comment les acteurs, 
chacun en ce qui le concerne réagit. Vous allez voir quels sont les acteurs influents, et quels sont les 
acteurs (comment on dit là) les acteurs qui sont influencés. Vous allez comprendre un peu le jeu des 
acteurs à ce niveau-là. 
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Moreover, the interview data raises awareness of global influences and questions the 
legitimacy of this plan and the political will of the actors concerned, as the following quote of a 
representative of the ANCB shows:  
There are indeed many things that have been put in place. Is this not under pressure from 
funders? Yes! One wonders if it is not under pressure from donors. Actually, when the documents 
were developed, we had agreed to make a 2D plan, the 2D plan was done. […] but frankly, we 
cannot say that we felt any real impact at the municipal level. No! Today, the political will, as my 
colleague said, has become very, very thin overall, not just for education (I61, municipal/ 
decentralisation, italics added, 06 06 2017).76 
This quote suggests that the development of Plan2D was under pressure from the IOs, 
whereas the political will of the government for education decentralisation has weakened. The 
decline in the political will is also remarkable regarding the re-organisation of the MEMP, which 
removed its department of education decentralisation in 2016 and re-centralised its local school 
authorities in 2017 (cf. chapter 6).  
I interpret the non-adoption of Plan2D as a form of resistance to the agenda of global 
actors and strategies, on the one hand, and colonial power, on the other. While the MEMP could 
not prevent the elaboration of the plan, they found strategies to circumvent its adoption. The 
authors of Plan2D are aware of these challenges and call for ownership and participation: 
[It] is essential that the heads of the [sub-] units and the staff of the ministry take 
ownership of this plan as well as the managers and the staff with a role to play in the promotion 
and functioning of the pre-school and primary education sector in each municipality to ensure their 
constructive participation in the implementation of this plan (MEMP and MDGLAAT, 2015, 
conclusions, own translation).77 
This excerpt from Plan2D indicates the lack of participation and ownership of the officials 
at not only the national, but also at lower levels. However, I question how far the textual emphasis 
on participation and ownership of Plan2D can be productive in encouraging participation and 
ownership in practice. Instead, I propose that participation is underpinned by a rationale of 
instrumentalism in line with a liberal approach. A liberal conception of participation brings 
individuals and groups into the state. Since the existing institutions, such as the ministries and 
                                                          
76 C'est vrai qu'il y a beaucoup de choses qui ont été mises en place. Est-ce que ce n'est pas sous la 
pression des bailleurs? Oui! On se demande si ce n'est pas sous la pression des bailleurs. Parce que 
quand les bailleurs… en fait quand les documents sont élaborés, on a dit le plan 2D, le plan 2D est fait 
[…] Non ! Aujourd’hui, la volonté politique comme l’a dit [mon collègue] est devenue très, très mince 
globalement pas seulement pour l’éducation. 
77 Il est important que ce plan soit approprié par les responsables des structures et l’ensemble du 
personnel du ministère ainsi que les responsables et le personnel ayant un rôle à jouer dans la promotion 
et le fonctionnement de l’éducation maternelle et primaire dans chaque commune, afin d’assurer leur 
participation constructive à la mise en œuvre de ce plan. 
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donors, ‘fund and manage these policies, they tend to maintain the status quo’ (Edwards and 
Klees, 2015, p. 488).  
5.3.3 Summing-up 
This part reviewed the Education Sector Strategy and the Implementation Plan for 
Education Decentralisation. The analysis of the PDDSE revealed the relative insignificance of 
decentralisation in the PDDSE, which addresses decentralisation only vaguely, privileging de-
concentration over devolution, coherent with the discourse of education officials. Moreover, most 
activities relating to decentralisation concern the transfer of funds from the MEMP to the 
municipalities, which I interpret as reclaiming power and control. A closer analysis of the 
activities related to decentralisation demonstrated a clear tension between autonomy and control 
because the local school authorities are empowered, on the one hand, but also controlled through 
a defined system of accountability, on the other. Finally, education, as decentralisation officials 
claim no involvement in the planning processes for either decentralisation or education; this may 
lead to separate and fragmented planning processes. 
For Plan2D, I understand the non-collaboration of the MEMP as a form of resistance to 
the institutional changes that this plan implies. The reason given in the PONADEC is the 
rationalisation of resources, which was substantiated in Plan2D. The ‘streamlining’ of the central 
education administration goes back to issues of the power relations and personal interests involved 
in the adoption and implementation of Plan2D. Moreover, I interpret the non-adoption of Plan2D 
as a form of non-participation and resistance to the agenda of global actors and the colonial legacy. 
The data suggests that the development of Plan2D was due to the pressure exerted by IOs, whereas 
the political will of the government for education decentralisation has weakened. 
5.4 Summary  
This chapter is a Critical Discourse Analysis of the policy of decentralisation spanning 
20 years (1990 to 2010). The policy formulation process includes the incremental policy 
documents, such as the 1990 constitution and laws (education and decentralisation) in the first 
part of this chapter; the decentralisation policy in 2010 in the second part; and strategic as well as 
the implementing documents, the Education Sector Strategy and the Implementation Plan for 
Education Decentralisation in the third part. 
In this chapter, I first argue that the devolution laws from 1999 did not change the power 
relations between the actors significantly because they mainly remain limited to what used to be 
managed locally. Second, the PONADEC presents a shift from the idea of devolution to a mixed 
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system of devolution and de-concentration, whereby de-concentration is privileged over 
devolution. An understanding of development, underpinned by the idea of modernisation, informs 
the PONADEC, pointing to a hybrid approach embracing predominantly social, liberal and neo-
liberal values. The decentralisation policy can also be considered as a neo-colonial bricolage in 
that it builds upon the administrative structure of the colonial period. Third, the relative 
unimportance of education decentralisation in the education strategy on the one hand and the non-
adoption of the Implementation Plan for Education Decentralisation, on the other hand, show how 
a policy influenced by global actors and strategies can be resisted by national governments. 
The next chapter discusses the social practices of the actors involved in the enactment of 
education decentralisation from a relational perspective. 
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6 ‘You gave me a sheep, but you have kept the rope’- The mediation 
of the decentralisation policy for the provision of schooling78 
What do the [legal] texts say? How are they implemented? Thus, it is about the social practices. 
We have made the devolution laws, but we continue to manage the country as if we had not 
experienced devolution or de-concentration (I18, IO, 21 02 2017).79 
While the previous chapter analysed the policy text of PONADEC and its policy package, 
this chapter examines the social practices in the context of education decentralisation as the 
interviewee (above) suggested what the texts said and what happened in practice were not the 
same. With reference to Ball’s (1993, 2015) third dimension in policy trajectory studies, this 
chapter explores the second sub-question of how the actors involved in the provision of schooling 
mediate the current decentralisation policy. In line with actor-network theory as a methodological 
approach, this chapter is a study of small actor-networks at the local level in the Southern and 
Northern field sites to illuminate ‘the strategic, relational, and productive character of particular, 
small-scale, heterogonous actor-networks’ (Law, 2009, p. 145).  
I consider that ANT’s notion of translation is particularly helpful for analysing the 
discursive and social practices in this chapter because it ‘helps to unpick practices, processes and 
precepts to trace how things come to be’ (Fenwick and Edwards, 2010, p. 12). It is about the 
(trans)-formation of meaning in one context to interpretation in another context, the translation 
and localisation of meaning in the process of becoming something new. I use semi-structured 
interviews with officials from three different ministries in charge of education, decentralisation 
or planning, and their sub-units. I also draw on data from focus-group discussions (FGD) with 
teachers and parents and the visual actor-maps produced by teachers (cf. chapter 4).  
Following on from chapter 3, the data in this chapter is from both human and non-human 
actors. In particular, it draws on the voices and actions of humans collected in the form of 
interviews, and uses maps for non-humans as part of the documentary review, and participatory 
and visual maps. According to Fenwick and Edwards (2010), non-human actors can be material 
things (e.g. classrooms or parents’ meetings), bodies and how they are governed, (e.g. parents, 
teachers or municipal actors), and textual things, such as policies or development plans. As 
explained in section 4.4.1.3, the actor-maps proved themselves to be particularly suitable for 
making explicit the material dimension of associations or the role of non-human processes in this 
chapter. Besides human actors, these maps include corporate bodies, i.e. the Beninese 
                                                          
78 In this chapter, I use schooling to refer to pre-school and primary education to improve the readability.  
79 Les textes disent quoi? Comment on les met en œuvre? Donc, c'est les pratiques sociales. On a fait les 
textes de décentralisation, mais on continue de gérer le pays comme si on n'a pas connu la 
décentralisation, ni la déconcentration.  
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government, a loose aggregate of institutions, i.e. NGOs or individuals as well as the processes 
of resistance and convergence constituting further assemblages in the broader actor-network. 
The first part of this chapter disentangles the discursive and social practices of the actors 
involved in the delivery of schooling at the local level in the Northern and the Southern field site. 
More precisely, it deals with the widely diverse social practices as a consequence of the 
decentralisation policy exemplified in the case of school construction. The second part sheds light 
on the reconfiguration of the relationships between the municipal government entities, 
particularly the Local school authority, and the town council, and its citizens, notably teachers 
and parents. Finally, the third part discusses the reconfiguration of the relationships and networks 
within the government, notably the central and municipal government entities. This chapter starts 
start by shedding light on the widely diverse social practices in the context of school construction. 
6.1.1 Widely diverse social practices as a consequence of the decentralisation policy - 
the situation with school construction 
The following section explores how actors at the school, the municipal and the provincial 
level discursively understood what putting in place the de-concentrated and devolved 
responsibilities involved. The concrete example of school construction - the main devolved 
responsibility -and comparing the narratives from two different geographical areas: North-South 
and urban-rural/ centre-periphery (cf. chapter 2) begins the analysis. While I consider both field 
sites as particular locations [place] of negotiation and the exercise of power as illustrated by the 
issues of school construction encountered, the discursive and social practices lead to reflections 
on space as the 'realm of the […] chaos of simultaneity and multiplicity' (Massey, 1994b, p. 1).  
6.1.1.1 The Northern field sites: actors and processes 
 
The rural Northern field site 
Based on the visual data, I start with a description of how the research participants80 
perceived their influence on the provision of school infrastructure in the rural Northern field site. 
More precisely, the first actor-map captures the perceptions of teachers of which actors were 
involved in school construction and extension, how influential they were and the processes 
involved in the new building and the extension of the existing school buildings. As figure 11 
illustrates, the teachers in the rural school in the North placed the municipality and the NGOs in 
the centre of the map, which implies that they are more influential than the actors at the periphery. 
                                                          
80 Teachers produced the actor-maps. Interview data with head teachers, students’ parents and members 
of teacher unions complement the visual data 
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At the same level as the municipality but on the margins of the map are the students' parents. 
Interestingly, the school and the Government were placed at the same distance from the centre - 
symbolising decision-making - and likewise, the provincial and local school authorities. The map 
blurs the lines of a predominantly hierarchical understanding, with the central administration as 
the centre of decision-making and the lower levels as less influential, because the map ‘equates’ 
the school level with that of the Government, and the NGO level with that of the municipality, 
although the legal framework of the decentralisation reform theoretically strengthens the central 
Government and municipal structures (MDGLAAT, 2008).  
 
Figure 11 Actor-map of the rural Northern field site81  
The presentation of the map and the explanations from the FGD are different in terms of 
the process of school construction. The teachers from the focus group explained that the need to 
extend an existing school stems logically from the concerns of teachers and headteachers, or 
parents when there is a need to create a new school. The teachers explained that they communicate 
the need to parents, on the one hand, and, the local and provincial school authorities, on the other. 
Subsequently, the provincial school authority communicates the need to the central government. 
In contrast, the interpretation of the map could suggest that the process of constructing schools 
starts at the level of the NGOs. While the map documents the relationship between the 
municipality with the central government and the de-concentrated services as reciprocal, the 
                                                          
81 Original actor-map including translations (blue rectangles)  
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NGOs seem to communicate with parents, the town council and the local school authority 
unilaterally. Once the need reaches the MEMP, the ministry contacts the municipality, which then 
proceeds to undertake the school construction. 
Even though school construction is within the responsibility of the municipality, the data 
from the FGD and the maps suggest the process starts at the school level and then goes up to the 
central administration. However, the map seems to allocate more importance to NGOs. In 
contrast, teachers emphasise their role and agency for the process of extending school buildings. 
The data generated in the semi-urban field site in the North in the next section shows a more 
multifaceted picture of the school construction process and actors involved. 
The semi-urban Northern field site  
At first sight, the actor-map in figure 12 looks more multi-layered because of the increased 
number of actors and the complexity of their relationships to . The map does not tell the reader if 
more actors intervene in this semi-urban field site or if the teachers identified more actors than 
the previous FGD. On closer inspection, the map reveals two levels in a circular arrangement: 
first, going from centre left to centre upper right, they list NGOs, the municipality, parents, 
teachers and the local school authority. Second, the map documents the Ministry, the Government 
and the provincial school authority in a half circle below the other actors.  
In comparison with the previous map, the teachers identified those potentially powerful 
actors geographically close to them. Actors in the inner circle (NGOs, municipality, parents, 
teachers and local school authority) seem to relate to each other in various, and most often, in 
harmonious ways, with the exception of the relationship between parents and the local school 
authority. The relationship between the actors in the outer circle (the Ministry, Government, 
provincial school authority) are only partially mutual. This observation suggests a perceived 
closer collaboration between actors at the school and municipal levels, whereas their perception 
of the collaboration between the provincial and central administration remains somehow distant. 
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Figure 12 Actor-map of the semi-urban Northern field site 
Teachers from the FGD reported the school construction and extension process in the semi-
urban Northern field site as follows: the teachers identify the need to extend or repair and equip 
a school building, which they communic to both the local school authority and the parents, while 
the local school authority double-checks the needs of the teachers and parents are reasonable, the 
teachers and parents contact both the town council and NGOs. After that, the provincial school 
authority comes to check the poposed development is necessary, and if so, they communicate this 
to the minister, as the following discussion between teachers illustrates.  
The DDEMP also comes to inspect the [identified] place, and when they see that there is 
potential, they ask the minister directly "can we create a school in such place?" [....]. Right now, 
the minister gives the order to the DDEMP [....] (I27, school, North, 21 03 2017).82 
Not only does the provincial school authority have to validate the need, according to the 
research participants, some suggested that even the council of ministers has to validate the 
decision. 
When the ministry grants the request, […], it builds [a school] (Participant a). No, he [the 
minister] is accountable to the government (Participant b). The ministry already is the government. 
                                                          
82 La DDEMP aussi vient à l’inspection sur le lieu et quand il voit qu’il y a opportunité, il demande 
directement au ministre « ah on peut créer une école dans tel lieu ». En ce moment, le ministre donne 
l'ordre à la DDEMP. 
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[....] The ministry says that it requests the creation [of a school] in such a locality and there is the 
council of ministers which approves the creation. [....] It is the council of the minister that decides 
to create [a school] (Participant a) (I27, school, North, 21 03 2017).83 
The dialogue of the two interviewees indicates the centralisation of school construction 
decisions, presumably, more in discursive than in practice terms. Where the municipality is 
legally responsible for school infrastructure, teachers perceived the school construction as an even 
more centralised process, as the quote above evidences. The perceived centralisation of education 
may emerge from the still highly centralised system of government, on the one hand, and its 
historical roots in political centralisation on the other (cf. chapter 2). It points to the various 
discursive and social practices, which suggest a tendency towards centralisation, and the 
negotiation of power between multiple actors.  
Summing-up the perceptions of teachers about school construction in both Northern field 
sites, it can be stated, first, that practices diverge from the legal and policy framework 
significantly. Second, NGOs play an important role in funding school construction, particularly 
in the rural site. In line with Fichtner's (2012) argument, I interpret the central positioning of 
NGOs next to the central and municipal government entities as the parallel functioning of 
governmental and non-governmental structures. Third, albeit with the general perception of an 
uneasy collaboration beteen the municipality and the local school authority, the data is mixed; the 
Northern field site suggests there is a strong and constructive connection in the rural area, while 
links are more distant in the semi-urban site. Fourth, even though school construction is legally 
codified as a responsibility of the municipality according to the devolution law 99-029 
(MDGLAAT, 2010, article 97), the data from the FGD and the maps suggest the involvement of 
the provincial and central administration of education in approving the need for new or more 
building identified by teachers and parents. 
The next two sections discuss the actors and processes in the context of building schools in 
the Southern fieldsite, which is divided into two settings again: urban-centre and urban-periphery. 
6.1.1.2 The Southern field sites: actors and processes 
 
The Southern periphery field site  
                                                          
83 Quand la demande est accordée par le ministère, c’est fini, il crée. Non il [le ministre] doit rendre 
compte à l’Etat. Le ministère déjà, c’est l’Etat. [….] Le ministère dit qu’il veut la création dans telle 
localité et il y a un conseil des ministres qui sanctionne la création. [….] C’est au conseil de ministre 
qu’il y a décision pour création. 
156 
 
 
In the Southern periphery field site, the teachers situated the MEMP at the centre of 
decision-making (cf. figure 13). The MEMP sits literally in the centre, which is not surprising as 
the ministry is located physically in Porto Novo. Close by is the municipality, with which the 
MEMP communicates unilaterally in the direction of the municipality. This way of 
communicating is remarkable because it could be assumed that communication starts at the level 
of the municipality, as the main actor in school construction. NGOs and benefactors are situated 
in the second circle, whereas the local school authority, the school and the students’ parents are 
all placed at the margins of the map. This observation is again significant, because teachers, 
parents and students are the actors who are most concerned by the availability and the quality of 
school infrastructure.  
 
Figure 13 Actor-map of the Southern periphery field site 
The interpretation of the visual data describes the school construction process as follows: 
the local school authority communicates the need for school buildings to the Ministry, bypassing 
the provincial authority. The Ministry then contacts the municipality. Formally, communication 
circulates between all levels of the MEMP and its sub-units. Whether the absence of the provincial 
school authority is an omission or whether it indicates that the provincial administration is 
considered unnecessary, remains unclear. While teachers, parents and benefactors are placed 
close to each other, the relationship between the municipality and the local school authority 
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appears to be disconnected or absent. This observation suggests stronger collaboration between 
benefactors, NGOs and school actors, and raises a question about the role and cooperation of 
other actors, particularly the municipality and the local school authority. 
In contrast to the map, teachers from the FGD and parents considered themselves in a 
position to identify the need for new constructions or extending an existing school building. As 
in the North, they communicated their needs to the local school authority, benefactors and NGOs 
at the same time, presumably to improve their chances of accessing funding as well as approval.  
The school identifies the need [...] because everything starts from the school. [...] If the school 
does not ask [...], not everyone has to play a role. Therefore, the school is of vital importance [...] 
because it is the starting point [...] (I43, school, South, 20 04 2017).84 
The quote above demonstrates that school actors consider the school to have a potentially 
influential role regarding the school extension process as they claim that they have to identify and 
communicate the need. Similar to the data from the Northern field sites, teachers, headteachers 
and parents tend to emphasise their role in the school construction process in their oral account 
but tend to neglect it in their visualisation of the process. This observation may suggest that they 
consider their voice is not highly influential, as documented in the actor-maps, but they reclaim 
it discursively in the FGD. I now move on to the last school setting, which is centrally located in 
an urban setting. 
The Southern centre field site  
Based on the visual map (cf. figure 14), the school actors in the 'centre school' in the South 
positioned the municipality in the decision-making centre. In addition to already known actors, 
they also mentioned the role of the chief of the district and the provincial school authority, 
whereas the students' parents sit between the provincial and the local school authority. This is the 
only focus group that included the district chief on their map. The district chief is elected as are 
the mayor and the town council, but has no legal personality or financial autonomy according to 
the devolution law 97-029 (MDGLAAT, 2010, article 5). 
Nonetheless, the district chief can be considered a potentially powerful person due to his 
professional and political closemess to the mayor. The research participants expressed the chief’s 
                                                          
84 L’école identifie le besoin [...] parce que tout part de l’école. [...] Si l’école ne demande pas, [...], tout 
ceux-ci-là n’ont pas de rôle à jouer. Donc l’école a une certaine importance [...] parce que c’est le point 
de démarrage. […] 
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power by positioning him at the same level as the provincial school authority. Teachers, nearby 
the headteachers, are closer the margins, likewise NGOs and economic operators. 
 
Figure 14 Actor-map of the Southern centre field site 
This map suggests that teachers and head teachers communicate with each other as well as 
head teachers and parents. The head teacher refers the school’s needs to the local school authority, 
which then follows the hierarchical order to pass it on to the provincial school authority. While 
parents discuss the needs with the district chief and the district chief communicates with the town 
council, the research participants did not document how the local school authority relates to the 
municipality. As in the other school in the Southern field site, the teachers evaluated the 
relationship between the de-concentrated actor, the local school authority, and the devolved actor 
the municipality, as being disconnected. In contrast to all the other maps, these research 
participants did not include the ministry or the Government. This observation particularly 
contrasts with the other school in the periphery in the South, which situated the MEMP in the 
centre of the map.  
Crucial in this focus group (FGD 27, institutional, 21 03 2017)85 is the discussion of who 
has access to funding for constructing schools and how they get hold of it. The teachers discussed 
                                                          
85 This FGD was neither audiotaped nor transcribed, following the request of the research participants.  
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the roles of municipalities and NGOs but also pointed out the importance of the head teacher 
having a political link to the mayor. For preference, the teachers of this focus group call the 
municipality to account concerning their devolved responsibilities. They suggested that the town 
council has access to income through local taxes, which could be unlocked to pay for school 
construction purposes if the government did not transfer the necessary funds. However, political 
proximity to the mayor was a central theme in this group discussion. The research participants 
argued that the approval of applications for new school buildings or extensions and their funding 
mainly depended on the principal or students’ parents being supporters of the same political party 
as the mayor. This argument is in line with the example in Rasmussen’s (2011, 2013) study 
whereby local election results shift the priorities of the town council to build schools in urban 
rather than in rural areas because the majority of voters lives in the more densely popuated urban 
areas. Similarly, Bierschenk and de Sardan (2003, p. 165) state that ‘[a]ccess to local government 
representatives can become an important element of the political processes in various situations’.  
Summing-up the perceptions of teachers regarding school construction in both Southern 
field sites, it can be stated, first, that what happens in practice significantly diverges from the legal 
and policy framework. As in the North, perceptions were mixed about the level of collaboration 
between the local school authority and the municipality, but there was the suggestion of tensions. 
In the periphery Southern field site, the relationship between both actors (school authorities and 
the municipality) was documented as disconnected, whereas in the centre Southern field site, the 
tension was less visible. However, the geographical particularities of their locations influenced 
the perceptions and practices of the actors involved in the mediation of education decentralisation. 
Presumably, due to the better socio-economic situation of the Southern field site and better 
educational outcomes (cf. chapter 2), NGOs are considered as less important actors; instead, 
schools there rely on individual economic operators and benefactors. Third, the data in both the 
Southern field sites diverges significantly concerning the perceived role of the central 
administration. Whereas the periphery field site emphasised the role of the Ministry, the centre 
field site did not mention the central administration. It is impossible to explain the divergence in 
both Southern field sites, but it can be assumed that the central administration plays a more 
important role in the South than in the North, because of its geographical proximity.  
This section has frequently addressed the divergent perspectives that emerged. Mannay 
(2016) suggests embedding the visual data into a more comprehensive narrative, which I did 
through the combination of the actor-maps with the FGD. The combination of the data collected 
resulted, however, in divergent perspectives as explained. Sometimes, the data from the actor-
maps provided a different perspective compared to the data from the focus groups; at other times, 
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the FGD in the Southern or Northern field site revealed contradictory narratives, which could not 
be related to the particular geographical locations, such as urban, semi-urban or rural. In light of 
the hierarchical context in Benin and the particular interview situation, I privileged the reading of 
the map over the oral data because the interview data was likely to align with the dominant 
discourses, whereas the map may have allowed for a more subtle documentation of the diverse 
social practices. The divergence between the interview and the visual data may indicate the 
possibly widely diverse social processes at the local level.  
6.1.1.3 Summing-up 
In this part of the chapter, I discussed the multiple perceptions of the school actors on the 
topic of school infrastructure, the mainly devolved responsibility of the municipalities. To sum-
up this part, I discuss it from the ANT perspective of three moves; localising the global, 
redistributing the local and connecting sites (Latour, 2005). This study of small-scale actor-
networks at the local level in the Southern and Northern field sites exemplified the mediating role 
of the decentralisation policy. Albeit the singular discourses that decentralisation is saturated with, 
the data from the focus groups with teachers and the participatory visual data demonstrated that 
the discourses and practices around school construction are multiple and messy. The data 
collected in the North as in the South, drew a picture of disorderly networks deliberating and 
negotiating to have their say and influence in the education sector.  
In using ANT, I followed the actors and their connections -the teachers, parents, NGOs, 
appointed and elected officials - to understand how they discursively and socially connected with 
each other to bring about education decentralisation. Networks, such as education or development 
fora, bringing together different human actors from different geographical settings, are further 
actors in this excerpt. Even school buildings and the quality norms required to build these schools 
are vital to the discussion of how education decentralisation is enacted. Documents, such as the 
education and devolution laws as well as the implementation plans form further assemblages, 
connecting with human actors and bringing about certain social practices, some of which are more 
dominant than others. Fenwick and Edwards (2010) remind us to be aware of  materially induced 
changes, e.g.  digital or on paper, which can distract us from focusing on the information and 
discourse a text or document conveys; the focus needs to be not only on what they mean but what 
they do. 
In comparing the sites, I noted certain tendencies in how power was exercised through 
networks, even though the data was varied. Some discursive and social practices had become 
more dominant than others. Among other things, I also stated that the government- non-
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government actor relationship was different in each field site. The Northern field site seemed to 
rely more heavily on the support of NGO, while the Southern field site seemed to communicate 
its needs directly to the DDEMP or the MEMP rather than through cooperating with the 
municipality. School actors in the South may tend to circumvent the municipalities as they depend 
upon the transferl of funds from the Education Ministry, and then the necessary funds are only 
partially transferred. However, these social practices are not permanent, but reflect a particular 
moment in time.  
I interpreted the different constellations in terms of their geographical location, e.g. the 
presence of NGOs in the North makes funding accessible through non-government actors. In the 
South, in contrast, the physical proximity of the central and provincial administration makes 
funding more likely to be accessed from them rather than the municipality. In using different field 
sites and adopting a spatial lens, I brought out how the analysis of the local, focusing on the spatial 
power dynamics, is more informative than a single temporal focus on the achievement or 
enactment of decentralisation as a policy imperative (Massey, 1994b). Instead of considering the 
local as a deficit, it can be rather found in the universalised policy informed by dominant 
development discourses.  
In the Beninese context, Fichtner (2012, p. 114) referring to Gluckmann (1955) suggests 
the local level to be a ‘social arena structured by an institutional pluralism and "multiplex" 
relationships’, i.e. relationships which serve many interests. Similarly, Oussou (2017), comparing 
school management before the Beninese decentralisation reform and today, describes the 
municipality as an arena where actors compete for the control of transferred abilities. He states 
that the logic and social practices of the actors will have not changed. I challenge this statement 
in the next two parts of this chapter, arguing that the relationships between government and non-
government actors had been altered, at least temporarily. I will unpack more carefully some of 
the connections between the actors, notably between the government and its citizens, and within 
the government. In doing so, I acknowledge that I reduce the discussion to the human actors, and 
also emphasise that the discursive and social practices are not stable, but reflect a particular 
moment in time.  
The next part starts with a discussion of the reconfiguration of the relationships between 
government and non-government actors.  
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6.1.2 Reconfiguring the relationships between government and non-government actors 
at the local level  
This part analyses how government and non-government actors relate to each other (cf. 
figure 15). It first unpacks the roles of the appointed and elected officials; it then sheds light on 
the role of NGOs and benefactors; and finally discussies the role of parents in the historical 
context of education in Benin. As previously pointed out, I consider these trends to be temporary 
stable practices which are subject to change.  
 
Figure 15 Changing relationships between government and non-government actors 
6.1.2.1 PONADEC empowers elected officials and silences appointed education officials  
From a legal perspective, the town councils only exist because of the decentralisation 
reform, which has its foundation in the 1990 constitution, and became 'effective' during the first 
elections in 2002/03 (cf. chapter 2). The devolution laws and PONADEC clarify primarily the 
responsibilities of the prefectures at the provincial level (devolution laws N°97-028) and the 
municipalities at the municipal level (devolution laws N°97-029). They allude only occasionally 
to the role of the sectoral authorities and if so, only to the provincial level as being the only 
formally de-concentrated level. Hence, the policy of devolution and de-concentration has not 
addressed the role and responsibilities of the appointed education officials at the municipal level.  
In terms of the social practices, the interview data remains unclear because the appointed 
and elected officials have different perspectives. The data may suggest the potential 
PONADEC
Teachers
Local School 
Authority 
ParentsMunicipality
NGOs
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empowerment of the elected officials to the detriment of the influence of the appointed officials 
since the decentralisation reform. For instance, a senior official of the local school authority in 
the Northern field site complained that the municipality does not involve him in the management 
of the devolved responsibilities. He considered himself to be the technical advisor of the mayor, 
as the following quote demonstrates.  
The head of the local school authority is the technical advisor of the mayor. […] 
[However,] it is as if the municipality takes decisions without us (I23, municipal/ education, North, 
09 03 2018).86 
Although the heads of both local school authorities claimed to be the technical advisors of 
the mayor, the municipal officials in the Southern field site clearly stated that the head of the local 
school authority does not advise the mayor.  
The role of the head of the school authority concerns teachers. It is not at the level of the 
town council. [Instead], it is about teachers. [...] He plays the role of supervisor of all the activities 
that take place in the area of education. So he is there as a supervisor, to supervise the teachers in 
the field. [...] To return to the town hall, the head of the local school authority does not have a right 
[to advise], but he has the power to advise the teachers who are on its territory (I47, municipal/ 
decentralisation, South, 05 05 2017).87 
As the legal and policy framework only makes provision for one de-concentrated level, 
notably the prefecture and sectoral authorities at the provincial level, the role of the local school 
authority is not clear, which may explain why the heads of local school authorities experienced 
resistance from the elected officials.  
However, the Northern municipality introduced a consultation framework for the elected 
and appointed officials at the municipal level. The officials of the municipality explained the 
coordination mechanism, justifying its existence as being in accordance with the legal framework, 
as the following quote illustrates.  
Once a month, the mayor of the municipality of N'dali and all the heads of the de-
concentrated units come together in a consultative framework. That is also in the [legal] texts. […] 
This is the place for each of them to say the difficulties they face (I29, municipal/ decentralisation, 
North, 22 03 2019).88 
                                                          
86 Le C/CS est le conseiller technique du maire. […] C’est comme si la mairie prend des décisions sans 
nous. 
87 Le rôle que le C/CS joue, c’est à l’endroit des enseignants. Ce n’est pas au niveau de la mairie. C’est à 
l’endroit des enseignants. [...] Il joue un rôle de superviseur de toutes les activités qui se mènent au 
niveau de l’enseignement. Donc il est là en tant que superviseur pour encadrer les enseignants sur le 
terrain. [...] Pour revenir à la mairie, le C/CS n’a pas un droit mais il a le droit de conseil sur les 
enseignants qui sont sur son territoire. 
88 Une fois, par mois, le maire et tous les chefs-services déconcentrés de la commune de N’dali se 
retrouvent dans un cadre de concertation. Ça, ce sont également les textes qui le disent. […] Et c’est le 
lieu pour chacun d’eux de dire les difficultés auxquelles ils font face. 
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As previously noted, the devolution laws, and the corresponding policy, make only 
provision for de-concentration at the provincial level. Education, however, has been historically, 
the most de-concentrated sector, which may be explained by the necessity to manage and monitor 
schools at the village level (cf. chapter 2).  
I have discussed how the elected officials from the municipality perceived their role to have 
been strengthened, while the appointed officials from the local school authority felt largely 
ignored by them, with little or no involvement. Okanla (2013) noted a similar point, saying that 
the municipalities in Benin have increased their authority because of the decentralisation policy. 
According to him, the municipalities are in a better position today to manage their devolved 
responsibilities and respond to the needs and demands of the local population compared to the 
arrangement before the current decentralisation reform.  
The role of NGOs and benefactors is the subject of discussion in the next section, in which 
I examine the differences in the field sites concerning the role of non-government actors.  
6.1.2.2 The role of NGOs and benefactors in the North and the South 
The data shows that NGOs hold an influential position in the Northern fieldsite, while 
benefactors appear to be more significant in the Southern field site for funding school 
construction. Moreover, the research participants in the rural field site in the North emphasise the 
role of NGOs more than those in the semi-urban site. As explained in chapter 2, the provinces 
Alibori/ Borgou are known to have the poorest school results in terms of access, retention and 
achievement. This kind of situation tends to attract NGOs supported by national and international 
donors and, hence, NGOs are powerful actors for delivering education at the local level. Parents 
appreciate the existence of NGOs; one interviewee commented ‘in this respect, we are not 
unhappy’ (I26, school level, 21 03 2017).  
However, the role of NGOs is outside the formal legal and policy framework of education 
decentralisation. Therefore, NGOs can and do intervene in various ways in the provision of school 
infrastructure, as the discussion of the teachers in the Northern field site demonstrated:  
When the decision comes to the […] town hall, the mayor, in collaboration with the parents 
brought about [the construction of the school building]. So we can already establish this 
relationship: Parent-town council for the construction work. Alternatively, town council-NGO for 
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the construction work. Alternatively, again NGO-parents for the construction work (I27, school, 
North, 21 03 2017).89  
This quote not only indicates the prominent place of NGOs in school infrastructure but also 
points out the various ways NGOs can intervene in the system.  
Similarly, municipal officials highlighted the important role of technical and financial 
partners90 in the implementation of the education strategy in the Northern field site.  
Fortunately, the technical and financial partners are there to help us, […]. I will say that for 
our ten year plan for the development of the education sector; this plan is well-designed, but we 
cannot afford to execute this plan wisely. That is why, at any time, I will say we appeal to our 
financial and technical partners to help us (I23, municipal/ decentralisation, North, 09 03 2017).91 
However, they also point to the problem of the sustainability of external support and call 
themselves to account.  
However, the problem that Benin faces is that we rely so much on the partners that we can 
no longer even demonstrate our strengths. Also, when the partners leave us, we have serious 
problems. This [behaviour] is what we will have to correct. At the same time as the partners are 
helping us, we have to get on with it ourselves. We have to develop the capacity to take care of 
ourselves from when the technical and financial partners leave us (I23, municipal/ decentralisation, 
North, 09 03 2017).92 
Education officials at the national level shared this concern. The following quote adresses 
the powerful role of NGOs in determining the development agenda, notably regarding 
decentralisation. The interventions of NGOs can be disruptive at times, leading even to the 
degradation of local development as the repondent explained.  
So, as we also know that NGOs and other funders provide finance, we theoretically align 
ourselves with their choice of decentralisation. However, we adopt strategies to circumvent the 
things we have set ourselves up for implementation. [...] However, the weight of IOs can be good 
or maybe negative. I believe that the pressure of governmental and non-governmental 
organisations can sometimes lead to the downgrading of some decisions. At the same time, it can 
                                                          
89 Quand la décision vient au niveau de la mairie, soit la mairie en collaboration avec les parents, réalise 
l’ouvrage. Donc on peut déjà établir cette relation. Mairie-parents pour l’ouvrage. [...] Ou mairie-ONG 
pour l’ouvrage. Ou bien encore ONG- parents pour l’ouvrage. 
90 The thesis uses the terminology ‘partner of the international community’ and IOs interchangeably.  
91 Heureusement, les partenaires techniques et financiers sont là en train de nous aider, […]. Je dirai 
qu’avec notre plan décennal pour le développement du secteur de l’éducation ; ce plan là est un plan 
bien conçu mais nous n’avons pas les moyens pour exécuter ce plan là à bon escient. C’est pour quoi à 
tout moment je dirai nous faisons appel à nos partenaires financiers et techniques pour qu’ils nous aider. 
92 Mais c’est que le problème auquel le Bénin fait face, c’est que nous comptons tellement sur les 
partenaires que même nous n’arrivons plus à démontrer nos propres forces. Et lorsque les partenaires 
nous quittent, nous avons de sérieux problèmes. C’est cela qu’il va falloir corriger. Au même moment que 
les partenaires sont en train de nous aider, nous devons nous même nous mettre à la tâche, nous devons 
nous-mêmes développer des capacités d’activités en mesure de nous prendre en charge dès que les 
partenaires techniques et financiers vont nous laisser à nos propres comptes. 
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be disruptive for some innovations when people sometimes try to meet local needs (I6, national/ 
education, 18 01 2017).93 
This quote simultaneously expresses alignment and resistance to donor priorities. As 
Koyama and Varenne (2012, p. 159) suggest ‘playing was part and parcel of daily works in 
education' regarding the NCLB policy in the US. In this regard, PONADEC becomes ‘part and 
parcel of daily works in education’ in the (re-)negotiation of power relationships. Koyama and 
Varenne (2012, p. 159) borrow the term ‘socio-technical controversies’ from Callon, Lascoumes 
& Barthe (2001) to explain how ‘multiple actors are playing not only with their roles but also with 
each other, their policy contexts, and the policy itself'.  
In the Southern field site, benefactors rather than NGOs acted with the municipality as 
potential funders of school constructions. The reason for the less notable presence of NGOs may 
lie in the relatively good socio-economic situation of the field site, as previously explained. 
Teachers from the FGD reported that they did not need to address the town council if there were 
benefactors willing to help out. 
If the school wants [to extend or repair] without these [central or municipal government] 
actors, it can work with benefactors, with the good wills. […] The school can [cooperate] with the 
help of benefactors. The school can go even without the town hall, without the MEMP [...] (I43, 
school, South, 20 04 2017).94 
Even though the NGO landscape in the South differs from that of the North, this quote 
indicates how NGOs could bypass the government in both field sites. It links back to Fichtner's 
(2012) argument: she considers the support for NGOs to education as a vital phenomenon to the 
government acting in a global system. The 'NGOisation' of education is not a process of 
developing a privatised welfare system in the shadow of the government.This statement implies 
that NGOs do not replace government actors, but intervene in parallel and various ways, as the 
data fromthis study indicated. 
                                                          
93 Donc comme on sait également que ce sont les ONG et les partenaires financiers qui financent, on 
s’aligne sur leur choix en matière de la décentralisation théoriquement. Mais on joue des stratégies 
d’acteur dans la mise en œuvre pour contourner les choses qu’on a soi-même mises en place. […]Mais il 
y a toujours un poids des acteurs des organisations internationales qui peut être en bien ou qui peut-être 
aussi en négatif. Je crois que les pressions des PTF et des organisations non gouvernementales peuvent 
parfois une dégradation à certaines décisions. Et en même temps, ça peut être un perturbateur de 
certaines innovations au cas où les gens tentent parfois de répondre aux besoins des localités. 
94 Si l’école veut sans ces acteurs-là, elle peut avec les bonnes volontés. […] Même sans la mairie, sans le 
MEMP, l’école peut. 
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Whereas the influence of NGOs does not seem to be contested, the influence of parents 
appears to have been weakened since the advent of education decentralisation, which I explain in 
the next section. 
6.1.2.3 Students’ parents reclaiming their role: stronger in the North than in the South 
Emerging from the previous analytical chapter (cf. Chapter 5), the role of parents in in the 
provision of schooling shifted significantly after the democratic renewal in 1990. The data 
suggests that parents' influence has become weaker compared to before the advent of 
decentralisation. However, parents in the Northern field site positioned themselves differently to 
the parents in the Southern field site: parents in the North perceived themselves to be more 
influential than parents in the South.  
Albeit within a general trend of fading influence, parents in the Northern field site form a 
relatively important actor in the landscape of education, A senior representative of the municipal 
association for students' parents considered the local school authority, the town council and the 
association of students' parents as the three most important actors as the following quote 
illustrates:  
There is the local school authority that is closer to the decision-making as they collaborate 
with the central administration. After them, there is the town hall. Moreover, at the level of the town 
hall, the mayor of the municipality can be said to be the minister of education. After that, there is 
the coordination [of students' parents]. At the level of the municipality, there are these three. 
Education cannot move forward without them: the town hall, the CS and the CAP. They are actors 
who have to agree [with each other] (I26, school, North, 21 03 2017).95 
This quote indicates that the local school authority is the first decision-making instance as 
it is 'close' to the ministry regarding its attributes, organisation and operation. I consider the role 
of the local school authority referred to in this quote as an example of traditional power-holding 
before the introduction of the reform of education decentralisation. Nonetheless, this students' 
parent acknowledged the importance of the municipality in second place, and the students' parents 
in third place, suggesting that all three actors have to collaborate.  
From the perspective of municipal officials in the North, however, parents have become 
disengaged from supporting schooling, as the following quote indicates. This municipal official 
                                                          
95 Il y a la circonscription qui est plus proche de la décision. Puisse que c’est eux qui travaillent avec 
l’administration centrale. Après eux, il y a la mairie. Et au niveau de la mairie, c’est le maire de la 
commune qui est on peut dire comme le ministre de l’éducation. Après, il y a la coordination. Au niveau 
de la commune il y a ces trois-là. Sans eux l’éducation ne peut aller de l’avant. La mairie, la CS et la 
CAP. C’est des gens qui doivent nécessairement s’entendre. 
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of the Northern field site saw the reason for the disengagement of parents the 2006 which decreed 
schooling free. 
The free schooling we speak about is only in name, not a reality. In spite of everything, it 
has flown away. The parents, too, as soon as they heard talk about free [schooling] […] gave up 
any obligation. They do not do their duties, as they should. They have given up, I can say somehow, 
since, according to some, the state must provide everything for their children. That is, however, 
not the freedom we are talking about - it is about no tuition fees (I23, municipal/ education, North, 
09 03 2018). 96 
Moreover, this research participant used the perceived disengagement of parents as an 
argument for drawing in the government again. 
Parents no longer actively engage in the education of their children [e.g. school construction, 
recruitment of community teachers]. This is why the town council asks the [central] government to 
[financially] help the system (I23, municipal/ education, North, 09 03 2018).97 
I consider the debate around the (dis-)/ engagement of parents within the broader political 
climate of Benin. Since 1975, parents had been organised in networks covering school concerns 
at all levels. Although Benin had a socialist government until 1989, the World Bank, among 
others, had already intervened with the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the late 80s 
because of Benin's economic and financial breakdown. During the SAPs of the late 80s and early 
90s, community schools became common, and parents paid different levels of fees to cover for 
teachers' salaries, buildings and recurrent costs (Rasmussen, 2011, 2013). As chapter 5 discussed, 
the decentralisation reform strengthened the role of the government again from 1990 onwards. 
Education has been legally codified as shared between the municipality - responsible for school 
construction - and the central government, responsible for teacher recruitment and management, 
among other areas.  
Unlike the students' parents in the North, the students' parents in the Southern field site 
considered their influence as fading. More specifically, they did not feel any involvement in 
education prompted by either the schools themselves or the municipalities. As the next quote 
suggests, parents may be involved in working sessions with the town council, but they perceive 
their involvement as only symbolic.  
                                                          
96 La gratuité dont on parle, la gratuité là ce n’est que de nom en réalité. Malgré tout ce qui se fait, ça 
prend de l’aile. Les parents aussi, comme ils ont entendu qu’on parle de la gratuité, les parents aussi en 
tout cas ont abandonné leur devoir. Ils ne font plus leurs devoirs comme cela se doit. Ils ont démissionné 
je vais dire en quelque sorte puisque selon certains, c’est l’Etat qui doit fournir tout à leurs enfants. Alors 
que ce n’est pas ça. La gratuité dont on parle, c’est par rapport aux frais de scolarité. 
97 Les parents ne participent plus activement à l'éducation de leurs enfants. C’est pourquoi le conseil 
municipal demande au gouvernement d’aider le système. 
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Do the municipalities involve anyone? No! No! At most, they set up a working session 
and call the students’ parents to say, "come". We do not agree with them, but they do not accept 
any discussion with us (I40, school, South, 12 04 2018).98 
Moreover, the school budget has become the subject of a complex interplay between the 
local school authority, the head teacher and students' parents. The representative of the parents' 
associations in the South claimed that the parents’ signature of agreement on the school budget is 
only symbolic. 
When it is like that, the municipal parents’ association cannot say anything. Then, the 
head teachers claim for themselves the right to manage and everything is managed [without us]... 
It is true they need our signatures for this and that, but, in reality, we do not carry much weight 
[…] (I40, school, South, 12 04 2018).99  
The Education Ministry initiated a reform in 2014 to employ accountants within local 
school authorities, for the co-management of the budget by these newly appointed accountants, 
headteachers and parents. Previously, parents had co-managed the local financial grants along 
with the headteacher and hence, had felt they had more influence on how money was spent. I 
suggest that the employment of accountants in the local school authority presents a shift of power 
from the parents to de-concentrated officials. The MEMP may have taken this reform as a reaction 
to PONADEC in order to recentralise power in the central administration. Unsurprisingly, the 
Education Sector Strategy (Ministères en charge de l’éducation, 2012) insists on the control of 
transferred funds, aiming to strengthen the role of accountants (cf. chapter 5).  
Within my argument about the weakened role of students’ parents, I revisit three reasons 
or events which have reshaped the role of parents: first, the launch of the decentralisation law in 
1999, stating the municipality is responsible for school construction, equipment and repair, 
implying that parents are discharged of their former, but informal responsibility for school 
infrastructure. Second, the former president, Yayi Boni  decreed primary school fee-free in 2006, 
which many officials, from the municipal to the national level, regret. The fee-free decree implies 
that parents do not need to pay tuition fees anymore, but they tend to consider this means the 
government has responsibility for all expenses related to schooling, such as textbooks and 
uniforms. This contributes to government officials’ perception that parents have become 
disengaged from the formal education of their children. Third, the Education Ministry brought in 
                                                          
98 Mais est-ce que les mairies associent quelqu’un ? Non ! Non ! Tout au plus, tout au plus ils font une 
séance de travail et appellent les parents d’élèves pour dire « venez ». Mais nous ne convenons pas avec 
eux. Ils n’acceptent pas trop discuter avec nous. 
99 Quand c’est comme ça, l’APE ne peut plus rien dire. Donc les directeurs s’arrogent carrément le 
pouvoir de leur gestion et tout se gère… C’est vrai qu’ils requièrent nos signatures pour ci et pour ça. 
Mais en réalité on n’a pas trop de poids. 
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a reform in 2014 to employ accountants within local school authorities to co-manage school 
budgets with headteachers and parents.  
All three events, over 15 years, suggest ‘centralisation’ at the municipal level: parents at 
the school level have been legally discharged of their previous responsibilities, notably co-
managing the school budget, employing community teachers and building schools. This 
observation is in line with Rasmussen’s (2011) argument that  
[t]he implementation of decentralisation reform also reveals the existence of local power 
centres below the new municipal level. In this sense, the decentralisation reform implies local 
centralisation processes, and it is also sometimes resisted from below (Rasmussen, 2011, p. 10). 
In this context, I consider parents together with the traditional (religious and ethnic) leaders 
as 'power centres from below' as the quote suggests.  
In this study, the strengthening of municipal government actors contrasts with the 
marginalisation of parents, who had historically been involved in enabling their children to access 
and attend school. The reduced voice of parents is noteworthy as the dominant argument in the 
literature claims that decentralisation empowers parents (e.g. Gershberg, González and Meade, 
2012). The scholarly literature focusing on the Beninese context is divided: Odushina et al. (2008) 
state that that parents associations represented an essential institution for the management of the 
school. Rasmussen (2011) also confirms that parental initiatives continued to be powerful, 
although the devolution laws do not give them a formal role. In contrast, Oussou (2017) argued 
that students' parents were willing to build schools and pay contract teachers in the past, but they 
are reticent today because they consider the municipality as being responsible for these functions. 
6.1.2.4 Summing-up 
I have argued in this part first, that the decentralisation policy reinforces the role of the 
municipalities as government entities and, more specifically, as responsible for the provision of 
school infrastructure for pre-school and primary education. Revisiting Arnstein’s (1969) ladder 
of participation, I suggest that elected municipal actors enjoy the greatest freedom in terms of 
participation, ‘citizen control’, which implies that citizens can govern an institution. In contrast, 
the role of the local school authority remains unchanged as an effect of PONADEC. The structure 
of the local school authorities as de-concentrated units of the MEMP seems to cohere most with 
Arnstein’s concept of delegation, where power is delegated to appointed officials for a particular 
purpose, such as school inspection, in which they have the power of decision-making (Arnstein, 
1969).  
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Second, NGOs, particularly in the North, and benefactors in the South, tended to be 
influential and intervened in various ways. They navigated the system in parallel with government 
structures, as demonstrated in the North, or influenced the practice of school actors to exclude 
municipal and central government entities in the South. I propose that NGOs’ degree of 
participation can be situated somewhere on the continuum between partnership and delegation. 
For example, NGOs, elected and appointed officials as well as civil society actors shared planning 
and decision-making responsibilities through specific structures (Arnstein, 1969), such as 
education or development fora, in the case of partnerships. Pinkney (2009) explains how NGOs 
are used by international development agencies to simultanously benefit from more development 
assistance by channelling development funds through service delivery or advocacy. 
Third, more parents reported feelings of disempowerment in the South than in the North. I 
argued that the reasons for their loss of power are three-fold: the adoption of the devolution laws 
in 1999, the introduction of free primary education in 2006, and the reform of employing 
accountants at the municipal level to control the school budget in 2014. I consider the involvement 
of parents as consultation which serves as a forum for bringing people together with different 
levels of power, but in Arnstein (1969, p. 217) words, the ‘have-nots’ ‘lack the power to insure 
that their views will be heeded by the powerful’. 
I consider, however, that these relationships are only fixed in particular moments as power 
and hence participation may be negotiated on a daily basis and thus are of a changing nature. The 
next part discusses the reconfiguration of the relationship between central and municipal 
government entities.  
6.1.3 Reconfiguring relationships and networks between central and municipal 
government entities  
In this last part of the chapter, I review how the relationship within the government, notably 
between central and municipal government entities, has been reconfigured. The analysis of the 
legal framework for decentralisation in chapter 5 revealed the potential tension over autonomy 
and control between the municipal and provincial levels and the devolution and de-concentration 
forms of decentralisation. The first section discusses devolved responsibilities as a competition 
between the national and local levels from the perspective of the national and provincial officials. 
The second section debates the attitude of the governor to the mayor, alluding to how the central 
government controls the activities of the town council through the specific functions of the 
prefect.  Finally, the third section contends that the strengthening of de-concentration to the 
detriment of devolution empowers the central government at the local level.  
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This part also revisits the proverb in the title of the chapter: ‘You gave me a sheep, but you 
have kept the rope’, which repeatedly emerged in the interview data. In theory, the mayor has a 
statutory position and financial autonomy, but in practice, officials at the national and provincial 
level often contest the idea of autonomy to maintain power at the central level. This proverb 
represents the legally devolved responsibilities as the sheep: the rope is hung on to the central 
government, with the governor representing the head of the government at provincial level. I use 
the sheep metaphor throughout this last part to demonstrate the dialectic of autonomy and control 
between central and municipal government entities. It starts by discussing how national and local 
actors negotiate power in devolved responsibilities for resources and control.  
6.1.3.1 Devolved responsibilities as a competing game between the national and the local 
level  
In this section, I extend my argument from the local complexities to the role of the central 
level, exploring the concept of devolved responsibilities as a competing game between the central 
and municipal government entities. This section links back to issues that teachers and parents 
raised in section 6.1.1. I borrowed the idea of a competing game from a senior education official 
from the STP/ PDDSE who considered the responsibilities for maintaining school infrastructure 
as a competition between the national and local levels in which the national level still dominates.  
In the game of competition between nationally elected officials and locally elected 
representatives, I perceive that the national officials are not playing fairly. They have held on to 
issues of school buildings and equipment at the national level (I6, national/ education, 18 01 
2017).100 
I illustrate the competing game through three points mainly made by central government 
officials themselves: firstly, the MEMP continues to build schools; secondly, the national level 
exercises power by not transferring the necessary resources; and, thirdly, in its control of any 
transferred funds.  
Data from the interviews at different levels confirmed the practice of the Education 
Ministry continuing to build pre-school and primary schools, even though the devolution laws 
transferred this responsibility entirely to the municipalities. To this end, the following quote from 
a central education official states that there are several school building projects which his ministry 
manages. 
                                                          
100 Dans le jeu de concurrence des élus nationaux et des élus locaux, je vois que les élus nationaux ont 
pris plutôt la précisasse. Ils ont maintenu à leur niveau national la question des constructions et des 
équipements scolaires. 
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There is an abundance of projects that the central level continues to carry out. They go 
directly to the municipalities and build schools without even informing the mayor. Even the 
Ministry of Decentralisation [does] the same [thing] (I5, national/ education, 17 01 2017).101 
This quote suggests that the central administration carries out tasks that on paper have been 
devolved to the municipalities, and this is not only prevalent in the Education Ministry but also 
in other ministries, such as the Decentralisation Ministry.  
The underlying rationales for maintaining responsibility for school infrastructure at the 
central level are several. For example, it can be due to the fear of losing power and privilege when 
the national level effectively transferred responsibilities, including the necessary resources, as the 
following quote from an ANCB representative indicates.  
However, there is some reluctance by high-ranking officials, especially those of the central 
administration. They do not want to transfer resources because they fear losing their prerogative 
to the benefit of the municipalities (I61, municipal/ decentralisation, 06 06 2017).102 
However, the MEMP is only part of a wider network sustaining the centralisation of school 
infrastructure. Some IOs continued to transfer their funds for school construction to the Ministry 
rather than the municipalities. For example, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
supported the centralisation trend of the Ministry, according to a CONAFIL representative. 
I believe that the MEMP needs to go beyond what it does since it is no longer rare to find 
construction projects within the MEMP budget. Yes! I have witnessed this. Nevertheless, the law 
says that the municipality is competent to put up buildings. If we respect the law, these different 
projects should not exist anymore, and these different partners [IOs] should no longer transfer 
resources to the MEMP but use the [financial mechanism] FADeC to transfer resources [to the 
municipalities] (I38, national/ decentralisation, 05 04 2017).103 
Moreover, the national level exercises control over the municipality through not 
transferring to it the necessary human, financial and material resources as having overall control 
of the transferred funds. I elaborate the insufficient transfer of resources only briefly because other 
studies and reports (Odushina et al., 2008; Sembene, 2012; MDGLAAT, MEF and 
MERPMEDER, 2014) have made this argument. 
                                                          
101 Il y a plein plein de projets qui continuent par être conduits depuis le niveau central. Ils vont 
directement dans les communes sans même informer le maire et érigent des modules. Même au ministère 
de la décentralisation, c’est pareil. 
102 Mais on sent certaine réticence au niveau des cadres surtout qui animent l’administration centrale. Ils 
ne veulent pas transférer les ressources qui craignent de perdre leur prérogative au profit des communes. 
103 Je crois que le MEMP doit aller au-delà de ce qu’il fait. Parce qu’il n’est pas encore rare de trouver 
dans le budget du MEMP des projets de construction. Oui ! J’en suis témoin. Or la loi a dit que c’est la 
commune qui est compétente pour construire. Si nous devons respecter la loi, ces différents projets ne 
doivent plus exister et ces différents partenaires ne doivent plus remettre les ressources au niveau du 
MEMP mais plutôt passer par le FADeC. Pour transférer des ressources. 
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Even though all the IOs participating in this study emphasised the willingness of the 
Education Ministry to transfer funds to the municipalities, the MEMP did not fulfil the conditions 
set out by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Economique et Monétaire 
Ouest Africaine, UEMOA). A CONAFIL representative explained that the amount transferred to 
the municipalities was still relatively low in light of the relative cost-intensive responsibility to 
build schools.  
When the MEMP says it is the ministry that transfers the most, it is in terms of volume; 
however, it is not much [...] [as the] MEMP has a big budget. [...] So, I think it is right in terms of 
volume. The MEMP transfers a bit more than the other [ministries]. However, the MEMP does 
not transfer everything that it could. [...] I do not think the MEMP transfers 10% of what it needs 
to transfer (I38, national/ decentralisation, 05 04 2017).104 
Finally, the central government exercises power by assuming control of the transferred 
funds. More precisely, the various ministries regularly monitor the municipalities to check how 
they spent the funds. The monitoring missions by the Education Ministry, the Decentralisation 
Ministry and the Finance Ministry as well as donors, do not complement each other but rather 
repeat the same tasks. Officials from different ministries feel entitled to control the municipalities 
because their understanding is that 'they' transferred the money, as the following quote from a 
CONAFIL representative illustrates.  
It is the role of the sectoral ministry to transfer and monitor [funds]. However, since the 
sectoral ministry has de-concentrated services to the municipal level, it should delegate the mission 
to these de-concentrated services. Since we should not leave Cotonou first, to build in Malanville, 
which is more than 700 kilometres from here; secondly, supervise a construction site that is in 
Malanville because that requires monitoring from nearby. So the MEMP ought to transfer [the 
responsibility to its provincial and local school authorities] (I38, national/ decentralisation, 05 04 
2017).105 
This interviewee suggests, on the one hand, that the MEMP should just transfer the funds, 
but delegate the monitoring to its provincial and local school authorities. On the other hand, he 
considers the Ministry of Finance and the CONAFIL, which he represents, entitled to control 
what funds are spent on at the local level.  
                                                          
104 Quand le MEMP dit, qu’il est le ministère qui transfère le plus ; c’est qu’en termes de volume, ce n’est 
pas beaucoup hein. [..] Mais c’est le MEMP qui a un grand budget. [...] Donc je pense que c’est vrai en 
termes de volume le MEMP transfère un peu plus que les autres. Mais le MEMP ne transfère pas tout ce 
qui est transférable. [...]Je ne pense pas que le MEMP transfère 10% de ce qu’il doit transférer. 
105 C’est d’ailleurs le rôle du ministère sectoriel de transférer et suivre. Mais étant donné que le ministère 
sectoriel a des services déconcentrés au niveau des communes, le ministère sectoriel devrait déléguer 
cette mission de suivi à ces services déconcentrés. Parce qu’on ne doit plus quitter Cotonou (1) pour aller 
construire à Malanville qui est à plus de 700 kilomètres d’ici. (2-) pour aller superviser un chantier de 
construction qui est à Malanville parce qu’il faut un suivi de proximité. Donc le MEMP doit transférer et 
suivre simplement.  
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We do the monitoring ourselves to avoid slippage. We do this to allow different structures to 
coordinate their activities better. Moreover, some departments of the Ministry of Finance want to 
follow up [the expenditure] since, after all, they allocate the resources to different ministries.  They 
just want to see clearly, what is done with the resources allocated to different ministries. So we are 
coordinating this follow-up by the Finance Ministry. We carry out joint missions (I38, national/ 
decentralisation, 05 04 2017).106 
Besides the overlapping of control mechanisms, an ANCB representative explained that 
the legal framework includes provisions to reduce the likelihood of funds being misappropriated, 
which contrasts with the widely held view by central state officials that the aim of control is to 
reduce the risk of corruption.   
We finally wonder if people are serious. Three percent of the [national budget is 
transferred to the municipal level] and we set up ten commissions to control it. Three percent of 
resources [at the municipal level and] 97% per cent [at the central level]. [How is that controlling? 
[…] Frankly, we wonder if people are serious. […] Not only is the accountant of the town hall, an 
agent of the government. He is a treasury agent. Even if the mayor wants to do something, he is 
there to say, "Mr Mayor, it does not follow procedures". So, there are many guardrails at the 
municipal level. The rest is a question of willingness (I61, municipal/ decentralisation, 06 06 
2017).107 
This section discussed how the central and the municipal level compete for control of 
devolved responsibilities, whereas the next section deals with the dialectic relationship between 
the governor and the mayor when navigating questions of autonomy and control. 
6.1.3.2 The central state at the local level: the role of the governor and the relationship with 
the mayor  
The analysis of the devolution laws in chapter 2 stated that the prefect, who is the 
representative of the state at the provincial level, supervises the mayor, who is a legal personality 
and has financial autonomy. The governor checks the legality of the acts performed by the mayors 
according to the devolution law 97-028 (MDGLAAT, 2010, article 14). In this context, I suggest 
that the legal framework risks the ineffective transfer of power to mayors because governors can 
control the activities of the mayor. This is even more problematic if the mayor represents a 
                                                          
106 Nous-mêmes, nous suivons pour éviter les dérapages. Nous suivons pour permettre aux différentes 
structures de mieux coordonner leurs activités. Maintenant il y a les structures du ministère des finances 
aussi qui veulent suivre. Parce qu’après tout, c’est eux qui font les allocations de ressources aux 
différents ministères. Mais ils souhaitent souvent voir claire dans ce qui est fait avec les ressources 
allouées aux différents ministères. Alors ce suivi par le ministère des finances, c’est nous qui 
coordonnons cela. Nous faisons des missions conjointes à ça. 
107 On se demande finalement si les gens sont sérieux. 03% et on met dix commissions pour contrôler. 
03% des ressources. 97% pourcent ici, comment est-ce que c’est contrôler ? Combien de commissions de 
contrôle il y a ici. Franchement on se demande si les gens sont sérieux. […] Non seulement la mairie 
mais le comptable de la mairie, c’est un agent de l’Etat. C’est un agent du trésor. Même si le maire veut 
faire du n’importe quoi, lui, il est là pour dire « monsieur le maire, ça ne respecte pas les procédures ». 
Donc il y a énormément de garde-fou au niveau communal. Le reste c’est une question de volonté. 
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different political party to that of the head of state, as the following quote from a provincial 
representative of a teachers’ union points out. 
If the governor is not in agreement with the mayor, he can block his/her actions [...] and 
prevent him/her from working [...]. Since politically, if the mayor is not on the same side as the 
President of the Republic [...], but the governor is […], the mayor can easily be defeated and his 
place taken by someone who is (I51, school, South, 16 05 2017).108 
This interviewee argues that the governor can influence the activities of the mayor through 
his/ her role make sure municipal acts are in accordance with the national legislation, potentially 
politicising his/ her role alongside that of the political party of the central government.  
Surprisingly, the majority of critical voices came from the national and provincial level, 
whereas officials at the municipal level tended to defend the role of the prefect. The following 
quote illustrates how the municipal officials of the Northern municipality assumed that control by 
the governor was necessary to ensure that mayors respected the national legislation. 
Imagine that the prefectures do not insist [on controlling], it will be a disaster. It is the 
prefectures that are there to see our activities are legal [...] within national guidelines to see if an 
action taken respects the legal requirements (I29, municipal/ decentralisation, North, 22 03 2017).109 
Similarly, municipal officials in the Southern municipality did not think that the role and 
the activities of the governor got in the way of their autonomy.  
It does not disturb the autonomy of the municipality. [...] Well, decentralisation started 
not long ago. Moreover, many do not understand the operation of the laws [...]. If we put the 
prefecture there to control the legality [of the acts], it is to avoid any leakage [...]. Otherwise, the 
municipality is autonomous. The municipality is autonomous. It is not for the governor to come 
and say how the town hall should ... It is just to see ... (I47, municipal/ decentralisation, South, 
05/05/2017).110 
The municipal officials in this quote, however, displayed some resistance towards the 
prefecture, emphasising the autonomy of the municipality.  
                                                          
108 Si le préfet n'est pas d'accord avec le maire, il peut bloquer ses actions [...] et l'empêcher de travailler 
[...]. Car politiquement, si le maire n'est pas du même côté que le président de la République [...], mais 
que le préfet est […], le maire peut facilement être battu et sa place prise par quelqu'un qui est. 
109 Imaginez que les préfectures n’insistent pas, ça va être une catastrophe. C’est les préfectures qui sont 
là pour voir la légalité des actes que nous prenons, que nous produisons avec des dispositions nationales 
pour voir si tel acte qu’on a posé, si tel document qu’on a pris respecte les dispositions légales. 
110 Ça ne dérange pas l’autonomie de la commune. Mais ça permet à… Puisque nos communes, c’est des 
communes qui sont… Bon la décentralisation a commencé il n’y a pas longtemps. Et beaucoup n’ont pas 
le sens de la gestion des lois. C’est pour vous dire que si on a mis la préfecture là pour le contrôle de la 
légalité, c’est pour qu’il n’y ait pas de débordement. […] Sinon, la commune est autonome. La commune 
est autonome. Ce n’est pas à la préfecture de venir dire comment la mairie doit …. C’est juste pour 
voir… 
 
177 
 
 
Recalling the proverb 'You gave me a sheep, but you have kept the rope', I suggest that the 
governor may represent the invisible hand holding the sheep, which represents the devolved 
responsibilities. Thus, the guardianship of the governor could be considered a solid mechanism 
of the central state to control the activities of the town council. Nanako (2016) supports this 
argument, explaining that governors predominantly practised control over the legality of 
activities, while their advisory support to the municipalities is only minor. Interestingly, most 
municipalities respected the constitutional principles of the prefecture’s actions as being 
according to the laws of devolution. Similarly, Schneiderfritz (2016, p. 5) explained that even 
though the governor is nominated according to national policy criteria and, a degree of 
politicisation prevents him to continue impartially 'in the regular exercise of their technical/ 
administrative supervision of the municipalities'. The political role of the prefect, I suggest, 
therefore, poses a risk to the autonomy of mayors as governors may advise and control them 
according to national politics to the detriment of the needs of the local population.  
The next section deepens the current discussion in light of recent political reforms, notably 
how de-concentration helps to strengthen the control of the central government at the local level.  
6.1.3.3 Strengthening central government control locally through de-concentration 
In 2016, the government increased the number of provincial capitals and governors from 
six to 12, which I consider strengthens de-concentration, likely to counterbalance the devolution 
of education governance. Even though the General States of Territorial Administration instituted 
this territorial reform in 1993, I question its pertinence in light of the previous discussion in which 
I argued that the government still over-exercises power at the local level through the role of the 
prefect. Moreover, this reform raises the question of to what extent the current discursive and 
social practices interact with and reinforce the reform.  
I consider decentralisation understood as de-concentration as an attempt to optimise 
government control at the lower levels. The following quote from a senior education official 
suggests that the expansion of the number of prefectures serves to strengthen the central 
government’s control over the municipalities: ‘it is a way of multiplying the influence of the state 
on municipalities and provinces’ (I4, national/ education, 11 01 2017). Similarly, his colleague 
agreed that strengthening de-concentration through the appointment of further governors meant 
strengthening the central government.  
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When the population voted for its president, it voted for 13 presidents: the president 
himself and 12 governors (I16b, national/ education, 11 02 2017).111 
Moreover, this senior education official pointed out that 'the governor is called the authority 
of guardianship' and that the strengthening of the de-concentration is to continue ‘total centralism' 
(I16b, national/ education, 11 02 2017). Rondinelli (1990, p. 494) points out the risk that 
administrative decentralisation may not only promote greater political participation but also risks 
extending ‘state control to territorial units as to decision making'. I consider the example of the 
guardianship of the governor in the Beninese case as one such a mechanism helping to extend 
state control at the municipal level. From a different perspective, a retired official from a bilateral 
agency argued that decentralisation does not work without strengthening the central government. 
Consequently, the role of the prefecture as the government’s ‘local service’ and the increase in 
the number of prefectures because ‘Benin is under administered’ was essential (I60b, IO, 04 06 
2017).112  
Inspired by Berkhout’s (2005, p. 316) comparison of a functional analysis of 
decentralisation with a Foucauldian analysis in a comparative study of South Africa and Belgium, 
I argue that the Beninese decentralisation reform is an ‘amalgamation of decentralisation and 
concealed centralisation measures’ rather than a shift from the centre to the periphery, from a 
functional perspective. For instance, a senior education official pointed to the interconnectedness 
of decentralisation-centralisation.  
We are in a centralised position, and we are strengthening centralisation by saying 
decentralisation. [...] Instead of decentralising the school, the school is politicised as an aspect of 
decentralisation (I4, national/ education, 11 01 2017).113 
If I consider the de- and re-centralising trends from a Foucauldian perspective 
understanding power ‘as manifested only in relations’ (Berkhout, 2005, p. 315), decentralisation 
takes place within interactive actor-networks in a setting of pluralistic policy-making. Moreover, 
I suggest that strengthening centralisation through de-concentration, for instance, through the role 
of the prefect, among others, means that the governor is part of a more extensive network of actors 
(re-)interpreting the decentralisation policy and (re-) negotiating power in their various ways. 
Hence, power remains relational and fluid.  
                                                          
111 Quand la population a voté son président, elle a voté 13 présidents: le président lui-même et 12 
préfets. 
112 This interview was neither audiotaped nor transcribed.  
113 Nous, on est dans une centralisation et on renforce la centralisation en disant décentralisation. [...] Au 
lieu de décentraliser l’école, on politise l’école en parlant de décentralisation. 
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6.1.3.4 Summing-up 
In this section, I have argued that relationships have also changed within the central and 
municipal governments. First, I revisited some aspects of the beginning of the chapter, providing 
the perspectives of national and municipal officials on questions of devolved responsibilities, 
resources and their control. I argued that the national level still exercises power over the devolved 
responsibilities by not transferring or taking control of the necessary resources. Second, I argued 
that the legal framework, reinforced by social practices, gives the governor (appointed) a 
particularly powerful function over the mayor (elected). The predominantly practised control over 
giving advice questions the legitimacy of political decentralisation and democracy more broadly. 
Third, there is a tendency to re-centralise power, notably through strengthening de-concentration 
to the detriment of devolution. However, borrowing from Berkhout (2005), I suggested going 
beyond the centralisation- decentralisation debate to consider the re-configuration and re-
negotiation of power between the actors as moments of temporal stability, which can be changed 
as an effect of the broader actor-network.  
6.2 Summary 
This chapter has weaved together how actors connect to form social practices around 
education decentralisation across all levels and sectors. After a description of the social practices 
in the Northern and the Southern field sites, based on the actor-maps and focus groups with 
teachers, I disentangled the relationships and power dynamics among the actors from a 
comparative perspective. I argued that the local is a social arena allowing institutional and 
relational pluralism in the form of a bewildering array of networks, mechanism and relationships. 
Ball (1994a) captures the messiness pertinently through what he calls the ‘wild profusion of local 
practices’. 
Policy is both text and action, words and deeds; it is what is enacted as well as what is 
intended. Policies are always incomplete in so far as they relate to or map onto a government of 
local practice (Ball, 1994a, p. 10). 
The social practices around the de-concentrated responsibilities, such as school inspection, 
and devolved responsibilities, such as school construction, extension, maintenance and 
equipment, emerged as disorderly and diverse. From the ANT perspective, the devolved and de-
concentrated processes, actors, planning documents and understandings of these, the formal and 
informal relations all form assemblages. They are particular and fixed to specific geographies and 
territories, but simultaneously, fluid and exchangeable (Latour, 2005). 
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The second and third parts are extractions from the wider actor-network, identifying the 
reconfiguration of the relationships between government and non-government actors. More 
precisely, the second part explored how municipal government actors, notably the town council 
and the local school authority, (dis-) connected with non-government actors, especially NGOs 
and parents, but also how relationships have changed with state and non-state actors. While the 
decentralisation policy has not directly influenced the voice of the local school authority, it has 
strengthened the municipality to the detriment of parent's voices. Moreover, school actors across 
field sites, and in particular parents, shared feelings of being disempowered. In contrast, NGOs, 
a 'vital phenomenon to the government acting in a global system', as Fichtner (2012) puts it, 
continued to navigate the space, particularly in the North. 
The third part examined the actors within the government, notably the relationship between 
the central and the municipal government entities. I argued that the decentralisation policy 
reinforced rather than reconfigured the previous power relations. First, I considered the absence 
or over-control of the resources in the context of the devolved responsibilities as part of a 
competing game between the national and the local levels. Second, I discussed the dialectic 
relationship between the governor and the mayor, and how they related to each other about issues 
of autonomy and control. Third, I reflected on how the government tended to privilege de-
concentration at the expense of devolution and engaged in various ways to re-centralise power.  
However, I also suggested that power relations are dynamic and multi-directional, 
hierarchical, asymmetrical and non-egalitarian, fluid and potentially changeable (Foucault, 1978, 
2003b, 2003a). As a result, I understand the tendencies of centralisation and disempowerment as 
an ‘interactive force of networks and other structures and actors in a world of pluralistic policy-
making’ (Berkhout, 2005, p. 318). This theorisation implies that particular discourses and 
practices, such as centralisation trends, are fixed at a particular moment in time, but they may 
constantly change. 
The next chapter sheds light on the agenda setting of education decentralisation in 1990. I 
take the National Conference of the Active Forces as the starting point to unfold the historical, 
political and socio-economic formations to explain why education decentralisation became 
influential at this particular moment in time.
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7 The emergence of the education decentralisation reform as a 
complex web of assemblages114  
This chapter investigates the third sub-question which is how human and non-human actors 
connected to bring about education decentralisation in 1990 as a complex web of assemblages. 
While the previous chapter 6 focused on two local sites of enactment in the Northeast and the 
Southeast in Benin, this chapter examines the phenomenon across different places, - Cotonou 
(Benin), La Baule (France) and Berlin (Germany). It relates to the context of influence of Ball’s 
framework of policy trajectory studies (cf. chapter 3), exploring the agenda setting of education 
decentralisation in Benin. The interview data, particularly with officials from the MEMP, the 
MDGL, and the MPD, and their sub-units, as well as policy documents, inform this chapter.  
This chapter draws on ideas of ANT (Latour, 1996, 2005; Fenwick and Edwards, 2010) to 
trace the connections between assemblages that contributed to the emergence of the 
decentralisation policy in Benin. As Latour (2005, p. 54) explained, an actor can be a structural 
trait (e.g. colonialism), a corporate body (e.g. the Beninese government), an individual (e.g. 
Francois Mitterand), or a loose aggregate of individuals (e.g. participants at the 1990 conference). 
This chapter traces how the lived events (cf. section 7.1 and 7.3), individuals, groups and social 
formations (cf. section 7.2) and historical processes (cf. section 7.4) acted upon one another to 
make education decentralisation powerful at a particular moment in time. As I previously pointed 
out in my critique of the human/non-human divide, this chapter considers non-human actors in 
the analysis to the extent that they are part of the broader network (cf. sections 7.1, 7.3 and 7.4), 
but privileges the voices and actions of human actors in section 7.2. 
Following ANT, this chapter has three aspects, starting with the National Conference of 
the Active Forces in 1990 and the unfolding of its actor-network, second, focusing on local and 
global events on and beyond this conference, and third, its historical formations. The first move 
in ANT is to localise the global, or in Latour’s words ‘to lay continuous connections leading from 
one local interaction to the other places, times, and agencies‘ (Latour, 2005, p. 173).  and, thus 
explain how education decentralisation became temporarily powerful and stable in 1990. 
                                                          
114 As explained in the introduction, I use assemblage and actor interchangeably, whereby I understand 
assemblage as an analytical focus on the dynamic networks of material and discursive practices (Koyama 
and Varenne, 2012). 
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7.1 The National Conference of the Active Forces in 1990 as the starting point 
for decentralisation. 
The first part sheds light on the central role of the National Conference of the Active Forces 
in 1990 in introducing a new political regime, namely democracy and decentralisation. I first 
unpack the underlying concepts of the conference, which are the citizen, the nation, and the 
principle of sovereignty. Second, I analyse how the agenda setting for education decentralisation 
is framed by global discourses. Overall, I use the 1990 conference as a non-human actor to unfold 
the actor-networks in space and time, whereby I consider neither time as linear nor space as flat. 
The National Conference of the Active Forces, held in Cotonou in February 1990, had a 
crucial role in the transition from a socialist government to a multi-party western-style political 
system (cf. chapter 2). Most of the research participants saw the 1990 conference as the turning 
point from socialism to a liberal democratic government, implying the decentralisation reform. 
The following two quotes are representative of this argument. A representative of ANCB 
describes the transition from one political regime to another through the event of the 1990 
conference. 
We were in a Marxist regime from 72, 75 to 89. From there, we went to the national 
conference, where we decided to return to democracy. So, the foundation of the reform is that. It is 
the decisions of the national conference (I61, national/ decentralisation, 06 06 2017).115 
While this interviewee describes the political change, the next quote from a senior official 
of the Decentralisation Ministry explicitly mentions the decision taken to decentralise the 
governance system.  
Following this conference, it was decided to implement decentralisation like many other 
countries (Interview 10, national/ decentralisation, 24 01 2017).116  
The conference proceedings also state that the national conference aimed to establish a new 
constitution involving separation between the Party and the State (the multiparty system), the 
creation of the post of prime minister, and the decentralisation of power (Fondation Friedrich 
Naumann, 1994).  
Gisselquist (2008, p. 792) stresses the significant role of the National Conference as an 
active force, 'a practice that soon adopted a model for democratic transition in other countries', in 
                                                          
115 On était dans un régime marxiste à partir de 72, 75 jusqu’à 89 où on est allé à la conférence nationale 
où on a décidé de revenir à la démocratie. Donc le fondement de la réforme, c’est ça. C’est les décisions 
de la conférence nationale. 
116 À la suite de cette conférence, il a été décidé de mettre en œuvre la décentralisation comme dans 
beaucoup d'autres pays. 
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the move from a relatively centralised government to a presidential representative democratic 
republic. In contrast, Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan (2003) argue that it was not the democratic 
renewal in 1990 that signalled a significant change, but rather, the Marxist-Leninist regime 
introduced in 1974. They explain that state officials and other now elected officials have mostly 
been reconfirmed in their previous functions of 1990 and before, such as village chief and mayors 
at village and municipal levels, respectively. They argue, furthermore, that the ‘[f]reedom of the 
press, a multi-party system or a strong emphasis on the rule of law is of little import[ance] to rural 
populations’ (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2003, p. 166).  
I propose that the different understandings of the central role of 1990 conference in 
introducing education decentralisation found in this study is the result of the focus on 
predominantly urban and mostly elite populations. I assume that rural people have different views 
to urban people about democracy and decentralisation as they are affected differently, as pointed 
out by Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan (2003). The reason for this divergence may be traced back 
to the education system under colonial rule, when urban elites and rural people had differing 
access to education. At that point, ‘urban elites [were] subject to the power of the colonial state, 
[…] rural dwellers […] were […] subject to traditional forms of authority’ (Tikly, 2019, p. 232). 
In other words, the urban elites can be considered as ‘citizens’ of the modern state or indigenous 
agents of modernity, whereas rural people are regarded as the ‘subjects’ of more traditional forms 
of authority.  
7.1.1 The citizen, the nation and the principle of sovereignty: semantic features of the 
conference  
The nation-state, the citizen and the sovereignty surrounding the 1990 conference are key 
themes in this study. De-constructing the conference title, the ‘Conference of the Active Forces 
of the Nation‘, I suggest that the term ‘active forces’ refers to ‘Beninese citizens’, for example in 
the summary of the objectives in the conference proceedings and the opening discourse of former 
president Kérékou (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994).117 Objective eight, for example, calls 
all Beninese citizens, referred to as ‘active forces’, to contribute to the implementation of the 
decisions and measures of the conference.  
                                                          
117 The Historical Dictionary of Benin (Houngnikpo and Decalo, 2013) translates ‘forces vives’ in French 
into ‘active forces’ in English, while other translation software also refers to ‘major players, powerful 
forces for change, driving forces, the strength, active forces, stakeholders, active civil population, active 
political forces’, among others.  
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[The National Conference of the Active Forces] calls upon all the Active Forces of the 
Nation to contribute fully to the diligent and full implementation of these decisions and measures 
(Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 33, own translation).118 
Houngnikpo and Decalo (2013) relate ‘active forces’ to a variety of citizens, from the 
government, armed forces, trade unions, non-government groups, the community in exile and 
academics, among others.  
Moreover, sovereignty was a recurrent theme in the conference proceedings and the 
interview data. The conference proceedings affirm the claim of sovereignty in objective six of the 
Declaration of the aims and competences of the conference.  
Solemnly proclaims its sovereignty and the executive power over these decisions (Fondation 
Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 33, own translation).119 
The interviewees explained that the ‘sovereign character’ of the conference enabled the 
participants to carry out the decisions taken at the conference.  
The National Conference wanted this reform. [...] The conference proclaimed itself 
sovereign. It imposed its decisions on the government of that time (I10, national/ decentralisation, 
24 01 2017).120 
I understand the emphasis on the sovereignty of the conference against the background of 
the previous regime and the former president, Kérékou, and his entourage. The conference and 
the actors present at the conference had the power to decide what was to happen to their country 
independently of the previous political regimes and possibly, without the influence of external 
actors.  
Conventionally, sovereignty is a defining characteristic of the modern nation-state, 'the idea 
that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community' (Hinsley, 1986, p. 1 in Held, 
1989, p. 215). Following Held’s (1989) development of sovereignty, the Marxist-Leninist regime 
of the previous form of authority in Benin was no longer legitimate. That is, the idea of 
sovereignty, represented through the 1990 conference, ‘provided a fresh link between political 
power and rulership’. Hence, the policy elites, religious leaders, and the international community, 
formed a powerful assemblage, and ‘sovereignty offered an alternative way of conceiving the 
legitimacy of claims to power’ (Held, 1989, p. 219).  
                                                          
118 …demande à toutes les Forces vives de la Nation de contribuer pleinement à l’application diligente et 
intégrale de ces décisions et mesures.  
119 Proclame solennellement sa souveraineté et la force exécutoires de ces décisions. 
120 C’est la Conférence Nationale qui voulait cette réforme. […] La conférence s’est proclamée 
souveraine. Donc, elle a imposé ses décisions aux gouvernons d’alors. 
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Finally, the title of the conference – ‘conference of the nation’ emphasises the concept of 
the nation, as does the alternative 'national conference'. I link this emphasis on the national 
character of the conference to the observed ownership claimed by many interviewees, which I 
discuss in section 7.2 in this chapter. 'Nation' in this sense could contain a patriotic vision, in 
particular after the long period with a Marxist-Leninist regime influenced by the Soviet Union. I 
propose that both terms, the active forces and the sovereign character of the conference, are a call 
to all citizens and authority is given to their actions. The term ‘all citizens’ contrasts with the 
elites, previously in power; the term ‘sovereignty’ contrasts with the previous hegemony of 
Kérékou and French colonial masters.  
Dunne et al. (2017) find fault with the Western origins of the nation-state, above all, those 
states emerging from colonial histories, such as Nigeria and Senegal, among others. In their 
examination, they distinguish between the 'nation' as 'a community of people who aspire to be 
politically self-determining' and the 'state' as 'the set of political institutions that a particular 
community may aspire to achieve'. The authors consider the nation as not only being a construct 
but as actualising cultural narratives, such as colonial and postcolonial discourses, which then 
become naturalised. They argue that these postcolonial countries have a relatively short period of 
nation-building and are influenced by 'particular extra-national, colonial and postcolonial 
configurations of power' (Dunne et al., 2017, p. 32). Dunne et al.’s (2017) analysis is relevant to 
the Beninese context as well in terms of its postcolonial setting. Colonial discourses of 
development, as the following argument about the discursive linkage between decentralisation, 
democracy and development in the next section demonstrates, shaped the cultural narrative 
surrounding education governance in Benin. 
7.1.2 Global discourses framing the conference and the democratic renewal 
Different motives underlie the introduction of education decentralisation in the context of 
the National Conference of the Active Forces. The first motive, I argue, is the promise of 
decentralisation as a way to foster democracy and development. The analysis of the conference 
proceedings reveals that ‘developing and adopting a Charter of National Union for democratic 
renewal and the economic, social and cultural development of Benin’ (Fondation Friedrich 
Naumann, 1994, p. 20, italics added)121 constitutes the main objective of the conference. 
Moreover, the report demands ‘a government based on democracy, and endogenous and self-
                                                          
121 D‘élaborer et d’adopter une Charte d’union Nationale pour le renouveau démocratique et le 
développement économique, social et culturel de notre pays. 
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centred development’ (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 45).122 Self or people-centred 
development refers to improving local communities' self-reliance, social justice, and participatory 
decision-making (Korten and Klauss, 1984). 
This report also alludes to ideas of participation and subsidiarity, which are common 
rationales for decentralisation. It states that ‘some can no longer highjack power to the detriment 
of others’ (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 37); ‘the mankind is to be at the centre of 
development; the mankind is to be at the heart of economic growth and the division of goods’ 
(Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 41).123 These elements were equally reflected in the 
interview data and call for the redistribution of power, giving the Beninese citizen an active role 
in contributing to the country's development. Likewise, officials from the MEMP and the MDGL 
respectively emphasise the role of the conference in handing power over to the population as an 
important principle of decentralisation.  
Therefore, we went to the national conference and decided to give up power to the 
population, so that the community itself decides its future (I67, national/ education/ 
decentralisation, 22 06 2017, italics added).124  
Most research participants offered different conceptions of development and participation 
at different points in time, e.g. an elitist notion of development anchored in a centralised and 
command regime before 1990, but afterwards, the idea of empowering people at the local level 
or transferring power to the local level. A senior official from the Education Ministry suggested 
that the elitist concept of development prevented the population from participating and benefiting 
from progress, as the following quote shows. 
The development of Benin was conceived in a somewhat elitist manner; all the enormous 
means, all the efforts made, hardly ever touched the population. Therefore, [...] the decision to 
decentralise was taken at the conference of February 1990 (I4, national/ education, 11 01 2017, 
italics added).125  
                                                          
122 Un système de gouvernement fondé sur la démocratie, et sur un développement endogène et 
autocentré.  
123 Le pouvoir ne peut plus être confisqué par quelques-uns pour l’écrasement des autres. […] 
 L’homme au centre du développement; l'homme au cœur de la croissance économique et du partage des 
biens. 
124 C’est comme ça que nous sommes allés à la conférence nationale et est ressortit que désormais il faut 
laisser le pouvoir au peuple, que le peuple lui-même décide de son avenir. 
125 [Vous savez avant], le développement du Bénin était conçu d’une manière un peu élitique. Les 
programmes de développement, les projets de développement, les moyens pour réaliser ces projets étaient 
gérés par les élites au niveau central, au niveau supérieur. […] Donc c’est à partir de la synthèse de 
toutes ces situations qu’à la conférence des forces vives de la nation du février 1990 l’option de 
décentraliser a été prise. 
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This interviewee considered participation as a precondition for development. Similarly, a 
junior official from the Decentralisation Ministry argued that decentralisation empowers people 
at the local level to decide the kind of development they want and, hence, their empowerment 
leads to the development of the country and the reduction of poverty. 
The national conference saw that this mode [central governance] is not the one that could 
boost development. Therefore, we wanted to make the grassroots people more empowered by 
giving them the power to decide their development through the election of a mayor or councillors 
who could stimulate development. So, for the majority, it was to solve the problem of poverty and 
development (I7, national/ decentralisation, 19 01 2017).126 
Even though the dominant discourse in the interview data reflects the relationship between 
decentralisation, democracy and development, scholars generally diverge from the interview data 
view, as pointed out in the literature (cf. chapter 3). In particular, Bierschenk (2009) points out 
the problematic relationship between democracy and economic development in the case of Benin. 
He questions whether it is possible ‘to transform a structurally deficient rent-based [economy] 
into a productive economy’ through democratisation in a context where ‘[p]olitical relations are 
characterised by neopatrimonialism, and widespread corruption, ethnicity and regionalism’ 
(Bierschenk, 2009, p. 2).  
Even though development, democracy and decentralisation are not necessarily related to 
each other, as suggested by the broader scholarly literature, they are discursively linked in the 
interview data and policy texts in this study. In other words, the review of the interview data and 
policy documents suggests that the respondents and producers of the policy document perceive 
development, democracy and decentralisation as related to one another; on the other hand, the 
literature suggests that democracy and decentralisation lead only conditionally to development.  
7.1.3 Summing-up 
So far, I have argued that the National Conference of the Active Forces in 1990 as a non-
human actor has been presented as the event marking the political transition leading to democracy 
and decentralisation. The sovereign character of the conference with its strong emphasis on the 
modern nation-state and its citizens provided the authority required for introducing a liberal form 
of democracy and decentralisation. Moreover, global discourses, linking together development, 
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democracy and decentralisation, can be found within the interview data and the documentary 
review.  
The next section unpacks the role of different actor groups at the 1990 conference and how 
they contributed to the outcome of the conference, acknowledging that I reduce this discussion to 
the human actors.  
7.2 The role of individuals and groups at the 1990 conference 
I first discuss the national aspirations before considering other social groups, such as elites 
returning from exile and high-ranking politicians in the Beninese context. Finally, I shed light on 
the external influences on the conference outcomes. 
7.2.1 National aspirations 
Most interviewees in this study suggested that the Beninese citizens themselves decided to 
opt for decentralisation, pointing to the 1990 conference as a national initiative. They emphasised 
the national ambitions of Beninese citizens in initiating the conference to decide on Benin's future. 
The quote below from a senior education official not only explicitly mentions decentralisation as 
a product of the 1990 conference, but also emphasises the role of the ‘brilliance of Beninese 
mankind’ in holding this conference. 
The national conference of February 1990, which prescribed decentralisation, is the fruit 
of the brilliance of the Beninese humankind. That had never happened before. It was an 
unprecedented experience in Benin (I4, national/ education, 11 01 2017, italics added).127 
This quote has to be understood in the context of the importance of the national conference 
for the region. The conference has been described as a conference with model characteristics, 
which other countries in the region have copied because of its success (Gisselquist, 2008).  
Other interviewees give credit to the incumbent president Mathieu Kérékou in initiating 
the conference. To this end, a retired official of the government, explained that ‘the conference, 
which united the political class with the religious leaders, was the decision of president Kérékou' 
(I9, national/ decentralisation, 24 01 2017).128 Taking a different perspective to the interview data, 
Laloupo (1993 in Gisselquist, 2008) argues that France recommended Kérékou organising this 
conference, which they promised to support financially.  
                                                          
127 La conférence nationale de février 1990 qui a prescrit la décentralisation est le fruit du génie de l’homme 
béninois. Car cela ne s’était jamais encore passé nulle part. C’était une expérience inédite au Bénin. 
128 This interview was neither recorded nor transcribed.  
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In terms of the representation of the actors at the conference, most interviewees, 
particularly the senior officials, emphasised that Beninese citizens from all sectors, regardless of 
their social position, were present at the conference. The following quote from a senior 
decentralisation official emphasises the role of all social groups, as he puts it.  
That we come together, Beninese people from all social groups, to think about the ways and 
means to undertake or to bring back to every citizen what we call peace, freedom of expression, 
[and] the opportunity to organise ourselves (I67, national/ education/ decentralisation, 22 06 2017, 
italics added).129 
The proceedings of the conference (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994) confirm that 
more than 500 participants attended the 1990 conference, notably  
peasants, workers of all kinds, administrators, political parties and groups, development 
associations, non-governmental organisations, religious representatives; influencers who have 
held leading positions at national and international levels (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 
34, own translation).130 
The interview and documentary data suggest that different social groups were present at 
the conference, but such a large presence of a different range of groups does not mean that they 
participated equally or that their views were taken seriously. Thus, I come back to my argument 
that the elites, on behalf of the general population, significantly influenced the outcome of the 
conference. For instance, a former senior decentralisation official pointed out that 500 participants 
was too large a number to take any decisions and that is why a smaller group decided on behalf 
of the population (I50, national/ decentralisation, 12/05/2017).131 Another interviewee from the 
Decentralisation Ministry also pointed out that only a ‘small nucleus’ influenced the outcome 
significantly, as the following quote illustrates. 
The conference was sovereign. It made decisions that were imposed on the rulers of that time. 
It is true in any reflection, there is always a small nucleus that launches ideas (I10, national/ 
decentralisation, 24 01 2019).132 
Moreover, 500 participants in relation to the nearly five million overall population in 1990 
(World Population Review, 2019) indicates that the Beninese citizens were represented, but not 
themselves present as the 500 only amounted to 0.01% of the overall population. This observation 
                                                          
129 Qu’on se retrouve tous les béninois quelques soit leurs couches sociales pour réfléchir sur les voies, 
les moyens et les pistes pour entreprendre ou ramener au niveau de chacun des citoyens ce que nous 
appelons la paix, la libre expression, la possibilité de s’organiser. 
130 Paysans, travailleurs de tous ordres, cadres de l’administration, partis et sensibilités politiques, 
associations de développement, organisations non-gouvernementales, représentants des cultes; 
personnalités ayant exercé des fonctions de premier plan sur le plan national et international. 
131 This interview was neither audiotaped nor transcribed.  
132 La conférence a été souveraine. Elle a pris des décisions qui se sont imposées aux gouvernants 
d’alors. C’est vrai dans toute réflexion il y a toujours un petit noyau qui lance les idées. 
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leads to the exploration of the question of precisely who was included in the small nucleus of 
decision-makers, whereby the interview data points to the powerful role of the elites in exile, 
which the next section explores.  
7.2.2 Elites in exile vs all Beninese citizens  
Following the previous section, I suggest that the conference attendees in themselves were 
an elite. On the one hand, they included elites returned from exile, and on the other, high-ranking 
politicians in Benin. As a first response to the economic and financial breakdown, the conference 
proceedings state that ‘the diaspora has to return' (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 43).  
Those belonging to the diaspora may have had characteristics in common with how elites can be 
defined, as outlined in chapter 4, such as having had higher social positions, more knowledge, 
better education, money and status (Odendahl and Shaw, 2002).  
A few interviewees explained that Beninese intellectuals, who had either studied and lived 
outside the country or were persecuted and exiled to foreign countries, had decided to decentralise 
the Beninese State, as a junior decentralisation official suggests.  
To my knowledge, I would say that, while the national conference had been externally 
influenced […], it is perhaps the Beninese who came from outside to the conference. [...] I will say 
that these were the intellectuals [who introduced the decentralisation idea at the conference]. As I 
said, decentralisation was decided at the national conference. Once the constitution was passed by 
referendum, all [decisions] were adopted. So, the decision was taken at the time of the conference. 
Intellectuals were present at the conference (I7, national/ decentralisation, 19 01 2017).133 
This quote states clearly that the decision to decentralise was taken at the conference, but 
he also implicitly alludes to the assumption that the returning elites from exile may have exercised 
a particular influence on the outcome of the conference.  
Moreover, the data and secondary literature reveal disagreement between the elites. Besides 
the elite returning from exile, high-ranking politicians from the previous government formed a 
powerful actor group. Kérékou, the then president, who entrusted the organisation of the 
conference to Robert Dossou, a Beninese lawyer and politician, and the Archbishop of Cotonou, 
led the conference (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994) and formed a powerful network of elites 
                                                          
133 A ma connaissance je dirai que s’il y a une influence, c’est par rapport à la conférence nationale. Parce 
que la décision de décentraliser est partit de la conférence nationale et s’inscrit dans la constitution du 
Bénin. Je ne dirai pas que ça vient de l’extérieur. Si ça vient de l’extérieur, c’est peut-être les béninois qui 
sont venus de l’extérieur à la conférence. […] Je dirai que c’est les intellectuels. Puisse que comme je l’ai 
dit, la décentralisation a été décidée à la conférence nationale. Une fois que la constitution a été votée par 
référendum, on a adopté tout. Donc la décision est prise depuis la conférence. Et à la conférence c’était 
les intellectuels qui y étaient présents. 
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deciding on the agenda to decentralise Benin’s government. Robert Dossou, president of the 
preparatory committee of the National Conference, was an influential politician and lawyer. The 
Archbishop of Cotonou, Isidore de Souza, was elected as president of the presidium of the 
conference. Some interviewees alluded to his role as a mediator throughout the conference, in 
particular, when the conference was in danger of failing because Kérékou did not want to 
recognise the sovereign character of the conference. Houngnikpo and Decalo (2013) agree with 
this claim, explaining that only the diplomacy of the Archbishop and pressure from France 
prevented the conference from failing. These key players disrupted the then Marxist-Leninist 
regime and, borrowing the expression of Koyama and Varenne (2012, p. 158), ‘opened up new 
routes for participation and resistance’.  
Besides the powerful network of Beninese elites, external actors equally influenced the 
agenda setting, as discussed in the next section.  
7.2.3 External influences 
The interview data and the documentary review provide different perspectives of the roles 
of external actors and influences. From the analysis of the conference proceedings, it emerges that 
NGOs and country representatives while not significantly represented in terms of numbers at the 
conference, occupied a prominent place. Only four NGOs were admitted to the conference, while 
about ten foreign countries were present, including France, the Soviet Union and the United States 
of America (USA) (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994).134  
In particular, the conference proceedings quote an excerpt of the speech of the then French 
Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, which emphasises the necessity for the political will, democracy 
and human rights to solve the financial and economic crisis.  
There is no cure for situations of economic and social crisis that do not stem primarily from 
the political will, notably through a deepening of democracy and respect for human rights (Fondation 
Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 45, own translation).135 
The French Prime Minister is given an ‘authoritative position’ and his voice seems to 
legitimatise the political turn. It also helps to create a perceived consensus of the aims of the 
conference in the context of international solidarity and cooperation. 
                                                          
134 In addition, Egypt, Nigeria, Germany, Switzerland, Algeria, Ghana 
135 Il n'y a pas de remède à des situations de crise économique et sociale qui ne procède d'abord d'une 
volonté politique passant notamment par un approfondissement de la démocratie et du respect des droits 
de l'homme. 
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Moreover, the report frequently mentions ‘financial and technical partners' (Fondation 
Friedrich Naumann, 1994, pp. 40, 43; 45–48) as well as SAPs (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 
1994, pp. 14, 16, 19). The assistance of IOs and the implementation of SAPs are proposed as the 
third and fourth remedy measures for the economic and financial breakdown of the country. In 
addition, the report mentions education and health - among other sectors - as a priority for external 
aid (third priority), and IOs are called upon to support the education system (fourth priority) 
(Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, pp. 43–44). The positioning of IOs and SAPs in the 
conference proceedings suggest that external actors exercised an influential role to produce the 
outcome consensus to democratise and decentralise Benin’s governance system.  
From the interview data, however, most interviewees at the national level argued that 
external actors did not pressurise the institution of the decentralisation reform, but a few 
acknowledged the external influence in the agenda setting for decentralisation in Benin: 
No! There are indeed external influences, but we ourselves gave us our devolution laws. 
[…] We developed devolution laws by ourselves. […] It is possible that external pressures 
contributed to this or that. It is possible, but not to the extent that they interfered with the 
proceedings (I4, national/ education, 11 01 2017, italics added).136  
The interviewee emphasises the role of Beninese citizens in developing the devolution 
laws, but at the same time, by contrast, acknowledges the possibility of external pressure. This 
contradiction could be traced back to the sovereign character of the conference, giving authority 
to the decisions made. However, the conference not only represented national but also global 
actors and their aspirations, as previously discussed. 
Other interviewees referred to the external influences more explicitly, as the words of a 
junior decentralisation official show.  
It is possible [that there was an external influence], highly possible because African 
countries are not autonomous as such. Most policies are even externally implemented. So I cannot 
exclude the ‘invisible hand' from outside that may have said ‘go in this direction'. You alluded to 
France-Africa and your Bretton Wood institutions. In particular, France and those institutions 
which have the most influence on French-speaking countries, the same thing happened with the 
SAPs. [It is] a dictate, the leaders of the time were stuck and were offered a remedy that did not 
allow them to get out of their situation (I7, national/ decentralisation, 19 01 2017, italics added).137 
                                                          
136 Non ! C’est vrai qu’il y a des influences extérieures, mais c’est nous- mêmes qui nous sommes donnés 
nos lois sur la décentralisation. […] Nos lois de la décentralisation ont été élaborées par nous-mêmes. […] 
C’est possible que les pressions extérieures contribuent pour ceci ou pour cela. C’est possible. Mais dans 
une proportion qui ne puisse mettre l’expérience en échec.  
 
 
137 C’est possible. C’est fort possible. Parce que les pays africains ne sont pas autonomes en tant que tel. 
La plupart des politiques sont mises en œuvre par l’extérieur même de façon directe. Donc je ne peux pas 
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This interviewee acknowledged the influence of global actors and interventions, providing 
the example of SAPs, which he considered not only as a dictate but also as a remedy without 
effect. He also alludes to Bretton Wood institutions and the influence of France on its former 
colonies. Hence, he does not exclude the possibility that IOs influenced the agenda setting. 
Similarly, a senior official of the MDP argued 
so it is from this perspective that I say that the international environment makes 
decentralisation a requirement for the states today. It is even a condition for receiving development 
aid (I56, national/ planning, 24 06 2017).138 
This planning official went further, arguing that decentralisation is a precondition for 
accessing development aid. Steiner-Khamsi (2012, p. 5) explains that external funding may 
support policy borrowing: ‘a condition for receiving aid', as she puts it, and concludes that ‘policy 
borrowing in developing countries is coercive and unilateral'. Similarly, Bierschenk (2009, lines 
561-562) points out that ‘the political discourse is easily adapted to the latest fashion emanating 
from the West’ and he quotes, among other terms, ‘decentralisation and poverty’.  
7.2.4 Summing-up  
Although most interviewees emphasised the national aspirations of Beninese citizens in 
initiating the conference and deciding on Benin's future, I suggest that the elites, on behalf of the 
population, together with external actors, influenced the outcome of the conference. In particular, 
the interviewees argued that the citizens of Benin themselves decided to opt for decentralisation, 
seeing the 1990 conference as a national initiative from the former president, Kérékou, and ‘wide-
ranging’ representation of different social groups at the conference.  
I challenge this view since the conference attendees were themselves an elite of 500 
representatives, including in that number elites returning from exile and influential politicians 
from the former government. Extending the argument about the role of elites, I refer to Rizvi, 
Lingard and Lavia (2006, p. 256) who argue that the so-called ‘global culture’ has largely 
reproduced the colonial structures of inequality, with postcolonial elites playing a major role in 
                                                          
exclure la main invisible de l’extérieur qui peut-être a dit bon allez dans ce sens. Vous faites allusion à la 
France-Afrique, vos institutions de Bretton Wood. Surtout la France et ces instituions-là qui ont surtout 
d’influence (pour la France) sur les pays francophones. C’est la même chose qui s’est passé avec les PAS 
(les Programmes d’Ajustement Structurel). C’est un dicta, les dirigeants d’alors étaient coincés et leur a 
proposé un remède qui n’a pas bien permis à les faire sortir de leur situation.  
138 Donc c’est dans cette optique que je dis que l’environnement international fait de la décentralisation 
une exigence aujourd’hui pour les Etats. C’est même une conditionnalité pour avoir l’aide au 
développement. 
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their reproduction. Likewise, while NGOs and other country representatives were not present in 
significant numbers, they occupied a prominent place in the conference proceedings. Together 
with the Beninese elites, they formed a powerful assemblage to decide upon education 
decentralisation.  
The next part examines the question of why the agenda for education decentralisation was 
set at that moment in time, exploring further formations, which contributed to the conference and 
the political transition. 
7.3 The reform of education decentralisation as an assemblage of local and 
global events  
I now introduce the second move in tracing the actor-network, which is the redistribution 
of the local or, in Latour’s words‚ the path ‘to trudge toward the many local places where the 
global, the structural, and the total were being assembled and where they expand 
outward‘ (Latour, 2005, p. 191). In this part, I situate the agenda setting of education 
decentralisation as a network of further local, national and global assemblages. In extending the 
actor-network in space (and time), I discuss the role of the economic and financial breakdown in 
Benin in the 80s and how it contributed to the holding of the 1990 conference; and how this 
conference was embedded in a wider global network of events in and around 1990, such as the 
fall of the Berlin wall and the democratisation discourse at La Baule. Acknowledging that the 
actor-network cannot be reduced to these events only, I use them only as an example of non-
human actors aiming to redistribute the local. 
7.3.1 The breakdown of the Beninese economy in the late 80s 
The national conference and the democratic renewal in Benin in 1990 can be considered in 
the context of the breakdown of the economy at the time of the then Marxist-Leninist government, 
as some senior officials from MEMP and MDGL discussed.  
While we arrived in Benin at this stage, we started from the socio-economic situation and 
the socio-political and colonial experience that we had lived through in the 80s. Moreover, there 
were economic problems where the state was not able to pay wages anymore [particularly to the 
army and to teachers] (I67, national/ education/ decentralisation, 22 06 2017).139 
The quote above suggests the democratic renewal was anchored in the economic and 
financial breakdown of the country. According to Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan (2003), the 
                                                          
139 Alors que nous sommes arrivés au Benin a cette étape à partir de la situation socio-économique que 
nous avons socio-politique et colonique que nous avons vécu dans les années 80. Et il y a eu des 
problèmes effectivement économiques ou l’Etat arrivait même plus à payer les salaires. 
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financial crisis, as well as the global 'de-ideologisation' and the relaxation of the hold of Marxism, 
all contributed to the unfolding of the concept of democratic renewal. The crisis meant the 
recruitment of civil service positions was disrupted, school and university diplomas were 
devalued and finally, the State was unable to pay its civil servants, and began laying off workers, 
which led to an urban exodus.  
The conference proceedings also labelled the economic and financial crisis as one of 
‘exceptional gravity' (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 41). The suggestions for how to 
respond to this crisis covered five areas. Of relevance to this study is the development of 
emergency relief measures for the education sector, in particular, the sciences. In terms of 
financial relief, the report calls upon the services of the Beninese diaspora and the need to 
maintain a relationship with the international community, particularly NGOs, to contribute to the 
recovery of Benin. Implementing the SAPs and the National Economic Recovery Program were 
further mechanisms to promote development (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994). Drawing on 
ANT, this is an example of how groups (Beninese diaspora, international community) and policy 
documents (SAP, National Economic Recovery Program) form assemblages, which only become 
powerful through the process of connecting in the emergence of education decentralisation.  
In the next section, I discuss the local changes which took place in Benin within the remit 
of geopolitical power changes.  
7.3.2 The geopolitical world shift and the democratisation discourse at La Baule as 
further assemblages  
Most respondents with official positions in this study emphasised the view that Beninese 
citizens had decided on the decentralisation reform at the 1990 conference. As a few mentioned, 
however, global events also influenced the emergence of education decentralisation. Thus, 
education decentralisation did not emerge as a strong concept because of local events in Benin 
alone, such as the 1990 conference, but also because of other ‘local’ events, which had a global 
impact through connections with other assemblages.  
The political transformation process in Benin took place at a time when geopolitical change 
was occurring, exemplified by the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 - before the 1990 
conference - and the end of the cold war between the West/ US and the East/ Soviet Union 
(Grugel, 2002). Kérékou in his opening speech, as documented in the conference proceedings, 
stated:  
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We appreciate the definitive symbol of liberation that the destruction of the Berlin Wall is 
today. We know what it means for Europe and for the people in reunified Germany. This lesson 
of tenacity and hope that you thus give to the whole universe will mark our time. Our conference 
wanted me to tell you how much we are counting on you [the representatives of Germany present 
at the conference] so that our awakening and rebirth can be sustained by the same clarity of 
political choice as yours (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 47, own translation).140 
In this quote, the destruction of the Berlin Wall' is considered as a ‘definitive symbol of 
liberation', linking back to the section on global discourses (cf. section 7.1.2).  
The geopolitical world shift was also mirrored in Benin. The Soviet Union's influence in 
Benin faded, while France and the US became key players in influencing the political direction 
of Benin, as shown in the analysis of Kérékou’s opening speech. Kérékou, addressing France first, 
asked for a closer and franker cooperation, asked ‘Mr Mitterrand to be the first guarantor of the 
Solidarity Contract that we have negotiated and sealed here’141 (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 
1994, p. 46). The US was considered as a ‘a witness; … partner; …friend.'  
Please convey to President Bush our sincere hope that he will be with us in our struggle for 
freedom, democracy and development (Fondation Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 46).142 
In contrast, Kérékou states the following regarding the former Soviet Union:  
Our conference has more than once referred to Perestroika. We believe in it and we ask 
you, as the wish of the Assembly, to convey to Mr Gorbachev our sincere admiration (Fondation 
Friedrich Naumann, 1994, p. 46, own translation).143 
While the Soviet Union only receives Benin's admiration, France is considered to be 'the 
guarantor of the Solidarity Contract', which indicates an expected commitment by France. 
Largely, Kérékou’s speech reflects the changing power relations, from the Soviet Union to France 
and the US, for Benin.  Pinkney (1993, p. 15) suggests that the ‘collapse of the Soviet Empire, 
and the limited achievements of Third World […], have hastened support for less centralized, 
more participatory brands of socialism’. 
Moreover, I argue that the democratisation discourse of Francois Mitterrand at La Baule in 
June 1990 forms a further assemblage contributing to the emergence of education decentralisation 
                                                          
140 Nous apprécions à sa juste valeur le symbole définitif de libération que signifie aujourd'hui la 
destruction du mur de Berlin. Nous savons ce que signifie pour l'Europe et pour le Monde en Allemagne 
réunifiée. Cette leçon de ténacité et d'espérance que vous administrez ainsi à tout l'univers marquera 
notre temps. Notre conférence a voulu que je vous dise combien nous comptons sur vous pour que notre 
réveil et notre renaissance soient soutenues par la force de votre détermination et la lucidité de vos choix 
politiques. 
141 M. Mitterand d’être le premier garant du Contrat de Solidarité qu’ici nous avons négocié et scellé.  
142 Original quote is in English, therefore no translation.  
143 Notre conférence a plus d'une fois fait référence à la Pestroika. Nous y avons foi et nous vous prions, 
c'est le vœu de l’Assemblée, de transmettre à Monsieur Gorbatchev notre sincère admiration. 
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in Benin. Several interviewees referred to this speech, as the following quote of a senior official, 
representing the mayors at the national level, illustrates.  
Benin does not live in a vacuum. You know that there was this famous speech by François 
Mitterrand, at La Baule, calling upon African countries to [opt for] democracy. After this speech, 
all these countries threw themselves into the dynamics of democracy according to their 
understanding and ability. In some places, there is peace; other places went for democracy, but peace 
took a hit; social cohesion took a hit. So, it is clear that international agendas also affect the rhythm 
of internal events. I cannot [exactly] know what is behind the speech at La Baule. However, what is 
clear, […] that this was the speech where François Mitterrand called on African countries to go 
towards democracy (I61, municipal/ decentralisation, 06 06 2017).144 
Mitterrand’s speech, which urged African countries to engage with democracy, forms an 
assemblage underpinning peace and social cohesion in some cases, but unrest in other cases, as 
exemplified in the quote. This quote requires revisiting a short excerpt of Mitterrand’s speech in 
which the underlying assumption is the interdependence of the concepts – development and 
freedom/democracy, implying that each is a necessary condition for the other – but not necessarily 
a sufficient condition for each other.  
I speak to you as a citizen of the world to other citizens of the world: when you take the 
path to freedom, at the same time, you advance along on the path of development. We could also 
reverse the formula: taking the road to development will put you on the road to democracy 
(Mitterand, 1990, own translation, italics added).145 
Mitterrand equates freedom with development and development with democracy. The 
notion of freedom alludes to a liberal understanding of democracy and citizens. The report of the 
Department of Education of the Province of the Eastern Cape Department (South Africa) states 
that decentralisation has been a dominant policy reform in many developing countries for years. 
It was a typical theme in the democratisation of nation-states and institution-building efforts, 
especially in the African continent, alongside the SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s (Province of the 
Eastern Cape Department, 2004).  
                                                          
144 Le Bénin ne vit pas en vase clos. Vous savez qu’il y a eu ce fameux discours de François Mitterrand à 
La Baule qui a appelé les pays africains à la démocratie. Après ce discours, tous les pays se sont lancés 
dans la dynamique de la démocratie. C’est vrai que chacun y allait comme il comprenait, comme il pouvait. 
Certains endroits, il y a la paix ; d’autres endroits, on est allé à la démocratie mais la paix a pris un coup. 
La cohésion sociale a pris un coup. Donc c’est clair que les agendas internationaux rythment aussi ce qui 
se passe à l’interne. Tout ce qu’il y a derrière le discours à La Baule, ça là, je ne peux pas le savoir. Mais 
ce qui est clair, au moins ça on sait qu’il y a eu ce discours où François Mitterrand a appelé les pays 
africains à aller vers la démocratie.  
145Je vous parle comme un citoyen du monde à d'autres citoyens du monde : c'est le chemin de la liberté 
sur lequel vous avancerez en même temps que vous avancerez sur le chemin du développement. On 
pourrait d'ailleurs inverser la formule : c'est en prenant la route du développement que vous serez 
engagés sur la route de la démocratie. 
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However, the Beninese conference took place before Mitterrand’s famous speech, linking 
freedom, development and democracy to French aid (Gisselquist, 2008). This suggests that while 
the development discourse from La Baule may have reinforced the democratisation and 
decentralisation process in Benin, other assemblages could also have contributed to bringing 
education decentralisation onto the agenda of the Beninese government. 
7.3.3 Summing-up 
Even though the National Conference of the Active Forces has been predominantly 
presented as the main political transition leading to decentralisation, I demonstrated in this section 
that other ‘local’ events of non-human nature, such as the economic and financial breakdown in 
Benin, the fall of the Berlin wall and the democratisation discourse at La Baule contributed. In 
particular, the global world shift and the democratisation discourse impacted globally on the 
actor-networks of IOs and geopolitical scenarios such as the democratisation of many African 
countries, giving rise to local actors forming and reforming networks through liberally and neo-
liberally shaped decentralisation reforms.  
7.4 Historical determinations and lived events in and beyond Benin before 1990 
The last part of this chapter extends the actor-network in time, going beyond the 1990 
conference, its actors and the global influences at that time. As previously pointed out by Latour 
(2005), actors can also be structural in nature, such as historical processes, which is the focus of 
the narrative of this last part of this chapter. In particular, the analysis traces the different and 
contradictory narratives about the endogenous and exogenous origins of the policy of devolution 
and de-concentration. As highlighted in chapter 3, I do not consider time as linear nor space as 
flat. This means that I do not think through education decentralisation to be chronologically built 
upon previous experiences, but consider it rather, as an assemblage of different experiences, 
which mash-up and overlap in the current policy. In this part of the chapter, I argue that the 
representative democracy including decentralisation was built up incrementally based on the 
previous political regimes, such as the participatory mechanisms under Marxism-Leninism (1974-
1989), the attempts at devolution to some municipalities under late colonial rule (1955s) and the 
traditional chieftaincies from before the colonial rule (before 1894). 
7.4.1 Community participation during the Marxist-Leninist regime 
As chapter 2 explained, Benin adopted a socialist regime between 1974 and 1989 informed 
by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. The research participants were divided in their opinion as to 
whether the Marxist-Leninist state was a centralised and command-driven regime or a first 
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attempt to devolve power. The majority of interviewees did refer, however, to democratic and 
devolved elements during the Kérékou government. For example, a senior official, representing 
the mayors at the national level, explained that the chiefs at the village level were democratically 
elected. 
At the village level, the elections of the village chiefs were democratic, at least for 
elections at the time before democracy. These were elections where people put themselves in front, 
and we chose them (I61, municipal/ decentralisation, 06 06 2017).146 
This quote illustrates that the village level adhered to a form of democracy for the free 
election of village chiefs.  
At the municipal and provincial levels, the interviewees referred to some form of 
democratic principle that translated into elections; however, these elections took place within the 
party in power. The following extensive quote explains the administration system under Kérékou, 
pointing to a hybrid form of devolution and de-concentration; the quasi-elections took place 
within the political party in power. 
The reforms started from 1977 onwards; different arrangements created the territorial 
administration and local power organs of the State. They put in place another form of 
decentralisation with its administrative authorities at the same time. […] It was a hybrid regime. 
We talked about the local power organs of the State; the central power appointed the overall head 
of the administration, the sub-governor and the head of the district. They were under the titular 
authority of the prefect, but they had a fully functioning unit. […] There was a form election within 
the political party in power. The people elected the political party in power as well as the authorities 
appointed; they collaborated to some extent. The same procedure took place at the district level. 
At that time, we called them municipalities. In addition, the Revolutionary Municipal Commission 
(Commission Communale Révolutionnaire) […] was an organ which came together to think about 
development problems in the municipality. […] There was a form of local democracy implying 
the level of the village, district and provincial (today’s councils). There was [also] the Provincial 
State Committee of Administration (Comité d’Etat d’Administration de Province) […]. However, 
the post holders were all members of the political party in power (I11, national/ decentralisation, 
26 01 2017, italics added).147 
                                                          
146 Parce qu’au niveau des villages, les élections des responsables de village, c’était des élections 
démocratiques. Ça au moins pour les élections au temps avant le temps de la démocratie. C’était des 
élections où les gens se mettaient devant et on les choisit. 
147 Les réformes ont commencé si bien qu’à partir de 1977 ; des différentes ordonnances ont créées 
l’administration territoriale, et les organes locaux de pouvoir d’Etat. Ils ont mis en place une autre forme 
de décentralisation avec en même temps les circonscriptions administratives. C’était un régime hybride. 
On a parlé des organes locaux de pouvoir d’Etat ; le chef de circonscription administrative, le sous-
préfet ou le chef de district est nommé par le pouvoir central. Il est placé sous l’autorité tutelle du préfet 
mais il a un organe délibérant qui est composé de tous les chefs services déconcentrés de pouvoir d’Etat 
au niveau de ces circonscriptions administratives. Il y avait des formes d’élection avec les organes du 
parti au pouvoir. Et c’était le parti unique. Donc les organes du parti au pouvoir, étaient élus et à côté de 
ces autorités nommées, il y avait une certaine collaboration. Au niveau des arrondissements c’était un 
même procédé. A l’époque on les appelait commune. Et à côté il y avait les CCR (Commission 
Communale Révolutionnaire) qui réunissait l’ensemble de tous les chefs de village de la commune c'est-
à-dire de l’arrondissement et était présidée par le maire. C’était quand-même un organe qui se réunissait 
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This interviewee summarises nicely ‘There was still a form of democracy from the bottom 
up’. Le Meur (1998) confirms that Kérékou's reform of 1977 introduced significant steps towards 
decentralisation and democratisation. He explains that the village, the village council and the 
village chief had a legal existence after the colonial period. 
The interview data also suggests that the local population was more involved in the 
management of schools during the revolutionary period compared to today. 'The school was their 
thing', as one senior official of the MEMP put it (I21, national/ education, 06 03 2017). Kérékou's 
slogans, like 'power to the people’ empowered people at the local level to participate actively in 
different areas of social life (education, health, among others), as he argues.  
I experienced decentralisation when I was a pupil during the revolution: the 'Ecole 
nouvelle' was good. […] You know, the slogan was 'honour to the people, the power to the people, 
and all the power to the people'. That was the slogan at the time of the revolution. It was then that 
the school became the object of the people (I21, national/ education, 06 03 2017).148 
Fichtner (2012) and Jarroux (2017) propose that the dominant approach to education 'Ecole 
nouvelle' during the revolutionary period served to democratise access to schooling, decolonise 
the curriculum and secularise education.  
Not surprisingly, education officials in particular, emphasised the role of parents in the 
delivery of pre-school and primary education, but officials from other disciplines, such as a senior 
official of the ANCB, also pointed out the relative power of parents during this period. Parents, 
represented in associations at all levels of the governance system, were empowered to give 
guidance, as the following quote suggests. 
The other element is the involvement of parents' associations. They were indeed, 
associations, but with some influence over the management of the school; they could provide 
guidance (I61, municipal/ decentralisation, 06 06 2017).149 
                                                          
pour réfléchir sur les problèmes de développement de la commune. […] Arrivé au niveau des villages ou 
quartier de ville, nous avons les CRL par exemple. Ils sont appelés comité Révolutionnaire Local. Ça 
c’est au niveau des quartiers ou des villages (conseil du village aujourd’hui). Il y avait quand-même une 
forme de démocratie depuis la base jusqu’au sommet. Donc vous avez le niveau quartier/village, le 
niveau arrondissement, le niveau district ou le niveau provincial ou départemental aujourd’hui. […] Il y 
avait un conseil départemental qu’on appelait le CEAP (Comité d’Etat d’Administration de Province) qui 
est un peu ce qu’on peut appeler ailleurs les conseils généraux. Mais c’était les membres du parti au 
pouvoir. 
148 La décentralisation avait été vécue quand j'étais élève au temps de la révolution: l'école nouvelle, 
c'était bon. Personne n'a voulu aujourd'hui… Vous savez, le slogan était: « honneur au peuple, pouvoir 
au peuple, tout le pouvoir au peuple ». C’était ça le slogan au temps de la révolution. C’est en ce 
moment-là que l’école est devenue la chose de la population. 
149 L’autre élément c’est l’implication des associations des parents d’élèves. C’est vrai que c’est une 
association mais qui avait certains regards sur la gestion faite au niveau de l’école et qui pouvait donner 
des orientations. 
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As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, parents felt more influential in the provision of the 
education of their children during the revolutionary regime. 
The majority of officials suggest that the Revolutionary period included ‘good’ elements 
of democracy and community participation, but that the transition to a democratic system replaced 
the previous system without taking account of these elements.  
Nevertheless, when we rejected Kérékou and his revolution, and democracy arrived, we 
threw away everything. There were good things we could draw upon from then. Unfortunately, we 
threw everything away (I21, national/ education, 06 03 2017).150  
This perspective contrasts with the views of a few interviewees identification of the 
Marxist-Leninist regime as ‘command-driven' and ‘centralised'. A junior official from the 
Decentralisation Ministry suggested the transition to a democratic government was a response to 
this centralised regime. 
By the way, before 90, […], the central State managed everything. The representatives of 
the State alone were responsible for […] the administration at the level of the municipalities, which 
we called sub-prefecture at that time. I would not say there was much preoccupation with 
development ... So the central State asked them to do what they did. It was just a command 
administrative system from the top (I7, national/ decentralisation, 19 01 2017, added italics).151 
Jarroux (2017, p. 72), referring to Alderfer (1964) explains that Kérékou described his 
regime as 'democratic centralism' referring to Lenin. His 'democratic centralism' promoted free 
discussion within the party and absolute discipline simultaneously, whereby the 'local 
government' in communist regimes is part of the overall system. Following on from this analysis, 
Bierschenk and Sardan (2003, pp. 148–149) argue that Benin's 'socialism' of the 1970s and 1980s 
'aimed at eliminating the instances of local mediation in place at the time and establishing direct 
and systematic state power within village communities'. In this regard, they consider 
decentralisation as an ‘alternative project being implemented against a background of different 
ideological orientations and the aim of improving the embeddedness of the central state in local 
societies' (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 2003, p. 149). 
Overall, the respondents had different perspectives of the Kérékou regime, suggesting it 
brought either empowerment at grass-roots level or the dominance of a command-driven 
                                                          
150 Mais quand nous avons rejeté Kérékou et sa révolution, et que la démocratie est arrivée, on a tout 
jeté. Il y avait encore de bonne chose qu’on peut aller puiser là-bas. Malheureusement on a tout jeté. 
151 Au fait, avant 90 […], c’était l’Etat central. Donc tout se gérait depuis l’Etat central. Et au niveau des 
communes d’alors qu’on appelait sous-préfecture, il n’y avait que les représentants de l’Etat qui 
assuraient le fonctionnement de l’administration légère ; je ne dirai pas de développement mais qui se 
préoccupaient par… Donc c’est ce que l’Etat central leur demande de faire qu’ils faisaient. C’était juste 
une administration de commandement d’exécution des ordres venus du haut. 
202 
 
 
system. Most research participants referred to the Revolutionary period under Kérékou as a period 
of grass-roots involvement. This perspective contrasts with the views of other interviewees 
perceiving the Marxist-Leninist regime as 'command-driven' and 'centralised' and the transition 
to a democratic regime as a response to this centralised regime. In order to explain the tension 
between the arguments of the majority of senior officials and those of some junior officials, it is 
helpful to draw on Berger and Luckmann (1991), who argue that a new generation constructs 
historical events differently. Although I did not collect data relating to respondents’ ages, I 
observed that research participants could be categorised into a senior generation who had 
experienced and possibly helped shape the political transformation in 1990 and the Marxist-
Leninist legacy on the one hand, and a mid-career generation who had grown up within the 
democratic system. This younger generation drew their knowledge about the emergence of the 
democratic system, including decentralisation, from their parents, teachers and other individuals 
and institutions. The observations of the different generations about the emergence of education 
decentralisation and their different perspectives of the contribution of the Marxist-Leninist period 
drawing on Berger and Luckmann (1991), may be related to their age and experience. 
I view the late colonial period as a further assemblage which has connections with other 
assemblages to give rise to education decentralisation today, which the following section 
elaborates. 
7.4.2 Decentralisation as a response to the centralised system under colonial rule 
Like the revolutionary regime, the colonial period divided the interviewee’s understanding 
of decentralisation as a response to a centralised system on the one hand and building up 
incrementally upon an initial experience of devolution, on the other. Colonial rule may have 
provoked decentralisation in two ways: on the one hand, the current decentralisation reform can 
be considered as a response to a highly centralised system of governance under French 
colonialism. On the other hand, Benin experienced the devolution of five municipalities in the 
late colonial period before its independence. In that regard, I see education decentralisation as not 
only inspired by community participation elements during the Marxist-Leninist period but also 
building upon Benin’s experience of partial devolution under colonial rule. 
I divide the argument considering the current reform of decentralisation as building upon 
experiences under colonial rule into two sub-arguments. On the one hand, the current territorial 
organisation of Benin has its roots in the colonial organisation (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, 
France made concessions by devolving some responsibilities to some municipalities in the later 
period of colonial rule. First, I discuss the similarities between the current, the colonial and 
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subsequent Marxist territorial organisation. This quote of a junior education official explains the 
structure under colonial rule.  
Since we had a long tradition of de-concentration, even before the advent of 
decentralisation... […] Well before that, we had sub-prefectures; there were the municipalities and 
districts within [the sub-prefectures]. We used to call [them] municipalities, what we call boroughs 
today. The sub-prefecture was at the macro level and subdivided into municipalities; each 
municipality was subdivided into villages so on (I5, national/ education, 17/01/2018).152 
After the Second World War, the colonial rule divided Dahomey (previous name of Benin) 
into départements governed by a central prefect, sous-préfectures governed by assistant governors 
or sous-préfets, and the necessary administrative unit, which was the arrondissement (Decalo, 
1987; Ki-Zerbo and Holenstein, 2003). As outlined in chapter 5, the decentralisation reforms, in 
the Territorial Administration of 1993, mostly kept the administrative organisation of the colonial 
rule, replacing the sous-préfectures by elected bodies, the municipalities. 
On the other hand, France made concessions by devolving responsibilities to some 
municipalities in the later colonial era153, as this quote from a senior decentralisation official 
indicates. 
There was already a strong desire for colonial emancipation. In 1958, France already felt 
that the phenomenon of autonomy would arise. Facing this strong demand from the colonised 
people to strive for their independence, France had already given the green light to show their 
willingness to adhere to these demands. [The ambition for independence] is what justified the 
creation of these municipalities from 1955 there, all over francophone Africa. It is mainly in the 
big cities that there were these municipalities (I11, national/ decentralisation, 26 01 2017).154 
Following this quote, I interpret France’s concession as a mandatory step in light of the 
forthcoming independence in 1960. However, the same interviewee also acknowledged that 
France only allocated limited autonomy to these municipalities. 
In reality, when you read the [legal] texts, one immediately feels that they were guided 
municipalities where full autonomy does not exist. […] They conferred [some] responsibilities on 
these municipalities, but in reality […] they did not really exist. There was the strong arm of 
                                                          
152 Parce que nous avions eu l’ancienne tradition de déconcentration, bien même avant l’avènement de la 
décentralisation. […] Bien avant ça on avait les sous-préfectures ; à l’intérieur d’elles il y avait les 
communes et des arrondissements. Ce que nous on appelait commune entre temps, ce que nous appelons 
aujourd’hui arrondissement. C’était la sous-préfecture qui était au niveau macro et subdivisée en 
commune ; les communes subdivisées en villages ainsi de suite. 
153 Porto-Novo, Cotonou, Ouidah, Abomey et Parakou anchored in the decree n 57-461 of 04 April 1957 
154 Il y avait déjà une forte volonté d’émancipation des colonies. La France sentait déjà de 1958 avec le 
phénomène de l’autonomie venir. Et face à cette forte revendication des peuples sous colonie à aller à 
l’indépendance, la France, pour montrer sa volonté avait déjà envoyé les signaux pour montrer quelle 
adhérait les revendications. C’est ça qui a justifié à partir de 1955 la création de ces communes-là. 
C’était dans toute l’Afrique francophone. C’est principalement dans les grandes villes qu’il y a eu ces 
communes.  
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colonial rule in the functioning of these municipalities (I11, national/ decentralisation, 26 01 
2017).155 
This quote also exemplifies the risks of decentralisation, where the State may use the de-
concentration of its administration as a way to exercise control at the local level (Rondinelli, 
1980). 
In contrast to the previous argument about the initial experience of devolution under late 
colonial rule, some officials argue that the decentralisation reform as a national aspiration was the 
response to the centralised organisation during the period of the French empire. From this 
perspective, Benin was governed not only by, but also mainly from France before 1960, as a 
senior education official at the national level explains: 
Benin has known a long tradition of centralisation. The smallest village in Benin was 
administered from Paris, later from Dakar. The only contribution the population was asked to make 
was to send their children to school (I16b, national/ education, 16 02 2017).156  
This quote points to the highly centralised system under colonial rule.  
Decentralisation often alternates with centralisation trends (Conyers, 1984). Lauglo (1995) 
explains that most countries struggling for independence tend to devolve power, but once these 
countries gain their freedom, they tend to recentralise for social cohesion. This statement confirms 
the findings of the study that Benin sought partial devolution in the late colonial period and re-
centralised after independence. The study has shown so far that the origins of decentralisation can 
be partially found in the French empire - as a response to the centralised administration or as an 
expression of devolved authority to a few municipalities in 1955 - and in the revolutionary regime 
for similar motives. 
A further constituent in the assemblage of education decentralisation stimuli today is the 
traditional organisation of Benin in pre-colonial times. The traditional chieftaincies provoke a 
debate about their form - whether de-concentrated or devolved - and their role in the current 
decentralisation reform.  
                                                          
155 Mais en réalité lorsque vous lisez les textes, on sent tout de suite que c’était des communes guidées où 
l’autonomie même n’existe pas. Parce que quand vous lisez les textes, il y a des compétences qui ont été 
conférées à ces communes créées mais en réalité pour ce qui doit être pour les communes, ce n’est pas 
réellement ça. Il y a un lien fort de la mainmise du colon dans le fonctionnement de ces communes. 
156  Le Bénin a connu une longue tradition de centralisation. Le plus petit village du Bénin était 
administré depuis Paris, plus tard depuis Dakar. La seule contribution qu'on a demandé à la population 
était d'envoyer ses enfants à l'école. 
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7.4.3 Traditional chieftaincies: precursors of de-concentration or devolution?  
Most interviewees emphasise the distant past of de-concentration in Beninese history and 
considered the first attempt to decentralise the system of governance was in the traditional 
chieftaincies in pre-colonial times (before 1894). Before French colonisation, Benin was called 
the Kingdom of Dahomey and had a strategic geopolitical role in the region. Benin could be 
characterised as being based on both political and geographical traditional chieftaincies (cf. 
chapter 2). Although interviewees acknowledged the importance of traditional forms of 
organisation within the current decentralisation policy, they do not agree whether the organisation 
of these regional kingdoms is closer to the idea of de-concentration or devolution. The following 
excerpt of the debriefing with officials of the Decentralisation Ministry and the Education 
Ministry demonstrates the ambiguity of the discussion.157  
Junior decentralisation official: What I wanted to say- [...] not in terms of participation, 
but in historical terms- when I take the case of the kingdoms I know, that they are devolved 
structures […]. There is the king; there are the chiefs of the land who have […] a defined territory 
for which they are accountable. [Therefore], it can be said that it is a form of de-concentration or 
devolution of power.158 
The junior decentralisation official (above) argues that, for example, the local kingdoms of 
Save or Nikki represented a form of de-concentration or devolution, whereas the senior official 
in the group argues (below) that they represented forms of de-concentration, not devolution.  
Senior decentralisation official: If we start from the definition that the law provides us 
with for devolution [and] de-concentration, devolution, it is the creation of [a local government]. 
Junior decentralisation official: [...] no, I am talking about kingdoms ... 
Senior decentralisation official: but then, you cannot talk about devolution.159 
The discussion suggests that some interviewees tended to classify traditional chieftaincies 
as models of de-concentration, rather than devolution, because regional kingdoms had their 
representatives at village level who were still accountable to and dependant on the king. 
Understanding traditional chieftaincies as a form of de-concentration rather than devolution is in 
                                                          
157 The following discussion is an excerpt of the group interview 67, national/ decentralisation/ education, 
22 06 2017.  
158 Ce que je voulais dire, hm, [..] pas en terme de participation, mais en terme historique, quand je 
prends le cas des royaumes que je connais, qu’ils sont des structures de façon décentralisées carrément : 
il y a roi, il y a des chefs de terre qui ont, les chefs de terre ont un certain territoire ou ils rendent compte, 
on peut dire que c’est une forme de et déconcentration ou de décentralisation du pouvoir qui a été fait. 
Donc, quand vous prenez les royaumes de Save ou les royaumes de Nikki, […] qui étaient une forme de 
décentralisation ou bien de déconcentration du pouvoir parce que […] 
159 I1 : Si nous partons de la définition que le texte nous donne de la décentralisation/ déconcentration, 
décentralisation, c’est la création d’état identité… 
I3 : ...non, je parle des royaumes... 
I1 : mais la la, vous ne pouvez pas parler de décentralisation. 
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line with Rondinelli's (1980) definition of decentralisation: devolution is understood as 
transferring particular responsibilities and resources to the local government, whereas de-
concentration means delegating specific responsibilities to field offices. 
Whereas the interview data showed consensus about the importance of traditional 
chieftaincies as the precursors of the decentralisation reform today, the literature discusses the 
role of traditional chieftaincies in a different way. Schneiderfritz (1989) underlines the importance 
of traditional chieftaincies for the current decentralisation reform, while Bierschenk and de Sardan 
(2003, p. 148) point to ‘the relative unimportance of traditional chieftaincy in Benin, despite 
laborious attempts at rehabilitation by the chiefs in particular’. They explain that these local 
chieftaincies gained their renaissance only after 1989, as a parallel structure to the town councils. 
Nanako (2016) considers traditional chieftaincies as a form of auto-organisation, which could 
have the potential to develop into real, local authorities if the colonial legacy, on the one hand, 
and the state power, on the other, had not been to their detriment. The literature points to either 
the (conditional) importance or insignificance of the traditional chieftaincies in terms of the 
governance structure of today, while the data from this study contends that education 
decentralisation was built up incrementally based on the experience of the traditional organisation 
of society, notably for de-concentration.  
The previous discussion showed how the interviewees debated whether the traditional 
chieftaincies formed an important assemblage in the networking of education decentralisation and 
whether they presented a form of devolution or de-concentration. I consider the traditional 
chieftaincies to be a form of de-concentration that has influenced the design of the current 
decentralisation policy, consisting of a mixed system of devolution and de-concentration. 
Although the data in this study and the literature shows consensus about the non-
institutionalisation of these traditional forms of governance in the recent constitution, some point 
to the potential they could have had in the current governance system.  
7.4.4 Summing-up 
This part discussed the multiple material assemblages that led to the decentralisation reform 
in 1990, resulting from the historical, political, socio-economic and cultural processes of their 
formations. The historical determinants point to the de-concentrated organisation of local 
kingdoms, attempts to devolve authority to a few municipalities in the late colonial period, and 
community participation in the Marxist-Leninist period that followed. More specifically, I have 
argued that the representative democracy, including decentralisation, has been built up 
incrementally on previous political regimes, such as the participatory mechanisms under 
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Marxism-Leninism (1974-1989), attempts to devolve power to some municipalities under late 
colonial rule (1955s) and to the traditional chieftaincies from before the colonial rule. From a 
post-colonial perspective, acknowledging the endogenous experience of, and knowledge about 
decentralisation is important, as this perspective shows the legacy of European imperialism 
(Rizvi, Lingard and Lavia, 2006).  
7.5 Summary 
This chapter showed how decentralisation emerged powerfully in 1990 as part of a network 
traced through the connections between local and global actors. The third move in ANT 
combinied the two previous moves - localising the global and distributing the local at the same 
time - to trace ‘connections, vehicles, and attachments’ [as] variously entangled and varied 
(Latour, 2005, p. 220). The policy of decentralisation emerged from a complex web of 
connections of lived events (1990 conference), historical determinations (endogenous precursors 
of decentralisation), concepts (devolution and de-concentration), individuals (the former 
president, and Archbishop of Cotonou, among others), groups and social formations (elites in 
exile). Moreover, the political instability in the fading authority of the Marxist-Leninist regime in 
Benin on the one hand, and the end of the cold war in 1989 on the other, point to the political 
determinations underlying the agenda setting for education decentralisation in Benin.  
In the first part, I showed how the National Conference of the Active Forces in 1990 was 
significant in bringing about the education decentralisation reform. More precisely, I argued that 
this conference reflected the shift in Benin from a socialist democracy, ideologically influenced 
by Marxism-Leninism, to a liberal form of democracy. The emphasis on the nation-state, the 
citizen and sovereignty framed this shift as well as the discursive interdependence of 
decentralisation, democracy and development. In the second part, I discussed the role of human 
actors at the National Conference of the Active Forces in 1990. Even though there is a strong 
narrative suggesting that Beninese’ citizens decided themselves to opt for decentralisation 
pointing to the 1990 conference as a national initiative, my contention is that elites and external 
actors influenced the outcome of the conference. Particularly the elites returning from exile and 
influential politicians formed a powerful assemblage together with NGOs and country 
representatives to bring education decentralisation onto the agenda of the Beninese government 
in 1990. 
In the third part, I extended the actor-network in space (and slightly in time), to consider 
the emergence of education decentralisation as a network of local and global assemblages. 
Besides the fading authority of the Marxist-Leninist regime and the economic and financial break-
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down in Benin, I drew attention to the global world shift symbolically represented by the fall of 
the Berlin wall, which globally led to a decrease in the number of social democracies in favour of 
liberal and neo-liberal forms of democracy in the 90s. Moreover, I embedded the political 
transition of Benin within the democratisation discourse of Mitterrand at La Baule in 1990. In the 
final part, I pointed out that decentralisation has been present since pre-colonial rule through local 
kingdoms as a form of de-concentration. The colonial rule may have provoked the official 
decentralisation reform in 1990 as a reaction to the centralised system. Alternatively, it may have 
built upon the experience of devolving responsibilities to five municipalities in the mid-50s. 
Officials framed their discourse in similar ways regarding the Marxist-Leninist period, where they 
argued that decentralisation presented a response to a highly centralised system, while also 
acknowledging the mechanisms of community participation. 
Following Sayed’s (1999) argument about the introduction of education decentralisation in 
South Africa in the 90s, I suggest that the decision to decentralise Benin’s governance system 
also happened in a state of fragile consensus. Each moment represents a consensus around an 
agreement that later ruptures due to contextual and historical factors. The decentralisation policy 
as a temporary agreement captured in a moment of fragile consensus also contains within itself 
the ever-present possibility of rupture inimical to the consensus then, and visible within the 
current government of Talon (2016-today).  
The next chapter is a synthesis of thesis, discussing the contribution to knowledge and 
implications of this study.
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8 Conclusions  
This study explored the discursive and social practices surrounding education 
decentralisation in the context of pre-school and primary education in Benin. Using the 
framework of Ball’s (1993, 2015) policy trajectory studies, it traced the origins, the formulation 
processes and the mediation of education decentralisation in the Beninese context. Discursive and 
social practices in the context of this thesis refer to a Foucauldian understanding of discourse, 
aiming ‘to address the structures and rules that constitute a discourse rather than the texts and 
utterances produced within it' (Ball, 2015, p. 311). Ball considers policy as discourse ‘produced 
and formed by taken-for-granted and implicit knowledges and assumptions about the world and 
ourselves' (Ball, 2015, p. 311). In other words, discourse embodies the history of a society, 
whereas social practices refer to the ‘processes of interpretation and translation of policy through 
which school actors enact policy’ (Gee, Hull & Lankshear, 1996, p. 10 in Ball, 2015, p. 307). 
The conclusions provide a synthesis of the main findings of this study: firstly, the 
discursive analysis of the policy of decentralisation, its incremental documents and the broader 
policy ensemble; secondly, the mediation of education decentralisation from a relational 
perspective in two local field sites; and thirdly, the emergence of the decentralisation reform as a 
complex web of assemblages. The second part outlines the contribution to knowledge from the 
theoretical and empirical aspects, and the final part considers the practical and political 
implications and offers suggestions for future research. The next section answers the main 
research question which asks how the policy of education decentralisation is discursively 
constituted, and how it is mediated by the diverse actors involved in the provision of pre-school 
and primary education in Benin. 
8.1 Summary of main findings 
This thesis traced the discursive and social practices of the actors involved in the pre-
school and primary education back to the policy adopted in 2010 and the agenda setting of 1990. 
These actors, both human and non-human, have agency: they ‘compare, produce typologies, 
design standards […] actively, reflectively, obsessively' (Latour, 2005, p. 149). In that regard, this 
study focused on how the actors discursively constructed the emergence, formulation and 
enactment of the decentralisation policy.  
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8.1.1 A discursive analysis of the decentralisation policy  
This section first revisits chapter 5, the discursive de-construction of education 
decentralisation and its incremental and implementation documents to answer the first sub-
question concerning how the policy of decentralisation is discursively constructed, and how it 
relates to the broader ensemble of policies. This focus refers to the second dimension of Ball’s 
(1993, 2015) policy framework, the policy production process and is informed by Critical 
Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995, 2010, 2013). As regards the formulation process, this study 
used a narrower understanding, focusing on the textual and discursive features of education 
decentralisation and its policy ensemble.  
Findings 
1. Despite a tendency to strengthen the role of the state actors at the municipal 
and central levels, the legal framework did not significantly change the power 
basis between actors. 
2. The policy of decentralisation can be considered as being underpinned by the 
discourses of development and modernisation and reflects Benin’s colonial 
and post-colonial legacies and development trajectory. 
3. Concerns surrounding devolution are insignificant in the Education Sector 
Strategy, whereas the non-adoption of the Implementation Plan for Education 
Decentralisation can be seen as a form of resistance. 
8.1.1.1 Finding 1 
In terms of the incremental documents, this study stated that the constitution of 1990 
remained silent about how education and decentralisation related to each other, even though it 
laid out the bedrock of decentralisation as through elected bodies at the municipal level. It was 
only in 1999 that the devolution laws specified how education was to be shared between the 
central and municipal government entities: the municipality is in charge of school infrastructure 
and the promotion of activities for young people, while the Ministry of Education and its sub-
units are responsible for all other areas, such as the curriculum, teacher recruitment and 
management, school inspection. The analysis of the education and devolution laws revealed that 
devolved responsibilities remained firstly, limited to what used to be managed locally; secondly, 
they were vague and were not translated into regulations; and thirdly, the vague legislation in 
relation to a weak judiciary posed a challenge to putting the decentralisation policy into practice. 
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Despite a tendency to strengthen the role of state actors at the municipal and central levels, the 
devolution laws did not change the power basis between actors significantly.  
8.1.1.2 Finding 2 
The discursive de-construction of the policy of decentralisation revealed first, a textual 
shift from devolution to a mixed system of devolution and de-concentration, whereby de-
concentration had become discursively powerful. Second, this study discussed the underlying 
ideologies of decentralisation, namely development and modernisation in the context of a hybrid 
mixture of social, liberal and neo-liberal ideologies. Third, the decentralisation policy as part of 
a broader policy ensemble is a product of the powerful connections between the Beninese 
government, bilateral development agencies and consulting firms. Overall, the policy of 
decentralisation can be considered as a policy underpinned by the discourses of development and 
modernisation, reflecting Benin’s colonial and post-colonial legacies and development trajectory. 
8.1.1.3 Finding 3 
Finally, the analysis of the strategic and implementation plans revealed the relative 
absence of devolution in the Education Sector Strategy, and second, interpreted the non-adoption 
of the Implementation Plan for Education Decentralisation as a form of resistance. More precisely, 
the analysis of the Education Sector Strategy showed that this strategy addressed decentralisation 
only erratically, privileging de-concentration over devolution. The rationalisation of resources, 
and hence, institutional changes at central level, on the one hand, and the agenda of global actors 
and strategies, on the other, may have led to the Implementation Plan not being appropriately 
adopted, resulting in the non-participation of both politicians and administrators in education 
decentralisation. 
The next section revisits the understanding and mediation of education decentralisation 
in the context of two local field sites.  
8.1.2 The mediation of education decentralisation from a relational perspective 
 Chapter 6 explored the second sub-question of how actors involved in the provision of 
schooling mediated the current decentralisation policy from Actor-Network Theory perspective 
(Latour, 1996, 2005; Fenwick and Edwards, 2010). The mediation of education decentralisation 
refers to Ball’s (1993, 2015) third dimension of policy trajectory studies, whereby discursive and 
social practices can be considered as small-scale actor-networks in both field sites.  
Findings 
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1. The mediation of education decentralisation can be considered as a social arena 
allowing institutional and relational pluralism at the local level: the actors in the 
Northern field site tended to privilege the collaboration with Non-governmental 
Organisations, while the actors in the Southern field site tended to collaborate with 
the provincial and central education administration.  
2. The policy of decentralisation affected the power and possibilities for actors to 
participate differently: it tended to strengthen the municipalities (elected), whereas 
the power of the local school authorities remained unchanged. Non-governmental 
Organisations remained powerful in their role of navigating the system, while parents 
felt they had been disempowered.  
3. The mediation of education decentralisation between central and municipal 
government entities can be considered as a competing game. The current government 
tends to privilege de-concentration over devolution in discursive and in practical 
terms, reinforced by the legal and policy framework.  
8.1.2.1 Finding 1 
This study compared the discourses and social practices of the actors involved in the 
provision of schooling in two local field sites in the Northeast and the Southeast in Benin. First, 
the mediation of the decentralisation policy can be conceived as a social arena allowing for 
institutional and relational pluralism or in Ball’s (1994a, p. 10) terms for a ‘wild profusion’ of 
social practices. However, this study also identified some differences particular to each field site. 
While in the North, Non-governmental Organisations navigated the system powerfully by 
connecting with parents, teachers or the town council, according to their objectives, local actors 
in the Southern field site tended to collaborate with the provincial and central administration of 
education, rather than the municipality, for school construction projects.  
8.1.2.2 Finding 2 
Second, the decentralisation policy privileged the relationship between the central 
administration and the newly elected bodies, whereas the influence of local school authorities and 
Non-governmental Organisations remained unaffected by the decentralisation policy. In 
particular, the Non-governmental Organisations tended to be influential and intervened in various 
ways. They navigated the system in parallel to government structures, as demonstrated in the 
North, or lead to the practice of school actors excluding the municipal and central government 
entities in the South. In contrast, the influence of parents has decreased since the advent of 
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decentralisation. Their previous, albeit informal, responsibilities for school construction and 
community teacher employment have been ‘re-centralised’ to the municipality.  
8.1.2.3 Finding 3 
Finally, this study has demonstrated how actors from central and municipal government 
entities (re-)negotiate their power base. In particular, the devolved responsibilities between the 
national and the municipal actors can be considered as a competing game. Moreover, the 
influential role of the governor shows how the state has continued to control the elected bodies at 
the municipal level. The predominantly practised control questions the legitimacy of the political 
decentralisation and democracy more broadly. Lastly, the current government privileges de-
concentration over devolution measures, which suggests centralisation tendencies. However, 
borrowing from Berkhout (2005), this study suggested the need to go beyond the centralisation- 
decentralisation debate. The actors’ reconfiguration and re-negotiation of power can be conceived 
as a moment of temporal stability which can change depending on the actions of the broader actor-
network. 
The next section revisits the emergence of education decentralisation as a complex web 
of assemblages. 
8.1.3 The emergence of education decentralisation as a complex web of assemblages 
This section revisits chapter 7, which explored the agenda setting of education 
decentralisation in Benin from Actor-Network Theory perspective (Latour, 1996, 2005; Fenwick 
and Edwards, 2010). It relates to the context of influence in Ball’s (1993, 2015) framework of 
policy trajectory studies and examined the third sub-question, which is how human and non-
human actors connected to bring about education decentralisation in 1990.  
Findings: 
1. This study presented the National Conference of the Active Forces in 1990 as a 
compelling event instigating the education decentralisation reform. This conference 
has been framed as the way to democracy and development in the context of the 
global world shift and democratisation discourses linking development aid to 
democracy in the Global South. 
2. Besides national influences, global events and actors impacted upon the decision of 
the Beninese government to opt for democratic renewal. Policy elites, together with 
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external actors, influenced the political decisions concerning democracy and 
decentralisation significantly. 
3. However, education decentralisation has also been building up incrementally since 
pre-colonial rule, e.g. the de-concentrated organisation of local kingdoms, attempts 
to devolve authority to a few municipalities in the late colonial period and community 
participation in the subsequent Marxist-Leninist period. 
8.1.3.1 Finding 1 
The National Conference of the Active Forces in 1990 has been presented as a compelling 
event stimulating the education decentralisation reform in Benin. In particular, this conference 
offered a powerful assemblage in the shift of Benin from its social democratic system, 
ideologically influenced by Marxism-Leninism, to a liberal form of democracy. This shift was 
framed by the concepts of the nation, the citizen and sovereignty, and the underlying rationale of 
linking decentralisation to economic development.  
8.1.3.2 Finding 2 
Besides national influences, global events and actors impacted upon the decision of the 
Beninese government to opt for democratic renewal. Even though the conference assembled 500 
participants across all social strata, this study demonstrated that the elites, together with external 
actors, influenced significantly the political decisions concerning democracy and decentralisation. 
Moreover, education decentralisation can be considered as an assemblage of further local and 
global events. First, the global world shift, symbolically represented through the fall of the Berlin 
wall, globally led to a decrease in social democracies in favour of liberal and neo-liberal forms of 
democracy in the 90s. Second, the democratisation discourse at La Baule in 1990 may have re-
enforced the democratisation trend in the Global South, particularly in Francophone Africa, when 
Mitterrand advised developing countries to adhere to democratic principles if they wanted to 
receive the benefit of development aid.  
8.1.3.3 Finding 3 
This study also emphasised how decentralisation has been historically present from 
before colonial rule. Historically, the organisation of local kingdoms was de-concentrated, then 
there were attempts to devolve authority to a few municipalities in the late colonial period, and 
then community participation in the subsequent Marxist-Leninist period. In particular, the earlier 
colonial rule may have influenced the official decentralisation reform in 1990, as a reaction to the 
centralised system on the one hand and building upon the experiences of responsibilities having 
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been devolved to five municipalities in the late colonial period, on the other hand. Officials framed 
their discourse similarly when referring to the Marxist-Leninist period, arguing that 
decentralisation presented a response to a highly centralised system or acknowledging the earlier 
mechanisms for community participation.  
This study not only traced the historical process of the decentralisation policy to its 
mediation today, with its web of assemblages leading to particular events and documents, but also 
de-constructed the policy itself, shedding light on the dominant concepts, such as participation 
and power. So far, this chapter has provided a synthesis of the analytical chapters, which leads to 
a discussion of the theoretical and methodological choices of this study. 
8.2 Theoretical and methodological reflections  
This section critically reflects on the advantages and disadvantages of the theoretical and 
methodological approach adopted, starting with Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to the 
documentary review and interview data, and Actor-Network Theory in relation to the interviews, 
focus groups and visual participatory methods. I first outline what each theoretical and 
methodological choice offered in terms of the aims of this study, and second, identify what they 
did not, before reflecting on how this combination contributed to this study.  
Critical Discourse Analysis was particularly suitable for critical policy analysis because it 
allowed texts to be analysed within the interplay of broader social processes involved (Rizvi and 
Lingard, 2010). Fairclough’s three-dimensional model made the policy of decentralisation 
possible to be examined on three levels: the text, the discourses and the social process (Fairclough, 
2013) thus permitting the examination of the broader social processes from a normative and 
explanatory stance. 
The semiotic CDA analysis (at the textual or descriptive level) based on Halliday’s 
functional analysis of grammar was too restrictive to fully interpret and understand the policy. 
Consequently, I only used CDA at a comparatively superficial level, relying instead on a 
Foucauldian  influenced understanding of discourse to address the underlying structures and rules 
that constitute discourse to de-construct the ‘taken-for-granted and implicit knowledges and 
assumptions about the world and ourselves' (Ball, 2015, p. 311). Further caution was necessary  
to avoid (mis-) using the social analysis (third level) and jumping to the conclusion that particular 
values, worldviews or events, such as neo-liberalism, democracy or (neo-)colonialism, served as 
a clear, direct and straightforward explanation of a particular phenomenon, such as a policy text 
concerning education governance. I suggest that Critical Discourse Analysis,  particularly at the 
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textual/ descriptive level, while appropriate for analysing (policy) text, was less fruitful  for 
interpreting oral data (interviews/ focus groups), particularly in multi-linguistic research, where 
the translation process added a further layer of interpretation.  
Inspired by the collected data, I looked for different kinds of suitable theories to grasp the 
complex dynamics of local policy implementation. Actor-Network Theory turned out to be 
suitable as a method to learn from actors without imposing on them any a priori definition of their 
world‐building capacities (Kanger, 2017). The inclusion of non-human actors and the relational 
ontology built from its network characteristic provided a more holistic understanding of the data. 
How a given element became strategic or less important and was able to bring about certain 
temporarily stabilised discourses and practices indicated the messiness, but also the fluidity and 
connections between actor-networks in this study. 
However, the Actor-Network Theory was not without limitations in this study. The first 
limitation concerned the nature of the data produced for this study, which was too limited to shed 
light on the material dimension of actor-networks. Even though the actor-maps included non-
human elements, the oral data privileged the agency of human actors. Second, the analysis centred 
more on human rather than non-human actors. Although chapter 3 clearly identified human and 
non-human actors, overall, the study focused more on the voice and agency of human actors. 
Third, it was particularly difficult to reconstruct the actor-network of an event in the past in 
chapter 7 since this approach centres on the current situation as its analytical focus. 
Despite the limitations of the analytical approaches for this study, both Critical Discourse 
Analysis and Actor-Network Theory presented potential avenues for deepening and extending the 
understanding of this topic since they keep in play the dynamic between actors in their network 
formations. More precisely, the combination was useful for tracing actors’ trajectories and how 
they connected to one another, while analysing the policy text and discourse from a discursive 
and linguistic perspective. Using both frameworks enriched the data collected and the 
understanding of policy. I was thus able to provide a more compelling and comprehensive 
narrative of the policy of education decentralisation in Benin (cf. also section 8.3.2.3).  
8.3 Contribution to knowledge  
This thesis is the first study focusing on education decentralisation at all levels of the 
Beninese governance system, offering a holistic account exploring the emergence, formulation 
and mediation of the national decentralisation policy in the context of pre-school and primary 
education in Benin. A few studies have focused on decentralisation in Benin, covering education 
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among other sectors (Rasmussen, 2011, 2013) or a particular aspect of education and 
decentralisation (Odushina et al., 2008; Fichtner, 2012; Jarroux, 2017; Oussou, 2017). Most of 
them are ethnographic studies and offer in-depth insights, capturing particular aspects, 
predominantly at the local and municipal level. Globally, many studies on decentralisation focus 
on the implementation of particular issues, such as inequality or quality, not acknowledging 
sufficiently the permeability and interaction between the local and the global. The strength of this 
work lies in its temporal but also spatial perspective of education decentralisation, providing a 
deeper understanding of how this ‘cross border’ understanding of decentralisation policy actually 
happens. 
This section is divided into the empirical and theoretical contributions, starting with the 
former.  
8.3.1 Empirical contribution 
8.3.1.1 Local insights have relevance for global policies  
In light of the unequal and uneven relationships between previously colonised and 
colonising countries, and the resulting development machinery (Escobar, 2012) perpetuating 
these uneven relationships, it is time to question them through examining popular and widely 
travelled educations reforms involving governance and decentralisation. In the global context, 
International Organisations change the temporal and spatial relationships of nation-states and 
have become essential vehicles for ideas around good governance and decentralisation. Cheema 
and Rondinelli point out the need to conceive of government in terms of governance institutions 
in the context of globalisation. In this way, this study examined how the global and the local 
interact in policy processes, thereby contributing to a wider understanding of policy not usually 
considered by policy-makers. More specifically, this study has provided insights specific to the 
particular context of Benin, some of which are relevant to other post-colonial contexts in the 
African continent and the Global South, more broadly. As such, this research has contributed to 
the understanding of education governance in the Global South, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and provided insights into how the policy of education decentralisation in Benin has been 
influenced by local, national and global factors. It offers a holistic understanding of the emergence 
and implementation of the decentralisation reform in Benin, so contributing to a deeper 
understanding of how local policy knowledge can be discounted by policymakers.  
8.3.1.2 How this study speaks back to the post-colonial condition 
What is striking in the particular context of Benin is how deeply the current governance 
reform is infused with colonial and neo-colonial legacies. Overall, the discussion has shown that 
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the contemporary governance system in Benin and the discursive and social practices of the actors 
involved in the provision of schooling remain saturated with colonial and neo-colonial ideologies. 
Moreover, it points out that questions of power and discourse are imbricated with both the colonial 
legacy and the post-colonial condition. In analysing the dominant discourses of education 
governance, notably decentralisation, modernisation and development, and in discussing their 
material effects on the polity, culture and the economy, this study argued that both the policy text 
and the practices of actors are infused with the colonial experience and development discourses. 
In terms of the material dimension of the post-colonial condition (Tikly, 2019), this study 
analysed the similarities between the territory’s administration under colonial rule and the 
administration today, for example. In discursive terms, it showed how decentralisation is 
underpinned by ideas from  modernisation and (neo-) liberal development discourses. Moreover, 
decentralisation has fostered particular forms of democracy in the Global South, such as 
liberalism, which maintain the unequal relationship between the previous colonisers and the 
colonised. These relationships, however, have been dialectic and continue to be dialectic, with a 
post-colonial elite reproducing the colonial structures of inequality (Rizvi, Lingard and Lavia, 
2006). 
Overall, this study offers a holistic understanding of the dynamics of decentralisation 
reforms in a globalised space and hence contributes to the understanding of policy knowledge as 
unaccounted for by policymakers.  
8.3.2 Theoretical contribution  
The theoretical contribution is the use of a spatial and temporal lens in the context of a post-
development framework and the combination of two distinct analytical approaches.  
8.3.2.1 A spatial and temporal lens on policy studies  
No study has studied education decentralisation in Benin using a policy trajectory 
conceptual framework (Ball, 1993, 2015). In line with Massey (1994b), who argues that space 
and time are integral to one another, this thesis provided a historical exploration of education 
governance in two different regions in Benin (Northeast and Southeast, cf. chapter 2). Hence, this 
study draws on a temporal and spatial lens, beginning with research in two local field sites in 
2017 and extending this (retrospectively) to the analysis of national and global influences on 
policy formulation and mediation in Benin from 1990 onwards. While Ball’s framework 
prioritises a temporal perspective for policy trajectory studies, Massey privileges the spatial over 
the temporal. On the one hand, the study has provided a holistic understanding of education 
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decentralisation through a temporal perspective in how the colonial legacy, among others, is 
implicated in the present discourses and practices of governance reforms in the Global South. On 
the other hand, this study illuminated how the analysis of the local with a focus on the spatial 
power dynamics in this context is more informative than the one dimensional temporal focus on 
the achievement of decentralisation as a policy imperative (Massey, 1994b). Instead of 
considering the local as a deficit, it can be found as part of universal policy prescriptions informed 
by the dominant development discourses.  
8.3.2.2 Spatial and temporal reflections in the context of a post-development framework 
From a Foucauldian influenced post-development perspective, it could be argued that the 
‘wild profusion of local practices’ taking place in the context of a constrained development policy 
can be considered as a multiplicity of ‘localised hierarchizations’ (DuBois, 1991). This idea is 
exemplified in chapter 6, discussing the empowerment of some actors (e.g. municipal 
governments and NGOs) and the disempowerment of other actors (e.g. parents and teachers). It 
refers back to the developed/ underdeveloped binary- a structural pattern from early development 
discourse, which persists until today (Ziai, 2017) and is taken from Dubois as follows.   
The hierarchization of cultures that characterizes the categorization of ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ nations is not imposed from the top down but is the sum (effect) of a multiplicity of 
localized hierarchizations or judgments regarding economic, political, social, and cultural aspects 
(DuBois, 1991, p. 22). 
The analysis of the local practices and discourses surrounding the policy of education 
decentralisation illustrates how the development paradigm is resisted through contestations whilst 
at the same time  being sustained through localised hierarchizations (cf. also section 8.4.2).  
Development proponents may object to this viewpoint, arguing that the messiness of local 
practices illustrates the inadequate implementation of the decentralisation policy. This 
counterargument implies that development necessarily serves the ‘common good’, and if it does 
not, it is an implementation issue. This hypothesis leads development agencies to employ a 
recurrent cycle of diagnosis, consisting of prescribing, promising, and if not successful, re-
diagnosing, leading to changing patterns in the development discourse, while maintaining the 
claim that the function of development is to serve the common good (Ziai, 2017). 
8.3.2.3 Actor-Network Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis in conversation  
 The study also combined two different analytical approaches, Critical Discourse 
Analysis (Fairclough, 1995, 2010, 2013) and Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 1996, 2005; 
Fenwick and Edwards, 2010). They have the potential to deepen the understanding of the topic 
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under study and to keep in play the dynamic actors in their network formations. Combining both 
approaches contributes to a richer, multi-dimensional, in-depth analysis through engaging with 
the tensions and convergences. More precisely, the combination is useful for tracing actors’ 
trajectories and how they associate with one another, while considering the policy text and 
discourse through a discursive and linguistic in-depth analysis.  
Both analytical approaches are also useful when adopting a post-development paradigm; 
the discursive aspects of development discourse were addressed through CDA and the material 
aspects through ANT. In other words, CDA helped to critically de-construct the embedded 
development discourse in the policy of education decentralisation (cf. chapter 5), while ANT shed 
light on the uneven power relations that produced material inequalities, as discussed in chapter 6. 
This positioning lays the foundation for the argument in section 8.4.2. i.e. that discourse analysis 
in the context of the post-development paradigm can only partially address issues of material 
inequality.  
8.4 Implications  
This final section discusses some implications for the quality of education, policy-
formulation as well as suggestions for further research.  
8.4.1 A concern with quality 
This section considers further areas to consider in the context of the de-/recentralisation 
of the Beninese education system informed by the empirical data, on the one hand, and the 
concerns about the quality of global agendas, on the other. It suggests that governance studies 
should include questions of  the quality of education and learning, in particular.  
Research participants across the sectors and levels shared divergent perspectives of how 
they envision education decentralisation in the future. While some had a far-reaching view of 
education decentralisation, suggesting that the municipality alone should manage school 
provision, others doubt its responsibility or even criticised decentralisation as having worsened 
education provision. However, the majority of research participants envisioned education as a 
shared responsibility in line with the literature on decentralisation, e.g. McGinn and Welsh (1999), 
recommending devolving, firstly, school construction and, secondly, teacher recruitment and 
management, which again raises questions of how the global governance agenda affects the 
discourses of national and local actors in particular contexts. 
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8.4.1.1 Teacher recruitment, management and development 
Good quality teachers are commonly associated with the delivery of good quality 
education (McGinn and Welsh, 1999). The de-concentration or devolution of teacher recruitment 
and management has been and is a constant and recurring discussion within the Beninese 
government, as the Education Sector Strategy (2006-2015) and regular education reviews show. 
It became increasingly a matter of concern in light of the strikes that periodically paralyse the 
education system in Benin. For example, the first recommendation of the government-led review 
of education policy of 2014 states the need to ‘accelerate the process of strengthening the de-
concentration/ devolution process, especially regarding the recruitment of teachers’ (Ministères 
en charge de l’éducation, 2014, p. 1).  
The views of municipal actors (elected and appointed) remain controversial in terms of 
whether teacher recruitment and management should remain a centrally managed responsibility, 
transferred to the town council, or delegated to the provincial and local school authorities. In 
contrast, teachers as the concerned target group of this probably upcoming reform discussed this 
issue critically, fearing that the devolution of teacher recruitment and management may become 
politicised. Some municipalities, among others from the Northern field site, were already 
committed to funding teacher training and employing teachers in their community due to the lack 
of teachers, especially in the North and rural parts of the country. These informal practices could 
serve as an encouraging example of how education as a shared responsibility between central and 
the municipal government entities can contribute to improving access to and the quality of pre-
school and primary education. Whether this responsibility should be de-concentrated or devolved 
has to be examined thoroughly to avoid politicisation.  
Teacher development in Benin is sub-divided into pre-service training, provided by 
public and private teacher education institutions (Ecole Normale d’Instituteur) at national/ 
regional level, and in-service training provided by regional and local school authorities as well as 
school networks (unite pédagogique). Although the in-service training in Benin can be considered 
as already highly de-concentrated, de-concentration implies limited autonomy of school 
authorities in delivering the in-service training. If this area should be devolved rather than de-
concentrated, raises questions of decentralisation motivated by professional expertise (in the case 
of local school authorities) or political legitimacy (in the case of municipalities). Expert 
decentralisation occurs if the objective is to minimise variations in school quality and to maximise 
overall school effectiveness, while political legitimacy reforms imply a shift from professional to 
political control to empower communities (McGinn and Welsh, 1999). This development raises 
a further discussion informed by a democratic theory argument versus a social justice argument 
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(Badat and Sayed, 2014), as devolving responsibilities to lower levels may result in greater 
inequity, particularly in countries with vast geographical disparities, as is the case in Benin. As 
such, I suggest weighing up the genuinely democratic argument giving voice to those who are the 
direct beneficiaries or recipients of education in the forms of participation and democracy against 
the backdrop of potentially increasing inequality in access and quality of service delivery. 
8.4.2 Political implications  
The current decentralisation system is a bricolage predominantly of characteristics of the 
French governance system, although both the policy and some of the interview data asserted that 
it has been adjusted to the local context. This study questions, however, ‘how local the local 
context is’ as decentralisation in its current form relies on the administrative structure inherited 
from the colonial system and is also influenced by global discourses, such as linking 
decentralisation, democracy and development (cf. chapter 5 and 7). In that regard, the colonial 
organisation on the one hand, and global influences, on the other, have persisted and mediated the 
way in which decentralisation is currently understood and practiced. The process of creating 
governance policies would benefit if national governments involved with International 
Organisations considered the history and the specificities of their particular context.  
School maps serve as an interesting example of how the aim of giving a voice to local 
actors implicitly and inherently reproduces aspects of the development discourse. The school map 
(carte scolaire), a tool which helps with planning where to build which schools within a 
municipality, was a recurrent suggestions by the research participants as a way to address the 
concerns that planning was politically motivated rather than for a needs-based school 
infrastructure. This suggestion recalls Wainwright’s (2008) example of the Maya atlas used to 
portray their land and their culture. He argues that in reality, discursive elements from 
nationalism, international law and sustainable development pervade the atlas (Wainwright, 2008), 
but simultaneously remain silent about other aspects, such as gender relations and marital 
violence. Like the decentralisation policy itself and the broader policy ensemble, the school map 
is highly advocated by development agencies as a seeming technological solution to a deeply 
political issue. If decentralisation is defined as redistributing responsibilities and resources, which 
is how development agencies claim they act within an apolitical space for the common good, they 
nevertheless do politically intervene in the so-called/ so-wanted sovereign post-colonial nation-
states. This example does not only illustrates how the apolitical becomes political, but also how 
actors in the Global South, elites in particular, appropriate the development discourse (Ziai, 2017).  
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Power and power relations are inherently central in the concept of decentralisation. The 
study showed how actors perceive and narrate the negotiation of power between the central and 
the local levels (vertically), but also between different ministries or between actors on the ground 
(horizontally). International Organisations form a further powerful actor group, whose 
interventions often complicate the power game between actors, as this study has shown. In light 
of the uneven power relations in both the formulation and enactment of the policy of education 
decentralisation, and the lack of significance accorded to the specificities of local contexts, I 
suggest that education governance remains a challenge to deal with far beyond the scope of 
development policies.  
In the context of a post-development paradigm, I question the appropriateness of the 
decentralisation policy, as decentralisation as a reform, implies the perception of a lack, and re-
inscribes the very notion of development as a historically singular experience, the creation of a 
domain of thought and action, as proposed by Escobar (2012). At the same time, I acknowledge 
that a post-development perspective, especially through the lens of discourse analysis, can only 
partially address the issue of material inequalities - to the extent that representational practices 
(development discourse) and the material practices (development policy) are interrelated. As Ziai 
claimed ‘development discourse did not only function as a discourse of hierarchisation and 
depoliticisation, but it also worked […] as a discourse of claims and rights’ (Ziai, 2017, p. 227) 
for the less priviledged communities. However, I conclude that any material redistribution/ 
transformation has to be preceeded by a discursive transformation within the development 
discourse. As long as this does not happen, the transformation of educational governance systems 
cannot be found within the development discourse.  
8.4.3 Implications for further research 
This study has pointed out the gender imbalance in the administration across sectors 
(education, decentralisation, planning) and levels (central, provincial, municipal). Further 
research could explore the female perspective of education decentralisation, by capturing the 
perceptions of female mayors or members of the town councils who are highly underrepresented, 
particularly in elected bodies, but also generally within the Beninese administration. The agenda 
setting of education decentralisation in 1990, materialised through its national conference, aimed 
at representing and involving all social groups, but women in local decision-making have been 
underrepresented so far.160 This observation is striking insofar as women occupy most positions 
                                                          
160 For example, the first municipal elections in 2002/03 resulted in 77 male mayors. Even though later 
elections had a slightly better result, women continue to be highly under-represented at all levels of the 
system, but particularly at the municipal level. 
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in devolved social services, notably education, health, the local economy and environment 
(Vankpinmede, 2016). Therefore, further research could explore the extent to which the 
involvement of women in local governance in Benin constitutes a determining factor for the 
enactment of the decentralisation policy and the socio-economic development at the local level 
more broadly. Such a study may draw a different analysis of education decentralisation and open 
up new perspectives and contributions on education governance in a post-colonial setting. 
Revisiting Sustainable Development Goal 4, promoting inclusive and equitable quality 
education, it is essential to reflect on how redistributing the governance of education may affect 
the quality of education delivered. Curriculum, teacher development and assessment are 
commonly associated with the quality of education, to enable both relevant and effective learning 
outcomes  (Sayed and Moriarty, 2017). These quality questions can only be dealt with in relation 
to overarching questions of education governance. Future research could explore how education 
governance reforms affect quality issues, such as the curriculum, teacher development and 
assessment, potentially contributing to the achievement of  Sustainable Development Goal 4, to 
provide an inclusive and equitable quality of education. Some research has already carried out in 
this direction; Kuhon (2020) explored, for example, the extent to which the reform of education 
decentralisation contributed to the achievement of Education for All, and concluded that the 
reform had not had a significant effect on this aim, drawing attention to the  particular issues 
concerning human resources, the curriculum, corruption and poverty issues. Further research into 
education governance and questions of education quality and inclusivity education are highly 
important.  
8.4.4 Summing-up  
This study explored how the policy of decentralisation emerged and how the actors 
involved in the provision of pre- and primary education in Benin (West Africa) mediated this 
policy. It argues that even though the national Conference of the Active Forces in 1990 was  
significant for setting the agenda of education decentralisation, the policy process was influenced 
by further exogenous and endogenous factors (chapter 7). Moreover, this policy contains evidence 
of Benin’s colonial and neo-colonial legacies in material and discursive terms.  In material terms, 
it builds incrementally upon the territorial administration of previous political regimes, notably 
colonial rule. In discursive terms, it is underpinned by discourses of modernisation and 
development, reinforced by the influence of international aid agencies and consulting firms 
(chapter 5). Finally, the actors are part of broader, fluid and changing actor-networks constantly 
negotiating power and responsibilities. The study reveals a bewildering array of messy practices 
in the context of a restricted understanding of decentralisation and governance (chapter 6). The 
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thesis offers a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of education decentralisation 
reforms in general, not only in the particular context of Benin. It therefore contributes to an 
understanding of policy knowledge unaccounted for or ignored by policymakers. The nuanced 
and fine-grained analysis of Benin talks back to the broader agendas and landscapes of global 
governance reforms that advocate decentralisation as a necessary policy reform as a basis for good 
quality learning, democracy and social justice. 
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Analysis of the responsibilities of actors in the context of pre-school and 
primary education in Benin161 
 
 
                                                          
161 This analysis is based on the decree 2012-538 of 17 December 2012 clarifying the organisation of the 
Ministry for Pre-school and Primary Education. 
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9.2 Chronological overview of interviews and focus groups 
N° Date Institution Function Govt.  I
O 
Nei
ther  
Pla
n-
ned  
Un-
pla
n-
ned  
Observations 
1 05/01/2017 National Education Board 
(Conseil National de 
l’Education) 
Senior official X    x  
2 07/01/2017 Public primary school (Cotonou) Management X    x This interview was 
planned as a pilot. I 
asked for official 
permission to use the 
information afterwards. 
3 11/01/2017 German Development Agency 
(GIZ)  
Senior management   x  x   
4 11/01/2017 Ministry for Pre-school and 
Primary Education 
Senior official X   x  The person has been 
affected to the Ministry 
for Secondary 
Education during the 
data collection period. 
 
5 17/01/2017 ibid Junior official X   x  This service has been 
re-allocated to the 
Planning Department  
6 18/01/2017 Permanent Technical Office of 
the Education Strategy  
Senior official X   x   
7 19/01/2017 Decentralisation Ministry  Junior official X   x   
8 20/01/2017 - Independent searcher   x  x  
9 24/01/2017 Government Senior official x    x Retired  
10 24/01 Decentralisation Ministry  Senior official  X   x   
11 26/01 ibid Senior official X   x   
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12 26/01 ibid Junior official  X    x Is part of the General 
Department of State 
Administration  
13 31/01/2017 GIZ Senior management  x  x   
14 31/01/2017 See line 9        
15 07/02/2017 See line 14        
16 07/02/2017 MDGL Senior official X   x   
16b 16/02/2017 MEMP Senior official x    x  
17 20/02/2017 Provincial school authority  Senior official x   x  As the decentralisation 
service has been 
abandoned, the 
interviewee was 
recently affected to a 
Local school authority.  
18 21/02/2017 Swiss Cooperation (DEZA) Programme Manager   x  x   
19 01/03/2017 Aide et Action (NGO) Programme Manager  x  x   
20 02/03/2017 MEMP Senior official x   x   
21 06/03/2017 MEMP Senior official x   x   
22 07/03/2017 PSDCC (World Bank/ 
Decentralisation Ministry) 
Programme Manager   x   x  
23 09/03/2017 Local school authority (MEMP) Senior official x   x   
24 21/03/2017 Provincial school authority Senior official x   x   
25 21/03/2017 Pre-school N’Dali Centre 
(urban) 
Management x   x  Not transcribed  
26 21/03/2017 Coordination/ Association of 
students’ parents 
Senior officials   x x   
27 21/03/2017 Pre-school and Primary School 
N’Dali Centre (urban) 
4 teachers (two from each 
school, one male and one 
female) 
x   x  FGD 
28 21/03/2017 Primary School N’Dali Centre 
(urban) 
Management  x   x   
29 22/03/2017 Municipality N’Dali Senior official  x   x  Spontanous FGD 
30 22/03/2017 Municipality N’Dali Senior official x   x   
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31 23/03/2017 Primary School Alafiarou A + B 
group (Arondissement 
Gbégourou) (rural) 
Management x   x  Not audiotaped 
32 23/03/2017 Pre-school and Primary School 
Alafiarou (Arondissement 
Gbégourou) (rural) 
3 teachers (two male from 
primary and one female from 
pre-school) 
x   x  Not audiotaped  
33 24/03/2017 Prefecture Borgou Senior official x   x  Not audiotaped 
34 24/03/2017 Provincial planning authority  Senior official x   x   
35 24/03/2017 Prefecture Borgou Senior official x   x   
36 04/04/2017 Prefecture Ouémé Senior official x   x  Not audiotaped 
Visit of courtesy to the 
prefect 
37 05/04/2017 Delegation of the European 
Union 
Programme Manager   x  x   
38 05/04/2017 MDGL/ CONAFIL Senior official x   x  Possibly planned 
39 07/04/2017 Local school authority Senior official x   x   
40 12/04/2017 ibid Representative of the 
municipal students’ parents 
association (C/APE) 
  x x   
41 18/04/2017 Pre-school + Primary School 
Tokpota/ Porto Novo 
Management x   x  Not audiotaped  
42 ibid ibid 4 teachers (two from each 
school, 1 male, 3 female) 
x   x  ibid 
43 20/04/2017 Pre-school + Primary School 
Dowa-Gbago/ Porto Novo 
4 teachers (one from pre-
school, female; 3 from 
primary school, 1 male, 2 
female) 
x   x   
44 24/04/2017 ibid Management x   x  Not audiotaped 
45 26/04/2017 Provicial planning authority 
Ouémé 
Senior official X   X  Not entirely audiotaped 
because the battery 
was weak 
46 28/04/2017 Provincial school authority 
Ouémé 
Senior official X   X  The interviewee asked 
to get the audio tape 
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47 05/05/2017 Town council Porto Novo Senior and junior official X   X   
48 ibid ibid Senior official X   X  Not audiotaped 
49 09/05/2017 Association of Students’ Parents Representative of students’ 
parents of Tokpota, Dowa-
Gbago and Todowe 
  x  x The research 
participant is also a 
member of the 
Coordination of the 
APE 
50 12/05/2017 Decentralisation Ministry Senior official   x  x 1998 – 2005, not 
audiotaped 
51 16/05/2017 Teacher union SYNIA-EP Benin Representative of teacher 
union 
x   x  Retired principal -> 
Pedagogical Advisor; 
provincial level 
52 18/05/2017 Prefecture Ouèmè Senior official x   x  Recently affected to 
the Decentralisation 
Ministry (DGAE) 
53 20/05/2017 Planning authority Ouémé Junior official x    x  
54 23/05/2017 Decentralisation Ministry Senior official x    x Retired, recommended 
by GIZ and European 
Union 
Not audiotaped  
55 23/05/2017 Independent  Searcher   x  x Long experience in 
civil society and 
education 
administration  
Not audiotaped 
56 24/05/2017 Planning Ministry Senior official x   x   
57 24/05/2017 Communication agency ‘Le 
Municipal’ 
Senior Management    x  x Not audiotaped 
58 31/05/2017 Municipality Porto Novo Senior official x    x  
59 02/06/2017 ibid Municipal advisor  x    X Elected 
60 ibid ibid Municipal advisor  x    X elected, opposition 
(only one on 33 
municipal advisors) 
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60b 04/06/2017 GIZ Programme manager   x  x Retired  
61 06/06/2017 ANCB Representative of ANCB x   x  Part of MDGL? 
62 ibid MEMP Senior official x    x Retired since 2014 
63 08/06/2017 Municipality Porto Novo Senior official x    x  
64 09/06/2017 Teacher union SYNIA-EM 
Benin 
Representative of teacher 
union 
x    x  
65 16/06/2017 GIZ Programme manager  x   x Debriefing, not 
audiotaped 
66 16/06/2017 UNICEF Programme manager  x   x She talked as a private 
person and not as a 
UNICEF 
representative as I did 
not address my request 
to the head to 
UNICEF. 
67 22/06/2017 MEMP, MDGL 1 senior und one junior 
official of each ministry  
x    x Debriefing 
68 29/06/2017 MEMP Senior official x    x Not audiotaped  
No consent form 
signed as the exchange 
was not expected  
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9.3 Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study title 
“The policy of decentralisation as discursive and social practices with regard to pre-school and 
primary education in Benin” 
 
Invitation paragraph 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take 
part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this study is to explore how the decentralisation policy is conceptualised as 
discursive and social practices and how it is mediated through different actors within the pre-
school and primary education system in Benin (West Africa). This research will explore 
education decentralisation as a social phenomenon to identify ways in which the 
conceptualisation of the policy of decentralisation can be improved to make it more equitable 
taking into account the historical, socio-political, economic and cultural context of Benin.  
 
The empirical research draws on qualitative data and is divided into two parts of data 
collection: firstly, a documentary review of the policy of decentralisation and related 
documents; secondly, semi-structured interviews with high and middle rank officials from the 
Decentralisation Ministry, and from the Ministry for Pre-school and primary education and 
their sub-units. The doctoral research project goes over three years which involves 6 months of 
data collection in the field. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been chosen to take part in the research project because of your area of expertise and 
the institution you work for. You can make a valuable contribution to this research project and 
express your views about decentralising pre-school and primary education, according to your 
experience. The proposed study covers all levels of the pre-school and primary education 
system and the actors involved in the delivery of pre-school and primary education. A maximum 
of 25 interviews and four FGDs will be carried out in total. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
If you decide you would like to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be 
asked to sign a consent form. It will explain that you are still free to withdraw at any time 
UNTIL THE THESIS IS SUBMITTED without giving a reason. IF YOU WITHDRAW 
CONSENT AFTER BEING INTERVIEWED, THEN ALL DATA WILL BE DESTROYED AND 
NOT USED FOR ANY PURPOSE. 
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you are interviewed, interviews will last approximately one hour  in your place of work. The 
interviews will be recorded and carried out in French. If  you are a member of a focus group in 
your school,  these will last for up to one and a half hours each. If clarification is needed, I will 
request a follow-up interview within the school for approximately an hour. THE INTERVIEWS 
AND THE FGDS WILL BE TRANSCRIBED AFTERWARDS.  YOU WILL BE GIVEN THE 
TRANSCRIPT OF YOUR INTERVIEW/ FGD AND THEN HAVE TWO WEEKS TO CHECK 
THE ACCURACY OF THE CONTENT. IF YOU DO NOT RESPOND  WITHIN TWO WEEKS, 
YOUR CONSENT WILL BE ASSUMED.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? (where appropriate) 
There are no disadvantages or 'costs' involved in taking part in the study, except offering your 
time for the interview/ focus groups discussion.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The interview and the focus groups discussions are safe places to critically reflect on the 
decentralisation reform in Benin. The study aims at improving the conceptualisation of the 
decentralisation policy in order to make it more equitable and appropriate to the Beninese 
context and needs.  
 
Will my information in this study be kept confidential? 
All information collected will be kept strictly confidential. Names of participants will not be 
revealed to third parties or in any form of communication. At institutional level, your 
participation will be confidential and your anonymity ensured. However, a reasonable risk of 
being identified at higher level remains.   
Each person will be assigned a random identity number or a pseudonym so the data cannot be 
linked to their name, their institution and/or any other identifiable information e.g. contact 
details. Once the participants have been assigned their codes, their names and contact 
information will be destroyed. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
You can participate in the study if you wish but can door out any time before submission. You 
will contribute to a better understanding of the discursive and social practices of the 
decentralisation policy in Benin through your participation.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
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I will use the data obtained for the above described doctoral research to show the discursive 
and social practices of decentralisation, which I hope will broaden the discussion in Benin 
through  publication and conference papers. If you would like a copy of the thesis, please 
contact me (see below). 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am conducting the research as a doctoral student of the School of Education and Social Work 
at University of Sussex. I am funding the research on my own and, consequently, I am 
independent of any donor requirements.  
 
Who has approved this study? 
This research has been approved by the Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (C-REC).  
 
Contact for Further Information 
If you like to come back to me for further information, feel free to contact me:  
Eva Bulgrin, doctoral research student, 00229 97734343, eb223@sussex.ac.uk   
 
You can also contact the supervisors of the doctoral research if you have any concerns about the 
way in which the study has been conducted:  
 
Dr. Yusuf Sayed, Professor of International Education and Development Policy (Education): 
y.sayed@sussex.ac.uk  
Dr. Kwame Akyeampong, Professor of International Education and Development (Education): 
a.akyeampong@sussex.ac.uk  
 
University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. 
 
Thank you for taking time to read the information sheet. 
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9.4 Consent Form For Project Participants 
 
PROJECT TITLE: “The policy of decentralisation as discursive and social practices 
with regard to pre-school and primary education in Benin” 
 
Project Approval 
Reference: 
 
ER/EB223/1 
    
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project 
explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I may keep for 
records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to:  
- Be interviewed by the researcher; 
- Allow the interview to be audio taped and transcribed; 
- Make myself available for a further interview should that be required.  
 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I 
disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by 
the researcher or by any other party. However, a reasonable risk of being identified at higher 
level remains. I WILL BE ASKED EVERY SIX MONTHS IF I WISH TO CONTINUE TO 
PARTICIPATE OR NOT. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all 
of the project, and that I can withdraw my participation and/ OR the data at any stage of the 
project without giving reason. I WILL NOT be penalised or disadvantaged in any way IN THIS 
CASE.  
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study.  I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.  
 
Name: 
 
 
 
Signature 
 
 
 
Date: 
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9.5 Interview schedules 
9.5.1 Questions for the national level 
Opening question 
 Can you tell me a little bit about your professional role within the department/ 
service/… 
 Can you elaborate how the decentralisation policy affects your work?  
 Can you give an example of an area of tension between policy and practice? 
Main body of questions 
 Based on your professional practice, how would you personally define decentralisation? 
 Do you think decentralization is necessary to the education strategy? 
 Talon, the new president, intends to strengthen the decentralisation reform.  
 What are his intentions to do this?  
 What do you think about these intentions?  
 The decentralisation reform has been introduced at the beginning of 2000. Can you tell 
me how the reform has been introduced? 
 Why was the decentralisation reform introduced at this time?  
 How has the decentralisation policy been introduced?  
 What happened since then? 
 How was the management before decentralization? 
 Who were the groups involved in establishing the policy? How in your experience 
o …did national/ provincial/ municipal state structure influence the policy 
process?  
o …is the policy influenced by local ideas and actors?  
 In what way do local, national and global motivations vary?  
 How have competing interests been negotiated in relation to the policy? 
 Can you tell me how IO work in (sector) decentralisation in Benin?  
 Do you know of instances when (and how) IO have influenced the decentralization 
policy?  
 What is the role of international agendas in the work of IO (e.g. SDG, Education for 
all)? 
 Which are the most important aspects of the policy of decentralisation according to 
you?  
 Where are the challenges?  
 What is not said?  
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 Can you give an example of  
o …which part of the policy of decentralisation is not clear enough  
o …how this aspect could be differently understood? 
 Let me know more about the future of the decentralisation policy. 
 What is your personal vision for the decentralisation reform for the next 10 years?  
 What do you specifically hope for the pre-school and primary education sector? 
Closing questions 
 To whom else should I speak during my research? 
 Is there anything you would like to add?  
 
 
Thank you 
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9.5.2 Questions for the provincial level 
Opening question 
 Can you tell me a little bit about your professional role within the department/ 
service/… 
 Can you elaborate how the decentralisation policy affects your work?  
Specific questions to the Provincial school authority:  
 In what way do you assist and advice the municipality?  
 According to your opinion, in what areas of educational management and 
administration would you say that the Provincial school authority performs better than 
the central Ministry? 
 Do you see any area of tension for your task? If yes, which? 
To the prefecture:  
 How do you ensure your supervision function towards the Local school authorities?  
 Do you see any area of tension for your task? If yes, which? 
Main body of questions 
 Based on your professional practice, how would you personally define decentralisation? 
 Do you think decentralization is necessary to the education strategy? 
 Talon, the new president, intends to strengthen the decentralisation reform.  
 What are his intentions to do this?  
 What do you think about these intentions?  
 The decentralisation reform has been introduced at the beginning of 2000. Can you tell 
me how the reform has been introduced? 
 Why was the decentralisation reform introduced at this time?  
 How has the decentralisation policy been introduced?  
 What happened since then? 
 How was the management before decentralization? 
 Who were the groups involved in establishing the policy? How in your experience 
o …did national/ provincial/ municipal state structure influence the policy 
process?  
o …is the policy influenced by local ideas and actors?  
 In what way do local, national and global motivations vary?  
 How have competing interests been negotiated in relation to the policy? 
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 Can you tell me how IO work in (sector) decentralisation in Benin?  
 Do you know of instances when (and how) IO have influenced the decentralization 
policy?  
 What is the role of international agendas in the work of IO (e.g. SDG, Education for 
all)? 
 Which are the most important aspects of the policy of decentralisation according to 
you?  
 Where are the challenges?  
 What is not said?  
 Can you give an example of  
o …which part of the policy of decentralisation is not clear enough  
o …how this aspect could be differently understood? 
 Let me know more about the future of the decentralisation policy. 
 What is your personal vision for the decentralisation reform with regard to pre-school 
and primary education for the next 10 years?  
 What do you specifically hope for the pre-school and primary education sector? 
Closing questions 
 To whom else should I speak during my research? 
 Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
Thank you 
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9.5.3 Questions for the municipal level 
Opening question 
 Can you tell me a little bit about your professional role within the department/ 
service/… 
 Can you elaborate how the decentralisation policy affects your work?  
Specific Questions to the Local school authority:  
 How do you coordinate your work with the municipality generally? 
o …with regard to school construction and equipment? 
o …with regard to local development plans/ local education plans? 
 Can you describe which aspects of local development plans/ local education plans you 
are familiar with?  
 Can you describe the process how you develop, implement and monitor local education 
plans? 
 Is there a law/ decree which prescribes local education plans?  
 How do local education plans relate to local education plans?  
 In what areas of educational management and administration does the CS perform better 
than the central Ministry and/ or the Provincial school authority? 
To the municipality:  
 In what way are you assisted by the regional and the Local school authority… 
o … when you construct and equip schools?  
o …when you develop local development plans? 
 Where does the money come from for school construction and equipment?  
 Can you describe with which aspects of local development plans/ local education plans 
you are familiar with?  
 Can you describe the process how you develop, implement and monitor local 
development plans? 
 Is there a law/ decree which prescribes local development plans?  
 How do local development plans relate to local education plans?  
 To what extent are you accountable to the Prefecture and/ or the Ministry for Pre-school 
and Primary Education?  
Main body of questions 
 Based on your professional practice, how would you personally define decentralisation? 
253 
 
 
 Do you think decentralization is necessary to the education strategy? 
 Talon, the new president, intends to strengthen the decentralisation reform.  
 What are his intentions to do this?  
 What do you think about these intentions?  
 The decentralisation reform has been introduced at the beginning of 2000. Can you tell 
me how the reform has been introduced? 
 Why was the decentralisation reform introduced at this time?  
 How has the decentralisation policy been introduced?  
 What happened since then? 
 How was the management before decentralization? 
 Who were the groups involved in establishing the policy? How in your experience 
o …did national/ provincial/ municipal state structure influence the policy 
process?  
o …is the policy influenced by local ideas and actors?  
 In what way do local, national and global motivations vary?  
 How have competing interests been negotiated in relation to the policy? 
 Can you tell me how IO work in (sector) decentralisation in Benin?  
 Do you know of instances when (and how) IO have influenced the decentralization 
policy?  
 What is the role of international agendas in the work of IO (e.g. SDG, Education for 
all)? 
 Which are the most important aspects of the policy of decentralisation according to 
you?  
 Where are the challenges?  
 What is not said?  
 Can you give an example of  
o …which part of the policy of decentralisation is not clear enough  
o …how this aspect could be differently understood? 
 Let me know more about the future of the decentralisation policy. 
 What is your personal vision for the decentralisation reform with regard to pre-school 
and primary education for the next 10 years?  
 What do you specifically hope for the pre-school and primary education sector? 
Closing questions 
 To whom else should I speak during my research? 
 Is there anything you would like to add? 
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Thank you  
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9.5.4 Questions for the school level 
Opening question 
 Can you tell me a little bit about your professional role within the department/ 
service/… 
 Can you elaborate how the decentralisation policy affects your work?  
Main body of questions 
 How do you describe the school construction and equipment process?  
 Which actors are involved and how dominant are they? 
 To whom is your school accountable to?  
 Where does your school get the money from?  
 Can you think of any other examples how the decentralisation policy has affected 
primary schools? 
 What else should be devolved according to your opinion? Why? 
 Is there an attempt to adapt the decentralisation policy in order to achieve what you are 
looking for? 
Closing questions 
 To whom else should I speak during my research? 
 Is there anything you would like to add? 
Thank you 
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9.5.5 Interview questions for International Organisations 
Opening question 
 Could you describe how you support the decentralisation reform of the Beninese 
government [with regard to primary education]? 
 Since when?  
 How much budget have you allocated up to now? 
Main body of questions 
 Why did your organisation decide to support the Beninese reform? 
 How has the global agenda influenced the decision to support the decentralisation 
reform? 
 Talon, the new president, announced at the beginning of his presidency to strengthen 
the decentralisation reform.  
 What are his intentions to do this?  
 What do you think about these intentions?  
 Why has the Beninese government made the decision to decentralise some competences 
in the primary education sector at the beginning of 2000? 
 Can you describe the reform process from your perspective?  
 Who were the groups involved in establishing the policy? How in your experience 
o …did national/ provincial/ municipal state structure influence the policy 
process?  
o …is the policy influenced by local ideas and actors?  
 In what way do local, national and global motivations vary?  
 How have competing interests been negotiated in relation to the policy? 
 How do you coordinate your support 
o …with the Decentralisation Ministry/ Primary Education Ministry/ 
Municipalities 
o …with other International Organisations? 
 Can you give an example how the decentralisation reform has affected primary 
education? 
 Do you think that the decentralisation reform should be further supported in order to 
improve the primary education sector in Benin? If yes,  
o …in which dimensions is decentralisation appropriate, in which dimension not? 
o …what is your vision for the decentralisation reform with regard to the pre-
school and primary education sector for the next 10 years? 
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Closing questions 
 To whom else should I speak during my research? 
 Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
Thank you
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9.6 Interview and focus group transcripts  
9.6.1 School level: focus group discussion N° 43 
Interviewer 
Participant 1 (teacher): P1 
Participant 2 (teacher): P2 
Participant 3 (teacher): P3 
Participant 4 (intern): P4 
Interviewer : Donc je serais heureuse si vous pouviez me parler un tout petit peu de votre rôle 
comme institutrice ou instituteur et un peu le quotidien. Si vous souhaitez déjà aborder 
les défis vous êtes bienvenus de faire ça aussi. Donc il y a un qui peut commencer et puis 
les autres complètent. Après ça devient plus concrète.  
P 1 : Donc si je comprends bien on va parler de l’école (oui) et de notre (de votre, de vos tâches) 
carrière d’institutrice (bon non) ou bien les tâches quotidiennes  
Interviewer : Oui voilà les tâches quotidiennes 
P 1 : dans le domaine pédagogique.  
Oui ! Oui !  Dans le domaine pédagogique, l’école (et administra… Bon si vous avez aussi 
administratif. Les deux volets).  
P 1 : Qui commence ? Ok ! Je crois j’ai déjà fait une dizaine d’année dans la carrière. Je suis 
titulaire avec un certificat d’aptitude pédagogique.  
Interviewer : Vous êtes APE ou ACE ?  
P 1 : Je suis APE. Je viens d’être d’avoir (comment dirais-je) le projet pas plus tard hier à la DRH. 
Donc le projet est sorti, j’ai mon nom. Donc je suis reversée en APE.  
Interviewer : Oh ! Félicitation ! Donc vous êtes heureuse. Vous avez dit ? Il faut que je m’en 
rappelle CM1. Parlez-moi un peu de vos tâches régaliennes.  
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P 1 : Donc dans la boîte, je représente le personnel enseignant de l’école du point de vue 
administratif. Et par responsabilité collégiale, je suis chargée du matériel didactique de 
l’école.  Ensuite qu’est-ce que je pourrai dire ? Et aussi la formation des apprenants. Je 
préfère m’en arrêter là pour que les autres aussi complète.  
Interviewer : Merci beaucoup.  
P 2 : Ok ! Je peux la suivre. Moi je ne suis pas encore APE. Je suis ACE (Agent Contractuel de 
l’Etat). Je suis dans ma septième année. J’ai fait ENI Porto-Novo. Je suis sortie. Je suis 
dans ma cinquième année à l’EPP Dowa-Gbago. Depuis que je suis arrivée là, je suis 
chargée aux affaires administratives. Donc je suis la rare comme les gens le disent. Donc 
tout ce qui concerne l’école ; c'est-à-dire sa création, s’il y a extension, les courriers 
arrivé-départ, je suis chargée de tout cela. S’il y a une demande à faire dans l’école, 
demande de tables et bancs, demande de… Quelque soit la demande à faire, je suis 
chargée de le faire. S’il y a les évaluations, les résultats des évaluations, avec les collègues 
ensembles on le fait. Je le mets au propre et je le transmets à la circonscription. Donc 
c’est surtout mon travail dans l’école. Et je suis également l’adjointe directe de la 
directrice. 
Interviewer : Ok ! Oui ! Je voulais le dis, on dirait ça ressemble déjà beaucoup aux tâches de la 
direction. Apparemment la directrice a bien délégué…  
P 2 : Voilà ! Donc je crois que c’est en quelques sortes la tâche que j’ai dans l’école. 
Quotidiennement on est à l’école, on a la responsabilité de suivre nos enfants, travailler 
avec eux. On passe plus de temps avec les enfants à l’école qu’à la maison. Donc c’est à 
peu près en bref ce que je peux dire d’abord. 
Interviewer : Vos enfants ils vont dans la même école ou ils vont dans d’autres écoles ?  
P : Non ils ne sont pas… Surtout qu’actuellement moi, la dernière est au CM1, elle est dans une 
école privée. Les autres sont déjà au collège. Donc elle est dans une école privée. Je ne 
mets pas mes enfants dans les écoles publiques.  
Interviewer : Pourquoi pas le public ?  
P 2 : Bon sinon de mon… Si ça ne tenait qu’à moi seule, ils iront au public. Mais à cause des 
grèves. Par moment il y a des grèves dans le public. C’est pour quoi leur papa a préféré 
qu’ils restent dans une école privée pour pouvoir les suivre. Sinon si ça ne tenait qu’à moi 
260 
 
 
seule, ils vont me suivre dans les publics. Parce que moi aussi je suis allée dans une école 
publique. Jusqu’à mon BAC je suis toujours allée dans une école publique. Même s’il y 
a grève, on arrive toujours à s’en sortir. Mais il a voulu qu’ils aillent dans une école privée. 
Je ne peux pas refuser.  
Interviewer : Oui ! Bon en fait peut-être notre enfant que vous venez de voir il va aussi bon dans… 
à la crèche dans une école privée. J’avoue moi-même de façon générale je suis un peu 
critique par rapport au nombre des écoles privées. Surtout ici à Porto-Novo. Je dis il ne 
peut pas avoir la même qualité d’accompagnement etc., la qualification des enseignants. 
Donc je ne vous cache pas. Je suis… Mais moi-même j’envoie notre enfant à l’école 
privée.  
P 2 : On se connaît, nous enseignants, on se connaît. Chacun sait ce qu’il fait. Chacun le fait selon 
sa conscience. C’est vrai qu’il y a des gens qui travaillent bien. Ils travaillent bien comme 
s’ils étaient dans une école privée. Mais il y a encore d’autres non. Donc si les gens 
préfèrent amener leurs enfants dans une école privée, moi je ne refuse pas hein. Je dis si 
vous avez les possibilités, il faut envoyer vos enfants. Terminé.  
Interviewer : En même temps, j’ai appris juste pour la circonscription scolaire Oganla, il y a (je 
ne m’en rappelle plus exactement, mais) disons une 70 école publiques et plus que 200 
écoles privées. Vous pouvez imaginer. Et c’est pour une circonscription scolaire.  
P 2 : Hou ! 200 écoles privées ? Ça fait le triple hein.   
P 3 : Il y a des écoles à côté à côté en désordre.  
P 4 : Et les écoles sont très rapprochées. Très même. Très même. Et la distance n’est pas… oui !  
Interviewer : Oui !  
P 2 : L’Etat ne peut pas tout faire. S’il n’y a pas d’école privée, je ne crois pas que ça peut… Le 
système éducatif peut aller plus loin hein. L’école privée est là pour aider l’école 
publique. Mais si c’est encore trop, c’est ça qui n’est pas bon.  
P 1 : Effectivement pour la plupart des écoles les effectifs sont plutôt élevés.  
P 2 : Elevé. Pléthorique.  
P 4 : Oui ! Très élevé hein.  
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P 1 : Le nombre d’enseignants n’est pas suffisant. Donc il faut que ces écoles accompagnent le 
système éducatif. C’est normal. Lorsqu’ils en abusent, c’est là où la question est…, Il y a 
point d’interrogation.  
Interviewer : On finit avec vous.  
P 4 : Moi je n’ai une tâche précise.  
P 1 : Vous travaillez avec les enfants.  
P 4 : Je travaille avec les enfants. Je n’ai pas une tâche…  
Interviewer : Moi je me dis c’est une grande tâche. J’ai raconté à notre… où le mercredi après 
midi, je fais une sortie d’éveille musicale ici à la maison. Notre enfant et quelques d’autres 
enfants. Et parfois, je suis débordée avec six.  
P 2 : Surtout avec les petits enfants là. C’est une grande tâche.  
Interviewer : Ils ont quel âge ? Entre quel et quel âge ?  
P 4 : Trois ans et quatre ans au plus.  
Interviewer : Donc vous n’avez pas de deux ans ? Pas comme dans les privées.  
P 4 : Deux ans et demi, trois ans.  
P 2 : Session des petits. Session des petits.   
P 4 : Deux ans et demi, trois ans. Session des grands, trois ans et quatre à cinq ans.  
Interviewer : Ok ! Vous êtes dans quelle ENI ?  
P 1 : ENI privée de TANZOUN. Où ça ? TANZOUN.  
P 2 : TANZOUN dans la circonscription d’Avrankou.  
P 3 : Avrankou.  
P 1 : La circonscription d’Avrankou. Oui ! C’est une ENI privée.  
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Interviewer : Avrankou. Ok ! Merci beaucoup. Est-ce qu’on vous a oublié ?  
P 3 : Pas du tout.  
Interviewer : On a commencé par vous.  
P 2 : Non hein. Il n’a pas encore parlé.  
P 1 : Il n’a pas encore parlé.  
P 3 : Moi je viens d’arriver dans la maison publique. Sinon j’étais au privé. J’ai fait dix ans au 
privé avant d’aller au concours. Donc je viens de venir dans la maison. Donc je n’ai pas 
encore une tâche officielle comme ça. Puisque on a pris service le 13 passé du moi de 
février. Donc les choses ne sont pas encore réorganisées. Donc j’attends l’année 
prochaine pour avoir ma charge. La seule tâche qu’on m’a confiée, c’est la classe de CE2.  
P 1 : La classe de CE2.  
P 3 : Pour le moment.  
Interviewer : Ce qui est déjà beaucoup.  
P 3 : Voilà ce que je peux dire pour le moment.  
Interviewer : Ok ! Et vos impressions si vous comparez vos premières expériences avec le privé 
et avec le public.  
P 2 : Quelles sont tes impressions ? Tes impressions ? C'est-à-dire par rapport aux élèves, par 
rapport au cadre, qu’est-ce que tu as à dire ?  
P 1 : Entre privé et public, qu’est-ce que tu as constaté ? Bon, c’est vrai au privé, il y a certaines 
rigueurs qui font qu’on est obligé de travailler, de s’y mettre. On se donne. On est obligé 
de se donner. Mais ici, il y a le problème d’effectif qui fait que parfois même, on est 
obligé de… C'est-à-dire même si tu fais, on se dit toujours qu’on n’a rien encore fait. 
Puisque les enfants tellement nombreux puis on est dépassé parfois. Oui ! Mais là-bas, 
c’est, c’est… Il y a au moins une marge. Pour les privés, certaines écoles privées 
respectent. Ça fait que même le message là ça passe normalement plus que le public. 
P 2 : A cause des effectifs.  
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P 1 : A cause des effectifs. Comme moi-même je viens d’arriver, je ne sais pas si avec le temps 
je vais m’y habituer. Puisque vraiment je me suis rentré dedans comme ça. Donc je suis 
obligé d’avoir… C’est un peu difficile pour le moment comme c’est le début. Puisque je 
n’ai jamais habitué à garder ce genre d’effectif au privé.  
Interviewer : Vous en avez combien ?  
P 1 : C’était à trente, trente-deux et trente-cinq au plus.  
Interviewer : Oui ! Et maintenant ?  
P 1 : Maintenant je suis à 42 ici à 42 pour le moment. Ça fait que bon… Ce n’est pas aussi trop 
parfois. Mais quand-même…  
P 2 : Estime-toi heureux. Moi qui gardais soixante, soixante quinze.  
P 3 : Oui ! C’est de là que… Vous voyez ? C’est en se forgeant qu’on devient forgeron.  
P 2 : Ah ! Au CE1 encore hein. Classe de transition. Attention !  
P 3 : Maitresse ! Maitresse ! Mais si j’avais deux enfants avant et doucement ça revient à trois. 
Ça devient une charge et c’est un peu difficile.  
Interviewer : Et qu’est-ce qui vous a amené à postuler pour le public ?  
P 3 : Pour le public ?  
Interviewer : Oui ! 
P 3 : Bon ! Vous voyez c‘est par rapport aux avantages. Puisque le privé n’est pas rassurant et à 
tout moment, on peut te remercier. Comparativement au public, c'est-à-dire c’est pour une 
grande éternité. Et c’est fini.  
Vous êtes ACE ou APE ?  
P 3 : Non je viens d’être ACE. ACE 2017.  
Interviewer : Et les stagiaires ont quel statut ?  
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P 2 : Non ! C’est stagiaire. C’est après ça il faut lancer un concours et postuler. Ils vont postuler 
au concours et devenir ACE.  
Interviewer : En fait en Allemagne dans le passé, les enseignants étaient APE, mais de plus en 
plus surtout dans les grandes villes, on les contractualise dans ACE et les avantages sont 
beaucoup moins. Mais ils ont l’avantage de pouvoir travailler en ville. 
Interviewer : Ok ! Maintenant si ça ne vous gène pas on va déplacer pour un petit moment.  
(Instructions for visual and participatory activity). 
Interviewer : Donc j’ai entendu à part la mairie, les bonnes volontaires.  
P 2 : Oui ! Les ONG.  
Interviewer : Ok ! Allez-y. Qui veut… ? Il y a des cartes. Mon écriture est illisible.   
P 2 : C’est chacun qui écrit ou bien…  
Interviewer : On met tout ensemble ?  
P 1 : On a besoin juste une fois la mairie. La mairie plus les ONG. 
Interviewer : C’est aussi très important au nord. Il me semble plus important dans les coins qui 
sont plus reculés.  
P 3 : Les bonnes volontés.  
Interviewer : Les bonnes volontés, les individus.  
P 1 : Les individus qui ont la force de frappe dans le pays.  
P 2 : Oui ! Les bonnes volontés.  
Interviewer : Pour avoir l’électorat après ou quoi...  
P 3 : Il y a aussi ça là.  
Interviewer : Comme ADJAVON par exemple.  
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P 2 : In hein. Quand vous allez dans le plateau, c’est encore d’autres.  
P 3 : C’est encore d’autres hein.  
P 2 : Les bonnes volontés. Qui encore ? Il y a même dans l’école même, l’association des parents 
d’élèves là.  
P 1 : Parfois eux-aussi contribuent. Il y a les parents d’élèves. Le bureau.  
P 2 : Par exemple CI2, CE12 qui est là. C’est les parents d’élèves. Oui !  
P 1 : Donc on va écrire le bureau APE. Les membres du bureau APE. Puisqu’ils sont en relation 
avec la population de la localité.  
Interviewer : Et c’est eux qui ont construit deux salles de classe ?  
P 1 : C’est ça ?  
P 3 : Oui dans l’école.  
P 1 : On va définir APE. Association des parents d’élèves. Association des parents d’élèves. Là 
c’est les membres de ce bureau là concertés qui donnent le résultat. Pour avoir une école. 
Pour avoir une école c’est la mairie. C’est la mairie fonds FADeC. 
P 2 : Souvent la mairie ne réagit pas. On a écrit plusieurs fois. Dans cette école on a écrit plusieurs 
fois à la mairie qu’on veut de salles de classe.  
P 1 : Ce sont les ONG…  
Interviewer : ça n’a pas changé depuis que les mairies ont changé ?  
P 1 : Nous sommes toujours là.  
Interviewer : Vous êtes toujours là ?  
P 1 : On est toujours au point mort. On est toujours là. On a écrit fatigué. Oun kan wé ka ka bo 
alo bivè1. Et comment on peut explique que les mairies ne réagissent même pas. Ils ne 
réagissent même pas.  
P 2 : Ils ne réagissent pas. Il faut aussi dire qu’il y a aussi problème de connaissance hein.  
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Interviewer : Problème de connaissance ? 
P 2 : Si tu connais quelqu’un là qui pourra appuyer, être derrière eux, les pistonner. In hein ! Mais 
si tu ne connais personne là… Même leur chose d’ADJAVON là, ils construisent des 
écoles toujours.  
P 3 : C’est ça je dis non.  
Interviewer : Je le… effectivement le mardi j’ai vu des écoles…  
P 1 : Si tu vas dans le plateau tu vas voir ADJAVON, ADJAVON.  
Interviewer : Même à Porto-Novo.  
P 1 : Même à Porto-Novo aussi. Oui, dans Ekpè, Sèmè.  
P 2 : Anan mon ADJAVON, ADJAVON2.  
P 1 : Même les centres de loisir.  
P 2 : Tout est affaire de connaissance. Si tu connais quelqu’un dans… là ton dossier passe très 
vite.  
Interviewer : Qui doit connaître quelqu’un ? Le Directeur, ou l’APE ou… ?  
P 2 : Bon ils parlent de direction. Même un enseignant. Même si tu es enseignant et tu connais 
quelqu’un dedans tu peux passer par là. Tu sais que dans ton milieu, dans ton école tu as 
besoin de classes, tu connais quelqu’un qui est influent, le dossier va passer.  
P 1 : Si tu as quelqu’un influent, il suit le dossier ça suit le cours normal pour atteindre l’objectif.  
Interviewer : Et la mairie, est-ce que vous adressez le courrier directement à la mairie ou ça passe 
par…?  
P 1 : Tout prend par voie hiérarchique.  
Interviewer : C’est- à dire circonscription…  
P 2 : Si vous vous… ça va à la circonscription. De la circonscription ça va à la mairie.  
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Interviewer : Peut-être on va noter la circonscription scolaire aussi. Souvent, par mon expérience 
professionnelle, j’ai souvent rencontré la phrase : « le CCS doit être le conseiller 
technique du maire en matière de l’éducation ».  
P 2 : Oui !  
P 1 : C’est toujours ça.  
Interviewer : Est-ce que vous le sentez sur le terrain ?  
P 2 : Oun ! Moi je ne le sens pas hein. Ils le disent seulement à la bouche. Moi je ne le sens pas 
hein. C’est vrai. C’est vrai. S’il était vraiment le conseiller technique de la mairie là, sa 
circonscription serait bien développée.  
P 1 : Bien développée.  
P 2 : Oui ! Ils le disent seulement mais ça ne sent pas en pratique.  
Interviewer : Vous avez la même perception ?  
P 1 : Oui ! Oui !  
Interviewer : Est-ce que le chef quartier, le chef d’arrondissement (20 minutes) joue un rôle 
dans…  
P 2 : Bien sûr. Ils jouent un rôle.  
Interviewer : Ça passe d’abord par eux ?  
P 2 : Il doit avoir sa signature. Quand on fait la demande par exemple à l’école, demande d’un 
module de trois classes. La directrice ou le directeur signe. Le président APE, sa signature 
est importante. Après ça le délégué. Avant même qu’on ne fasse l’école, le délégué doit 
être informé qu’il doit avoir telle chose dans le quartier, dans telle école. Il est informé. 
Donc quand on fait la demande, on lui envoie et il doit avoir nécessairement sa signature 
dessus avant d’envoyer.  
Interviewer : Après ça va directement à la mairie. Mais il y aura une copie qui va à la 
circonscription scolaire.  
268 
 
 
P 2 : A la circonscription scolaire et après ça va… ça vient même à la DDEMP d’abord.  
P 1 : De la circonscription ça doit transiter par la direction.  
P 2 : Direction d’abord DDEMP.  
P 1 : De la direction ça chemine au ministère.  
Interviewer : Ça va jusqu’au ministère ?  
P 1 : Maintenant la décentralisation au niveau du ministère envoie ça à la mairie.  
P 2 : C’est ça.  
P 1 : Ça doit allez à la direction, au ministère.  
Interviewer : Je n’ai pas très bien compris la dernière partie. Donc la copie va à la CS,   
P 1: (oui)  
Interviewer : DDEMP et puis MEMP ?  
P 1 : Et là c’est la direction de la décentralisation qui l’envoie à la mairie. C'est-à-dire au niveau 
du ministère, il y a le cabinet chargé et qui s’occupe. Il est en relation avec la mairie. 
Puisqu’il y a des fonds qui sont alloués et affectés à la mairie dans ce canevas. Donc la 
structure est en place là et s’occupe de ça pour que la mairie en relation avec le 
ministère…  
Interviewer : Pour définir peut-être le montant des fonds transférés.  
P 1 : Le reste là, je ne maîtrise pas trop. Mais c’est la procédure. Notre hiérarchie à nous, le 
secrétaire administratif. Nous respectons cette hiérarchie. Le reste là ça se finalise à leur 
niveau.  
Interviewer : Ok ! Mais néanmoins il y a une correspondance qui va aussi directement à la mairie 
et ils sont déjà informés. Maintenant le MEMP s’il veut bien s’adresse à la mairie à travers 
la DPP. C’est le FADEC affecté. Et pourtant le ministère continue aussi à construire des 
écoles d’après ce que je sais.  
P 1 : Le MEMP ?  
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Interviewer : Oui !  
P 2 : Si, le MEMP construit certains modules de classes. Ministère des Enseignements Maternels 
et Primaire. MEMP aussi construit.  
Interviewer : Mais là vous n’avez pas une expérience donnée que vous allez partager.  
P 1 : Toujours depuis fort longtemps, ce que moi j’ai pu assister c’est les fonds de la mairie, les 
fonds FADEC là. C'est-à-dire au niveau, au moment où on était dans le changement. 
P 3 : YAYI Boni 
P 1 : Le régime changement là. Donc c’est la mairie qui a pris cette option de pouvoir permettre 
aux écoles d’avoir des salles de classes.  
Interviewer : Quelle est la situation des salles de classes ? Est-ce que vous avez suffisamment de 
salles de classe ? Donc pour chaque groupe. Bon pas chaque groupe. Pour chaque classe 
vous avez une salle de classe ?  
P 2 : Non ! Pour chaque école. Pour chaque école.  
Interviewer : Dans votre école.  
P 2 : Dans notre école, chaque enseignant à sa salle classe.  
P 1 : Han c’est ce qu’elle demandait ?  
P 2 : On va dire à peu près oui.  
P 1 : Puisque nous avons huit… 
P 2 : A peu près oui. 
Interviewer : Le ‘’à peu près’’ ça m’intéresse.  
P 2 : Oui c’est à peu près. Pourquoi j’ai dit à peu près. Parce que les deux salles qu’on dit en tant 
que salle ce n’est pas salle de classe.  
Interviewer : C’est quoi alors ?  
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P 2 : Ce n’est pas salle de classe. C’est à peu près salle de classe.  
Interviewer : C’est une paillote ou c’est… ?  
P 2 : Non ce n’est pas une paillote. Je disais tantôt que ce sont les parents d’élèves qui ont fait ça. 
A la rentrée, souvent à la rentrée quand on fait souscription là, les parents donnent quelque 
chose. Après, avec l’association des parents d’élèves, la directrice les appelle, le bureau 
APE. Bon on a trouvé tant, l’école a besoin de tant. Donc ils prennent sable, ciment. On 
appelle maçon. C’est ça qui a fait qu’on a encore deux classes là. Sinon, on va dire que 
tous les enseignants n’ont pas classe. Vous voyez, la classe on l’a fait mais ce n’est pas 
dans les normes.  
P 1 : Dans les normes. Ce n’est pas matériaux définitifs.  
P 2 : Il n’y a pas de fenêtres, il n’y a pas de portes, ce n’est pas remblayé. Vous voyez ce que je 
dis non ? Quand on va dire salle de classe ? Ce n’est pas une salle de classe normalement.  
Interviewer : Je crois il y a les normes pour la construction des écoles. Parce que vous venez de 
dire que ce n’est pas du tout dans les normes  
P 1 : non ce n’est pas dans les normes.  
Interviewer : Je me demande, pour les autres, est-ce qu’il y a des normes qui sont prises en 
compte ? Quelles sont les normes ?  
P 1 : Nous avons un module qui est en matériaux définitifs. Là nous pouvons dire que les normes 
sont respectées. Parce que fenêtres, portes, placards, armoires, chaises. Maintenant la 
salle là, la souffrance… Je n’ai pas ça en tête.  
P 3 : C’est dans les documents.  
Interviewer : Ok ! Donc ! 
Interviewer : On peut encore parler brièvement … Je crois qu’on a parlé du processus des tâches. 
Mais quels sont les acteurs qui ont plus de poids dans le processus que d’autres ?  
P 1 : Plus de poids c’est la mairie. C’est la mairie hein ! Tout est dirigé vers la mairie. C’est la 
mairie.  
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Interviewer : La mairie on la met au centre.  
P 1 : On la met au centre.  
P 2 : Après la mairie, …  
Interviewer : Et la mairie décide sur quelle base ? Est-ce que la mairie travaille avec une carte 
scolaire ?  
P 2 : Ce n’est pas l’Etat ? C’est l’Etat qui leur octroie de fonds non ?  
P 3 : Les fonds FADEC là.  
P 2 : C’est l’Etat qui leur octroie le fond. Avant que la mairie ne réalise, il faut que l’école exprime 
ses besoins. Nous nous sommes à Gbago. On exprime nos besoins. On a besoin de salles 
de classes. Et ils envoient les gens. Leur DST (Direction des Services Techniques). Très 
bien. Ils les envoient sur le terrain, ils vérifient et constatent.  
Interviewer : C’est le service de la mairie ou quel service ?  
P 2 : Oui de la mairie. DST service de la mairie.  
Interviewer : Parce que vous avez parlé aussi de l’école. Donc l’école exprime le besoin.  
P 1 : L’école exprime le besoin. Bon souvent ça passe par le directeur ou la directrice adjointe. 
Bon on a négligé le MEMP. N’est-ce pas ? Parce que j’ai entendu une remarque 
importante. Si le ministère n’envoie pas les fonds, la mairie ne peut rien faire.  
P 1 : Oui la mairie ne peut rien faire. Donc, donc, avoir quel est…  Vous voyez ?  
Interviewer : Je comprends…  
P 1 : C’est le MEMP qui est le centre hein. C’est le MEMP ? Oui ! Puisque c’est après tout le 
circuit, le cheminement hiérarchique là, c’est ici ça s’achemine. Et qui dit « down-top » 
… La décision d’application c’est ici et puis ça renvoie comme ça. Donc l’autonomie de 
la mairie, est-ce qu’on peut dire que c’est relatif ? Parce qu’elle dépend. Oui elle dépend 
du MEMP.  
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Interviewer : Maintenant si la mairie ne joue pas son rôle, il y a les bonnes volontés, il y a les 
ONG.  
P 1 : C’est ça.  
P 2 : La circonscription ne peut venir sans ceux-là. Parce qu’il faudrait que ceux-là se manifestent 
avant qu’on envoie à la circonscription.  
P 1 : Ils font leur entrée dans l’établissement…  
Interviewer : Ici c’est relationnel si je comprends bien. Ici aussi…  
P 1 : … c’est relationnel. Et d’ici maintenant ça vient là… 
Interviewer : …à la circonscription. Quel est le poids, quelle est l’importance de la circonscription 
scolaire à part que ça a une procédure formalisée, standardisée ? Est-ce qu’eux… peuvent 
appuyer ?  
P 1 : Toujours dans le respect de hiérarchie, nous sommes tenus… Toute information qui doit, 
tout ce qui doit avoir lieu dans l’école doit transiter par la circonscription pour un bon 
suivi. Il a un poids. C'est-à-dire si la demande passe par la circonscription, est-ce qu’ils 
ont un poids de vite accélérer ou de ralentir le processus ?  
P 3 : Ils n’ont pas un poids. Ils envoient ça seulement.  
P 1 : Non ils transitent. Ils vont transiter. Normalement une circonscription qui joue bien son rôle 
(doit), c’est dans ta circonscription qu’on veut… tu dois œuvrer normalement. Ou bien ? 
Oui ! S’il y a des démarches à faire… Etant le coordonnateur direct de l’éducation au 
niveau de la mairie, normalement quand ça vient ici à la circonscription, … 
P 3 : … il devrait directement aller voir le maire et en parler.  
P 1 : D’accord !  
P 3 : Vous voyez non ?  
Interviewer : Donc est-ce qu’on peut dire si je vous comprends bien. Si ici le courant passait bien, 
la circonscription scolaire aurait plus d’importance parce qu’elle sera écoutée.  
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P 2 + 3 : Oui !  
Interviewer : Mais vu que le lien ici est un peu interrompu, le poids de la circonscription scolaire 
diminue.  
P 1 : Ça diminue.  
Interviewer : C’est très intéressant. On va juste les coller comme ça pour réaliser les liens et 
retourner à la table. Donc je mets la mairie… 
P 3 : … à côté du MEMP 
Interviewer : … à côté du MEMP. C’est au même niveau ? C’est au même niveau ? 
P 3 : Non pas au même niveau. Ça doit sortir un peu.  
Interviewer : Le MEMP, … 
P 2 : … c’est vers le haut.  
P 3 : Le MEMP reste en haut complètement. 
Interviewer : D’accord ! Ok ! Donc la circonscription scolaire est un peu reculée.  
P 2 : Oui elle est un peu reculée.  
P 1 : Je peux déjà faire un…  
P 2 : Oui une flèche… 
P 1 : … pour dire c’est un peu interrompu. Bon maintenant il y a l’école. L’école identifie le 
besoin. 
P 2 : Oui l’école identifie le besoin parce que tout part de l’école.  
P 1 : Tout part de là. 
P 2 : Si l’école ne demande pas.  
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P 1 : Si le besoin n’est pas exprimé, tout ceux-ci là n’ont pas de rôle à jouer. Donc l’école a une 
certaine importance parce que c’est le point de démarrage. 
Interviewer : Mais l’école si je comprends bien sans elle, les acteurs ne peuvent rien faire.  
P 1 : Oui !  
P 2 : Ils ne peuvent rien faire.  
Interviewer : Donc où est-ce qu’on va la placer ? Est-ce qu’elle au même niveau que la 
circonscription scolaire ou encore plus loin ou proche ?  
P 1 : du MEMP non ? 
Interviewer : A côté du MEMP pourquoi ? 
P 1 : Non c’est rattaché à la circonscription.  
P 2 : Elle est en bas de la circonscription.  
Interviewer : Si on respecte la hiérarchie. Maintenant par rapport au centre d’influence, au centre 
de pouvoir. Moi je raisonne toujours en termes de…  
P 2 : Je comprends. 
Interviewer : Oui je crois. 
P 2 : Je comprends.  
P 1 : Ça suit le cours normal. Nous sommes en train de suivre la hiérarchie déjà. Ça vient. 
Interviewer : Ça c’est la voie hiérarchie.  
P 2 : La voie hiérarchie.  
Interviewer : Sinon il se peut que dans la voie hiérarchique quelqu’un qui a un niveau élevé n’a 
pas forcément un pouvoir donné.  
P 2 : Oui effectivement.  
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Interviewer : Mais, mais je vous… J’essaie de vous suivre. Je vous donne la carte.  
P 1 : C'est-à-dire pour que je sois écouté ici, je dois transiter par tout ceci. C'est-à-dire l’école ne 
peut pas sauter la circonscription quelque soit son action. Ça c’est, c’est ce que nous nous 
respectons : la hiérarchie.  
Interviewer : Maintenant, l’école identifie le besoin. Donc si l’école n’identifie pas, il n’y a rien 
qui se déclenche. Mais en même temps si tous les acteurs ne jouent pas leur rôle, l’école 
ne sera pas construite dans ma compréhension mais je souhaite avoir votre 
compréhension. Je me dis l’école n’a pas au tant d’influence dans la réalisation. Donc est-
ce qu’on la met à côté de la circonscription scolaire ou… ? Je vois bien le lien 
hiérarchique : c’est sous la circonscription. Mais par rapport à l’influence…  
P 2 : Mais il y a une chose. Quand on dit… Si l’école veut sans ces acteurs là, elle peut avec les 
bonnes volontés.  
P 1 : Avec les bonnes volontés. Elle peut.  
P 2 : Avec l’aide des bonnes volontés l’école peut. Même sans la mairie, sans le MEMP, l’école 
peut.  
P 1 : Il y a le cas qui est en cours là.  
Interviewer : C’est intéressant.  
P 3 : Moi je pensais qu’on va mettre l’école ici.  
P 1 : Ce que moi je dis, l’école peut.  
P 2 : Même sans ceux-là. Si ceux-là ne décident pas et l’école a des ONG, les bonnes volontés, 
elle peut construire.  
P 2 : Si on mettait l’école à côté ou bien quelque part ici, et on met les parents d’élèves à côté, 
eux ils viennent directement dans l’école et c’est fini. Ça s’achève là. Maintenant s’il y a 
un acteur de circonscription qui va voir mairie, lui continue.  
P 2 : Si on veut suivre la hiérarchie, on va à la circonscription. Sinon l’école part des ONG et des 
bonnes volontés, on peut ne pas informer la circonscription. C’est parce qu’on veut suivre 
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la hiérarchie qu’il y a telle situation dans l’école qu’on veut leur adresser ça. Si l’école a 
des bonnes volontés et ONG, tous ceux-là, on peut les oublier.  
P 1 : Si l’école là…  
Interviewer : Oui c’est une réflexion importante. Donc comment est-ce qu’on va les classer ?  
P 3 : L’école reste ici.  
P 1 : Mi man si gan ze do do niin.162 Ça ne peut pas rester en bas de la circonscription.  
P 2 : Ah… ! C’est vrai ! Excusez ! Je disais que ça ne peut pas rester en bas de la circonscription.  
P 1 : Ça peut rester à côté. A côté. Et les ONG, les bonnes volontés à côté. Il faut mettre ça à côté. 
Les bonnes volontés restent ici. Oui ! Elles sont à côté de l’école.  
P 3 : Donc ils viennent directement dans l’école.  
Interviewer : Est-ce qu’ils sont un eu plus proche du pouvoir parce qu’ils ont les ressources 
financières ?  
P 3 : Par rapport aux ressources financières, voilà qu’eux, ils ne peuvent rien faire maintenant 
sans l’école.  
Interviewer : Ça c’est vrai.  
P 3 : Même s’ils les voies, ils doivent venir d’abord dans l’école (constater) dire quel besoin. Et 
nous, on leur parle de nos besoins. C’est là avec la directrice ils se comprennent.  
Interviewer : Ok !  
P 3 : Si je ne me trompe pas bien. Mais les bonnes volontés peuvent aller à la circonscription pour 
dire qu’ils veulent construire dans l’école directement comme ça ?  
P 1 : Non ! Eux ils sont dans les quartiers.   
P 3 : Donc eux, ils vont rester à côté de l’école.  
                                                          
162 Local language, not possible to translate.  
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P 1 : Les bonnes volontés dont on parle là, c’est ceux qui sont dans le quartier. Ils ont vu, ils ont 
remarqué que ah dans mon quartier il y a une école là mais les enfants, ils ont manque… 
Peut-être ils ont une ONG, ils vont leur en parler. Ils vont venir vers l’école. C’est ça.  
P 3 : Donc c’est là… Si c’est l’affaire de poids, si c’est l’affaire de poids tel que la madame vient 
de dire, ils pouvaient rester en haut mais c’est impossible.  Ils ne peuvent pas rester en 
haut.  
Interviewer : Et si on les mettait entre…  
P 1 : Entre le MEMP et l’école ? Oui ! Oui on peut les mettre là. C’est bon ? Oui c’est bon. Et les 
APE. Ah les APE… C’est lié directement à l’école. Quand on dit école, on dit APE direct.  
Interviewer : D’accord ! 
Interviewer : Donc on a de liens hiérarchiques qui sont entre école, CS (circonscription), MEMP. 
On n’a pas mis la DEMP, ce n’est pas important. Donc on peut mettre école, 
circonscription scolaire, MEMP, … 
P 1 : C’est ça. C’est la hiérarchie là ça.  
Interviewer : … les bonnes volontés, les ONG, ça c’est relationnel… 
P 1 : oui c’est relationnel.  
Interviewer : Mettons un point d’interrogation, ça dépend des relations. L’APE et l’école, c’est 
comment ? Quelle est leur relation ? Est-ce qu’elle est proche ?  
P 1 : C’est un lien qui est très proche. Très proche. Quelque soit la situation dans l’école là, l’APE 
est informé en même temps. Très proche. Immédiat.  
Interviewer : Donc ça fait…  
P 1 : Très proche.  
Interviewer : Le MEMP doit informer la mairie.  
P 1 : Oui !  
Interviewer : Donc quel est le lien entre le MEMP et la mairie ?  
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P 1 : Le MEMP doit informer la mairie d’autant plus que c’est la mairie qui reconstruise l’école, 
les salles de classe. C’est la mairie qui doit donner le top. Le MEMP est déjà informé. 
Donc c’est au MEMP maintenant d’informer la mairie qu’il y a une telle situation dans la 
commune.  
Interviewer : Et en même temps elle doit débloquer les fonds.  
P 1 : Elle doit débloquer les fonds.  
P 2 : C’est ça.  
P 1 : Et qui aime faire sortir l’argent de sa poche ?  
Interviewer : Donc est-ce qu’on peut dire « point d’interrogation » ?  
P 1 : Ce n’est pas de sa propre poche. Normalement ce n’est pas de sa poche.  
P 3 : C’est dans le budget national. 
P 1 : C’est l’Etat. Ce n’est pas de sa propre poche. Ce n‘est pas de sa poche qu’il va faire sortir 
l’argent. C’est l’Etat.  
Interviewer : Ok ! Je crois on a … Est-ce qu’il a des rajouts ? Sinon on peut s’asseoir de l’autre 
côté. Je pense que c’est tout hein. 
(Focus group discussion after visual participatory activity).  
Interviewer : Ok on va s’asseoir de l’autre côté. Vous avez commencé déjà à aborder les défis ; 
on a parlé de la location des enseignants dans des écoles ; que la situation dans votre école 
s’est beaucoup plus améliorée depuis l’année passée. On a parlé de façon plus 
approfondie des bâtiments. Maintenant est-ce qu’il y a d’autres préoccupations, d’autres 
défis que vous rencontrez dans votre quotidien ?  
P 1 : D’autres défis selon moi, ce serait par rapport à nos apprenants ou parents d’élèves. Surtout 
au début de l’année là, il n’y a pas de fournitures. Ils n’achètent pas de fournitures aux 
enfants. Vous allez les renvoyer fatigué. Mon père n’est pas à la maison, ma mère n’est 
pas à la maison. Surtout dans notre zone là, ça là. Les fournitures ne viennent pas à temps. 
Oui et ça bloque parfois le travail. Surtout au début, ça bloque le travail. C’est quelques 
uns qui ont leurs fournitures. Et il faut, il faut, c’est par force tu dois les renvoyer, les 
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renvoyer… avant qu’ils n’amènent deux, un, deux, un… il y a ça. Ça là c’est vraiment 
difficile.  
Interviewer : Donc fournitures comme quoi ?  
P 1 : Bic, ardoise, cahiers, crayons, gommes…  
Interviewer : Donc c’est aux parents d’en acheter ?  
P 1 : Oui !  
Interviewer : Ce n’est pas à envoyer par la DDEMP ?  
P 1 : Ce n’est pas envoyé. C’est aux parents d’en acheter. Les manuels sont envoyés. C’est envoyé 
par la DDEMP. Quand on parle de gratuité là, les parents croient que tout est gratuit quoi. 
Même jusqu’au Kaki (school uniform) de l’enfant, c’est l’école qui doit… Or ce n’est pas 
ça. C’est, ce qui est donné, ce sont les manuels et parfois, parfois le cahier d’activité. 
Cette année par exemple, ce n’était pas en nombre suffisant. Donc on a été obligé de dire 
à certains élèves d’acheter. Normalement ce qui est gratuit, c’est cahier d’activité CI, CP 
et manuel de toutes les classes.  
Interviewer : Donc cahiers d’activité pour CI, CP.  
P 1 : Mais ce n’était pas en nombre suffisant. Ce n’était pas en nombre suffisant. On était encore 
obligé de dire aux enfants d’acheter et quelques parents ont acheté. C’est qui est gratuit 
ça.  
Interviewer : C’est quasi gratuité. N’est-ce pas ?  
P 1 : Oui c’est quasi gratuité. 
Interviewer : Maintenant vous avez dit, bon quelqu’un a fait une remarque « surtout dans notre 
quartier ». Bon je vais me rendre dans votre quartier. Mais comment est-ce que vous 
décriviez votre quartier. Quelles sont les caractéristiques.  
P 2 : Moi je suis dans ma deuxième année. Elle a fait plus d’ancienneté dans la zone. Je suis dans 
ma deuxième année.  
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Interviewer : Est-ce que c’est quartier résidentiel, est-ce que s’est favorisé, ou est-ce que s’est 
bien mélangé ?  
P 1 : Non c’est un quartier mélangé. Surtout qu’actuellement il y a des, … il y a des autochtones, 
mais actuellement, les étrangers viennent construire.  
Interviewer : Parce que c’est moins cher ?  
P 1 : Bon ce n’est pas si moins cher hein. Attention ! Pour prendre quelques choses dans la zone 
maintenant c’est au moins trois millions hein. Oui ! Au moins trois à quatre millions. 
Alors qu’il y a cinq ans, ou dix ans, un million cinq cent, deux millions, tu as déjà payé 
une parcelle.  
P 3 : Cinq ans- dix ans ? 
P 1 : Oui ! Il y a dix ans dans notre zone là.  
P 3 : Deux millions ou bien ?  
P 1 : Oui ! Il y a dix ans. Mais actuellement là tu es à trois voire quatre même. 
Interviewer : Ça me rappelle un phénomène en Allemagne qu’on appelle « … » et je ne sais pas 
comment le dire en Français comme ‘’gentrification’’ ça veut dire qu’un quartier 
défavorisé dans une ville a gagné beaucoup de valeurs en très peu de temps. Parce que 
justement les gens (les étrangers) sont venus investir ce qui fait que pour les autochtones, 
c’est difficile à supporter. Parce que tout commence par augmenter. Et pourquoi vous 
dites surtout dans votre quartier c’est… Si je finis la phrase, surtout dans votre quartier et 
ce n’est pas évident que les parents ils achètent.  
P 1 : J’ai dit que surtout dans notre quartier là, d’usage, c’est par rapport à d’autres expériences. 
J’étais restée dans une autre école avant de venir ici. Et j’ai comparé. Oui ! Donc… 
Pourquoi il y a ce… Non ! C’est manque de volonté ?  
P 2 : Comment on peut expliquer cela ?  
P 3 : Et c’est ce que la madame dit avant que les gens pensent que quand on dit la gratuité, c’est 
tout. Alors que c’est défini sur un certains matériels. Les cahiers nécessaires, ce sont eux-
mêmes qui devraient… 
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P 1 : Disons qui a appris la mauvaise volonté des parents ?  
P 3 : De certains parents. 
P 1 : De certains parents. Et après tout « a man s éwé, a nan kplon masson163 ». De certains parents. 
Interviewer : Et ceux qui ont les moyens. Est-ce qu’ils envoient leurs enfants dans les écoles 
privées ? Ou est-ce que… ?  
P 1 : Oui ! D’autres viennent dans notre école. Il y a d’autres qui ont un peu de moyens, ils 
envoient leurs enfants dans les écoles privées. Mais ce n’est pas en nombre intéressant.  
Interviewer : Donc il y a une tendance qui sont dans les écoles privées.  
P 1 : Oui ! Parce qu’il y a beaucoup de privées hein. Ah il y en a. A Dowa là, il y a de privée. Il y 
a des écoles privées.  
P 3 : Et ils achètent tout hein. Le jour de la rentrée là, le premier jour de la rentrée. Ils achètent 
tout et le travail commence en même temps. Tous les parents.  
P 1 : Parce que je suis aussi parent d’élève dans une école privée.  
P 3 : Voilà !  
P 1 : Quand on dit rentrée trois octobre là, si l’enfant va à l’école, s’il revient, c’est avec leçon 
dans le cahier. Donc tu dois lui donner toutes les fournitures scolaires. Puisque le jour là, 
il va avec son sac au dos et toutes les fournitures sont dedans. Mais chez nous, ce n’est 
pas ça. Quand on dit rentrée le lundi là, c’est à peine tu va trouver quelques uns. Parce 
que les parents se disent : quand il y a rentrée, ils ne vont pas commencer par écrire 
maintenant.  
P 2 : Or en réalité, le système pour cette année, pratiquement cette année, on nous a recommandé 
dès la rentrée là de commencer par travailler. On n’était bien présent, les cahiers bien 
préparés, mais les apprenants nous sont pas prêts pour pouvoir au moins les premières 
leçons. La leçon était au tableau mais l’enfant était dans la classe et il ne pouvait pas 
prendre.  
                                                          
163 ‘Si tu n’es pas intelligent à l’école, tu iras apprendre la maçonnerie.’ (translation from local language 
into French)  
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Interviewer : Parce que ? 
P 1 : …il est venu les mains vides. 
P 2 : Et c’est après deux semaines déjà, parce qu’il y avait eu la prérentrée. On avait effectué la 
prérentrée et ils ont reçu leur liste de fourniture. Cahier, combien de cahiers il faut, le 
nombre de livres qu’il faut. Pourtant après ces deux semaines là, ils ne sont pas prêts pour 
pouvoir démarrer effectivement la rentrée.  
Interviewer : Donc si je comprends bien, cette année, les enseignants, l’école était prête.  
P 2 : Mais (la classe bien préparée) mais les apprenants, les parents d’élèves n’ont pas 
accompagné pour que l’effectivité soit constatée par l’écrit dans les cahiers.  
Interviewer : Pourquoi il n’y avait pas de communication entre les APE et l’école ?  
P 2 : Il y avait la communication puisque la prérentrée a été effectuée. Ils étaient venus prendre 
la liste chez nous. On leur a donné la liste là. Mais pourtant, notre constat ça n’avait pas 
pris.  
P 1 : Donc on voit que la mentalité n’a pas encore… Ils n’ont pas encore compris. On va encore 
attendre cette année ci pour voir ce que ça va donner. Peut-être que c’est la première fois, 
nous disons que c’est une expérience. On attend encore l’année prochaine pour voir ce 
que ça va donner. Sinon très souvent là, ils ne payent pas les fournitures. Ça va faire deux 
semaines. Je te dis même jusqu’… avant d’aller en congé là, il y a encore un enfant, ces 
fournitures ne sont pas encore prêtes. A quelques mois des vacances. Et ses camarades 
travaillent. Et lui, chaque fois, arrivé à ce stage là, il est là. Je dis « Toi là, tu es dans la 
classe depuis septembre, octobre, novembre, décembre, janvier, février, mars, bientôt 
quelques mois et tu n’as pas amené… Allez, va chercher un cahier ! » Et quand tu les 
renvoies parfois, ils peuvent rester à la maison hein ; une semaine avant de revenir. Même 
si je dis va à la maison là, il dit oui, oui. Tes parents sont à la maison, il dit oui. Assois-
toi, assois-toi là. Parce que si tu les renvoies là, ce n’est pas sûr qu’ils viennent avec ça. 
Là c’est un cas.  
P 2 : Ce genre de constats, ceux qui sont comme ça là, on peut les placer dans les cas sociaux. 
Parce que le parent est là avec l’enfant et après six mois de travail, il n’a pas encore tout 
acheté. Est-ce que c’est manque de volonté ? Ou bien les moyens ne sont pas. Les moyens. 
Sur un effectif de quarante et quelque et c’est deux ou trois qui n’arrivent pas à finir 
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d’acheter leur… On se pose des questions. Mille et une questions. C’est ces 
comportements que nous constatons à des moments donnés.  
P 1 : Si c’est moyen là, ils n’ont qu’à cesser de faire. Parce qu’il faut faire la politique de ses 
moyens. 
Interviewer : Et si vous parlez des moyens, est-ce qu’on parler des subventions de l’Etat.  
P 1 : Non ! Pas … L’Etat a déjà fait ce qu’il peut…  
Interviewer : Non en fait, ce n‘est pas la même chose, mais peut-être on aborder question.  
P 1 : La subvention. Oui ! La subvention pour cette année là, l’Etat n’a rien fait hein. Non !  
P 2 : Je suis en train de parler pour les cas sociaux peut-être.  
P 1 : Les cas sociaux là… 
P 2 : Je veux comprendre si l’Etat a subventionné dans le domaine des cas sociaux ou bien.  
P 1 : Non elle parle de l’école.  
P 2 : Pour le fonctionnement de l’école ?  
P 1 : Pour le fonctionnement de l’école. Cette année… Quand on parle de subvention là, cette 
année, l’Etat n’a pas du tout honoré à son engagement. Pas du tout. Même jusqu’avant-
hier, j’ai eu un message. Ils ont dit que si l’Etat ne donne pas les ¾ restants là, on boycotte 
la rentrée du 24 là. On va boycotter d’abord parce que nous sommes à quelques mois de 
la fin et les ¾ ne sont pas encore venus.  Quand est-ce que ça va venir ? Depuis la rentrée, 
ils ont envoyé seulement ¼. Comment l’école veut fonctionner ? Il y a des trucs qui sont 
terminés et les enseignants doivent prendre. Il y a les factures à payer. Il y a ci, il y a ci à 
faire. L’Etat n’a pas débloqué les fonds. Ils ont dit qu’ils vont boycotter la rentrée hein. 
Si ça ne tombe pas dans cette semaine avant le lundi là, la rentrée sera d’abord boycottée. 
Il faudrait que l’Etat sorte les ¾ restants là avant que l’école ne continue. Cette année, il 
n’a pas du tout honoré à son engagement. Pas du tout ! Pas du tout !  
Interviewer : Et quel est… L’Etat doit se justifier ?  
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P 1 : Normalement l’Etat doit se justifier. Qu’est-ce qu’ils vont dire. Est-ce que… Bon je ‘en sais 
pas grande chose hein. Ils disent que le problème se trouve au finance. Que c’est au niveau 
de la finance que les fonds sont bloqués (au ministère des finances). Oui ! Que les fonds 
sont bloqués. Je ne sais pas si l’Etat se défend comme ça hein. Que les fonds sont bloqués 
au niveau de la finance. Et il a fait appel au directeur là de débloquer les fonds pour les 
enseignants. Comme ils ont mis certaines influences sur l’Etat, que s’il ne donne pas les 
trois restants là, ils vont boycotter la rentrée. Donc il fait appel au ministre des finances 
là. Donc ils vont débloquer les fonds. On attend encore. On a encore deux jours. 
Normalement ce sont ces fonds là qui vont permettre à l’école de bien fonctionner.  
Et comment vous faites ? Comment vous… 
P 1 : On se débrouille.  
Interviewer : Comment vous vous débrouillez ?  
P 1 : Alors qu’on dit : une mission, des moyens. Tu envoies les gens, il faut donner les moyens. 
Les gens sont là ; on est là, il y a des fiches, il y a certains nombres de fiches qu’on doit 
prendre chaque année. Les fiches sont terminées depuis. L’enseignant est obligé d’enlever 
l’argent de sa poche pour acheter quand il veut travailler. Voilà que le directeur n’en a 
pas, la directrice n’en a pas. Elle aussi attend la subvention qui n’est pas venue. Est-ce 
qu’elle va sortir l’argent de sa poche pour satisfaire tous les enseignants ? Je ne crois pas. 
Les enseignants mêmes se débrouillent parfois. Ils sortent l’argent de leur propre poche.  
Interviewer : C’est pareil à la maternelle ?  
P 1 : C’est pareil. C’est pareil parce que c’est le même ministère qui gère l’enseignement maternel 
et primaire.  
Interviewer : J’ai tenu à me n’échanger pas seulement avec le primaire, d’abord j’ai focalisé sur 
le primaire. Mais j’ai pu assister à un atelier sur les réformes éducatives et la question de 
la décentralisation a été abordée par rapport à la maternelle. Si éventuellement… Bon 
c’est vraiment rien de concret. Mais ça a été discuté. Et peut-être la commune va prendre 
plus la responsabilité par rapport à la maternelle. Donc c’est pour cela que j’ai souhaité 
mieux à vous avoir dans le groupe. Quelle est votre appréciation ? Est-ce que d’autres 
compétences à part la construction des écoles devraient être transférées à la commune. 
Est-ce que plus de compétences devrons être décentralisées ?  
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P 1 : On parle de décentralisation. Quand on parle de la décentralisation dans l’école, il doit y 
avoir des centres de loisir, des centres de jeux. Que les enfants puissent s’épargner après 
l’école. Qu’il ait un centre où ils vont se distraire. Normalement il n’y a pas ça. Quand on 
dit décentralisation, c’est pouvoir à la base.  
P 3 : Oui !  
P 1 : Ou bien ?  
P 2 : Tout à fait.  
Interviewer : J’ai bien mis la phrase, « c’est le pouvoir à la base ». 
Interviewer : C’est vrai ; vous ne rencontrez pas un problème particulier par rapport au nombre 
d’enseignant dans votre école, mais par exemple le recrutement et la gestion des 
enseignant ; est-ce que vous pensez que… C’est bien géré au niveau central par le 
ministère ? Ou est-ce que ça pourrait être mieux géré au niveau de la commune ? C’est 
juste un exemple.  
P 1 : Oui ! Oui ! Je comprends. Le personnel là, quand il y a les mutations, il y a souvent aussi 
l’autre qu’on fait au niveau de la circonscription. Ou bien ? Il y a des mutations qu’ils 
font à l’interne. C'est-à-dire ce n’est pas seulement au niveau du ministère. Il s’agit de 
recrutement qui se fait sur la base… que le gouvernement organise. N’est-ce pas ? Et il y 
a aussi la commune qui recrute. N’est-ce pas ? Elle demande est-ce que cela ne soit pas 
bon au lieu que ça soit seulement au ministère là-bas. Je vois. Puisqu’entre temps, les 
années passées, il y avait ces gens de choses. Des communautaires d’entre temps là. 
C’était un peu dans les communes. C’était les communes qui avaient recruté. C’étaient 
les communes qui avaient recruté et qui avaient géré. Ce n’était pas l’Etat.  Pour pouvoir 
fermer le vide. Des années passées. Il y a une décennie. Je crois les communautaires. Et 
ils étaient nombreux. Très nombreux.  
P 3 : Il y a encore des communautaires sur le terrain.  
P 1 : Ça a permis de renforcer le système éducatif. Mais aujourd’hui l’Etat les a reversés déjà (en 
ACE). Maintenant l’Etat les a rendus fonctionnaires.  
Interviewer : Peut-être la question, elle est plus pertinente. Les communes qui sont loin du 
ministère comme N’dali, Karimama etc. puisque je me dis vous êtes proches du ministère. 
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Donc ça permet de… tout ce qui est encore centralisé, ça permet de facilement…bon plus 
ou moins de résoudre. Je me demande quelle est votre vision sur la gestion de l’école d’ici 
dans dix ans ? Donc qu’est-ce qui doit changer pour que vous puissiez encore mieux faire 
votre travail ? Qu’est-ce qui doit changer pour qu’on puisse mieux faire ?  
P 1 : Tout part toujours du haut là-bas. Tout part toujours du ministère. Moi je vois que pour que 
l’école puisse bien fonctionner, c’est surtout les subventions. C’est surtout les 
subventions. Venir à tant. Si on peut mettre les subventions au niveau, peut-être il faut 
venir au niveau des circonscriptions. Au lieu que ça reste en haut là-bas là, c’est de là-bas 
qu’ils vont envoyer là, à quelques semaines de la rentrée, les gens sont déjà au niveau de 
la circonscription, la moitié au niveau de la circonscription. Et les directeurs, directrices 
concernés viennent, ils sont en possession et ils prennent déjà les dispositions nécessaires 
pour la bonne rentrée, je pense que ce serait mieux hein. Ça va donner un plus au bon 
fonctionnement de l’école. Donc si les subventions arrivent à tant, ça va donner plus 
d’autonomie à l’école (à l’école). Arriver à tant, ça donnerait plus d’autonomie à l’école.  
Interviewer : Et qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire pour que les subventions viennent à tant ?  
P 1 : Cette question-là. Qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire vraiment.  
P 3 : C’est l’Etat qui décide de tout ça là.   
P 1 : Avant que la rentrée ne commence, c’est l’Etat qui fixe. Ou bien ? Oui ! L’Etat même a fixé 
telle date pour la rentrée. Il doit savoir qu’au moins deux semaines d’avance, il doit 
apprêter certaines choses s’il veut vraiment que l’école commence et bien. Vous voyez 
non. Parce que c’est lui qui fixe la rentrée. Deux semaines avant ces dates là, il doit mettre 
les choses au point pour qu’à la rentrée tout commence normalement. C'est-à-dire il y a 
déjà les fonds. Si c’est les réfections qu’il y a à faire, c’est déjà fait. Le matériel est remis 
à chaque enseignant ; les primes qu’il va percevoir, ils ont déjà perçu leur prime. Ça 
motive aussi l’enseignant qui veut aussi travailler. Il voit. Ah ! Il y a le matériel. Je suis 
motivé. Il va travailler.  
Interviewer : Donc plus d’anticipation de la part du MEMP.  
P 1 : Oui ! Du gouvernement.  
Interviewer : Est-ce qu’il y a d’autres aspects ?  
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P 1 : Est-ce qu’il y a d’autres aspects. C’est le grand carrefour ça. Si à la longue on peut revoir ce 
point là, l’école va s’améliorer plus. Et cela nous rendra aussi la tâche facile. Tout ce qu’il 
met dans gratuité là, il faut que tout ça là soit au nombre. C'est-à-dire les cahiers d’activité, 
les manuels. Il faut que tout ça là soit au nombre. En quantité suffisante. Vous voyez non. 
Pour permettre à l’enseignant et aux apprenants aussi de travailler. Parce que le parent 
qui sait que son enfant va à l’école va trouver un cahier d’activité. Il n’a pas fait ce 
programme là. Mais à un mois comme ça on l’appelle pour dire que le cahier ne suffit 
pas. Va acheter. Vous voyez un peu la difficulté que ça peut créer. Donc il faudrait qu’ils 
mettent les choses à la disposition de l’école et je pense que tout irait mieux.  
Interviewer : Une dernière question de ma part. Tout à l’heure vous avez abordé les grèves. Il se 
peut qu’il y aura (ait) d’autres grèves parce que les subventions n’arrivent pas. C’est un 
espace protégé ? Est-ce je peux vous demander si vous participer aux grèves.  
P 1 : Ah, oui ! Lorsque nous avons… Lorsque ces points là sont intéressants. Nous avons nos 
intérêts, nous sommes tenus de respecter le mouvement d’ensemble pour avoir gain de 
cause. C’est ça notre objectif. On ne va pas en grève pour aller à la grève. En tout cas 
quand on a lancé la grève là, on dira non. On se met en possession de la motion, on lit, on 
voit les points qui sont cités ; si ça nous concerne et ça nous avantage, pourquoi ne pas 
aller en grève. On y va. On signe la motion on dépose.  On va à la grève. Parce que l’union 
fait la force.  
Interviewer : L’union fait la force. C’est une belle phrase et vous aviez dit quelque chose 
semblable, je n’ai pas pu noter. Mais je vais voir après. Quelque chose comme « nous 
devons nous mettre ensemble pour avoir gain de cause ».  
P 1 : Parce que seule la lutte paie. Surtout chez nous. Seule la lutte paie (au Bénin). Seule la lutte 
paie hein. Nos devanciers ils ont lutté pour que nous, nous soyons ici. Ils ont lutté pour 
qu’on ait ces salaires et toutes ces choses là. C’est parce qu’ils ont lutté. Ils ont lutté fort. 
Il faudrait aussi que nous luttions pour l’avenir de ceux qui viennent derrière. Il faut lutter.  
Interviewer : Et bon. Entre temps, il y avait de grève par rapport aux inspecteurs retraités. Et moi-
même, j’étais très surpris. Il suffit que je travaille sur la décentralisation de voir une 
certaine régionalisation des circonscriptions scolaires plus les retraités. Quel est votre 
point de vue là-dessus ?  
P 1 : Les retraités.  
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P 2 : Chacun tire le drap de son côté.  
Interviewer : Pardon !   
P 2 : Les gens essaient de tirer le drap de leur côté. Comment faire pour leur domaine trouve 
satisfaction. Ils trouvent satisfaction.  
Interviewer : Tire le drap de son côté.  
P 2 : Oui ! Parce que nous avons les aînés, les adjoints et les collaborateurs. Nous, notre gain de 
cause, il y a nos avancements qui sont… On bat pour ça là. Mais eux de leur côté, il 
faudrait qu’ils aient, qu’ils trouvent leur place. Qu’ils ne soient pas oubliés. Parce qu’il y 
a des connaissances qu’on ne doit pas laisser de côté. Donc je c’est une manière pour 
(comment dirai-je ?) C'est-à-dire frapper pour que attention hein. On doit aussi penser à 
eux. On doit aussi penser à eux. Ce n’est pas parce qu’ils sont à la retraite que tout est 
fini. Il y a encore des connaissances qu’il faut transmettre à la génération montante.  
P 1 : Au bout de l’ancienne corde on tisse la nouvelle dit-on.  
Interviewer : Pardon ? 
P 1 : J’ai dit au bout de l’ancienne corde qu’on tisse la nouvelle. Dit-on. Mais ce n’est pas pour 
ça qu’il faut en abuser. Non ! Les pépés, les retraités là. A un certains moments, l’Etat a 
dit tu peux valoir tes droits à la retraite. Mais va t’assoir et céder la place à d’autres qui 
sont là. Il faut permettre aussi aux directeurs, aux directrices de « compétir », d’aller au 
concours de CP et pour devenir inspecteur aussi. Ou bien eux aussi, ils ont pris par ici 
non ? Ils ont été aussi enseignants. Ils ont été directeurs. Ils n’ont qu’à permettre aussi 
aux autres d’aller aussi. Leurs connaissances qu’ils ont là, ils peuvent toute fois rester 
chez eux et on peut venir vers eux. S’ils veulent ils n’ont qu’à donner ou ils n’ont qu’à 
garder pour aller dans leur tombe.  
P 3 : Personnes ressources. 
P 1 : Oui ! Peut-être que c’est la manière dont eux- aussi ils ont accepté faire le travail qui a fait 
qu’ils ont supposé. Non seulement la manière, les (comment je vais appeler ça). Ce qu’ils 
veulent percevoir là c’est trop. C’est trop. Le salaire là. Leur salaire là, c’est trop. On dit 
qu’on veut inspecter pour quelque… C’est trop. Soyons… C’est trop. Et au même 
moment… qu’est-ce qui a surtout fait chose là. Au même moment où on paie ces gens là 
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d’une telle somme, l’Etat dit qu’il n’y a pas l’argent pour avancer. Et où est-ce qu’il a 
trouvé l’argent pour payer, pour sortir ces sous là. Il y a tout ça qui a soulevé les gens. Il 
y a ça qui a soulevé.  
Interviewer : Donc si je comprends bien, l’Etat a essayé de contractualiser des inspecteurs 
retraités, mais ne permet pas aux directeurs et aux directrices d’école de se faire former 
comme le conseiller pédagogique.  
P 1 : Il n’y avait pas une politique parallèle qu’ils ont en même temps promu.  
Interviewer : Comment ?  
P 1 : Promu. D’accord ! Ils ont promu. Ils n’ont pas promu la formation des directeurs comme 
conseillers pédagogiques ? Non ! Non ! En ce moment non. Ils n’ont pas promu les 
directeurs. Ils n’ont pas promu. Il y a quand-même des gens CP.  
P 2 : Beaucoup.  
P 3 : Beaucoup en herbe.  
P 3 : Il a déjà des CP qui ne sont pas employés. Non ! Ils sont employés. Qui peuvent concourir 
pour devenir inspecteur. Ils disent qu’il n’y a pas assez d’inspecteurs. C’est pour ça qu’ils 
ont fait appel à ceux qui sont à la retraite. Ils n’ont qu’à permettre à ceux qui sont là d’aller 
au concours d’abord. Ils disent que les jeunes d’aujourd’hui qu’ils ne veulent pas 
travailler. Les jeunes ne veulent pas travailler. Les jeunes ne veulent pas travailler. 
Comment ils sont venus à ce point. Comment eux ils savent que nous ne voulons pas 
travailler. Laissez-nous le temps d’abord pour voir effectivement si on veut travailler ou 
pas.  
Interviewer : Il me semble que pour les diplômés des ENI, il y avait aussi des grèves. Est-ce que 
vous y avez participé ? Est-ce que vous pourriez me dire un peu ? On me dit par rapport 
à la dictée.  
P 1 : Ceux qui sont recalés là. Les recalés. Oui ! Et ça a donné gain de cause hein. Parce que la 
grève qu’on avait faite entre temps là, ces points là aussi étaient dedans. Oui ! Les recalés 
là. Recalé. Ce sont les recalés.  
Interviewer : Ça veut dire quoi ?  
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P 2 : Ils ont repris.  
Interviewer : Est-ce qu’il y a d’autres éléments que vous souhaitez ajouter à la discussion. Moi 
j’ai pu faire le tour des questions.  
P 2 : D’autres éléments non. Puisque nous, nous sommes des pratiquants de la chose pédagogique. 
C’est ça beaucoup ce que nous… notre métier, notre quotidien. Oui ! La formation. Il 
faudrait qu’après nos formations professionnelles, qu’il ait des séances de recyclage. 
Parce qu’il y a des innovations. Même dans la sous-région, il y a des innovations. Donc 
on ne peut pas rester là, là. Donc il faudrait que ces décideurs puissent repenser. Ils sont 
en train mais il faudrait que cela prenne. Ils sont en train. C’est ça d’ailleurs qui fait que 
nous avons des écoles normales qui sont là. Et par moment on invite des enseignants à 
des moments donnés. Et on a des thèmes et on s’échange sur les thèmes. Donc il faudrait 
que cela soit périodique. Là cela permettra à chaque enseignant d’être bien outillé et 
aguerri pour faire face aux difficultés. Puisque les enfants ne sont pas les mêmes. Les 
années ne sont pas les mêmes. Donc il faut qu’il ait ces formations de recyclage.  
Interviewer : Effectivement aujourd’hui on a négligé un peu le côté pédagogique. Ce qui est au 
cœur de votre travail peut-être. Est-ce qu’il y a d’autres aspects que vous souhaitez 
partager ? Ou bien ça va ?  
P 1 : Ça peut aller.
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9.6.2 National level: interview N° 67 
Interviewee 1 (decentralisation): I1 
Interviewee 2 (education): I2 
Interviewee 3 (decentralisation): I3 
Interviewee 4 (education): I4 
I4: On peut commencer. Merci, bien, Madame. Alors que nous sommes arrivés au Benin a cette 
étape la partir de la situation socio-économique que nous avons socio-politique et 
colonique que nous avons vécu dans les années 80. Et il y a eu des problèmes 
effectivement économiques ou l’Etat arrivait même plus à payer les salaires. Ensuite, 
c’est qu’il y avait que sur le plan politique il était difficile ou impossible même de créer 
les partis politiques officiellement reconnus. Il y avait un seul parti, c’était sous le régime 
révolutionnaire ce que appelions PRBP et à la faveur donc de cette, je dirais, décadence 
et le pouvoir en place avec son chef à décider pouvait lui dire que programmer peut-être, 
disons la la la paix dans le pays qu’on se retrouve tous les béninois quelques soit leurs 
couches sociales pour réfléchir sur les voies, les moyens et les pistes pour entreprendre 
ou ramener au niveau de chacun des citoyens ce que nous appelons la paix, la libre 
expressions, la possibilité de s’organiser et c’est comme cas que nous sommes allés à la 
conférence nationale et est ressortit que désormais il faut laisser le pouvoir au peuple, que 
le peuple lui-même décide de son avenir. C’est comme ça que les recommandations, les 
stratégies qui ont été abordé dans la période. Nous avons outils à ce processus de 
décentralisation qu’on […] là la constitution 1990, réaffirmé par les Etats généraux de 
l’administration territoriale en 93. Voilà un résume, voilà le parcours qui nous a conduits 
à ce processus. Les collègues, mes frères vont me compléter. Je ne suis pas allé dans les 
détails. 
Interviewer : Oui, après on peut y aller.  
I1 : […] planter le décor […] 
Interviewer : Est-ce qu’il y a peut-être de la perspective éducation un aspect à ajouter puisque 
quand même les communautés, comment je peux dire, ils se sont impliqués dans 
l’éducation depuis même avant l’avènement de la décentralisation. Est-ce qu’il y a un 
aspect de cette perspective la que vous souhaitez ajouter ? 
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I1 : Pas particulièrement. Pas particulièrement. Parce que comme il le dit dans la période, au fait 
c’est pas l’éducation qui a…, ce n’est pas ça le problème. C’est pour cela que je n’ai pas 
abordé l’aspect culturel. Personne n’est gêné que j’aille chez mon frère de Parakou ou 
chez mon frère de Porto Novo. Ce n’est pas ça, cela ne gênait personne.  
I3 : C’était même mieux structure en ce temps-là. Le préfet par exemple, en ce temps, il n’allait 
pas servir nécessairement dans sa zone. 
I1 : J’étais sous-préfet à Abomey. Sans problème.  
I3 : Alors qu’actuellement la tendance, c’est d’envoyer le fils du territoire/ du roi dans telle zone. 
Et puis, il n’est pas bon.  
I4 : Je ne sais pas, c’est… Le préfet pourrait nous imprégner d’avantage. Est-ce que par rapport, 
moi, il y a une idée qui a souvent trotté dans ma tête, hein… Au fil des années, non 
seulement la population […] par nombre, les […] ont commencé à se multiplier, sur le 
plan des écoles, on est passé avec la reforme de ce […] de l’internet, l’école, et il y avait 
un boum de l’école au point ou auparavant jusqu’aux années 70, il y avait 12 inspecteurs 
pour le Benin. Et puis, et puis, on pouvait commenter le nombre des CEG, mais à partir 
de 72, il y avait eu […], c’est-à-dire il y eu […] de création d’école. Et l’école a 
commencé à se démocratiser petit à petit. Alors, cette gestion de l’école a commencé à 
poser problème puisqu’avec 12 inspecteurs dans le temps, l’école était bien gérée. 
L’inspecteur, je crois dans le Mono, c’est l’inspecteur était à Athieme, il pouvait aplater 
jusqu’à Grand Popo. Et c’est l’inspecteur de Savalou qui couvrait de Bassila jusqu’à 
Tchaurou en passant par Dassa. Et puis ça marchait d’une manière ou d’une autre, mais 
aujourd’hui, vous voyez, avec la […] de la carte scolaire, on pouvait plus, on a dû 
commencer, hm, multiplier les inspections juri…, les instances de décisions et autres là 
pour que l’administration [..] puisse avoir des répondants beaucoup plus proches de la 
population. Je me dis qu’avec cette politique de décentralisation, c’était aussi une 
opportunité pour améliorer cette gestion de l’école. Et, mais, en même temps a déjà 
commencé par, ça a commencé par poser des problèmes, ça échappait déjà d’une manière 
ou d’une autre a l’administration central, d’où la création des différents corps que nous 
avons avec les enseignants communautaires ; une expression aussi de ce que les 
populations se préoccupaient par la chose scolaire. Des enseignants communautaires, ce 
sont des enseignants, les parents d’élevés qui ont recruté ceux-là pour gérer leur école 
parce que l’administration centrale était dans l’incapacité d’envoyer des enseignants. 
Donc, une, hm, une bonne politique de décentralisation pouvait venir, donc, à organiser 
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tout ça, bon. Je mets les choses comme ça puisque je me dis que « Est-ce que tout ça 
n’avait pas concouru à cette, a cette […] de la décentralisation et voir que c’est en même 
temps des perspectives pour mieux organiser l’Etat. Je mets ça dans le panier comme ça. 
I3 : Un autre aspect que je voulais soulever, le système éducatif comme l’a dit le doyen xxx, au 
cours de la période révolutionnaire, tout était étatise, tout appartenait à l’Etat. Donc, il y 
avait plus d’école, hm, professionnelle, école privée, tout appartenait à l’Etat. Donc, au 
lendemain de la conférence, on a voulu allé dans une forme de libéralisation, libéralisme 
colonique. Donc, tout a été libéralisé, hm, certaines communautés devaient prendre en 
charge, c’est la la naissance également des enseignants communautaires, de prendre en 
charge du fait du manque des enseignants dans certaines zones, devaient prendre en 
charge l’éducation des enfants, surtout au niveau primaire et même au niveau secondaire. 
Donc, ils ont dû recourir à des cadres qui n’ont peut-être pas le niveau pour pouvoir 
assurer cela. Maintenant, la décision de la conférence ne visait pas seulement le secteur 
de la décentralisation, elle visait de façon globale… 
I4 : …le secteur de l’éducation… 
I3 : …le secteur de l’éducation. Elle visait globalement l’économie et tous les, tous le, tous les 
secteurs politiques de la vie du pays. Donc, au lendemain de la conférence, ils parlaient 
non seulement libéraliser, mais démocratiser et, plusieurs, le processus de 
décentralisation a démarré et les lois de décentralisation sont allées dans le sens de, hm, 
d’alléger, de ne plus centraliser le circuit pouvait se faire au niveau local ; de le garder au 
niveau central, ça n’aurait pas été bien, donc les lois sont allées également dans le sens 
de déconcentrer, de décentraliser pour beaucoup d’aspects dont l’éducation. Il y a d’autres 
aspects comme l’économie locale et autres qui ont été également déconcentré, 
décentralisé.  
I1 : Comme l’a dit mon collègue du Ministère de l’enseignement primaire, hm, il y a […] de 
recommandations très fortes, hm, celle de rapprocher l’administration de l’administre. 
C’est-à-dire qu’il y avait, disons, une concentration des écoles et des apprenants a des 
lieux précis […] avant la, le nom démocratique. Donc, c’est pour cela que l’inspecteur 
n’avait pas beaucoup d’école ou établissement à inspecter. Il y avait des centres qui 
étaient déjà fixes. Mais avec la reforme et les […] généraux de l’éducation, il a été laisse 
la liberté au citoyen […] faire des demandes, exprimer leur besoin en matière d’éducation. 
Comme ça l’éclosion des écoles un peu partout. Il suffisait de faire une demande, les 
parents d’élevés faisaient une demande, c’est accepté, et la [..]. 
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I4 : … Vous donnez le site, vous commencez à construire… 
I1 : …vous commencez à construire les bâtiments, même si ce n’est pas en matériaux définitifs. 
Et ça vous donnait droit à l’ouverture de l’école chez vous. Voilà, un peu une idée que je 
voulais ajouter… […] 
I4 : Sinon, hm, au fait, comme, hm, hm, évoqué, c’est des choses qui sont acquises qui ont 
certainement à la réforme, qui étaient des soubassements sur lesquelles la politique, la 
reforme, c’est-à-dire de décentralisation / déconcentration aurait, on voulait expliquer. 
Voilà, c’est pourquoi on a estimé que, bon, il faut sortir ça. Puisque vous parlez des 
questions politiques, socio-économiques et historiques… 
Interviewer : Oui. 
Interviewer 2: Donc, on pourrait prendre chaque dimension de la question, est-ce qu’on peut y 
voir l’influence de la colonisation sur l’élaboration même de la politique de 
décentralisation jusqu’à son émergence. Est-ce qu’on peut voir de façon détaillée 
l’influence hm, hm, de la colonisation française sur l’élaboration même de cette politique. 
I1 : Je n’ai pas trop bien compris la question. 
Interviewer 2 : Jusqu’à aujourd’hui, on peut garder l’idée que la colonisation française a influence 
chaque béninois. On peut l’estimer comme ça. Et partant de là, est-ce qu’on peut dire, 
étant donné que la colonisation a forme et peut-être a disposé la conscience pour l’être 
individu, est-ce que cela a participé en quelques sortes à l’élaboration de cette… Parce 
que nécessairement il y avait des cadres béninois qui étaient là, mais qui nécessairement 
étaient des produits de la France. Est-ce que cela a eu une influence sur l’élaboration de 
cette politique de décentralisation?  
I1 : Est-ce que la question n’est pas trop [..]. Ce n’est pas très bien pense. On peut dire, je ne dirais 
pas que c’est la colonisation qui a eu une influence sur…, je dirais plutôt que, hm, hm, le 
vécu, le vécu d’avant le Renouveau Démocratique a eu à se référer à cette période, voyez-
vous ? A se référer à cette période, si nous avons désormais, nous voulons qu’on 
introduise de l’arme dans l’éducation. Et on a créé même un peu avant la révolution [..] 
des saisies des écoles ou on envoie les enfants qui apprennent la langue maternelle. Ça 
avait commencé. Je ne sais pas si on peut dire que c’est l’influence de la colonisation ou 
de la décolonisation.  
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Interviewer 2 : Ok, autrement dit, est-ce qu’il y avait des traits français qu’on avait colportés dans 
l’élaboration de la politique de la décentralisation ? Est-ce qu’il y a des traits, il y a des 
schémas français que qui qu’on peut retrouver.  
I1 : Oui, nous sommes dans le système français. Donc, tout ce qu’il y a aujourd’hui entraine, bon, 
avec la petite [..] que j’ai, j’étais en Allemagne, je suis allé chez les anglais, ce n’est pas 
la même chose. Nous n’avons copie que le système français, que le système français. Ça 
la, d’accord, c’est pour cela que j’ai dit que la question n’était pas du tout clair. 
L’excellence française a influencé les autres propos.  
I3 : Oui. 
I4 : La réforme est arrimée sur le système français. Il faut reconnaitre qu’après la colonisation, 
nous avons connue l’indépendance, nous avons connu la période révolutionnaire, et la 
révolution avait été véritablement une révolution.  
I3 : Ah oui.  
I4 : Tu sais, déjà, la révolution avait déjà fait la politique de décentralisation.  
I1 : Si, bien sûr.  
I4 : Vous voyez ? C’est avec la révolution que on est passe à un certain, voilà… 
I3 : aux 77 communes. 
I1 : Oui, c’est ça.  
I4 : On a trouvé, c’était les sous-préfectures qui existaient. On est passé aux districts. On a créé 
des districts. C’est en ce moment que Cotonou a été divise en 6 districts. Et... on a 
démultiplié les arrondissements qu’on appelait les mairies. Donc, il y avait et…Et c’est 
en ce moment qu’on parlait de rapprocher l’administration de l’administre. C’était déjà 
une politique de décentralisation. Et et donc, ça aussi, ça fait partie de l’historique.  
I ?: Oui. 
I4 : Donc, en même temps on dit qu’il y avait les communes  
I ?: …ce qu’on appelait commune avant…c’est […] d’aujourd’hui.  
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I4 : Il y avait soucis de créer un CEG dans chaque arrondissement pour que les élèves aillent plus 
loin. C’était, vous voyez, ça c’était la déconcentration puisque c’est en même temps le le 
les ordres du ministère […]. Donc on a débuté, on a commencé, on a trouvé beaucoup de 
CEG, on a créé les, dans le temps, on parlait de CMG et pour les communales, la 
déconcentration du pouvoir du Ministère de l’Education, c’est la division, la division du 
district […], la division de l’éducation et le ressort s’appelait RDDE. Vous voyez ? Donc, 
déjà il y avait déjà des soucis de décentralisation et de déconcentration. Donc, ce qui a 
été avance ou bien une avancée sur la période coloniale. Donc, c’est la révolution. Vous 
voyez ? Et la révolution est venue dire non à la période coloniale. Dans le cadre béninois, 
xxx a été forme par l’administration coloniale.  
I3 : Ils se sont libres de mener une certaine politique.  
I4 : Donc, voilà, c’est pour vous dire, même si nous sommes français dans la tête, il y a quand 
même une certaine indépendance qui a […] ceci aussi.  
Interviewer : J’avoue, je ne sais pas si ma question cadre, mais je suis très contente du 
développement de la discussion. Mais parce qu’on parle des éléments propres au Benin 
qui ont, qui sont peut-être déjà des éléments de décentralisation, est-ce que les chefferies 
traditionnelles, hm, sont aussi un élément qui peut-être reflètent, se reflètent, hm, dans le 
concept de la décentralisation. 
I1 : C’est une question plus difficile. Il faut dire, en réalité au Benin, nous ne connaissons pas ce, 
disons, cette société civile là. Les, comme vous avez, les… 
I (?) : …chefferies traditionnelles… 
I1 : … chefferies traditionnelles, est-ce qu’on ne les a jamais impliqués dans quelques choses au 
Benin ? Réellement non. Sinon, officiellement non ! Officiellement, les chefferies 
traditionnelles ne se sont jamais vu impliquer par l’Etat dans la gestion des affaires au 
niveau local. Mais les citoyens même au niveau culturel, ah non, je respecte beaucoup [..] 
ça là, mais lui il n’est pas obligé de connaitre […], ce le regarde même pas. Voyez-vous ? 
Contrairement à ce que nous vivons au Togo, au Ghana, au Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, ou 
c’est, mon dieu, c’est écrit la dans leur constitution. Nous autres, on a tout fait, mais ça, 
jamais. Donc, je ne peux dire pas dire que ça a influencé le processus-là. C’est vrai, c’était 
aux Etat Généraux, j’y étais, hm, c’était reconnu, mais on n’a jamais compris des 
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responsabilités de la gestion, la gestion du pays, quelques soit la période. Je n’ai pas 
compris.  
I3 : Ce que je voulais dire, hm, [..] pas en terme de participation, mais en terme historique, quand 
je prends le cas des royaumes que je connais, qu’ils sont structure de façon décentralisé 
carrément : il y a roi, il y a des chefs de terre qui ont, les chefs de terre ont un certain 
territoire ou ils rendent compte, on peut dire que c’est une forme de et déconcentration 
ou de décentralisation du pouvoir qui a été fait. Donc, quand vous prenez les royaumes 
de Save ou les royaumes de Nikki, il y avait de ces, de ces trucs la qui étaient une forme 
de décentralisation ou bien de déconcentration du pouvoir parce que le le.  
I1 : Attention, xxx. Si nous partons de la définition que le texte nous donne de la décentralisation/ 
déconcentration, décentralisation, c’est la création état identité… 
I3 : Non, je parle des royaumes…. 
I1 : Mais la la, vous ne pouvez pas parler de décentralisation.  
I3 : Je parle en tant que royaume. Le royaume tel que c’était, c’était que le roi était quelque part. 
Quand je prends pour Save, par exemple, le roi est à Save, mais il a des représentants… 
I1 : …de régions… 
I3 : des valets dans les villages qu’ils suivent et qu’ils rendent compte. Lorsque le problème les 
dépasse, c’est le roi qui envoie un émissaire pour résoudre le problème. C’est le même 
cas que vous allez constater, dans les pays, dans le royaume Bariba ou le roi est à Nikki, 
bon l’empereur, il y a des rois dans les autres villes et qui rendent compte également et 
qui attendent souvent une décision du roi, du supérieur ou […] certaines décisions, a 
certaines, pour passer à certains problèmes, ils attendent la décision du roi pour prendre 
la décision. Donc, on peut dire de façon, peut-être, et, endogène, il y avait un peu cette 
culture dans, peut-être la culture du béninois, mais qui avec le colonialisme, on est parti 
à un truc central qui, après qu’on a réorganise. C’est juste ce que je voulais, l’aspect que 
je voulais aborder.  
I2 : Moi, je vais ajouter qu’historiquement, la déconcentration, la déconcentration a toujours 
existée. Quand [..], il y a des atouts qui existaient même bien avant la décentralisation. 
L’inspecteur [I4] a donné l’exemple maintenant que, pendant la révolution ou on a, je 
crois qu’on devait être là, au […]. Il y avait les provinces qui existaient, ensuite, il y avait 
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les districts, villages, quartier… Donc, la déconcentration existait, c’est une vic…, 
victoire. C’est la décentralisation qui est peut-être plus 
I3 : …qui est nouvelle… 
I2 : … nouvelle dans le processus. 
I3 : A partir de, bon, de la conférence, mais qui a pris réellement truc avec les promesses de 
l’édition, il faut dire que, il faut dire que…, pour répondre à votre deuxième question sur, 
hm, quel est le rôle, la place et le rôle de la population dans l’élaboration du document de 
politique… 
I1 : Est-ce qu’on a fini avec la première question ? 
Interviewer 1 : D’accord. En fait, je voulais proposer de faire la transition à la deuxième, mais s’il 
y a encore des éléments à ajouter pour la première… 
Interviewer 2 : Oui, est-ce que, hm, à partir des interventions, je comprends qu’il y avait l’aspect 
culturel qui déjà dans l’esprit ou la conscience des béninois qui poussait à capter la 
déconcentration. Mais ce n’était pas encore réellement la décentralisation. Donc, est-ce 
que cet élément culturel influence la décentralisation dans ce sens… 
I1 : Attends, quand vous dites ce n’était pas encore la déconcentration… 
Interviewer 2 : Ce n’est pas encore la décentralisation. 
I1 : Mais, non, je ne suis pas d’accord avec vous. On vient de le dire. Est-ce que c’est parce qu’on 
a donné une définition a ça, qu’estimez que ce n’est pas encore ça ? C’était la 
décentralisation aussi !!  
Interviewer : Ok. 
I1 : Voyez-vous ? On vient de dire, sous la révolution il y mairie, il y a arrondissement, il y a tout 
ça. Mais est-ce que ça veut dire que ce n’était pas décentralisé ?  
Interviewer 2 : Voilà.  
I1 : C’était bien décentralisé.  
Interviewer 2 : Et, je, je, je parle de la […] 
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I4 : Non, seulement qu’il y avait le pouvoir, une partie du pouvoir qui était déléguée a [..] cette 
base là, mais il y avait aussi, même si ce n’est pas consistant, il y avait un peu de 
compétence. Même si l’Etat central tenait fortement encore à la tirelire, et encore il y 
avait quand même une petite parcelle d’intérêt qu’on donnait. Oui. Donc, tout ça, comme 
ce n’était pas des, c’est-à-dire la politique vient donner toute l’ouverture.  
Interviewer 2 : En fait, je m’inscrivais dans, hm, la définition, hm, macro de de la démocratie. 
Excusez-moi beaucoup, veuillez moi excuser, parce que nous en sociologie, la démocratie 
a un autre sens qui, qui ne dit pas forcement la même chose qu’on on le prend à des 
niveaux donnes. Donc, il y a forcément, hm, des implications. Et je parle d’implications 
en ce sens que quand l’Etat délègue de pouvoir, hm, l’Etat est toujours là sous le contrôle. 
Maintenant, si l’Etat est toujours sous contrôle, comme, hm, hm, le Monsieur le disait 
tout à l’heure, c’était culturellement, je partage ça, que les rois avaient aussi des délégués 
qui…, donc tout ça là, c’était l’aspect encore de la déconcentration. Parce que la 
décentralisation exige quand même quelque part une liberté de l’autorité que vous mettez 
à la place de cette instance, une liberté, une autonomie, une certaine indépendance. Et 
donc, la déconcentration n’autorise pas tellement. 
I1 : Non, la déconcentration n’autorise pas parce que quand vous êtes déconcentré, vous n’êtes 
pas autonome. 
Interviewer 2 : Voilà :  
I ?: Vous êtes un bon délégué.  
I1 : Délégué, c’est un pouvoir délégué. Vous l’exercer au nom de quelqu’un. 
Interviewer 2 : Voilà. 
I3 : Mais la notion de décentralisé, il y a certaines… 
I1 : …certaines […] 
I3 : … qui font que vous ne pouvez pas exercer parce que… 
Interviewer 2 : Donc, dans la décentralisation, est-ce que ces compétences qui sont déléguées… 
I3 : …transférées… 
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Interviewer 2 : …ou transférées… 
I2 : Non, ce n’est pas décentralisation, c’est compétence transférées, Déconcentration, 
compétence déléguée… 
Interviewer 2: Ok, compétence déléguée. Et donc, quand on parle de compétence déléguée, 
déléguée, c’est à dire que l’Etat est en contact en permanence et contrôle tout. Maintenant, 
au niveau de de de de la des compétences transférées, nous sommes déjà dans la 
décentralisation. Et est-ce qu’il existe une autonomie ou une indépendance… 
I1 : C’est clair, c’est clair.  
I (?):  ...autonome et vous avez une personne juridique.  
Interviewer 2 : Maintenant, à partir de la… 
I (?): et vous prenez les décisions vous-mêmes.  
Interviewer 2 : Donc, à partir de là, est-ce qu’on peut dire aujourd’hui que réellement que les 
compétences qui sont transférées s’exercent de façon libre, indépendante, autonome ? 
I1 : C’est une question que vous posez ?  
Interviewer 2 : Oui, c’est une question. 
I1 : Moi, je peux vous répondre que oui, que oui. La loi a tout transféré et on dit : ces compétences 
transférées sont accompagnées par des moyens financiers. Pourquoi pas humain pour les 
exercer […]. Mais ce que nous vivons aujourd’hui que les moyens, les ressources 
financières et humaines ne l’accompagnent pas le transfert, les compétences transférées.  
I3 : Tout ce qui est transféré, ils sont libres de les exercer. Seulement dans les, avec des conditions, 
ce n’est pas parce que tu es libre qu’on te transfère des ressources que tu vas faire tout ce 
que tu veux.  
Interviewer 2 : Oui. 
I2 : Les compétences transférées sont exercées sous la tutelle. Parce qu’il y a ce qu’on appelle le 
contrôle de la légalité des actes poses le maire et aussi l’assistance conseil exercé par 
l’autorité. C’est vrai vous avez la compétence, mais où est l’Etat qui va contrôler la 
légalité des actes ?  
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I3 : Tout ce que vous faites… de Malanville, indépendant, […] bon je me […] désormais au Niger. 
Donc, vous êtes toujours sur le territoire […]. Donc, il y a la loi que vous devez respecter.  
Interviewer 2 : Ok.  
Interviewer : Peut-être, hm, regardons l’heure, on va faire encore une fois un pas en arrière parce 
que maintenant on est au niveau de la troisième dimension, les contextes et des pratiques 
aujourd’hui, les compétences transférées, les ressources etc. Si on peut faire un pas en 
arrière à l’élaboration de la PONADEC et l’implication, le rôle et la place des 
populations, de la population dans, dans le document, si cela vous convient.  
I1 : C’est [I3] qui a notre […]. 
Interviewer 1: Voilà. En fait, excusez-moi, hm, servez-vous, et servez-vous… 
I3 : Le processus de décentralisation a été lance comme on l’a dit toute à l’heure. Il y a eu la 
conférence de 1990 qui a dit on va, et c’est dans la constitution, qu’on va à la 
décentralisation. On a dû attendre décembre 2002 pour avoir les premières élections 
communales et municipales. Donc, entre ces deux temps, 1990 à 2002, il y avait les Etats 
Généraux de l’Administration Territoriale, il fallait rédiger toutes les lois et de la 
décentralisation, quelles sont les compétences transférées, quelles sont les compétences 
propres, compétences partagées, et déléguées. Donc, l’Etat a organisé les élections en 
janvier, décembre 2002, janvier 2003 et les premières mandatures se sont installées en 
2003. Donc, a l’expérience de ces premières mandatures, il y avait beaucoup de difficultés 
parce que on a dit que la commune est autonome, mais nous avons les communes méritent 
de quoi, d’un personnel de commandement ou, hm, c’était le sous-préfet qui était peut-
être le cadre le plus élevé de la commune et les autres étaient que des agents d’exécution. 
Or, lorsqu’on parle de développement des […] des communes, ce n’est pas des cadres de 
catégorie c, d qui vont aider le maire à impulser le processus de développement. Il n’y 
avait pas de ressources. Certaines communes ne pouvaient pas mobiliser les […], c’était 
difficile, et lui demander de résoudre les problèmes de sa commune. Donc, les communes 
étaient réellement confrontées à un problème non seulement de ressources humaines, en 
ressources financières, et il y avait de gros problèmes. Les premiers PDC étaient vraiment 
envergue, mais les ressources n’ont pas pu se mobiliser. Jusqu’à ce que l’Etat a dit. Bon, 
hm, bon… Peut-être bien avant ça, il y avait aussi le fait que l’Etat devait accompagner 
les communes dans ce sens avec l’assistance-conseil, la tutelle et tout. Mais on a constaté 
que l’Etat ne s’est pas déconcentré. Il est reste tel qu’il était. Donc, l’Etat dit, bon, on va 
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élaborer une politique qui permet de coupler les deux, la décentralisation et la 
déconcentration pour accompagner les communes. Et là, on prévoit comment faire pour 
transférer les ressources, transférer les compétences, comment aussi les communes 
doivent s’exercer, à l’exercice du pouvoir local et tout. D’où est ne la politique nationale 
de décentralisation et de déconcentration. Les populations ont été impliqué dans le 
processus du diagnostic et de, hm, de l’élaboration pour le Ministère, les maires, et et 
autorités locales ont été impliquées… Je vais laisser le doyen, puisque moi je n’étais pas 
encore la quand c’était élaboré en 2008 et adopte en 2009 quand moi j’arrivais, la 
PONADEC, donc c’est les doyens qu’ils l’ont élaboré, pourra mieux...  
Interviewer 1 : Ok 
I1 : Bon, ce que je pourrais ajouter, au départ, les populations n’ont pas joué un rôle au départ. 
C’est parce que, comme il a dit tantôt, on s’est retrouve, on s’est retrouve en face à une 
situation. On a dit qu’a vue. Il n’y avait pas une politique, il y avait pas un document qui 
place la voix sur pour que ce processus devienne une réalité. En réalité, qu’est-ce que 
nous faisons ? On se lève aujourd’hui, bon, on peut transférer, hm, telle compétence, on 
le fuit rapidement, […], on fait ceci, mais non, nous devons avoir une boussole, un guide 
et c’est à partir de cela que la réflexion a commencé à murir et on est arrivé à l’élaboration 
de cette politique là, ce document politique. Evidemment, hm, c’est beaucoup plus 
intellectuel. C’est beaucoup plus intellectuel. C’est pour cela que tout de suite, vous ne 
verrez pas le rôle et la place des populations dans l’élaboration. Elles n’ont pas été 
impliquées dans le processus de l’élaboration même. Par [..], comme il a dit tantôt, dans 
le processus on a dû les consulter puisque ce n’est pas nous qui allons-nous asseoir pour 
mettre en œuvre. Ils ont leur rôle à jouer à partir de, donc de la mise en œuvre. 
I3 : A partir de la mise en œuvre de la politique … 
I1 : La, ils ont un rôle à jouer. 
I4 : Donc, il parlait de les impliquer à un moment donne 
I1 : Quelques choses comme ça… Que demain là, ce document, c’est toi qui doit faire ci. Il n’y a 
personne pour le faire à ta place. A partir de là, ils étaient impliqués. Voilà, ce que je 
voulais ajouter.  
Interviewer 1 : Hm  
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I1 : […] 
Interviewer 1 : Est-ce qu’il y a d’autres, autres perspectives sur cette question ou des éléments à 
compléter? 
I1 : Il faut plutôt poser des questions. 
Interviewer 1 : Ok. 
Interviewer 2 : Ok, par exemple, dans la mise en œuvre, hm, dans l’élaboration ici, par exemple, 
hm, concrètement, qu’est-ce que la population fait, qu’est-ce que la population fait, 
concrètement ? 
I3 : Bon, la population devrait être informe qu’il y a une politique qui est en élaboration, qu’ils 
doivent prendre en compte, hm, la volonté de, du destinateur d’aller dans le sens de la 
décentralisation et voilà, ce que le document prévoit par rapport aux lois qui ont déjà été 
prises. Donc, avant l’adoption du document, il faut informer la population, bon, voilà la 
politique qu’on a élaboré, peut –être on a pas pu prendre en compte certains aspects qu’il 
peuvent voir, donc, ils ont eu un moment pour eux d’apporter leur contributions, bon tel 
aspect, parce que dans ma communauté peut-être, nous aussi, pourquoi vous avez pensé 
au nouveau décentralisation, aux nouveaux communes, mais la communauté aussi 
pourrait s’organiser ; pourquoi ne pas aussi donner de l’expérience aux communautés, 
donc ces des aspects peut-être qu’on, bon, c’est vrai c’est pris en compte dans la 
document, mais peut-être ils n’ont pas pris en compte que la communauté pourrait se 
lever. Parce que si on dit décentralisation, on a mis ça au niveau commune, mais, hm, 
actuellement l’exercice peut se faire avec les communautés pour voir comment ils eux-
mêmes s’approprient de leur développement. Donc, ils parlaient de leur élaboration, voir, 
hm, prendre en compte le, la voix des populations à la base pour peut-être corriger ce qui 
n’a pas été pris en compte et surtout les informer que quand ça va venir désormais, c’est 
vous parce que la décentralisation, hm, comprend le mot intrinsèquement, le mot, le 
développement, c’est la population, c’est pas le maire, vous mettrez, mais c’est vous. Si 
le maire doit acheter une boite de lait, c’est vous qui donnez l’argent pour qu’il achète la 
boite de lait. Il ne faut pas attendre de l’Etat qu’on vous donne de l’argent. Donc, pour 
également expliquer tout cela, a la population. 
I1 : Comme il le dit, la, on va illustrer un peu. Le législateur a dit désormais, c’est vous-même 
qui élisiez… 
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I2+3 : …le maire… 
I1 : …le maire. Est-ce que sans vous vous acceptez d’élire vos responsables vous-même. Parce 
qu’on a, on vous a habitué à faire venir tout, tout du sommet, du haut. Mais désormais, 
ça va partir de vous-même. C’est une manière de les impliquer désormais dans les prises 
de décision. Il a dit, votre maire, il a géré pendant un an. Comment peut-on savoir s’il a 
bien ou mal géré. Voyez-vous ? On a donc recueilli l’avis de la population de tout ça pour 
améliorer les textes que les législateurs ont proposée. Voilà, un peu l’implication dans 
cette politique-là. Parce que la politique, on l’a élaborée après, après la mise en œuvre, 
n’est-ce pas. Bon, après le processus 2002/03. Donc, il fallait maintenant cadrer, cadrer. 
C’est comme ça qu’on est allé à l’élaboration de la PONADEC en consultant, en repérant 
l’avis des populations sur le contenu qu’on a dans cette politique.  
Interviewer 1 : Une phrase qui m’a interpellé, si j’ai bien note, on vous a habitue que tout vient 
du haut. Pour moi, c’est un phénomène culturel et… Est-ce que vous pourriez élaborer 
un peu plus sur ce, disons, ce phénomène culturel et les implications sur la mise en œuvre 
de la décentralisation?  
I1 : L’Etat, tout se faisait par l’Etat, l’Etat seul.  
I 2 : Pour construire une école c’est l’Etat. Pour faire une piste même, c’est l’Etat. Pour faire une 
xxx, c’est l’Etat. 
I1 : Maintenant, on vous dit, non, l’Etat ne peut plus continuer à le faire. Il vous revient maintenant 
de décider de oui, je veux faire une piste, on veut le faire ici, voilà les moyens qu’avez 
aidé à mobiliser pour le faire. 
I4 : …mais voir ce que nous avons. 
I1 : …mais vous qu’est-ce que vous nous apportez.  
I4 : qu’est-ce que vous nous apportez. Donc, ce n’est plus un ingénieur qui va quitter là-haut et 
qui va s’asseoir pour le faire. C’est déjà le maire qui suit l’appel d’offre, xxx, designer, 
hm, ou bien il y a quelques choses qu’on appelle… 
I1 : …maitrise d’ouvrage… 
I4 : …hm, maitrise d’ouvrage. Il y a aussi une autre pratique la, entrepreneur locale de la 
population qui…oui, l’initiative de Dogbo. 
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I ?: … les gens faisaient ça aussi des listes non ? 
I4 : Ah, IMO. C’est des choses que la décentralisation a amené pour permettre à la population 
d’être acteur de, de développement. 
Interviewer1 : L’initiative de Dogbo, j’ai entendu, ‘laissez tomber’. Je connais un peu le concept, 
mais je suis intéressée par la phrase ‘laissez tomber’. Pourquoi ? 
I3 : C’est politisé parce que l’initiative de Dogbo, ce n’est pas, c’est pas de Dogbo que c’est ne, 
c’est un truc qui était là depuis, ce que les gens faisaient. Donc après, on a politisé, et on 
n’a pas voulu envoyer les ressources tel qu’il faut. Et on dit, on met ça sous l’initiative 
de Dogbo. On ne sait pas. Le doyen (I1) même en a parlé, de laisser tomber.  
I4 : Oui, je crois cette histoire est un manque de patriotisme.  
I1 : C’est tout. C’est le fonds du problème, ça. Parce que, bon, le chef de l’Etat, elle est en tourne, 
et, dans les soucis de, de, de construire toutes nos écoles en matériaux définitifs, il a dit à 
la population, ‘mais impliquez-vous !’. Mais si on vous envoie 10.000 francs au lieu des 
15.000, les 5.000 c’est à vous de les apporter. 
I3 : …en envoyant du sable… 
I1 : …du sable, de l’eau, des briques pour aider le maçon. C’est ce qu’on leur demandait.  
I 4: Et c’est ce qu’on appelait ‘Comptons sur nos propres forces’.  
I1 : … sur nos propres forces. Sous la révolution, c’était ça.  
I4 : Vous voyez ? 
I1 : là-bas, comme c’était la force xxx. ‘L’Etat prend en charge sans moi.’ 
I2 : Dans la mise en œuvre de ce programme au niveau du sous-secteur de l’enseignement 
maternel et primaire, nous avons espéré, écoutez, il y a xxx parce qu’il y a des gros sacs 
de xxx. Vous savez lorsque nous avons mis l’accent sur l’entreprenariat locale et la 
participation communautaire, au début, bien avant qu’on a conçu ce programme, on 
construisait avec deux trois million un module trois salles de classe, un bureau, un 
magasin. Mais avec l’initiative de Dogbo, nous avons ramené ça à 17 millions. Il y a des 
communes pour ça. Ça a pris simplement parce que au lieu d’envoyer un entrepreneur de 
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Cotonou, pour prendre un marché à Natitingou, par exemple, on choisit un entrepreneur 
local. Ce qui agit forcement sur le cout. Il y a la participation communautaire, la 
communauté doit contribuer à deux millions cinq cents, soit en nature ou en espèces, ça 
dépend. Il y a des communes ou ils se sont arranges ou c’est, disons, ramasser de sable. 
Quand la communauté se sent intéressée, se sont préoccupée, se sent associée, ils s’y 
donnent. Donc, par contre, il y a des communes ou quand on est parti, ils ont dit, ‘non, ça 
ne peut pas marcher parce que ce que tu dois au marché, le cout est à 10%. On les a 
habitués à 23 millions et on a ramené ça à 17 millions. Sur trois ans, Athieme était 
toujours le premier. Ils ont construit avec 17 millions en matériaux. Mais par exemple, à 
Abomey, à Cotonou, ils ont dit, ‘mais non’. Cotonou n’est pas intéressé à la chose.  
I1 : Moi, j’ai vu pendant que on faisait l’audit du FADeC, mais l’école qu’on a prise […]. ‘Vous 
avez l’argent et vous nous dites de venir. Quand j’abandonne un champ, qui va me payer. 
’C’est des questions qu’on me posait. 
I2 : A un CODIR, on nous a dit, ‘prenez vos sous et vous-même vous gérez votre histoire-là. 
Nous, on ne veut pas.’ Ils ne se sont pas intéressés à ça. Parce que du coup les autorités, 
ils se sont dit dans ça là, on aura rien. Ce n’est pas la peine quand c’est comme ça. Alors 
que PNDCC a fait l’expérience aussi avec la participation communautaire, ça a marché. 
I1 : Même actuellement, le PNDCC avec les philo-socio, tout va. Vous voyez ? 
I3 : Au plan ou, ça commence à exporter l’expertise chinoise au Togo.  
I1 : C’est incroyable ! Comme il a dit, il faut qu’on revoie… 
I2 : Il y a des aspects culturels aussi qui… Parce que certaines personnes… 
I1 : Il faut que… je ne voie pas la personne qui a lancé le projet…, hein ?! Mais on voit l’avantage 
du projet.  
Interviewer 1 : Est-ce que vous mettez ça dans les faits culturels ?  
I1+3 : Oui, c’est des faits culturels.  
I1 : Autre question ? 
Interviewer : Oui, je regarde toujours l’heure, hm, on aura plus autant de temps, mais je souhaite 
quand même partager deux proverbes. Voilà, le premier… 
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I1 : Moi, je ne suis pas fort en proverbe. 
Interviewer 1 : Ce n’est pas grave. Nous, on va le fournir. Le premier proverbe dit, ‘Le chef ne 
doit plus devenir le subordonne ou l’apprenti.’ C’est vrai on avait pas trop de temps de 
parler de la, disons la mise en œuvre et du décalage qu’il y avait peut-être entre la 
politique même, les compréhensions and les pratiques sociales. Mais je crois, vous êtes 
au cœur, ou du levier au au au quotidien. Moi, j’ai eu des éléments pendant la collecte de 
données et…, on ne va pas parler du manque de transfert des ressources financiers et 
humaines, mais, donc, disons, on va laisser, survoler cette étape, et si ça vous inspire, hm, 
parler …pour approfondir encore certains aspects. 
Le chef ne doit plus devenir quoi… ? 
Interviewer 1 : …le subordonne ou l’apprenti. […] Et l’autre proverbe, c’est, ‘Je t’ai donné un 
mouton, mais j’ai gardé la corde.’ Donc, on m’a offert ça pendant les entretiens et j’ai 
beaucoup aime. Je ne sais pas si ça vous inspire autant que moi. Le premier proverbe, 
moi je me réfère plutôt au contexte d’influence, c’est-à-dire aux conditions qui ont fait 
émerger la reforme et peut-être aussi au contexte de la production de la PONADEC ; le 
troisième plus au contexte des pratiques sociales. Donc, … 
I1 : Est-ce que le deuxième proverbe ne s’approche pas au proverbe chinois la qui dit : ‘Au lieu 
de donner du poisson tous les jours, il faut apprendre à pêcher.’  
I4 : ‘Non, c’est le contraire. C’est-à-dire, tu donnes le mouton et tu tiens la corde. Donc, en réalité, 
tu n’as rien reçu. 
Interviewer 1 : Par exemple, tout a l’heure vous avez parlé de l’autonomie des communes, hm, 
hm, … 
I3 : En fait, c’est ce qu’elle veut dire quoi, autonomie, mais en réalité, est-ce qu’il y a autonomie ? 
Est-ce que ce n’est pas une autonomie de façade ? Est-ce que le poids central n’a pas 
toujours, hm, hm, sa tuilerie…  
I1 : Bon, écoutez, qu’est-ce que vous voulez qu’in dises, l’autonomie elle est réelle, elle est une 
réalité parce que les communes, c’est elles-mêmes qui exercent leurs compétences. 
Comme ça quand les fonds sont transférés, ensuite, hm, la gestion de leur communauté 
leur revient actuellement. L’Etat ne regarde que là où il a mis quelques choses. Dans les 
compétences déléguées, par exemple, c’est délégué, c’est clair, on ne peut pas empêcher 
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l’Etat de regarder. Ensuite, le FADeC ou le cabinet d’argent, chaque année on fait l’audit 
parce que, il y a de l’argent […] qui a été mis à la disposition de l’autorité communale. 
On veut voir comment il a géré l’argent. Par contre, les ressources propres qu’ils 
mobilisent, personne n’a jamais vérifié comment il dépense jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Donc, 
moi, je pense en matière d’autonomie, bon c’est discutable, ça dépend de la position de 
chacun.  
I2 : Moi, je prends un autre aspect de la chose. Quand nous prenons les compétences, les 
compétences spécifiques ou partages, nous savons qu’aujourd’hui que la commune qui 
doit construire et réhabiliter les écoles au niveau du sous-secteur des enseignements 
maternel et primaire, et le secondaire dans les villes à statut particulier. Moi, je n’arrive 
pas à comprendre pourquoi jusqu’à présent le niveau continue à construire. J’ai souvent 
trouve ce problème dans le cadre quand on élaborait le Plan2D, c’est-à-dire on m’a dit 
que même au niveau du Ministère de la Décentralisation qui est censé vérifier, je ne sais 
pas, la chose est encore, se fait là-bas. On ne peut pas aujourd’hui aux communes qu’on 
leur a transféré des compétences et continuer de les exercer au niveau central. Vous avez 
dit tout à l’heure…. 
I1 : Donnez-nous un exemple… 
I2 : … j’ai donné un mouton… 
I1 : Donnez-nous un exemple…Nous sommes ici. 
I2 : Nous avons au niveau du sous-secteur encore des projets qui continuent à construire depuis 
le niveau central et parfois même… 
I1 : Vous avez donne un exemple du Ministère de la Décentralisation.  
I4 : Donnez-nous un exemple.  
I2 : C’était lors d’un atelier… 
I ?: Il ne faut pas dire les choses… 
I2 : …c’était même un responsable […] du Ministère de la Décentralisation qui m’a dit, ‘Ecoutez 
Monsieur …, même chez nous, il y a des trucs qui se font qui devaient se faire au niveau 
au niveau des communes’ 
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I3 : Mais bon, c’est possible avant, mais maintenant c’est corriger. Il y a une seule chose qui se 
faisait, c’est la construction des marchés centraux.  
I1 : Les marchés centraux seuls qui se faisaient. […] C’est les marches, c’est tout. Parce que tout 
simplement les marches étaient inscrites dans sur les PIP… 
I3 : Oui, et dans ce sens, normalement on a fini de corriger parce qu’on a constaté que quand c’est 
inscrit sur le PIP, on n’arrive pas à les exécuter. Ainsi depuis la, les gens ne le constatent 
pas dans les PEP parce que les marches qu’on a annoncées depuis 2012/2013 sont encore 
en concours et on arrive pas à les payer Sinon, depuis 2015 on a élaboré le manuel, et 
c’est à transférer. Dès qu’on identifie la commune, on évalue, on lui transfère les 
ressources. Parce que quand c’est transférer, l’Etat libère les fonds et la commune [..] à 
dégager. Quand c’est nous, quand c’est l’Etat central qui fait, tu vas faire le DAO, tu vas 
tout faire, ça traine, l’institut sera ferme, mais quand vous dites c’est […], c’est 10.000 
en début de l’année, pft, c’est envoyé. Lui, il prend ça là-bas, il fait le travail, après vous 
allez voir, si c’est bien fait. Donc, on a déjà pris la décision d’enlever comme ça.  
I1 : Mais, ce qu’il dit est vrai. Certaines écoles, certains centres de santé, continuent…, certaines 
pistes continuent […] par l’Etat. Ça la, il faut avouer, c’est vrai. Bon, il ne faut pas 
expliquer ce qu’il y a … Moi, je peux leur donner un exemple. Quand j’étais plus [..], il 
y a un des ministres qui, malgré que la loi le précise, qui a fait fabriquer les tables bancs 
et qui m’apporte le bordereau à signer. Je dis, ‘Je ne signe pas. Je ne sais pas où vous avez 
fait fabriquer les tables-bancs, je ne connais pas la quantité, je n’ai pas vu, et vous voulez 
que je signe. Bon, nous sommes dans un même Etat.’ Ce ministre a réussi à se faire payer 
au trésor. En tout cas… Alors c’est vrai, alors que la loi est claire !  
Interviewer 1 : La loi est clair, disons le cadre légal est clair. Maintenant le volet justice, bon, je 
me pose la question comment la justice, quel est son rôle pour que la décentralisation peut 
être effective? Par exemple… 
I1 : Le Ministère de la Justice ? 
Interviewer 1 : Non, pas le Ministère de la Justice, mais revenir sur l’exemple sur la construction 
des écoles. Le MEMP continue, tout le monde le sait, à construire certaines écoles. Donc, 
quels sont les mécanismes pour prendre en compte, c’est violations des lois ? 
I3 : Pour moi, c’est une volonté politique, hein, c’est-à-dire si l’Etat dit au Ministre de 
l’Enseignement Maternel et Primaire que désormais tout ce qui est école, tu transfère les 
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ressources, je pense que aucun ministre va dire ‘non, je le maintien’. Il va le faire. Mais 
si on n’a pas cette volonté politique de le faire, les cadres seront toujours résistants parce 
que quand le projet est là, c’est des missions que je fais. Donc, c’est des ressources pour 
moi. 
I1 : Mais on peut aller plus loin. C’est tout ce plan, je crois qu’on tient compte du niveau 
d’évolution de la population. Mais il ne peut pas traduire cette autorité devant les 
tribunaux ?  
Interviewer : Voilà, c’était un problème… 
I1 : Ah oui, conformément aux dispositions tels, tel ministre continue à…, malgré tout ce que j’ai 
dit, il porte plainte contre ce ministre-là, hm. [..] Il y a un problème de culture aussi. 
13 : C’est politisé.  
I1 : Et quand nos populations auront ce niveau-là, Vous allez voir que c’est pareil. Il contestera 
tout ça. Bon. L’Etat va répondre devant les tribunaux.  
Interviewer : Peut-être ce qui justifie le deuxième proverbe ‘Le chef fait tout pour rester chef’.  
I1 : Le premier… 
I3 : …le premier. Parce que moi je rangerai deux proverbes dans le même côté. Parce que les 
chefs qui nous a dit ‘que désormais il n’est pas le chef qu’il était, mais il ne fait pas tout 
pour permettre à l’apprenti de grandir, comme tu ne me permets pas de grandir, tu restes 
toujours chef. Or, en me disant, je suis libre, décentralisé, libre, tu dois me donner tout le 
pouvoir d’exercice que je dois…, c’est-à-dire pour le pouvoir que tu m’as confié, tu dois 
me donner les ressources pour que j’exerce ma liberté. Mais tu tu le garde aussi pour dire, 
‘si je te laisse tout ça, qu’est-ce que moi je deviens ?’ C’est ça quoi…, si les services, si 
les ministères envoient tous les ressources là-bas, qu’est-ce qu’ils deviennent ? Ils 
deviennent… 
I1 : Il y a un ministre qu’il a dit aussi : ‘Si vous voulez tout ça, qu’est-ce que moi je fais ? Je suis 
la pourquoi ?’Qu’il soit l’uniquement pour élaborer les politiques, voilà, les politiques et 
stratégies, c’est tout ce qu’ils ont à faire désormais là.  
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I2 : Mais… moi je veux comprendre puisque xxx est là. Je ne sais pas, ce qui pose toujours 
problème, je n’arrive pas à comprendre parce que j’ai suivi une étude […] sur la 
décentralisation au Ruanda et au Benin. Mais ce qu’on a nous […], était très bonifiant.  
I1 : Au Ruanda ?  
I2 : Au Ruanda ! On nous dit que le Ministère de l’Education n’a qu’à rester calme. Je n’ai pas 
dit Enseignement Maternel et Primaire, éducation n’a qu’à rester calme. Et, tout est 
opérationnel. Niveau central : élaboration des normes, pilotage, suivi, ça s’arrête là. On 
ne peut pas comprendre ici à l’ère de la décentralisation tout ce qui se fait encore au 
niveau central. Les activités opérationnelles, on doit les faire au niveau déconcentré. […] 
On ne veut rien lâcher. Alors, j’imagine, pour moi, le Ministère de la Décentralisation a 
encore du travail. […] Le Ministère a encore de travail parce que je me dis, les gens ne 
se sont pas du tout approprie du contenu. Vous sentez au MEMP quand on parle de la 
POANDEC, sur les 100 ou 200 cadres que nous avons dans la maison, à peine 50 ou bien 
20 pourront vous parler de cet outil.  
I1 : …même 10… 
I2 : Même 10. La dernière fois, il faisait un très bon discours au niveau du Ministère des Finances, 
on prenait la parole pour dire voilà, ça s’est conditionné, financement de l’Union 
Européenne de 2012, élaboration des Plans2D, des PDDI, les cadre de budget, les 
financements par l’aide de développement… ‘Mois, je leur ai dit non, le plan n’est pas 
là. Le problème n’est pas, il y a deux problèmes : approbation de la politique. Il faut 
vulgariser la politique, ce n’est pas connu. Ensuite, la volonté politique. Il faut faire un 
lobbying auprès des autorités. Je vous assure, vous m’excusez il y a des ministres qui ne 
savent pas le contenue de la PONADEC. De l’élaboration du Plan2D, nous avons au assez 
de difficultés aujourd’hui, assez de difficultés aujourd’hui pour des gens, des individus 
qui se sont mis à élaborer un truc et qu’on on voit ce truc. Et quand on vous voit, on se 
moque de moi à la limite. C’est comme si ce n’est pas dans les textes. Tant que les gens 
ne vont pas maitriser, on ne pourra pas aller à l’ère de la décentralisation. On doit plus 
continuer, les choses […] Quand vous prenez le contexte de la PONADEC, c’est quand 
même bien dit. Il faut l’articulation de la décentralisation/ déconcentration, il faut 
l’articulation entre les clos au niveau déconcentré et au niveau national. Tel qu’on ne va 
pas commencer à élaborer, mettre en œuvre les Plan2D, les PDDI, le problème va toujours 
se poser. Et pourtant, je dis, c’est la décentralisation, la structure faitière de cette histoire, 
c’est ce ministère. Le séminaire gouvernemental, on a parlé depuis des années, mais on 
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n’a jamais fait. Et tant on ne va pas faire…, puisque nous avons aujourd’hui un nouveau 
gouvernement, il faut que ça soit une réalité ce qu’on met dans la PONADEC. Qu’est-ce 
qu’on doit faire, on est à quelle étape ? Des partenaires et des communes, il faut 
s’approprier de ça. Quand nous allons commencer, ça va prendre.  
1i : Ce qu’il vient de dire est une réalité. Ce que nous voudrions souhaiter est que nous voudrions 
partager nos ouvrages avec tous les ministères. Il ne faut pas toujours voir le ministère de 
la décentralisation seule. C’est transversal désormais- et multisectoriels. Chaque 
ministère doit se dire à partir des textes, qu’est-ce que j’ai à attraper, qu’est-ce que j’ai à 
déléguer et travailler en conséquence. Par ce que le Ministère de la Décentralisation est 
au même niveau que tous les autres. Ce n’est pas un super ministère, voyez-vous ? Il faut 
qu’on en tienne compte. Cependant, tout ce [..] juste, nous avons eu beaucoup de choses 
là-dessus sur ce document-là. Séminaire gouvernementale, conférence annuelle, tout ce 
que vous voulez pour que cela soit une répétition tout le temps. Mais combien de 
ministres, combien de gouvernants de mon pays vous pouvez prendre maintenant passez 
mois à quel vous pouvez dire, ‘je connais la PONADEC’. Il n’y a pas. Passez ou à l’heure 
actuelle, il n’y a pas. Déjà les cadres, c’est difficilement comme l’a dit le cadre même ça, 
il y a un quand tu lui parle de PONADEC, c’est de gros yeux qui s’ouvre. C’est quoi 
PONADEC ? C’est quoi PONADEC ? Et là heureusement, nous avons commencé 
maintenant. Maintenant, nous allons commencer. Parce que les équipes sont renouveler 
périodiquement. Au ministère même, nous avons déjà fait un atelier de l’appropriation de 
la [..]. On vient de finir hier la première session du comité interministériel de pilotage de 
la PONADEC. Tous les représentants des ministères, et nous avons insisté que le niveau 
de représentation soit désormais carte juridique.  
I4 : je n’étais pas informe. 
I3 : C’est la DPP qui était présent.  
I1 : C’est plus les secrétaires, secrétaires de, je ne sais pas quoi, voilà, va t’asseoir, ça peut être 
un compte-rendu, ou bon. On ne veut plus. C’est pour les secrétaires généraux des 
ministères charges des reformes ou c’est les DPP ou leur adjoint. Tout simplement plus 
personne d’autres. Tous ceux qui étaient là, sauf malheureusement le ministère des 
finances malheureusement… 
Interviewer1 : …un ministère important quand même…. 
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I1 : …oui, celui qu’ils ont désigné, était en mission, était pas là. Voilà, donc, nous pensons 
maintenant, que ça va prendre maintenant. Déjà, c’est lui, c’est son activité. Le début, la 
première semaine du mois prochain, on a déjà un atelier d’appropriation de ces membres-
là. On veut les former, renforcer les capacités parce qu’ils doivent maitriser l’outil. Ça 
veut dire que à chacun de nos ministères, il y déjà au moins un élément qui pourra 
comprendre le contenu cette politique-là. On le fait progressivement. Ça va être autour 
des préfets et au niveau de chacun des cadres de chacun des ministères. Ce n’est pas prévu 
dans le budget 2017, mais 2018 le Ministère des Finances a dit, ‘je vous accompagne 
prochainement’. Donc, nous allons insister que ça soit inscrit dans le budget de l’Etat, le 
genre budget de l’Etat. Plus au niveau de ministère tel, ministère tel… Non. L’Etat même 
qui vous doivent […] ça désormais pour qu’on maitrise effectivement la chose. Ce qu’il 
a dit est réel, est vrai. Donc pour corriger ça, et ça va être un recommencement…, sinon 
vous […], demain vous allez partir. Il faut que on le reprenne encore. Voyez-vous ? C’est 
un […] un commencent… Comme c’est une politique, on ne peut pas se fatiguer de la 
vulgariser, c’est à ça que nous sommes actuellement en atelier. Et le secrétariat permanent 
a un rôle presque futurien, pour que cela […]. 
I4 : Moi, je voudrais savoir quelques choses. C’est vrai c’est un document comme vous le dites 
qui n’est pas suffisamment connu, il n’est pas partage non aussi.  
I1 : Si, c’est partagé !  
I4 : C’est là le mal de notre administration aussi, hein, moi je, j’étais dans une direction ou j’ai vu 
partir le directeur partir et quand le nouveau le même jour à invite dans son bureau, j’ai 
failli pleurer.  
I1 : Il n’y avait rien.  
I4 : Rien ! Tous documents, toute la documentation… 
I3 : C’est comme ça ! 
I1 : Quand on se met derrière les gens là, se met derrière les cadres, on nous dit… 
I3 : Même à la DPP, […], le DPP est parti cette année, il est parti avec toute la documentation.  
I3 : La réponse à l’administration que j’aurai… 
I4 : Donc, c’est, je ne sais pas, quelle est la mentalité, la mentalité que nous avons.  
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I3 : …toute la documentation qui vient et si c’est accompagné par une lettre officielle, mettre le 
cachet dedans en même temps, bon. […]  
I1 : Avant que le monsieur s’en va, il fait son carton, tu vas lui dire ‘je vais voir ce que tu as 
dedans’. C’est là où on sera obligé de […].  
I4 : On doit vraiment arriver là.  
I3 : C’est compliqué.  
I1 : C’est vraiment compliqué.  
I3 : La solution c’est de renforcer l’archivage du ministère. Et avec des outils électroniques, c’est-
à-dire nous avons désormais les DIP, direction d’Informatique et de Pré-archivage.  
I1 : Il faut que tous les ministères aient des directions d’archivage maintenant, tous les ministères 
ont un archivage maintenant. Et c’est là-bas que vous retrouvez les documents. […] 
I3 : La structure qu’ils ont quittée, il reste un-là. […] 
I4 : Je vais te prendre ça avant de partir maintenant. Donc, je voulais aborder […], c’est une idée 
qu’on est en train de murir, je ne sais pas encore exactement dans quel sens… Est-ce 
qu’on peut arriver a que la gestion des enseignants soit décentralisée ? Parce que si notre 
école est dans la situation ou elle est aujourd’hui, c’est du fait de la mauvaise, de mauvais 
engagement des enseignants. Les enseignants ne travaillent pas, sinon ils ne travaillent 
plus.  
I1 : ne travaillent plus. Voilà, combien d’inspecteur […] beaucoup. Mais il est partout, partout (!) 
je vous dis et il se faisait respecter, il s’imposait. Ah… 
I4 : Et je me dis lorsque on n’avait pas encore reversé les enseignants communautaires, ils étaient 
réguliers au poste. Parce que ils étaient payés sur le service fait. Les directeurs donnaient 
un document à la fin du mois qui rendait compte du nombre de jour effectif de travail.  
I1 : Pourquoi vous […]  
I2 : Avant le compte-rendu, le Ministère des Finances a déjà payé le salaire.  
I1 : Ce qu’il dit est faisable. Mais il y a des aspects, il faut revoir complètement la loi.  
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I3 : Ce que je dis.  
I1 : Il faut revoir la loi ! Parce que ce n’est pas une compétence de la commune.  
I1 : Moi, j’étais en train de dire, est-ce…, qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire puisqu’il faut qu’on aille là. 
I1 : C’est le maire qui recrute, qui paie, mais c’est l’Etat qui l’oriente à le faire. Et d’abord cette 
orientation politique et tout le monde dans ce sens-là. Vous savez, au Ruanda ce qui a fait 
marcher tout ça au Ruanda, si vous aviez un régime fort comme celui de Kérékou. Ça 
pouvait marcher davantage. Même au Togo tout près. Mais au feu tricolore, est-ce que tu 
peux ? Tu ne peux pas ! Au Burkina, tu ne peux pas !  
I4 : On avait raté le coche pendant la période révolutionnaire, […] cache. 
I1 : Même un délégué, un délégué te dis, il y a demain les travaux publics là, tu y vas C’est ça 
que le mandat a continué… 
Interviewer 2 : C’est-à-dire que la démocratie… 
I3 : Non, […], surtout au Benin, ça a été mal compris.  
I1 : Très mal compris. C’était tout simplement l’anarchie des ressources. 
I3 : En période révolutionnaire, ceux qui sont dans ce vont la, si on dit que ‘le samedi prochain, 
vous allez nettoyer votre vont… 
Interviewer2 : Nous sommes très enfants la, hein !? 
I4 : C’est vrai ! 
I3 : Tout le monde sortait… 
I4 : Je dis, à la veille, si la rentrée scolaire est le quatre octobre, mais c’étaient les parents qui 
nettoyaient l’école. 
I1 : Mais, c’est ça ! 
I4 : …et les enfants. Tout le monde ! Mais aujourd’hui, on démarre l’école, le quatre-là, vous 
allez voir… 
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I3 : Combien de fois, on monte des établissements ou il y a des élèves que l’Etat n’a qu’à venir 
nettoyer. 
I1 : … que l’Etat n’a qu’à venir nettoyer !  
I3 : Mais, ce n’est pas possible. […] Est-ce que vous avez des enfants jusqu’en CM2, 
vous ne pouvez pas leur donner la roue pour nettoyer ?  
I4 : Vous voyez, moi je crois que …. 
I3 : La démocratie nous a pas beaucoup aide au Benin. On a mis de l’anarchie. On a cru, bon, 
démocratie, ça veut dire je patinage ce que je veux… Et on a transféré, c’est ça aussi le 
problème de notre décentralisation, on a essayé de, on a transféré les tas la du niveau 
central au niveau local. Et, et, la population élis le maire et se battent attendre pour voir 
ce que le maire va faire autour des 50. 
I1 : C’est ça… 
I3 : Elle ne sait pas que, non, le développement-là, c’est nous. Il faut que j’accompagne le maire. 
Il faut que le maire aussi me rende compte de si je lui donne 10 francs aujourd’hui, ce 
qu’il a fait avec les 10 francs pour que demain je puisse lui donner 15 francs. Donc, on 
est là, on attend encore de l’Etat. Le maire même ne sait pas que le développement, c’est 
lui-même. C’est-à-dire tu rentres dans certaines communes, le maire avec garde de corps, 
alors que tu as appelé… 
I1 : Mais quel maire, quel maire… ? […] 
I ? : Normalement, tu es avec la population. 
I4 : Si tu as une garde de corps, comment les gens vont se rapprocher de toi ?  
I3 : ‘Monsieur, le Maire, le maçon qui vous avez mis la, la, il semble qu’il vient les soirs prendre 
les sacs de ciment.’ Voilà, que ton garde de corps est là. Qu’est-ce que je vais faire ?  
Interviewer2 : Et personnellement, j’ai constaté que… 
I2 : C’est un réel problème. Je ne parlais pas de, de, je ne sais pas, de patriotisme, voilà encore 
[…]. Vous voyez des maires qu’ils ne veulent pas, c’est-à-dire ils ne veulent rien ici. Moi, 
j’ai suivi la conférence budgétaire communale de, je ne sais pas, ce qu’on a eu à faire, hm 
en Septembre passe ou les communes… Pour la plupart des maires quand ils viennent, 
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les constructions sur fonds FADeC. Mais je dis quelle est la capacité d’autofinancement 
de votre commune ? Quelle est l’initiative de votre commune ? Allez, on attend tout du 
haut. 
I3 : C’est ça. 
I2 : Vous imaginez, on a fait 15 communes au Nord, tout se réalisait sur fonds FADeC. On ne 
veut pas initier. Quand vous les voyez, c’est comment construire le centre, comment 
appelle-t-on, la commune la… ?  
I3 : Ah oui, l’Hôtel de ville.  
I2 : La construction de l’Hôtel de ville et trainer l’eau, des caniveaux. Et quand ils finissent, quelle 
est votre capacité d’autofinancement ? Qu’est-ce que vous-même vous voulez faire 
dedans ? C’est parfois, peut-être 2 ou 3%. On veut tout faire sur FADeC ! Alors on est en 
train de vouloir faire le développement à la base.  
I1 : Depuis qu’on a créé le FADeC, les efforts ne sont plus… 
I3 : Oui, oui, la mobilisation… 
I1 : …la mobilisation des ressources propres, ça a pris un coup.  
I4 : Parce que tu vois, il y a le renversement… 
I1 : ça tombe, ça tombe, ça tombe. 
I3 : Et on se base sur son électorat pour dire, bon, si je vais les recruter maintenant, est-ce qu’ils 
vont me renouveler encore dans cinq ans ? 
I3 : Et effectivement, les gens viennent et deux mois après on les retourne dans leur… à Cotonou.  
I4 : Yayi est venu en 2006 et, et, et, donc au profit des élections des enseignants ont été envoyé 
sur le terrain pour la distribution de la carte d’électeur pendant 17 jours. Et la plupart 
d’entre eux, c’est des enseignants communautaires, donc des enseignants qu’on a recrutés 
parce qu’il y a un vide et qui sont paye sur la base de leur travail fait, présence au poste. 
Donc, j’étais chef de circonscription scolaires, a peine je garais au bureau le matin vers 
7h30, un directeur m’appelle pour me dire ‘je suis à l’école et on est en train de finir le 
drapeau, mais sur les 3 enseignants communautaires que j’ai, ils sont 4, lui et ses 3 
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enseignants communautaires, mais il y a 2 qui sont absents. Et le troisième me dit ‘qu’ils 
sont allés pour distribuer la carte d’électorat pendant 17 jours.’ Quelques temps après, je 
reçois un deuxième appel. Et j’en ai reçu tellement que j’ai dit, je suis monte sur mon 
ordinateur, j’ai pris une note de service pour leur demander de retourner dans la classe.’ 
J’ai écrit au maire pour demander au maire ‘voici le constat fait, mais que cette cible la 
n’est pas bien indiquer pour faire le travail.’ Et le maire a demandé par qui on peut les 
remplacer. J’ai pris une autre note de service pour informer l’association, la coordination 
de l’association des parents d’élèves. Et une note de service pour informer ma hiérarchie. 
Trois jours après, sur les 57 absents, c’est trois qui sont retourne en classe.  
I1 : Trois ?! 
I4 : 3 après 3 jours. […] 54 sont restes sur le terrain. Moi, e n’ai plus rien dit. J’ai attendu la fin 
du mois et j’ai demandé aux directeurs de me faire le point. A la fin du mois, j’ai demandé 
qu’on m’envoie les certificats de service faits. Certains ont signé des documents comme 
quoi, qu’ils sont venu tout le temps. Je vais faire savoir le point qu’on m’a fait auparavant, 
c’est-à-dire mettez, faites-moi le bon point, j’ai fait les détails de payement en 
conséquence. Et les gens…, pour 14 jours de travail. J’ai reçu une convention d’enquête 
après. On me demande pourquoi j’ai fait ça ? Et j’ai sorti l’arrêté qui gère les enseignants 
communautaires, ils sont payés sur le nombre de jours de service faits. Et on me demande, 
‘mais pourquoi dans les circonscriptions scolaires voisines, ça n’a pas été fait ?’. J’ai dit, 
allez leur poser la question. C’est un arrêté que j’ai applique. […] C’est un arrêté que j’ai 
applique. […] Dites-moi que l’arrêté… 
I1 : C’est quoi ces problèmes la… ? 
I4 : Vous voyez ? C’étaient, les enseignants ne manquaient plus l’école.  
I1 : C’est ça.  
I4 : Quand j’ai fait ça… puisque là […] d’enquête, ‘moi je n’ai jamais vu l’argent et puis on m’a 
dit que j’ai détourné l’argent sur 17 jours.’ J’ai dit que ‘c’est le trésor public qui paye.’ 
Moi, je rende compte de ce qu’ils ont fait et sur la base le trésor publique paye.  
I3 : Donc, moi, je ne vois même pas l’argent. 
I4 : … je ne vois même pas l’argent. Et les gens sont partis. Mais les moments qui ont suivis, mais 
j’avais, les gens sont devenus très sérieux, très studieux, très ponctuel à l’école. 
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I3 : Ah oui.  
I4 : Donc, je dis si jamais ne on en arrivait la…ce que c’est la population qui commence à 
dénoncer les absences ou bien le manque de travail’, je crois que notre école va […].  
Interviewer 1 : Oui, j’ai déjà le regard sur la montre. Moi, je suis sincèrement, je suis très très 
ravie de l’échange ce matin parce que ce que je sens, bon, ça a servi, c’est sûr, pour pour 
que je puisse faire une bonne rédaction de la thèse, donc je vous en remercie pour ça. 
Mais je sens qu’il y a aussi un échange entre deux ministères et peut-être que les échanges 
vont continuer sans ce projet doctoral. Donc, mon souhait c’est de faire une contribution, 
une contribution modeste, hm, a ce qu’il y a une politique de décentralisation qui est 
adaptée au monde enseignement maternel et primaire. C’est pas du tout pour dire qu’elle 
n’est pas adaptée, c’est un très très bon document, mais pour voir peut-être à travers des 
perspectives différentes que j’ai pu recueillir d’avoir encore une compréhension plus 
approfondie comment on peut l’adapter à ce secteur. Donc, je serais ravie de de de rester 
en contact avec vous. Il me reste un an et demi à faire et j’ai encore, je sais, on a dépassé 
le temps, j’ai encore deux petites questions qui sont sur un niveau méta, donc plus 
spécifiquement à la décentralisation, mais plus, hm, lie à la thèse. Donc la première 
question c’est quels sont les aspects importants pour vous que je devais prendre en compte 
dans la rédaction de la thèse et la deuxième question quel est le format, comment peut-on 
vulgariser la thèse après la soumission qu’il y a vraiment une utilité pour le gouvernement 
pour vos deux ministères ainsi que les populations à la base. Donc, c’est deux, deux, deux 
questions : la première est quels sont les aspects importants que moi je devrais prendre 
en compte et l’autre question c’est comment vulgariser une fois que le projet est terminé. 
Donc, vous pourriez si vous avez des idées spontanées, vous pourriez les lancer 
maintenant comme on peut aussi rester en contact, comme on peut aussi rester en contact 
par mail et on peut murir les réflexions après.  
I4 : Moi, ce que…, on va garder le.., on va continuer les échanges par mail, mais moi je crois que, 
vous voyez, il y a, avait une habitude que vous connaissez et qui a disparu dans nos 
communautés et qui pouvait aider a, hm, hm, […] à travers la décentralisation/ 
déconcentration au niveau de notre sous-secteur, doit pourvoir, hm, faire développer 
suffisamment l’école. Sinon, ce n’est pas la peine, quoi. Et, mais sais qu’il y a de bonnes 
habitudes du passé qui ont disparu et que nos communautés pouvaient suivre à base de 
ce que le souci, de soucis de développement de leur école pouvait aussi, hm, hm, les 
communautés donc pouvait, hm, hm, choisir de resituer c’est l’ouverture à l’étranger. 
Auparavant, lorsque les enseignants viennent dans nos villages, il y a une certaine, un 
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accueil qui leur est réservé. Et, accueil simple d’abord, et, logement, et intéressement aux 
problèmes de l’individu du nouveau de l’étranger pour que l’étranger se sente à la maison 
et mieux faire son travail. En réalité, donc, ce n’est pas des choses, hm, qui relèvent de 
l’Etat, mais qui relèvent de la communauté. Et la communauté qui veut, qui souhaite que 
les efforts de l’Etat soient, hm, profite, profite, devrait pouvoir, comment dit-on, devrait 
offrir aux étrangers un certain nombre de de, hm, un accueil pour que ceci s’acquittent 
dignement ou bien honnêtement de leur travail. Et, je me dis que la politique de la 
décentralisation que je ne connais pas suffisamment, d’a certainement mis la communauté 
au cœur du développement a la base. Et je ne pense pas que ce développement puisse se 
réaliser s’il n’y a pas cet accueil-là. Donc, par rapport à l’école je dis qu’il y a des efforts 
à faire la et il faut trouver les bons moyens pour amener nos dirigeants à comprendre la 
chose ou bien les élus locaux à comprendre cette intention pour que ça profite à la 
communauté, à leur communauté. Je dis les choses comme ça pour que [..] pour voir 
quelle forme à donner. Puisqu’il y a l’un des problèmes que notre école qu’on affecte des 
enseignants dans les localités et ils n’y restent pas. C’est un problème et il faut régler ça. 
Ça, c’est un problème, c’est tout. Parce que les premiers cadres des villages ont pour 
modèles les enseignants. Mais lorsque l’enseignant vient, il ne reste pas. Lorsque que… 
I3 : …il devient un soûler.  
I4 : Oui, ou bien devient […] la, il y a beaucoup de choses. Mais je dis rester premièrement, c’est 
loger dans la localité et participer à la localité. Puisque quand vous êtes là, et qu’il y a 
une situation donnée, étant le cadre le plus, le plus avance, les populations viendront vous 
voir. Moi, je me rappelle, hm, mon premier poste, c’est à 18km de Glazoue, mon premier 
poste, c’est à 18km de Glaziou. Et il n’y avait personne pour lire les lettres. C’est moi qui 
lisais les lettres aux parents […], alors que je ne suis pas de leur famille. Ce n’est pas 
aujourd’hui ou le comptable est dans tous les coins, mais ce besoin la quand quelqu’un 
va à l’hôpital et qu’il revient avec une ordonnance ou bien un produit qu’il a acheté, c’est 
les enseignants du coin qui sans cesse vérifient que si la prescription telle que l’infirmer 
ou le médecin a prescrit est respecté. Et c’est ce qu’il fait le respect des enseignants dans 
les localités. Et ça, c’étaient lorsque nous privions ces opportunités, c’étaient 
épanouissant pour nous-mêmes. Mais cette affaire a disparu. Les gens quittent Cotonou 
pour aller enseigner à Se. Ils veulent donner quel… ? Il est fatigué déjà !  
Interviewer 2 : …physiquement… 
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I4 : Il est fatigué déjà. Tu quittes la maison, d’abord, avec sa bonne volonté il ira avec retard. Mais 
pourquoi elle fait ça ? Mais parce que, je sais, dans des localités données, les gens, hm, 
les gens, hm, l’accueil n’est pas bon ou bien c’est l’enseignant même qui veut faire des 
courses de besoin à Cotonou tous les soirs. 
I3 : Voilà, encore un frein pour le développement. 
I2 : C’est terrible ! 
I4 : Bon, je dis les choses comme ça et on en voit en peu comment faire. 
Interviewer1 : Pour moi, ça fait encore partie de la vision-là, bon, on peut-on aller à l’école dans 
un contexte décentralisé. Est-ce qu’il y a d’autres éléments a… 
I3 : Par rapport à votre question, la première, bon, je ne sais pas si je peux répondre parce que… 
je ne connais pas le thème précis, donc vous dire ce que vous allez noter dans votre thèse, 
ça serait difficile pour moi. Donc, vous prenez tout ce qui entre dans le cadre de votre 
recherche et vous jugez, bon. Maintenant par rapport à la publication, hm, une fois que 
vous avez soutenu, vous pouvez nous envoyez ça au Ministère de la Décentralisation et 
au Ministère de l’Enseignement Secondaire ainsi que sur les sitewebs. Ce serait, bon, 
également vous pourriez envoyez ça a l’université parce que il y a des chercheurs qui s’y 
intéressent. Et dans nos, comme on a dit tout à l’heure, dans nos ministères, on espère 
que les services des archives vont prendre et que le document pourra rester pour que 
d’autres pourront s’en espérer. Bon, c’est les deux aspects qui je voudrais aborder par 
rapport à vos questions.  
I2 : Ok, tout ce qui me concerne, je pense que ça serait intéressant si vous pouvez programmer 
encore une autre séance, une autre séance du genre quand vous finirez de rédiger votre 
thèse. Juste pour nous présenter une synthèse. Ça nous permettra certainement de voir le 
contenu, voir si nous avons des abords. Parce que en état, nous ne maîtrisons vraiment 
pas le statut du document pour voir qu’est-ce qui manque […]. Donc, quand vous êtes 
prêts à soutenir et tenons compte de nos disponibilités, […] programmer une séance de 
quelques minutes. Vous allez peut-être nous présenter une synthèse. Ça nous permettra 
de voir s’il y a des éléments qui manquent spécifiquement concernant le contenu. Pour le 
second aspect comme l’a dit M. xxx, en plus de ça, vous pouvez mettre ça sur mémoire 
online. Ça permettra à tout le monde de consulter, d’avoir le contenu du document. Et 
comme vous avez promis aux autorités des ministères sectoriels que vous puissiez 
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envoyer de façon officielle le document au niveau du sous-secteur. Ça permettra 
certainement aux cadres de s’en espérer de dire ou voir si… 
I1 : Non, je partage entièrement cette démarche, cette approche [..]. Maintenant les aspects 
spécifiques qu’il faut encore revoir. Comme on l’a dit, approfondissez ce que nous avons 
déjà vu l’ensemble. On verra s’il y a encore des insuffisances. Sinon, c’est bon. 
Interviewer 1: Sylvain, il y a quelques choses que tu peut-être souhaite ajouter.  
Interviewer 2 : Oui, c’est bon ou peut-être, puisqu’il peut apprendre une présentation après la 
soutenance de la thèse, une présentation, un livre au niveau des ministères ou au niveau 
de l’université, est-ce qu’il peut avoir une présentation directe ? Le, l’intention peut-être 
de faire approprier le document directement parce que quand c’est libéré sous forme de 
document, c’est seul ceux qui ont le temps, c’est seul ceux qui ont le gout de la lecture 
qui souvent le… 
I1 : …le lisent.  
Interviewer 2 : Est-ce qu’on peut avoir une telle pensée, quelques choses du genre ? Là, ça touche 
directement, un peu directement, un peu seulement.  
I1 : Bon, vous pouvez également l’envoyer au niveau du Conseil National de l’Education en ce 
qui concerne l’éducation. Parce que le chef de l’Etat dit que c’est désormais la 
commission ou quoi la qui sera charge de s’occuper des orientations. Prochainement, si 
vous pouvez déposer une copie là-bas, ça serait bon. C’est les acteurs même ça. 
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9.7 Analysis of how International Organisations approach decentralisation 
 What are the 
reasons that 
this IO 
promotes 
decentralisatio
n? 
How does the IO 
understand the 
concept of 
decentralisation
?  
 
How does its 
understanding 
refer to the 
definitions in 
the literature 
review? 
What is the 
approach/ type 
of support of 
the IO to 
decentralisatio
n? 
 
Does the IO 
represent a 
liberal or a 
social 
conceptualizati
on? 
 
Conception of 
the role of the 
state  
Structures 
and 
mechanisms  
Conditions/ 
obstacles for 
successful 
implementatio
n 
Reference to 
international 
agendas or else 
GIZ (Lampe, 2017) 
 - Vision of a 
modern 
state  
- Claim for 
more 
participa-
tion in 
decision-
making and 
planning 
processes  
- The title 
‘Decentralisa
tion, Local 
Self-
Government 
and 
Federalism’ 
and the 
section on 
the benefits 
(Lampe, 
2017, p. 2) 
allude to 
Germany’s 
decentralised 
political and 
administrativ
e system. 
- Devolution 
at 
provincial 
(Bundeslan
d) and 
municipal 
(Landkreis
) level 
- Political, 
administrati
ve and 
fiscal 
decentralisa
tion 
- Participator
y  
(inclusion 
of reform 
actors)  
- Systemic 
(all levels 
of the 
system are 
strengthene
d)  
- Principle of 
subsidiarity  
- Principle of 
performanc
e of public 
action 
towards 
citizens 
satisfaction  
-  liberal  
- State is 
one actor 
of the 
‘cooperatio
n partners’ 
- GIZ 
advises the 
state and 
local 
governmen
ts equally  
- You = the 
State? 
- State 
(governme
nts, 
administra
tions and 
parliament
s) 
- administra
tive units 
at 
subnationa
l level / 
municipal 
and 
regional 
governme
nts 
- Citizens 
- N/A - Reference 
to the 
agenda 
2030 and 
particularly  
Localising 
the SDGs 
- Refer to 
their own 
experience 
of 
decentralisa
tion 
DEZA (DEZA, 2018) 
 - The goal 
are more 
efficient 
services, 
which are 
adapted to 
the needs 
- ‘Decentraliz
ation, with a 
shift of 
power, 
competences 
and 
resources 
from the 
- Devolution 
and/ or 
privatisatio
n to 
‘medium-
sized 
business 
centers’ 
- Political, 
administrati
ve and 
fiscal 
decentralisa
tion 
- SDC links 
decentralisa
- Principle of 
subsidiarity  
- Decentralis
ation aims 
to enhance 
effectivene
ss and 
efficiency 
- They 
acknowled
ge the state 
with the 
claim for 
more 
effectivene
ss and 
- SCD tends 
focus on 
civil 
society 
and 
medium-
sized 
business 
- Risk that 
local elites 
centralise 
power  
- Decentralis
ation may 
enhance the 
inequalities 
- Poverty 
reduction 
strategy  
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of the 
population. 
- Decentralis
ation is the 
core to 
democracy. 
central 
government 
to the 
medium-
sized 
business 
centers, 
forms the 
core of the 
democratizat
ion process.’ 
- SCD refers 
to the WB 
definition of 
decentralisati
on164 
- They 
critique 
decentralis
ation 
understood 
as de-
concentrati
on (60s-
70s) and 
promote 
decentralis
ation 
understood 
as 
devolution 
since the 
90s (Olsen, 
2007, p. 3) 
tion to local 
governance
165 
of local 
service 
delivery  
 neo-liberal 
 
efficiency 
through 
far-
reaching 
reforms, 
such as the 
civil 
service 
sector  
centers 
rather than 
on the 
state 
in terms of 
rich/ poor, 
gender etc. 
- …possibly 
undermine 
the national 
unity 
- …facilitate 
misuse or 
corruption 
of local 
government 
as 
AFD (Dafflon and Madiès, 2008, 2011)d 
 in post-
communist 
countries, 
decentralisation 
in the public 
sector 
accompanies 
the march 
towards the 
market 
economy and 
democracy 
  - Co-
financing 
with local 
authorities, 
NGOs, 
foundations
, among 
others; 
public and 
private 
enterprises, 
local 
 - State has 
the role to 
redistribute 
resources  
- State  
- Municipali
ties 
(Collectivi
tés 
territoriale
s) 
 - Refer to 
their own 
experience 
of 
decentralisa
tion  
                                                          
164 ‘Decentralisation is the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to intermediate and local governments or quasi‐
independent government organizations and/or the private sector. This is a complex, multifaceted concept. Different types of decentralisation should be distinguished because 
they have different characteristics, policy implications, and conditions for success’ (Olsen, 2007, p. 4). 
165 ‘Decentralisation pertains to public sector institutional and organisational reforms and processes and the support thereof, whereas local governance pertains more to 
supporting the creation of an enabling environment where multi‐stakeholder processes ‐ including public and private sector, as well as civil society – interact to foster 
effective local‐development processes’ (Olsen, 2007, p. 8). 
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(Dafflon and 
Madiès, 2008, 
p. 8) 
communitie
s, banks, 
investment 
funds and 
NGOs 
- French 
local and 
regional 
authorities 
provide 
developme
nt 
cooperation  
- AFD 
supports 
local 
government
s through 
direct 
interventio
ns, e.g. 
support for 
local 
budgets or 
project 
financing 
- … the 
central 
government 
through 
indirect 
interventio
ns, which 
then consist 
in helping 
central 
government
s to transfer 
326 
 
 
funds to the 
local 
government
s (Dafflon 
and 
Madiès, 
2011, p. 
10) 
World Bank (World Bank, 2012) 
 - Claims for 
economic 
efficiency, 
public 
accountabil
ity, and 
empowerm
ent 
- rationale 
for 
decentraliz
ation in 
terms of 
democratis
ation and 
pre-
dominantly 
economic 
efficiency, 
public 
accountabil
ity, and 
empowerm
ent 
- Decentralizat
ion transfers 
authority and 
responsibilit
y for public 
functions 
from the 
central 
government 
to 
intermediate 
and local 
governments 
or quasi-
independent 
government 
organization
s and/or the 
private 
sector - 
including 
local 
governments
, civil 
society, and 
the private 
sector. 
- Devolution 
and/ or 
privatisatio
n 
- Political, 
administrati
ve, fiscal 
and market 
decentralisa
tion 
- WB links 
decentralisa
tion to 
community
-driven 
developme
nt (CDD) 
- economic 
efficiency, 
public 
accountabil
ity, and 
empowerm
ent 
- greater 
voice and 
choice 
 neo-liberal 
approach 
- Communiti
es to exert 
influence 
over local 
governanc
e and 
services 
- People at 
the local 
level  
- Local 
governme
nts and 
communit
y-based 
organisatio
ns  
- districts, 
villages, 
communiti
es, and 
individual 
constituent
s 
- private 
enterprises 
and local 
non-
governme
ntal groups 
- Elite 
capture 
 
- Corruption 
 
- Patronage 
politics 
 
- Local civil 
servants 
feel 
compromis
ed 
 
- Impedes 
further 
decentraliz
ation 
 
- Incomplete 
information 
 
- Constituent
-  
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s not able 
to hold 
representati
ves 
accountable 
 
- Opaque 
decision 
accountabil
ity upwards 
and 
downwards 
Delegation European Commission (EC, 2014) 
 - Aim: 
institutiona
l 
modernisati
on of the 
country & 
strengtheni
ng the rule 
of law and 
participator
y 
democracy 
- In the 
context of 
Benin, they 
aim more 
precisely 
for 
separation 
of powers, 
the fight 
against 
- Decentralisat
ion 
understood 
as ‘Bringing 
the state 
closer to the 
citizens 
through 
sustainable 
and balanced 
territorial 
development 
based on 
concerted 
local 
governance’ 
- It will 
contribute to 
the 
development 
and the well-
being of the 
Coheres with 
PONADEC 
(decentralisatio
n = devolution 
and de-
concentration= 
de-
concentration) 
- Budget 
support  
- Decentralis
ation is part 
of the 
overall 
programme 
‘Support of 
good 
governance 
for 
developme
nt’ 
- Firstly, 
governance 
of the 
manageme
nt of state 
resources 
and 
accountabil
- Focus on 
state and 
internationa
l 
institutions  
 liberal 
approach 
- Strong role 
(strengthen
ing rule of 
law), 
decentralis
ation is 
only a sub 
project of 
the overall 
good 
governanc
e 
programm
e 
- The state 
has 
launched 
the reform 
with the 
Territorial 
Administra
tion 
- State  
- Municipali
ties 
(Collectivi
tés 
territoriale
s) 
N/A - Poverty 
Reduction 
Strategy  
- OSD 
(Orientatio
ns 
Stratégique
s de 
Développe
ment) 
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corruption, 
the 
independen
ce and 
efficiency 
of justice, 
among 
others. 
population.  
 
ity 
- Secondly, 
rule of law 
and the 
fight 
against 
corruption 
- Thirdly, 
decentralisa
tion and de-
concentrati
on  
-  tends to 
emphasize 
strengtheni
ng de-
concentrati
on, 
increasing 
financial 
transfer to 
municipalit
y and 
strengtheni
ng human 
resources at 
the local 
level 
Reform in 
2003, the 
financial 
transfer 
mechanism 
FADeC in 
2008 and 
the 
adoption of 
PONADE
C in 2009 
(EC, 2014) 
 
 
